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3ABSTRACT
In the interest of understanding the nature and degree of competition within 
off-patent molecule markets and improving purchasing efficiency, this thesis uses 
IMS Health data to analyse dimensions of competition within the off-patent 
omeprazole and paroxetine molecule markets in the USA, UK, France and Germany 
during the 2000q-2005ql period.
The main theoretical findings include:
• Regulation in homogeneous markets may inhibit generic price 
competition. Generic manufacturers may also product differentiate, 
resulting in a Bertrand-like model of “softened” price competition.
• Other forms of product differentiation in off-patent molecule markets may 
include strength segments and the OTC market.
The main empirical findings include:
• Generic price competition appears stronger in the USA and the UK than 
in Germany and France, although it is imperfect in all four countries. The 
USA and the UK achieve some of the lowest generic prices, while the UK 
is the most effective at actually purchasing its lowest prices.
• Generic penetration appears weak in less common strength segments, 
allowing original brand manufacturers’ the opportunity to retain relatively 
large market shares. This results in higher purchased prices and, hence, 
significant purchasing inefficiencies.
• There appears to be competition between over-the-counter and 
prescription omeprazole in the USA, but not in the UK. OTC prices are 
relatively low in the US, offering the opportunity for cost savings. In the 
UK, patients may face a financial disincentive to purchase OTC 
omeprazole, possibly masking the opportunity for improved self-care.
Certain countries may want to re-evaluate their generic reimbursement 
schemes in the interest of more price competitive markets and increased purchasing 
efficiency. Countries could also benefit from encouraging generic entry in less 
common strength markets. Finally, in approving an OTC switch, regulators should 
ensure that demand-side financial incentives are consistent with the goals of 
achieving cost containment and/or facilitating increased patient self-care.
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5PREFACE
In 2008, the Department of Social Policy approved new regulations which 
permit students who are doing their PhD in economics-related areas to submit a 
series of publishable papers as a thesis. The regulations stipulate that the publishable 
papers should be thematically linked, and be tied together with an introduction 
chapter, a conclusion chapter and any other appropriate chapters. This thesis follows 
this new format.
It begins with an introductory chapter that introduces the motivation behind 
these studies as well as the main research questions and contributions to the 
literature. The second chapter includes a broad overview of the literature on the 
main theme of this thesis—competition in the pharmaceutical market (in developed 
countries)—and discusses these studies’ contributions to the literature. The next 
chapter is the methodology chapter, which provides background information on the 
sample used in this thesis, including the dataset, the molecules and the countries. It 
also explains the type of research approach I have chosen and outlines the theory and 
methods used in each chapter. Because this thesis follows the publishable papers 
format, the next three main analytical chapters are also inclusive of the relevant 
literature and the specific methods used. Finally, the concluding policy chapter ties 
together the findings of the four analytical chapters and acknowledges the areas of 
weakness in this research as well as areas of potential further research. These three 
main analytical chapters have therefore been created so that they could stand alone as 
publishable papers -  but in addition my intention is that when integrated together 
into this thesis they will tell a broader story of pharmaceutical competition in a way 
that is both interesting and useful to health policymakers.
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
1.1 Background
Pharmaceutical innovations in the 20th and 21st centuries have undoubtedly 
made a substantial contribution to the health of individuals around the world. From 
vaccinations that prevent against diseases such as polio and diphtheria, to the 
discovery of antibiotics which can cure many bacterial infections, through to 
modern-day advances such as medicines to treat low birth-weight infants and 
medicines for chronic illnesses such as depression and cardiovascular disease, 
pharmaceuticals offer health benefits that may increase quality of life and can 
sometimes significantly extend a patient’s length of life (Cutler, 2004). 
Pharmaceutical treatments are therefore a vital part of the health care system.
However, many pharmaceutical treatments are notorious for being costly. 
They consume billions of dollars of health care expenditures in OECD countries 
every year. For example, pharmaceutical sales in the UK exceeded £12 billion in 
2004 (Bharat Book Bureau, 2005). In addition, pharmaceutical expenditures have 
been growing rapidly. Specifically, table 1-1 shows that pharmaceutical expenditure 
per capita increased significantly across all select countries during the 1995 to 2005 
period, and for example more than doubled in Canada, Spain and the USA. This 
growth outpaced overall health care cost increases such that pharmaceutical 
expenditure increased its share of total health spending in most OECD countries.
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Table 1-1 Comparison of Health and Pharmaceutical Expenditures across Select 
OECD Countries, 1995-2005
Total expenditure on 
health % of gross 
domestic product
Total expenditure on 
pharma and other 
nondurables per 
capita, USA exchange 
rate
Total expenditure on 
pharma and other 
nondurables as a % of 
total expenditure on 
health
Canada 9.2 8.9 M 252 330 537 13.8 15.9 18.2
France 9.4 9.2 10.5 451 418 676 17.6 20.3 18.9
Germany 10.1 10.3 10.6 401 322 494 12.8 13.6 14.1
Italy 7.1 8.1 8.7 299 339 546 21.1 21.9 20.3
Spain 7.4 7.2 L i 217 220 447 19.2 21.3 22.8
United Kingdom 7.0 7.3 8.4 209 15.3
United States 13.3 13.3 J53 325 535 752 8.9 11.7 12.3
Note: Underlined data was not yet available for 2005, so reflects 2004. 
Source: The Author, using OECD Health data, 2006
At the same time that pharmaceutical spending has been consuming an 
increasing share of total health spending, governments around the world struggle 
with the acute challenge of allocating society’s scarce resources on health care 
services. One illustration of this challenge is the case of the UK’s National Health 
Service (NHS). From April 1999 to March 2008, spending on the NHS in England 
grew by an average of 6.4% a year in real terms (Emmerson, 2008), and although it 
improved services and reduced waiting times for elective procedures, it resulted in a 
deficit o f over £600 million in 2006 (BBC, 2006). This led to claims of hospital 
mismanagement, among others. Consequently, to the dismay of hospital employees, 
more than 6,000 hospital jobs were cut in 2006, waiting times for operations 
increased in many hospitals, and some mental health service wards were closed 
(BBC, 2006).
This NHS example demonstrates that scarcity o f health care resources can 
have real consequences. Therefore, it is vital that health policymakers purchase 
health services efficiently so that society can reap the maximum benefits from the 
available health resources. In the process of striving for overall health system 
purchasing efficiency, it is also critical to consider the extent to which health 
policymakers succeed in efficiently purchasing prescription pharmaceuticals,
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particularly as pharmaceutical spending has increased substantially both in absolute 
terms and as a proportion of health spending in many OECD countries.
To the extent that research is able to guide policymakers on how to improve 
pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency, resources can be allocated accordingly. In the 
case of the NHS, an improvement in pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency may have 
been able to offset the £600 million deficit, thereby preventing job losses and service 
cuts. The scarcity of resources in times of recession also calls for rationality and 
difficult decisions in the resource allocation process and the use of available funds. A 
recent report projects an NHS real-terms budget reduction of £8-10bn during the 
2011-2014 period, which would likely result in significant staff cuts and could 
impact the pharmaceutical budget (BBC, 2009).
The challenge of spending scarce health resources—in particular, 
pharmaceutical resources in the case of this dissertation— is not a UK phenomenon 
and is paralleled in most other OECD countries. Another example is the USA, where 
pharmaceutical spending has increased substantially in recent years as a result of the 
implementation of the Medicare prescription drug benefit (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2008). Around the time that the Medicare prescription drug benefit was 
approved, a study acknowledged that the stability of the Medicare prescription drug 
benefit—and hence access to drugs for millions of seniors—largely relies on payors’ 
abilities to contain drug spending (Hass, 2005), which further underscores the 
importance of purchasing pharmaceuticals as efficiently as possible. This is not just a 
challenge in times of economic distress, but is likely to be at the forefront of health 
policy for generations to come.
In order for governments to strive for pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency, it 
is first necessary to understand the nature of pharmaceutical spending. There are 
three dimensions to pharmaceutical spending: the first is utilization, which mainly 
relates to the volume of drugs consumed; the second is drug prices; and the third is 
the drug mix, i.e. the share of different drugs that are consumed. If health 
policymakers are interested in improving pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency, they 
may need to target spending from all three angles—by improving utilization 
management, by optimizing prices and by altering the mix of drugs consumed.
Improving utilization management may involve trying to reduce the 
unnecessary consumption of drugs. However, this is a particularly challenging task 
in that some of the measures that attempt this feat, such as prescription cost-sharing,
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may also reduce the necessary consumption of drugs, as seen in the RAND Health 
Experiment (Brook, Ware, et al, 1984). Optimizing prices may involve reducing the 
price of patented drugs and/or off-patented drugs. In the case of reducing prices of 
patented drugs, policymakers also need to be very cautious about the implications of 
price reductions for innovation itself.1
Finally, policymakers may also strive to improve pharmaceutical purchasing 
efficiency by altering the mix of drugs. This may include shifting consumption 
between molecules or shifting consumption amongst drugs made from the same 
molecule. Shifting consumption between molecules to improve purchasing 
efficiency is challenging as policymakers may need to compare the cost- 
effectiveness of different molecules as well as overall cost-benefit implications. 
Altering the mix of drugs made from the same molecule may include shifting from 
original brand name to generic equivalents, from one generic equivalent to another or 
from prescription (original brand or generic) to OTC (original brand or generic).
In summary, policies that target the prices of off-patent drugs and attempt to 
alter the mix of drugs made from the same molecule (from higher priced drugs to 
lower priced drugs) have the distinct advantage of being relatively straightforward 
for policymakers because they have the potential to reduce pharmaceutical spending 
without altering the benefits to patients. More specifically, they do not attempt to 
reduce utilization (risking the reduction of necessary drugs), nor do they attempt to 
shift consumption to drugs that may offer inferior therapeutic benefits (assuming 
good manufacturing practice for generic equivalents). As a result, attempts to 
improve pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency through pricing and mix changes 
within the same molecule may be particularly attractive to policymakers. In addition 
to these methods being relatively easy to implement, they also have the potential to
1 It is important to note that many governments in OECD countries in this thesis seek to create and 
preserve incentives for the pharmaceutical industry to invest in research and development. This occurs 
largely through the patent system, but also through other direct and indirect incentives. They value 
the pharmaceutical industry for the contribution it makes to improving people’s health, as well as the 
contribution it makes as an employer in terms o f stimulating economic activity. There is much 
literature that focuses on the government’s need to preserve research and development. Many o f these 
articles warn o f the negative effect that regulation, particularly price controls, may have on 
pharmaceutical firms’ incentives to invest in research and development (Vogel 2004; Calfee 2001; 
Emilien 2004). For example, one study estimates that price controls could decrease R & D by 23.4 to 
32.7%, while another study conducts a cross-country comparison that shows the negative impact price 
regulation may have on launches o f  new drugs (Vernon 2005; Danzon 2005). Although preservation 
o f R&D is outside o f the scope o f this thesis, pharmaceutical policymakers must understand its 
importance when seeking to contain pharmaceutical costs.
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achieve significant cost savings in absolute terms. For example, a study on generic 
utilization in the USA estimates that for non-institutionalized adults, substituting 
generics for brand name drugs in 2000 could have saved 11% ($8.8 billion) of drug 
expenditures (Hass, 2005). Therefore, it is not surprising that policymakers in many 
countries have chosen to focus on increasing generic penetration rates, as is 
discussed in the following chapters.
Current policymaking primarily focuses on improving purchasing efficiency 
within molecule markets by increasing generic penetration. However, this thesis 
argues that molecule-level generic penetration is a crude measure that just skims that 
surface of purchasing efficiency within a molecule market and misses significant 
complexity at the micro-level. Therefore, this thesis focuses on several unstudied 
dimensions of molecule markets at a micro-level that may offer policymakers 
additional opportunities to improve purchasing efficiency. Given the challenges of 
scarce financial resources and increasing pharmaceutical costs, this thesis therefore 
aspires to push the thinking in an area of utmost importance to societal welfare.
1.2 Interventions in the Pharmaceutical Market
Pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency can be attained by altering the mix and 
targeting the prices of drugs at the molecule level, as outlined above. Payors can 
help to alter the mix of drugs by substituting original brand drugs with lower-priced 
generic equivalents, a policy that targets costs while, ceteris paribus, holding volume 
constant. In the process of influencing the mix and price of off-patent 
pharmaceuticals, payors may mandate substitution and impose direct generic price 
controls, or may seek to influence the price and mix of off-patent molecules by 
introducing off-patent pharmaceutical policies that encourage market competition. 
An example of a policy that may influence, but not directly control, generic prices is 
allowing pharmacists to negotiate discounts rather than stipulating distribution 
margins. In addition, an example of a policy that may influence, but not directly 
control, the mix of drugs at the molecule level is allowing pharmacists to substitute 
generics for original brand drugs and possibly even offering a higher dispensing fee 
for generics. In order to achieve improved purchasing efficiency, the implications of 
directly controlling prices and the mix of drugs within a molecule market need to be 
understood versus taking a more market-oriented approach by encouraging price 
competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets.
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It is important to understand the structure of the pharmaceutical market. 
Figure 1-1 shows that the majority of drugs flow from manufacturers to wholesalers, 
and then on to retail outlets (pharmacies) and hospitals, where they reach patients; in 
some cases, manufacturers bypass wholesalers by selling directly to hospitals (CBO, 
1998); this occurs generally in the hospital market for both branded originator and 
off-patent drugs and, very often, in the off-patent retail market. Some drugs are sold 
“over-the-counter” (OTC), and therefore do not require prescriptions from 
physicians. Depending on regulations, these drugs may only be available behind the 
counter of pharmacists at retail pharmacies, or may be available without the guidance 
of pharmacists at retail pharmacies, food stores and through mail order. Patented and 
off-patent drugs that require a prescription may only flow through the hospital, retail 
pharmacy or mail order channels. Some off-patent (whether original brand or 






















SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Micky Smith,
Pharmaceutical Marketing Strategy and Cases (New 
York: Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1991), Chapter 
3; Boston Consulting Group, The Changing Environ­
ment for U.S. Pharmaceuticals (Boston: Boston Con­
sulting Group, April 1993); and Pharmaceutical Re­
search and Manufacturers of America, 1997 Industry 
Profile (Washington, DC.: PhRMA, March 1997), p. 31.
NOTES: Figures in parentheses represent shares of the prescrip­
tion drug market in 1996, calculated as a percentage of 
total U.S. sales at manufacturer prices.
HMOs = health maintenance organizations.
a. Some chain-store pharmacies buy directly from the manufacturer.
b. Some mail-order pharmacies go through a wholesaler.
Within the context of the operation of the pharmaceutical market, various 
interventions are often implemented whether on the supply- or the demand-side, or 
both, aiming to contain costs and improve efficiency. Figure 1-2 illustrates these 
interventions. In this case, the supply side is assumed to be characterized as the 
manufacturers and the wholesalers. Physicians and pharmacists make up the “proxy 
demand side,” while third party payors and patients make up the most visible parts of 
the demand side itself.
2 The percentages in this figure reflect pharmaceutical distribution in the US in 1996.
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Figure 1-2 Supply- and Demand-Side Pharmaceutical Interventions
Proxy Demand Side
(pharmacists and physicians) 
















Targets brand name market 
Targets generic market 
Targets brand and generic market
Volume
Source: The Author.
For each of these regulations, there is a multitude of evaluative literature. For 
example, within the UK context and in the case of assessing the impact of financial 
incentives on GPs, one study found that compared to non-budget holders (non­
fundholders), the rate of generic prescribing increased for budget holders 
(fundholders), while the rate of growth in pharmaceutical costs slowed (Wilson, 
Buchan and Walley, 1995). In other studies of prescribing patterns, findings show 
that physicians in the USA respond to their patients’ insurance coverage and co­
payment arrangements, and that prescribing budgets in Germany led to increased 
generic prescribing and hence lower prescribing costs (Hellerstein, 1998; Busse and 
Howorth, 1999).
These evaluative studies are relevant domestically, but in many cases are not 
generalizable across countries because policies are implemented differently across 
countries, but also because such studies do not take into account differences in other 
factors, such as individual pharmaceutical market characteristics. In order to 
influence pharmaceutical costs, one must understand the various economic factors 
that drive firms’ competitive and strategic decisions.
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1.3 The Focus of this Thesis
This thesis focuses on the supply-side of pharmaceutical cost containment by 
identifying the market characteristics that are likely to have the largest impact on 
pharmaceutical competition particularly in off-patent markets, and directly 
incorporates them into a quantitative model of competition. It also incorporates 
relevant payors’ supply-side regulations into the analysis of pharmaceutical 
competition. While it is outside the scope of this research to quantify the effects of 
pharmacist and physician policies on pharmaceutical price and market share 
competition, the concluding discussion chapter does consider this proxy demand 
side, as well as the role of patients in further containing pharmaceutical costs.
The goal of this thesis is therefore to address the following overarching 
research questions:
• First, what is the role of product differentiation in softening Bertrand-like 
price competition in off-patent molecule markets and in what forms, if  at 
all, does product differentiation exist?
• Second, what hybrid of market and regulatory factors stimulate 
competition in off-patent molecule markets, resulting in improved 
pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency?
In doing so, the thesis addresses the above questions with the following case-specific 
research questions:
Case 1: What are the determinants of generic prices in the omeprazole and 
paroxetine retail markets in the USA, UK, Germany and France? To what extent do 
purchasers maximize savings from genericisation and what can the potential be for 
further savings?
Case 2: To what extent does the degree of competition between the original 
brand and generics within strength segment markets differ across these strength 
segment markets of the retail omeprazole and paroxetine markets in Germany, 
France, the UK and the USA?
3 The term “strength segment markets” refers to the segments o f  a molecule market in which drugs o f  
that molecule consist o f a particular strength. For example, depending on the country, omeprazole 
may have multiple strength segment markets, possibly including 10 mg, 20 mg, 30 mg and 40 mg. 
Within a molecule market, all drugs o f the same strength are classified into the same strength segment 
market, regardless o f formulation (e.g. tablet versus capsule) and the size (e.g. 100 tablets versus 500 
tablets) o f the package sold to the pharmacy.
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Case 3: What is the nature and degree of competition between the OTC 
omeprazole and retail prescription omeprazole markets in the USA and the UK from 
market entry onwards?
In pursuit of answers to these research questions, the studies in this report use 
proprietary data covering the period from 2000 Q1 -  2005 Q1 and make the 
following key contributions to the literature (see also “Gaps in Literature and Key 
Contributions” in Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion):
First, the Application of Industrial Organization Theory to Off-Patent 
Molecule Markets: This thesis makes a theoretical contribution by building on, 
applying and enhancing the current industrial organization framework/theory for 
markets with homogeneous products to off-patent pharmaceutical molecule markets. 
In doing so, this thesis shines light on aspects of competition that may have not yet 
been incorporated into the current industrial organization models, thereby generating 
new hypotheses that offer more complete versions of these industrial organization 
models.
Second, by addressing new Dimensions of Generic Competition: By 
modelling unstudied dimensions of competition in off-patent pharmaceutical 
molecule markets, this thesis offers a newfound understanding of ways in which 
payors could improve pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency. Specifically, these new 
dimensions include:
• Case One: modelling generic versus generic price competition between 
products of the same molecule at the presentation level in order to 
understand the detailed ways in which generic manufacturers may product 
differentiate, thereby carving out niches within what would other-wise be 
homogeneous markets.
• Case Two: modelling original brand versus generic market share 
competition between products of the same molecule within strength 
segments in order to determine the extent to which original brand 
manufacturers may be able to retain more dominant market positions than 
a simple generic penetration analysis would suggest.
• Case Three: modelling OTC versus prescription drug substitutability and 
degree of price competition in order to determine the extent to which the 
OTC market may directly compete with its prescription market
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counterpart in cases where medicines of the same molecule are approved 
for both the prescription and OTC distribution channels.
Third, analysis using a Comparative Perspective: This thesis conducts panel 
data analysis to study the above dimensions of pharmaceutical competition in off- 
patent molecule markets across four countries that exhibit differing health care 
systems and regulatory environments. This allows for the opportunity to compare 
findings across settings in order to gain a greater understanding of how 
pharmaceutical industrial organization may differ across countries. In addition, it 
will help payors to understand how opportunities to improve pharmaceutical 
purchasing efficiency may also vary across country settings.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS TO THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Background
There are three potential spheres of pharmaceutical competition— 
competition between in-patent drugs, competition between off-patent drugs and 
competition between in-patent and off-patent drugs. Figure 2-1 depicts these spheres 
and subdivides them by whether or not competition may occur between drugs of 
differing molecules or the same molecule. Most of the literature on competition in 
the pharmaceutical markets focuses on competition between in-patent drugs of 
differing molecules (that are usually within the same therapeutic class) and 
competition between off-patent original brand and generic drugs of the same 
molecule. In addition to the vast amount of literature on competition between off- 
patent original brand and generic drugs of the same molecule, a body of literature on 
competition between off patent generic drugs of the same molecule has begun to 
emerge in order to determine whether generic markets really offer the opportunity for 
purchasing efficiency that policymakers assume to be the case.
Following a review of the current literature, this chapter discusses the key 
contributions that this thesis makes to the gaps in the literature (as of August 2008). 
Studies that take a broad approach of analyzing competition across spheres may be 
referenced in several sections of this literature review.
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Figure 2-1 Potential Spheres of Pharmaceutical Competition
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2.2 C om petition in pharm aceutical m arkets
2.2.1 Sphere One: Competition between In-Patent Drugs
Although it is commonly assumed that in-patent drugs do not face 
competition (by nature of having a monopoly on that molecule market), there is a 
significant body of evidence that challenges this assumption. In a recent study, 
researchers analyzed the determinants of competition between patented statins in the 
UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, using IMS Health Data from 1992-2002 
(Kanavos, Costa Font and McGuire, 2007). They accounted for the effect of relevant 
supply side regulations and market characteristics on patented statins’ prices and 
market shares by including the following explanatory variables in the model: cost 
effectiveness used in price setting, price regulation, price cuts in operation, potential 
market size, and potential market competition. Findings showed that although there 
was no observable price decline as competitors entered the therapeutic market, 
competition did exist in the form of product differentiation. Specifically, patented 
statins seemed to compete on “quality” attributes and branding. Varying levels of 
prices for the same drug in different countries was also evidence of product 
differentiation. Although the statins did not compete directly on price, product
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differentiation shifted demand from the first entrant, pravastatin, to the second 
entrant, simvastatin. Thus, this study showed that in the statins class, the first mover 
advantage of dominant market share diminished with the entry of competing drugs.4 
It also notes that this shift in market share suggests price sensitivity in the statins 
class, even though prices of both statins continued to increase in the growing market.
Consistent with the above findings, another study found that first entrant 
drugs continued to increase real prices even after competitors entered the therapeutic 
class (CBO, 1998). Specifically, the study tracked prices of breakthrough drugs and 
me-too drugs from 1991-1994 for 5 therapeutic classes.5 In four of the five classes, 
breakthrough drugs’ prices continued to increase in real terms after me-too drugs 
entered the market, while in just one of the five classes, the real price of the 
breakthrough drug decreased after entry by competitors.
In addition to the above, another study looks at the price trends of 
breakthrough and me-too drugs within therapeutic classes (Lu and Comanor, 1998). 
Using IMS Health Data, it analyzed over a hundred products that were marketed 
during the late 1970s and 1980s in the USA. Findings showed that the vast 
majority—90%—of the drugs in the study had close substitutes, and that the larger 
the therapeutic advantage of the competitor, the larger the degree of substitutability. 
Similarly to previous studies, the CBO findings showed that the real price of 
patented drugs continued to rise after the entry of competing drugs, albeit at a slower 
rate. Taking it a step further, this study also observed a distinct price trend amongst 
these competing me-too drugs. Competing me-too drugs tended to enter the market 
with relatively low prices. However, within time, increased brand and quality 
recognition of these me-too drugs gave their manufacturers market power, allowing
4 A study noted that breakthrough drugs have a first mover advantage over me-too drugs in that 
physicians are hesitant to switch their patients from a breakthrough drug to a me-too drug until they 
feel confident that the me-too drug is more effective or has fewer side effects (Scherer and Ross 1990, 
quoted in CBO 1998).
5 In this study, breakthrough drugs are defined as the first drug to treat a specific therapeutic 
mechanism (hence first entrant into a therapeutic class). Successive entry o f drugs which have 
different chemical/molecule formulations, but target a similar therapeutic mechanism are called me- 
too drugs. Often me-too drugs aim to product differentiation through product formulation (such as 
time release capsules), superior therapeutic efficacy, and/or fewer side effects. In some cases, me-too 
drugs enable pharmaceutical firms to capitalize on profitable patented markets by developing and 
patenting similar, but not equivalent drugs. Findings from the CBO study show that while on-patent, 
breakthrough drugs may actually have only 1 to 6 years o f pure market exclusivity before a me-too 
drug enters the market. Specifically, the CBO study found that 6 out o f 13 breakthrough drugs in its 
data sample experienced competition from a me-too drug within one year o f  entering the market. In 
six other cases, the breakthrough drugs experienced competition from a me-too drug within two to six 
years.
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them to increase prices. For thirteen drugs that received an A rating from the FDA as 
most innovative (breakthrough drugs), the average real price was just 7% higher than 
the launch price eight years earlier. Comparatively, after 8 years of marketing, the 
average prices of forty-eight B rated drugs and sixty-nine C rated (least innovative) 
drugs increased by 32% and 62% respectively. These price increases for B and C 
rated drugs (me-too drugs) occurred despite the fact that their launch prices were not 
significantly below the prices of competing drugs that were already on the market. 
Thus, these studies above all suggest that patented drugs within therapeutic classes 
do seem to compete through product differentiation. Over time, promotional 
spending gains new drugs favourable branded recognition, which increases their 
market power and respective price.
Some studies found significant elasticities between therapeutic substitutes 
(Ellison, 1997). However, other studies were less conclusive, finding that the 
relationship between the price of patented drugs and the number of competitors 
within a class was unclear due to contradictory findings that resulted from differing 
methods (Wiggins and Maness, 1998). Specifically, the inverse specification of 
sellers produced a marginally significant effect, whereas the nested specification 
produced a statistically insignificant effect.
Two reasons why competition within a therapeutic class may be difficult to 
model are the complexities of discounts and promotional expenditures. Using IMS 
Health data, researchers studied therapeutic competition in the USA, Canada, France, 
Italy, Germany, and the UK in 1992 (Danzon and Chao, 2000). In looking at 
competition within a therapeutic class, the number of substitute molecules did not 
correlate with prices in most cases. These insignificant findings were attributed to 
the omission of discount and promotional spending variables (due to a lack of data). 
In France, Italy, Germany, and the UK, there was some evidence of therapeutic class 
entry having a small negative effect on the first entrant’s price. This was potentially 
due to the increased number of me-too drugs in these countries, which manufacturers 
introduce for the purpose of obtaining price increases. According to the researchers 
of this study, countries with strict regulatory schemes encourage production of me- 
too drugs, rather than truly innovative drugs. Thus, competition at the therapeutic 
class level did not appear to be strong in any country, although the degree of 
competition varied based on the countries’ regulatory environments and the 
significance of the omitted promotional and discount variables.
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In summary, literature on competition within therapeutic classes has found 
the following:
• Despite entry of competing drugs (i.e. me-too drugs), first entrant (i.e. 
breakthrough drugs) prices continued to increase in real terms.
• Me-too drugs tend to enter at prices that are lower than the first entrant 
into the therapeutic class; however, once they gain brand recognition, 
they increase their prices substantially, usually at rates that far surpass the 
price increases of breakthrough drugs.
• Competition at the therapeutic class level is characterized by product 
differentiation in the form of quality and branding. Thus, both price and 
therapeutic efficacy (i.e. quality) must be taken into account in this model 
of competition.
• In order to differentiate their products in the therapeutic market, firms 
invest in promotional spending. Consequently, promotional spending is a 
significant factor that should be taken into account when analyzing 
competition in this sphere.
2.2,2 Sphere Two: Competition between Off-patent Original Brand and 
Generic Drugs of the Same Molecule
While there has been some evidence to the contrary6, most researchers agree 
that generics are of the same quality as their original brand equivalents, as they are 
identical molecules, have equal bioavailability , and are therefore determined by the 
FDA to be bioequivalent. The FDA itself concludes that “there is no substantial 
evidence of significant differences, either in bioavailability or general quality (in 
terms of purity, potency, or other methods of quality control) between brand-name 
and unbranded products, or between products made by large and small 
manufacturers” (From Drug Product Selection, quoted in Hurwitz and Caves, 1988).
6 One study argues that because generic producers have less goodwill to lose, they may not invest as 
heavily in the fixed costs o f quality control. It also points out that recalls and failed inspections occur 
proportionally more in the generic industry, despite the fact that final generic products have never 
shown evidence o f inferior clinical performance. (Schwartzman 1976, quoted in Hurwitz and Caves 
1988)
7 Bioavailability measures the quantity and rate at which the drug’s active ingredient reaches the 
bloodstream and the site o f therapeutic action.
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Thus, this thesis assumes that there is no quality difference between brand drugs and 
their generic equivalents in these developed country markets.
Since there are no differences in quality between original brand drugs and 
their generic equivalents, the Bertrand model of competition between identical 
products might predict that post-patent competition erodes high brand name prices 
that were set while under patent, thereby driving down expenditure on that drug. 
However, a review of the literature below shows that this is not the case. In 
summary, the literature on competition between original brand drugs and their 
generic equivalents concludes that:
• Generic entry depends largely on the expected profitability in the market.
• Where generic entry does occur quickly, original brand name prices do 
not fall to comparable generic levels; in most cases, original brand prices 
stay at the same level, and in some cases actually increase after they go 
off patent.
•  There are some discrepancies between studies as to how quickly these 
relatively high priced original brand name drugs lose market share; in 
most cases, the share they retain is significant.
In order to understand these findings, it is necessary to look more closely at 
the literature. The analysis on competition between off-patent original brands and 
their generic equivalents has been sub-divided into two thematic areas— first, the 
study of what factors determine the degree of generic entry, and, second, the study of 
original brands’ prices and market shares after generic entry has occurred. The 
reason for reviewing both thematic areas is that while generic entry is a pre-requisite 
for competition, it is not a sufficient measure of the intensity of competition. The 
reason for considering them separately is that each follows a distinct model of 
competition that looks at a different set of explanatory variables. Studies that discuss 
both of these categories will therefore be referenced in both sections.
2.2.2.1 Generic Entry
Before the effects of competition on prices and market shares of original 
brand drugs can be analysed, generic entry must first take place. In the USA, 
however, this was not the case in the early 1980s. Research studying a sample of 
drugs from 1983 and 1984 revealed that 65% of the off-patent drugs did not face 
competition (Grabowski and Vernon, 1986). Suspecting that this was due to the
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onerous FDA requirement that generic companies conduct their own clinical trials, 
the study compared these findings to pre-1962 drugs and antibiotics, whose generic 
manufacturers were not required to conduct their own clinical trials. Only 10% of 
drugs in these categories had no competitors. Thus, the study concluded that the 
USA’ Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch- 
Waxman Act) would spur competition by allowing all generic manufacturers to 
simply prove bioequivalence with the brand name drug, rather than undergo their
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own clinical trials. The study also noted that competition would increase as a result 
of extraneous environmental changes, such as the emergence of managed care and 
state substitution laws.9 The study concluded by predicting that an increase in 
number of generic competitors would result in substantial price reductions.
The above prediction that the number of generic competitors would increase 
after the Hatch-Waxman Act proved correct. Another study researched 21 original 
brand drugs in the USA that went off patent between 1991 and 1993 and found that 
all but 2 of the 21 drugs experienced generic entry within one year of patent 
expiration; for many drugs, entry occurred within 3 months (CBO, 1998). These two 
studies show that the percentage of off-patent original brand drugs facing no generic 
competition decreased from 65% in the early 1980s to roughly 10% in the early 
1990s.
The various market characteristics that may influence generic manufacturers’ 
entry decisions have also been studied in the literature (Scott-Morton, 2000). By 
analyzing USA IMS Health data from 1986 to 1991 (the time period following the 
introduction of the Hatch-Waxman Act), the study sought to explore whether original 
brand manufacturers used advertising as a barrier to generic entry. In addition to 
detailing and journal advertising 2-3 years before patent expiration, some of the other 
explanatory factors the study regressed on generic entry10 included: chronic
8 The Hatch-Waxman Act also extended the effective life o f patents, and permitted generic 
manufacturers to go through the approval process before patent expiration. In addition, the Hatch- 
Waxman Act gave the first generic entrant a six-month exclusivity period, thereby de facto creating a 
short-term duopoly. The regulatory changes decreased the average generic entry delay (following 
patent expiration) from an average o f three years to three months.
9 By the early 1980s all states had repealed old anti-substitution laws that had forbidden pharmacists 
from substituting generic drugs for original brand drugs without the explicit permission o f the 
physician.
10 Generic entry was measured as the number o f generic approvals within 1 to 2 years o f patent 
expiration and the number o f generic applications within 6 months—before and after—o f patent 
expiration
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condition dummy, the proportion of drug revenues from hospital sales, pre-patent 
expiration revenues and number of months the drug had been sold under patent (a 
proxy for goodwill). The results were not what the study had predicted. It had 
hypothesized that leading up to patent expiration, original brand manufacturers 
would use advertising as a strategic barrier to entry. Instead, the results surrounding 
the advertising variable were ambiguous, leading to the conclusion that advertising 
was not a significant barrier to entry. The largest predictor of generic entry was the 
revenue size of the drug market (a proxy for expected profit since marginal generic 
costs are so low). In addition, findings showed that generic entry was positively 
correlated with the percent of drug revenue from hospitals, and with drugs that treat 
chronic conditions. This indicates that the hospital market is more price sensitive 
than the retail market, and the chronic drug market is more price sensitive than the 
acute/sporadic drug market. The reason for the hospital market being more price 
sensitive is that hospital and retail pharmacy procurement practices differ, suggesting 
that the hospital and retail markets should be studied separately.
Using Swedish data from the Medical Products Agency (MPA) on 22 
different molecules, another study researches the factors determining generic entry 
over the 1972 to 1996 period in Sweden (Rudholm, 2001). The study analyzed the 
effect that expected profit opportunities (measured by the original brand 
manufacturer’s profit in the year preceding patent expiration), the age of the original 
brand drug, and regulatory changes had on the number of generic manufacturers that 
entered the market. By employing a fixed effects model for panel data analysis, it 
was able to estimate the effects for each specific substance at each point in time. In 
addition, the study attempted to quantify two regulatory changes—implementation of 
reference pricing and drug approval changes (which were similar to the Hatch- 
Waxman Act). However, the dummy coefficient for regulatory changes was not 
significant, perhaps because the two regulatory changes, which occurred in the same 
year, had offsetting effects. Similar to the above study, the most significant finding 
was that large profits was the biggest factor in attracting competing generic 
manufacturers. It also found that in general, entry was less frequent in markets 
where the original brand had a relatively long effective patent life11.
11 During much o f a drug’s patent period, its manufacturer is still undergoing clinical trials and drug 
approval. Thus, effective patent life measures the time a drug was actually marketed while under 
patent. Although patents typically last around 14 years, the effective patent life (period o f time the
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Another study used USA IMS Health Data from 1978 and 1983, and, 
consistent with the above studies, found that the number of entrants increased with 
the total size of the market (measured in volume), and decreased with the original 
brand’s length of effective patent life (goodwill stock) (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988). 
This study did find that to a degree, the original brand manufacturer’s advertising 
deterred generic entry. However, findings showed that the original brand 
manufacturer decreased promotional spending as more generics entered. This study 
used data from before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Thus, it is likely 
that original brand manufacturers were willing to invest in promotional activities in 
the year preceding patent expiration because generic manufacturers were far slower 
to enter the market under the burdensome approval requirements; benefits of 
promotional activities such as increased market size were therefore more likely to 
accrue directly to the original brand manufacturer.
The role of advertising as a deterrent to entry can be further understood 
through another study, in which findings were in agreement with Scott-Morton 
2000—that promotional expenditures are not used as a deterrent to generic entry 
(Caves, 1991). Using IMS Health data on 30 drugs that went off patent between 
1976 and 1987, the study found that on average, the original brand’s promotional 
expenditures fell 10% two years before patent expiration, an additional 20% after the 
first generic entry, and an additional 40% and 20% when five and ten generics 
(respectively) entered the market. This supports the theory that original brand 
promotional expenditures are used to expand the drug market—not as a deterrent to 
entry—and that the free rider effect of generic entrants on expanded markets acts as a 
disincentive for original brand promotional spending. The study also found that 
original brand promotional spending declined more quickly in larger markets than in 
smaller markets. Since more generics enter larger markets (because of larger 
expected profitability), it is likely that promotional spending decreases faster in 
larger markets because of the increased free rider effect. Thus, the study concludes 
that while there may be some demand side barriers to generic entry (i.e. original 
brands’ accumulated goodwill assets), original brand manufacturers do not attempt to 
thwart generic competition on the supply side with promotional or pricing
drug can be marketed) is often around 8 years. In the US, regulatory changes under the 1994 Hatch- 
Waxman Act and the 1997 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act have attempted to 
streamline and expedite the drug approval process in order to lengthen drugs’ effective patent lives.
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strategies.12 Rather, original brand manufacturers take generic entry as a given, and 
optimize their return accordingly. It is important to note, however, that although the 
study uses data from before and after the Hatch-Waxman Act, it does not directly 
control for the regulatory change. Thus, the results could be biased, depending on 
the period of time in which most of the drugs went off patent.
Another study researches the determinants of generic entry in an attempt to 
identify strategies that original brand manufacturers may use to deter entry 
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). By using IMS Health data from 1984 and 1988, it 
studied generic entry for eighteen products during the period following the Hatch- 
Waxman Act. Also consistent with previous studies, it found that expected 
profitability (calculated as percent mark-up of original brand price over marginal cost 
at point of initial entry) was positively correlated with generic entry. The study did 
find that in four out of the eighteen cases, the original brand manufacturer attempted 
to stave off competition by differentiating its product. Such methods may include 
altering the delivery system (e.g. time-release capsules), taste, packing (to fill 
hospital dispensing units), or the appearance of a pill (e.g. the “purple pill”). In one 
case, the introduction of a “slow-release” dosage form succeeded in capturing 81% 
of the sales in the molecule market post patent expiry of the originator. However, the 
study found that in most cases, original brand manufacturers did not attempt to 
thwart entry through these product differentiation strategies mentioned above, or 
through price or promotional strategies.
Finally, a recent study models the effect that regulation (e.g. reference pricing 
arrangements) and product differentiation have on generic entry (Kanavos, Costa- 
Font and Seeley, 2008). Unlike the above studies that primarily focused on one 
country, this study analyzes the factors that influenced the generic entry of 12 
molecule markets during the 2000 to 2005 time period in the UK, Germany, France, 
Spain, Italy, Canada and the USA. Thus, it is able to offer a comparative analysis on 
the determinants of generic entry in regulated (Germany, Spain, France, Italy) and 
less regulated (the USA, UK and certain provinces of Canada) countries and by
12 In some industries, the original brand manufacturer could use its monopolist position to drop prices 
as a means o f deterring entrants. However, research clearly shows that original brand manufacturers 
do not take this approach, indicating that sunk costs for generic manufacturers may not be very high, 
especially in light o f the improved regulatory approval process. One study acknowledges that while 
there may be some technical difficulty in developing a generic drug, there are no substantial scale- 
economy barriers in production or distribution (Caves, 1991).
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studying originator and generic competition at molecule level and at company 
level.13 Findings were consistent in both the molecule level and company level 
models; reference price systems were positively associated with generic entry.
Given the downward rigidity of generic prices in reference price systems, it is not 
surprising that reference price systems encourage generic entry, as downward price 
rigidity implies relatively high expected profits for generic manufacturers, which is 
consistent with the above studies’ findings that expected profitability is positively 
correlated with generic entry. Moreover, product differentiation (measured as the 
number of formulations and the number of presentations) was also found to be 
positively associated with generic entry, which suggests that product differentiation 
enables increased marketing opportunity for generics.
In summary, research on generic entry shows that:
• The strongest determinant of entry is market size/market profitability.
• Accumulated goodwill assets deter entry to a degree, although not enough 
to offset the positive correlation associated with a profitable market.
• Original brand promotional/advertising expenditures do not significantly 
deter entry.
• Assuming the regulatory/approval costs are low, generic entrants face few 
supply side deterrents. Thus, original brand manufacturers do not attempt 
to optimize their return by thwarting competitors. Instead, they pursue a 
‘market harvesting strategy,’ which this thesis discusses in the section 
below.
• Reference price regulations and opportunities to product differentiate 
further encourage generic entry.
2.2.2.2 Original brands ’ Prices and Market Shares after Generic Entry
In addition to assessing barriers to entry, one of the above studies focuses on 
determinants of pharmaceutical competition by analyzing original brand 
manufacturers’ post patent price responses (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). Findings
13 Germany has been categorized as a regulated country because o f its reference price system, which 
has historically applied only to off-patent drugs. In the case o f in-patent drugs, pharmaceutical pricing 
in Germany is predominantly unregulated. In the case o f Canada, certain provinces have implemented 
reference pricing, while others have not. The degree o f regulation in Canada therefore depends on the 
province in question.
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show that despite generic entry, the prices of original brand drugs increased faster 
than inflation, and faster than their therapeutic category’s producer price index. 
Anti-infective drugs were the only cases in which the original brand prices decreased 
relative to their therapeutic category. Despite the relatively high prices that the 
original brand manufacturers maintained, in most cases, generic manufacturers had 
only gained roughly half of the market two years after entry. Thus, the study 
concludes that the market for a given molecule is segmented into two groups—a 
price sensitive group that the generics capture, and a price insensitive, brand loyal 
group that the original brand retains. The existence of a brand loyal, price insensitive 
group suggests that the original brand enjoys a ‘first mover advantage.’ Being the 
first to enter the market gives the original brand manufacturer the advantage of being 
able to keep prices relatively high, while continuing to hold on to a significant share 
of the market. Notably, the study finds that generic manufacturers achieved a larger 
market share for inpatient drugs than for retail drugs. Hence, the first mover 
advantage is greater for retail drugs.
Another study models the original brand price responses of 32 drugs from a 
variety of therapeutic areas that experienced generic entry between 1984 and 1987 
(Frank and Salkever, 1997). A fixed-effects model is estimated that assumed generic 
entry to be exogenous as well as a random-effects model with instrumented generic 
entry variables (time since patent expiration and market size before patent 
expiration). Both models were consistent in showing that generic entry was 
associated with original brand price rises. Specifically, the parameter in the fixed- 
effects model showed that each generic entrant is associated with a .7% rise in the 
original brand price.
In one of the other studies above, researchers analyzed original brands’ price 
responses in the USA by studying a sample of 34 original brand retail drugs that first 
faced generic competition after 1991 (CBO, 1998). Findings showed that after 
generics entered the market, original brand prices continued to rise faster than 
inflation. Specifically, the average original brand price increase between 1991 and 
1994 was 22%, compared to a price increase of 24.5% for brand drugs that did not 
face generic competition over the same period. Meanwhile, original brand drug 
prices that faced generic competition before 1991 increased by a similar 22.4%.
Thus, this study concludes that generic competition does not precipitate a decrease in 
original brand prices (unless this competition leads to original brand discounts that
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are not reflected in the data). However, it finds that in seven cases, generics were 
able to achieve a market share of 65% or more by 1994, compared to a generic 
market share of 50% in the above study (Frank and Salkever, 1997). This difference 
could be due to the two studies’ different time periods. The above study (Frank and 
Salkever, 1997) took place immediately following the Hatch-Waxman Act 
implementation, whereas these researchers (CBO, 1998) conducted their study nearly 
a decade after the act. Thus, it could be that as a lagged response to the changed 
regulations, generics entered the market more quickly and in larger numbers during 
this study’s time period, leading to lower generic prices, and hence a larger generic 
market share.
In the late 1990s, another study researched price and market share 
competition between original brand and generic drugs, this time separating the data 
into two time periods—8 drugs that experienced patent expiration between 1986 and 
1987, and 11 drugs that experienced patent expiration between 1989 and 1992 
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1996). On average, the generic drugs in the earlier time 
period gained a 38% market share within a year of entry, compared to a 50% generic 
market share for drugs in the later time period. These findings support the above 
theory that generic market share was larger in studies from the early 1990s than in 
studies from the mid 1980s because of the increased generic competition that 
resulted in the years following the Hatch-Waxman Act. Notably, this study and the 
CBO study above report differing generic market shares for drugs in the early 
1990s—50% in this study and 65% in the CBO study. One possible explanation for 
this difference could be that they used different samples of drugs, as well as different 
data sources. The researchers of the CBO study also point out that their findings 
may differ from these findings because they included all formulations of a drug in 
their market share calculations, even if certain formulations were still on patent.
Their reason for doing this was to take into account the three year extended patent 
exclusivity period original brand manufacturers have to introduce a new dosage 
form, such as time-release tablets. For these reasons, comparing the generic market 
shares across studies is not an apples to apples comparison. Nonetheless, these 
studies’ findings consistently show that during the 1980s and the 1990s, competition 
between original brand drugs and their generic equivalents in the USA seems to have 
increased in the form of faster generic entry and increased generic market share. At 
the same time, the above studies show that original brand drugs continued to enjoy a
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first mover advantage by continuing to increase their prices after generic entry and 
maintaining a significant market share (albeit a decreasing market share over time as 
generics penetrate the market).
The above studies show that original brand prices continued to increase after 
generic entry. However, some studies report relative original brand price decreases 
after generic entry. In its examination of 30 drugs whose patents expired between 
1976 and 1987, a study reported that although the prices of many original brand 
drugs increased after generic entry, they increased at slower rates than they would 
have in the absence of competition (Caves, 1991). The study concludes that with 
five generic competitors, brand name prices were on average 8.5% lower than they 
would have been; with ten generic competitors, prices were 15% lower. Despite 
these slowed price increases, an average generic/branded price ratio of .456 (with 
five generic competitors) only led to a generic market share of 25.2%. Thus, 
findings in this study are consistent with the conclusion that original brand drugs and 
generic drugs segment the market into price insensitive/brand loyal and price 
sensitive groups. According to the author of this study, “the relatively muted brand 
price response, the small market share generics achieve despite their relatively low 
prices, and the different effects that generic entrants have on generic prices than on 
brand prices” are evidence of this product differentiation (Caves, 1991). Consistent 
with other research findings, this study also finds the hospital market to be more 
price sensitive than the retail market; original brands’ price responses to generic 
entry were roughly 70% larger in the hospital market.
Most research finds little price competition between generic manufacturers 
and original brand manufacturers. However, multiple studies show or acknowledge 
that this is not the case with the anti-infective class of drugs. One of the above 
studies found that anti-infectives were the only drugs whose original brand prices 
decreased (relative to their class) following generic entry (Grabowski and Vernon, 
1992). Both this study and the CBO study note that compared to other therapeutic 
classes, antibiotics experience rapid generic entry, large generic market share and 
strong price competition (CBO, 1998). Using USA IMS Health data from 1985 to 
1991, one study analyzes the elasticities of cephalosporins, an anti-infective class of 
drugs, at both the therapeutic level and the molecule level (Ellison, 1997). The high 
elasticities between original brand drugs and their generic substitutes supported the
38
assertion that the anti-infective class is characterized by unusually high price 
competition.
Wiggins and Maness use USA IMS Health data to analyze price competition 
in the anti-infective class from 1984 to 1990 (Wiggins and Maness, 2004). Based on 
the assumption that the firms in their study are identical, they theorize that the main 
determinant of price for a given molecule is the number of generic and brand 
competitors. In contrast to the above studies, findings show that original brand 
prices significantly declined with generic entry. Thus, this study concluded that 
original brand drugs and generic drugs do in fact compete on price, and that the first 
mover advantage theory (that predicts market segmentation between the price 
sensitive group and the price insensitive/ brand loyal group) does not hold true. It 
does not, however, acknowledge that its findings may contradict the above studies 
because the anti-infective class is unique. One possible explanation for why 
competition in the anti-infective class differs in the USA is that historically, many 
anti-infective drugs had not been subject to the burdensome FDA approval 
regulations that the Hatch-Waxman Act repealed.
With the exception of anti-infectives, research consistently shows large price 
differences between original brand drugs and their generic equivalents. However, 
the extent to which large price differences result in decreased original brand market 
share differs across studies, and across therapeutic class. Recall that the studies 
above show generic market shares that range from 25.2% to 65%. These market 
shares depend on the study’s time period (which reflects different regulatory 
environments), the number of competing generic competitors, and the original brand 
vs. generic price difference.14 In addition, the extent to which large price differences 
influence generic market share could also depend on the therapeutic class. Using 
Swedish data from the MPA from 1972 to 1996, another study analyzed the effect of 
time (a proxy for innovation), relative brand vs. generic prices, and the reference 
pricing system on the original brand market share for fourteen therapeutic classes 
(Aronsson, Bergman and Rudholm, 1998). Findings show that in five of the fourteen 
classes, large price differences resulted in a significant original brand market share 
decrease. For three of the classes, the reference pricing system had a significant 
negative effect on original brand market shares. Consistent with above studies, these
14 All three o f these variables could be endogenous.
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findings show varying degrees of price sensitivity across therapeutic classes, 
depending on whether the class is more concentrated in the hospital or retail market, 
and whether it treats chronic or acute conditions. In the hospital market, it could be 
that demand is more price sensitive because hospitals have more incentive to keep 
costs down (through hospital-wide formularies that physicians must follow) than 
individual physicians who prescribe in the retail market. Regarding the chronic vs. 
acute market, it could be that patients with chronic conditions are more price 
sensitive because they have more time to look for the lowest price. Or, it could be 
that costs add up more quickly with chronic conditions, creating a greater financial 
incentive for patients to shop around.
In summary, literature on the effect of generic competition on original brands’ prices 
and market shares, has found that:
• In most cases, original brand prices do not moderate after generic entry; 
in some cases, they may even increase at a faster rate.
• Unlike other therapeutic classes, the entry of generic competitors in the 
anti-infective class seems to result in decreased original brand prices.
• Competition may result in varying levels of generic market share. In 
general, research shows that generic market share correlates positively 
with the number of generic competitors, the original brand vs. generic 
price difference, the time period (in the case of the USA), the hospital (vs. 
retail) market, and chronic (vs. acute) conditions.
• Original brand manufacturers seem to follow the market harvesting 
strategy, which is “the maintenance of premium price positions while 
market shares erode over time” (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992).
2.2.3 Sphere Two: Competition between Off-patent Generic Drugs of the 
Same Molecule
As shown in Figure 1-3 in Chapter 1, a large body of literature has focused on 
competition between off-patent drugs. More specifically, competition between off- 
patent original brands and their generic equivalents is most commonly studied 
because of payors’ expectations that once a drug loses its patent protection, 
competition should ensue and prices should decline. In addition, differences in 
quality attributes do not exist, in principle, in this sphere, making the model of
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competition potentially simpler to study. Comparatively, studies on competition 
between patented drugs in a therapeutic class must account for more complicated 
factors such as quality differences, promotional expenditures, and significant market 
growth. Nonetheless, research has still sought to define this model of competition. 
However, in the case of competition between off-patent generic drugs made from the 
same molecule, many studies that acknowledge this dimension of the broader second 
sphere (competition between off-patent drugs) have only done so as a side note, 
while focusing on competition between original brands and their generic equivalents. 
Only a few studies have actually attempted to model some of the determinants of 
competition amongst generics of the same molecule (Kanavos, Costa Font and 
Seeley, 2008; Hollis, 2002; Frank and Salkever, 1997).
Studies sometimes assume that off-patent generic medicines belong to a 
commodity market where no product differentiation exists and where competitors 
compete purely on price. For this reason, some studies that have examined 
competition between generics have focused on the correlation between the number of 
competitors and generic prices (Caves, 1991; CBO, 1998). One study found that the 
average prescription price of a generic drug with 1 to 5 generic manufacturers was 
$23.40, compared to the average price of $19.90 with 16 to 20 manufacturers (CBO, 
1998).
In addition to modelling the original brand price response (i.e. the price 
insensitive portion of the market) to generic entry, one of the above studies also 
modelled the effect of generic entry on the average generic prices for each given 
molecule (i.e. the price sensitive portion of the market). In this case, the number of 
generic entrants was treated as an endogenous variable. The model found that each 
generic entrant was associated with an average generic price decline of between 
5.6% and 7.2% (Frank and Salkever, 1997).
Another one of the studies above also includes the “generic versus generic” 
competition dimension in its analysis by modelling the determinants of company 
level generic prices and the determinants of the minimum generic prices across 12 
molecules in the UK, USA, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Canada (Kanavos, 
Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). At company level, generic prices appear to decline 
over time. Reference pricing has a small, but sluggish downward effect on generic 
prices at the company level (-1.4% to -2.7%), in comparison to non-reference price 
systems. This is intuitive in that because health insurance systems adjust reference
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prices over time, any decrease in generic prices would result in a downward ratchet 
effect for all generic reimbursement. Moreover, product differentiation (measured as 
the number of formulations and number of presentations) is found to be associated 
with price increases, which is consistent with the fact that product differentiation is 
also associated with increased generic entry. This suggests that manufacturers are 
able to avoid unbridled price competition by altering the formulation, package size 
and/or strength of their horizontal products (i.e. products of the same molecule). 
Interestingly, the lowest generic prices seem to increase marginally over time, 
although findings reveal that the reference price system reduces the minimum 
generic price by up to 47% in countries where reference pricing systems exist. 
However, while this study models the determinants of the lowest generic price, it 
does not provide information on how the market shares of these lowest price generics 
differ across countries.
Two studies do analyze the nature of competition amongst generics by 
focusing on the market shares of the products (of the same molecule). One was an 
exploratory study that observed the prices of generic drugs and their corresponding 
market shares (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). The findings were somewhat 
uncharacteristic of a commodity market in that generic prices varied significantly, 
and in half of the 18 molecule markets studied, the lowest price generic did not 
achieve the largest market share. In some cases, the first generic entrant captured the 
largest market share, despite its relatively high prices. These findings indicate the 
possible existence of a first mover advantage amongst generics in the US, which may 
partially reflect the six month exclusivity period that first generic entrants receive as 
a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The second study focused on the possible existence of first mover advantages 
amongst generic entrants. Findings suggest that a first mover advantage exists 
amongst generics in Canada, potentially due to pharmacist preferences and patient 
switching costs15 (Hollis, 2002). Specifically, the first generic entrant is able to 
maintain 25-30% more market share (compared to what it would have achieved had 
it not been first) for at least the first 4 years. Moreover, the benefits of the first
15 The patient switching costs that are incurred when pharmacists switch from one generic 
manufacturer to another generic manufacturer reflect the time that pharmacists may need to spend in 
order to reassure patients that despite possible differences in packaging, their new generic medicine 
should have the same quality attributes as their old generic medicine.
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generic mover are often reaped by pseudo-generics (generics that are marketed by 
the original brand manufacturer), thereby discouraging future entry and hence 
generic competition. The study also concludes that the reference pricing system, 
which reimburses the lowest cost generic in Canada, actually inhibits price 
competition by forcing all generic competitors to follow suit when one company cuts 
prices (less resort to the inevitable loss of market share that ensues when patients are 
forced to pay the difference between the reference price and the actual price). The 
result is that generic manufacturers have no financial incentive to cut prices, as they 
would not achieve a larger market share in exchange for doing so (since most other 
manufacturers would also cut prices). This finding is consistent with the previous 
study (Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008), which also finds reference pricing to 
result in generic prices moving sluggishly downwards.
In summary, literature on competition between generic equivalents has found 
the following:
• In general, average generic prices decline as the number of generic 
competitors increase.
• In many cases the lowest price generic does not achieve the largest 
market share; there is also some evidence of a first mover advantage 
amongst generics.
• Reference pricing seems to result in generic prices moving sluggishly 
downwards, while product differentiation results in relatively higher 
generic prices and therefore less generic price competition.
2.3 Gaps in the Literature and the Contribution of this Thesis
Having reviewed the literature on competition in pharmaceutical markets, we 
now turn attention to the gaps in the literature and the contribution this thesis makes 
to the literature on pharmaceutical competition. In particular, the thesis makes 
empirical as well as theoretical contributions and also adds a comparative dimension 
in the analysis of competition in pharmaceutical markets.
2.3.1 Empirical Contribution: Three New Dimensions of Generic 
Competition, a Closer Look at Cost Control Potential
Given that pharmaceutical competition is so complex and multidimensional, 
it is not surprising that there are many gaps in the literature. Literature on
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pharmaceutical competition seems to have targeted the well-known dimensions, 
which are easily researchable and in which pharmaceutical policymakers have 
traditionally sought to contain the cost of prescription drugs, namely competition 
between in-patent drugs of the same therapeutic class (in order to understand the 
effect that the introduction of follow-on drugs may have on prices and, therefore, on 
pharmaceutical spending) and competition between off-patent original brand and 
generic drugs of the same molecule. However, research has not sought to study 
pharmaceutical competition between off-patent drugs of differing molecules or 
between in-patent drugs and off-patent drugs of differing molecules within a 
therapeutic class (see Figure 2-2 below). Moreover, within the sphere of competition 
between off-patent drugs of the same molecule (original brand versus generic and 
amongst generics), research has primarily been conducted at aggregate levels. For 
example, individual product prices are often aggregated to the molecule level by 
using average or weighted prices. In a relatively disaggregated example, product 
prices were only aggregated to the manufacturer level (Kanavos, Costa-Font and 
Seeley, 2008). Thus, to date, no study has modelled prices at the most disaggregated 
level, the presentation level. This “presentation level” reflects the fact that there are 
a large number of ways in which pharmaceutical products of the same molecule may 
be packaged. The strength and formulation may vary as well as the package size, 
and with a number of manufacturers competing in the same molecule market, this 
may result in a large permutation of competing “presentations.”
In order to understand the true nature of price competition amongst generics 
and the degree of purchasing efficiency that payors have achieved, this thesis 
contributes to the literature by studying price competition amongst generics of the 
same molecule at the product presentation level. Theory may predict that 
homogeneous products such as generics compete in a commodity-like market. 
However, a recent study suggests that this may not be the case (Kanavos, Costa-Font 
and Seeley, 2008). Rather, factors such as regulations and product differentiation 
may result in a more complex picture where countries may have differing degrees of 
price competition amongst generics, resulting in more or less efficient generic 
purchasing. This thesis argues that it is by understanding price competition at the 
disaggregated, presentation level, that the effect of factors such as product 
differentiation and regulations on price competition amongst generics can really be 
understood. In addition, evidence suggests that although the average generic price
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declines with increased generic entry, the lowest priced drug does not necessarily 
achieve the largest market share, a finding that highlights the need for more in-depth 
research on competition amongst generics (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; CBO, 
1998). Thus, this case on competition amongst generics further contributes to the 
literature by analysing the full distribution of these presentations’ prices, which must 
be understood in order to determine the extent to which actual purchasing practices 
are taking advantage of the lowest prices.
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the literature by studying the degree of 
competition between off-patent original brand and generic drugs and amongst 
generics of the same molecule at the strength level (within a molecule market). For 
example, this thesis studies competition between the original brand and generic 
products in the lOmg omeprazole market separately from original brand and generic 
products in the 20mg omeprazole market. This is different from existing literature, 
where all studies of original brand versus generic competition within molecule 
markets aggregate the various strengths of a molecule by standardizing 
presentations’ strengths and package sizes. In doing so, they are able to calculate 
overall generic penetration levels within the broader molecule market. While this 
may provide a seemingly clear picture of the degree to which policymakers have 
succeeded in encouraging generic penetration, the reality is that it may mask 
differing degrees of generic penetration across strength segments within a molecule 
market, to the extent that strength segments of a molecule behave as separate 
submarkets. This thesis will therefore contribute to this gap in the literature by 
analysing competition between off-patent original brand and generics and amongst 
generics of the same molecule at the strength segment level in order to assess the 
extent to which the nature and degree of competition is the same across strength 
markets of the same molecule. To the extent that the degree of competition between 
the original brand and generic products and amongst generics differs across strength 
segments of the same molecule, policymakers who are seeking to improve 
purchasing efficiency may want to introduce policies that encourage competition in 
the less competitive strength markets.
Thirdly, this thesis will explore OTC versus prescription drug competition of 
the same molecule. Policymakers and researchers alike assume that altering the mix 
of original brand versus generic prescription products (either retail or hospital) 
achieves the greatest savings within a molecule. However, in the process of focusing
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on only the prescription market, they ignore other ways in which purchasing 
efficiency within a molecule could be improved. For example, where a molecule is 
available through both the prescription and over-the-counter distribution channels, 
market share competition between the over-the-counter and prescription products 
could shift demand toward lower cost over-the-counter drugs. The literature on OTC 
switch estimates the total cost savings that individual purchasers have achieved in 
switching members to an OTC drug (West, 2006). However, no study has yet 
analyzed the interface between OTC and prescription markets and the type of 
competition that may ensue for a molecule that has been switched to OTC status. 
Thus, this thesis addresses this gap in the literature by studying whether OTC and 
prescription drug products of the same molecule actually compete in the same market 
(i.e. compete for some of the same patients) and if so, whether they engage in price 
competition. By doing so, this study may then help to inform policymakers on the 
extent to which the OTC market acts as a compliment or a substitute to the 
prescription market (of the same molecule), and therefore whether approving an 
OTC switch is cost saving or cost increasing.
In summary, Figure 2-2 depicts the three new dimensions of competition 
between off-patent drugs of the same molecule that this thesis studies—generic vs. 
generic competition of the same molecule at the presentation level, competition 
between off-patent original brand and generics and amongst generics of the same 
molecule within strength segment markets and prescription versus over-the-counter 
competition of the same molecule. By studying the extent of competition within 
these unstudied dimensions of the molecule market, the thesis provides a more 
detailed, sophisticated understanding of pharmaceutical competition between drugs 
of the same molecule and offers a newfound understanding of ways in which payors 
could more efficiently contain pharmaceutical expenditures. The findings are also 
particularly relevant to the pharmaceutical policy arena since countries have 
implemented so many policies that aim to increase genericisation, without 
necessarily taking into account the market dynamics in off-patent markets.
A further strength of focusing on unstudied dimensions of pharmaceutical 
competition within molecule markets (as opposed to across molecule markets) is that 
these studies can empirically estimate the implications that the findings have on 
purchasing efficiency without having to contend with issues such as quality 
differences between differing molecule. Although some recent pharmaceutical
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policies have begun to encourage substitution within therapeutic classes (see the 
description of countries’ pharmaceutical policies in Appendix A), this practice is 
controversial and carries with it a host of complicated issues such as measures of 
cost-effectiveness and quality issues for patients, which make it difficult for 
policymakers to determine what purchasing practices are efficient at this level. Thus, 
the studies in this thesis have the potential to make significant contributions to 
enhancing the effectiveness of pharmaceutical purchasing efficiency since their 
recommendations are more politically acceptable than recommendations to improve 
purchasing efficiency on the therapeutic level. Although a comprehensive study of 
the therapeutic markets are outside of the scope of the thesis, it should be 
acknowledged that these molecule markets likely do experience some degree of 
competition from other molecules in their therapeutic class, and that further research 
in this area would also fill a significant gap in the literature and may contribute to 
policymakers’ understanding of pharmaceutical competition as well as the 
implications of certain, more recent policies, such as Germany’s therapeutic level 
reference pricing.
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By analyzing the nature of competition within three unstudied dimensions of 
the molecule market, this thesis makes an empirical contribution by offering a 
newfound understanding of ways in which payors could more efficiently contain 
pharmaceutical expenditures. In addition to this empirical contribution, these studies 
also make a theoretical contribution to the current understanding of the industrial 
organization of competition within pharmaceutical molecule markets. Industrial 
organisation theory predicts that manufacturers of homogeneous goods may compete 
on price as long as their capacities are not restricted by increasing marginal costs of 
production and assuming that manufacturers are not able to product differentiate 
(Tirole, 1988). This would be consistent with a Bertrand model of competition, 
where manufacturers engage in unbridled price competition, resulting in prices 
converging to marginal cost and market shares distributing evenly.
However, the literature review reveals that in the case of competition between 
original brand and generic manufacturers, original brand manufacturers follow a 
Market Harvesting Strategy, where they keep their prices flat or even increase their 
prices, in exchange for accepting the inevitable loss of the price sensitive portion of 
the market. On a theoretical level, this would be a case of original brand 
manufacturers leveraging their products as Experience Goods (Tirole, 1988), i.e. 
goods that some consumers are hesitant to substitute due to their positive historic 
experience. Thus, in the case of competition between the original brand versus 
generic equivalents, the null hypothesis is that the original brand manufacturers 
follow the market harvesting strategy. However, because policy makers have been 
increasingly aggressive about mandating or encouraging generic substitution, the null 
hypothesis must also acknowledge that original brand manufacturers may be limited 
in their ability to retain a significant share of the market, even in cases where a 
significant share of patients may have otherwise been brand loyal. By analyzing 
original brand versus generic competition at the strength level, this study expects to 
accept the part of the null hypothesis that original brand manufacturers continue to 
pursue the Market Harvesting Strategy, but to reject the part of the null hypothesis 
that assumes that original brand manufacturers no longer have any recourse for 
maintaining significant market share in the current policy environment that favours 
generic substitution. Instead, this study expects that analyzing competition at the
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strength level will reveal ways in which original brand manufacturers remain 
relatively shielded from generic competition, such that the market harvesting strategy 
is more long-lasting in certain strength segments of the molecule market than theory 
would predict.
On generic versus generic competition, the null hypothesis is that generics 
within a molecule market are homogeneous goods that are not constrained by 
increasing marginal costs of production and therefore follow the Bertrand model of 
perfect price competition. As discussed in the literature above, there is some 
evidence suggesting that generic manufacturers may be able to product differentiate, 
thereby avoiding unbridled price competition (Kanavos, Costa Font and Seeley, 
2008). As a result, this study expects to reject the null hypothesis of Bertrand price 
competition. Instead, it expects that while the nature of competition is likely to 
resemble the Bertrand model in some ways (by being based more on prices than 
market share as a result of fairly flat marginal costs), generic manufacturers’ abilities 
to differentiate their products results in generics no longer being perfectly 
homogeneous, resulting in an equilibrium of ranging prices and unevenly distributed 
market shares.
Finally, the study of OTC versus prescription drug competition contributes to 
theory by exploring the nature and degree of competition in a molecule market that is 
fragmented by differing demand-side characteristics and regulations. While 
industrial organization theory does not seem to directly address such a circumstance, 
this study’s null hypothesis is that prescription and OTC markets do not engage in 
direct competition as a result of being approved for different uses. This study 
expects to reject the null hypothesis, in favour of the fact that despite differing 
regulatory guidelines and fragmented demand sides, OTC and prescription 
manufacturers may engage in direct competition, where the regulations and patient 
incentives are aligned correctly. In this case, OTC products may become a form of 
product differentiation within the broader molecule market, rather than existing as an 
independent market from the prescription market, which likely results in a model 
whereby certain manufacturers are able to sustain profitable prices and relatively 
large molecule market shares by marketing in the OTC category, despite still facing 
some degree of competition from the prescription market.
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In conclusion, the thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the current 
understanding of the industrial organization of competition within pharmaceutical 
molecule markets by exploring the three dimensions of competition..
2.3.3 Comparative Perspective
The problem of pharmaceutical cost containment is similar in many 
developed countries, making comparative studies across countries particularly 
valuable. One cannot assume that a hybrid of solutions in one country is directly 
generalizable, as each country is unique politically, culturally, and economically. 
However, facing similar problems and applying similar policies does mean that there 
is potential for countries in this thesis (and several other developed countries) to 
learn from each other, and to apply similar generic drug policy approaches or 
principles. Moreover, there is evidence that in some cases, even where local 
circumstances differ, general health system ideas and micro-instruments, such as 
diagnostic related groups, may be transferrable between countries (Klein, 2003).
Many of the studies that model the determinants o f competition (rather than 
just observing price differences) focus on a single country, typically the USA16, 
making it difficult to assess the extent to which findings are attributable to 
confounding or unobservable factors. Modelling competition in the context of this 
thesis (generics versus generics at the product presentation level, prescription versus 
OTC, competition within strength markets of a molecule) across countries helps to 
shed light on the extent to which findings are unique to the country’s own 
pharmaceutical regulatory environment and market characteristics versus similar 
across countries and therefore more reflective of pharmaceutical markets in general.
There have been a number of studies that compare pharmaceutical prices in 
Western Europe and North America. These then broadly attribute their findings to 
countries’ regulatory and health system differences (Johnson, 1994; Rovira, 2001). 
However, these do not attempt to fully model the determinants of competition, and 
thus, do not have a genuine understanding of the individual factors that influence 
price differences. Thus, this thesis identifies similar trends and commonalities across 
countries, and highlights differences, in order to gain a greater understanding of how
16 There are also some articles on Sweden and Canada (Rudholm 2001; Wiggins and Maness 
2004;Lexchin 2004).
pharmaceutical policies relate to off-patent drug markets and of how the 
pharmaceutical prices and corresponding market shares differ across settings.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction
This thesis adopts a case study approach to assessing the nature and degree of 
competition in the omeprazole and paroxetine off-patent retail molecule markets in 
Germany, France, the UK and the USA, using IMS Health data during the 2000ql -
1 72005ql time period. Three dimensions of competition are analysed: 1) generic
versus generic competition at presentation level in Germany, France, the UK and the 
USA, 2) competition at strength level in Germany, France, the UK and the USA and 
3) OTC omeprazole versus prescription omeprazole competition in the UK and the 
USA. Germany and France could not be included in the assessment of OTC versus 
prescription competition in this case because omeprazole has not been approved for 
OTC use in these countries.18
By restricting the study to two molecules, instead of a large sample of 
molecules, the analysis can shine light on various levels of competition over time and 
across countries in a way that a large sample could not allow. For example, in the 
analysis of strength markets of a given molecule, a case study approach enables this 
study to trace manufacturer-level market data over time in order to determine which 
strength markets (and how many) each manufacturer decided to enter into.
3.2 Sample
3.2.1 Molecules
The molecules in this thesis, omeprazole and paroxetine, have been chosen 
deliberately with the following factors in mind. First, omeprazole and paroxetine 
were both blockbuster drugs, drugs that are defined by the European Commission to 
have achieved annual global revenues of over USA $1 billion (European 
Commission, 2008). As a result, the estimates of ways to improve purchasing 
efficiency in these molecule markets may have significant cost saving implications
17 The research approach in this thesis is a quantitative adaptation to Kathleen Eisenhardt’s qualitative 
case study, theory-building approach (i.e. the building o f  new theories through the use of hard 
evidence), through which this thesis can offer newfound insights on areas o f competition that are in 
their early stages o f research, which can act as a springboard for further theory-proving research 
(Eisenhardt 1989).
18 Paroxetine is not available for OTC use in these countries, so could not be included in this study on 
OTC versus prescription competition.
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for these countries. Furthermore, because these molecules treat chronic diseases, the 
long-term costs implications to payors further contributes to the opportunities for 
improved purchasing efficiency. Second, because their respective market sizes are 
large, they are likely to attract a relatively large number of manufacturers as market 
size seems to be a determinant of generic entry. This large number of competitors 
may result in individual manufacturers having to devise ways in which to remain 
profitable, which makes these markets ripe cases for studying manufacturers’ 
attempts to product differentiate from other manufacturers in the market. Table 3-1 
shows the 2004 market size (in USA dollars), number of manufacturers and number 
of product presentations in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in Germany, 
France, the USA and the UK.
Table 3-1 Size of Omeprazole and Paroxetine Markets in 2004, measured by the 
Sales (USD), Number of Manufacturers and Number of Presentations_________
2004 Sales (USD) Number of Manufacturers in 2004q4
Number of Presentations 
in 2004q4
Omeprazole Paroxetine Omeprazole Paroxetine Omeprazole Paroxetine
Germany $611,993,000 $53,722,000 35 36 284 204
France $317,382,000 $214,470,000 15 9 38 10
UK $180,053,000 $85,723,000 7 5 38 14
USA $903,099,000 $1,493,462,000 9 8 37 58
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Third, both molecules belong to therapeutic classes that are the most 
therapeutically superior classes of treatment for their respective disease areas, which 
likely reduces the extent to which patients would switch out of these classes to 
another therapeutic class (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005). Omeprazole was the 
first molecule to enter into the Proton Pump Inhibitor (PPI) therapeutic class of 
drugs, which treats gastroesophageal reflux disease, also known as acid reflux. 
Paroxetine was the second molecule to enter into the Selective Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitors class (SSRIs) of drugs, which treat depression, anxiety, and compulsive 
disorders. Fourth, by selecting molecules in the retail market that treat chronic 
conditions and where the most widely consumed form of medication is taken orally, 
these studies are able to eliminate a number of demand-side confounding factors that 
may arise in pharmaceutical pricing studies, namely the fact that price elasticities are 
higher for chronic diseases than for acute illnesses and the fact that demand 
conditions may vary between different formulations such as oral medication (tablets, 
capsules, etc.) and topical treatments. Consequently, it is likely that findings from
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this thesis would be the most generalizable to the population of other drugs that are 
primarily concentrated in the retail market, treat chronic conditions and are taken 
orally. It should be noted, however, that omeprazole treats a physical illness, while 
paroxetine treats a mental illness. This could result in slightly different demand 
conditions, despite their other similar properties. However, all molecules that treat 
different illnesses are likely to experience somewhat different market conditions 
since each illness has a different set of characteristics that are unique to it (such as 
the patient population, the nature of symptoms, the seriousness of the disease etc.).
Fifth, omeprazole has been chosen because it has the unique characteristic of 
having been approved for dual prescription and OTC status around the same time 
period in two of these study countries, which enables this study to be the first of its 
kind to compare the nature of and extent of prescription versus OTC competition 
across regulatory settings.
3.2.2 Countries
The study countries are the USA, UK, Germany and France because their 
pharmaceutical policies represent four different national approaches to 
pharmaceutical regulation. On one end of the spectrum, the USA has one of the most 
unregulated pharmaceutical pricing environments, whereas on the other end of the 
spectrum, France has historically had a much more tightly regulated pharmaceutical 
pricing environment. In a case-study theory-building research approach, researchers 
note that “given the limited number of cases which can usually be studied, it makes 
sense to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types in which the process 
of interest is ‘transparently observable’” (Eisenhardt, 1989). The salient features of 
each country’s supply-side off-patent pharmaceutical policies are briefly discussed in 
the paragraphs below. In addition, Table 3-2 summarises policies in each of the 
study countries. It is important to note that in order to put the studies into context, 
these off-patent pharmaceutical policy descriptions match the selected study time 
period. A more comprehensive overview of the four countries’ pharmaceutical 
regulations is provided in Appendix A.
In the area of off-patent pharmaceutical price regulation, the USA and the UK 
approaches may be characterised as free market-oriented, both for pricing and 
reimbursement, whereby manufacturers set prices, which are subsequently 
reimbursed by payors. Germany’s approach consists of free pricing combined with a
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reference pricing reimbursement system and France has historically implemented a 
system of price control for both original brand and generic drugs that has recently 
been combined with a reference pricing reimbursement system.
In the USA, the plurality of the health insurance system has led to a plurality 
of off-patent pharmaceutical pricing policies. For example, on behalf of the private 
insurance market and Medicare Part D enrolees, pharmaceutical benefit 
manufacturers may negotiate a percentage discount (in the form of a rebate) off retail 
prices directly with the manufacturers. Distribution chain discount practices are also 
permitted. Meanwhile, Medicaid stipulates a percentage discount for off-patent 
drugs, while the uninsured face full retail prices in most cases.
In the UK, the NHS reimburses one price for generics of the same molecule, 
called the Drug Tariff, that is based on freely set manufacturer and wholesaler prices. 
Similarly to the USA, distribution chain discount practices are also permitted in the 
UK. However, in contrast to the USA, the UK’s single payor system lends itself to a 
centralized purchasing policy for off-patent pharmaceuticals (in comparison with the 
USA’s pluralist system of multiple purchasers and consequently, varying rebates), 
whereby the NHS is able to retain a share of these discounts in the form of a 
clawback from retail pharmacies.
Germany also allows manufacturers of off-patent pharmaceuticals to freely 
set prices. However, distribution chain mark-ups are regulated. In addition, 
Germany was one of the first countries to pioneer the practice of reference pricing, 
whereby sickness funds set one reimbursement price for each reference group (based 
on the price in the lowest third of the group). During the study period, this reference 
pricing was applied at the molecule level, which grouped together original brand 
drugs and their generic equivalents, although in recent years, Germany has also 
introduced reference pricing at the therapeutic level for certain classes.
Finally, France has historically stipulated that generic prices not exceed a 
certain percentage (30-40%) of original brand prices. In addition, distribution chain 
mark-ups have been regulated. Discount practices are also permitted, although these 
discounts occur within the distribution chain, so are not captured by payors. Around 
the turn of the century, France introduced a number of generic pharmaceutical 
policies with the aim of increasing generic penetration rates. As part of this 
initiative, molecule level reference pricing was introduced in 2003 for off-patent 
pharmaceuticals, although the molecules in this study were not included in this
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reference price system during this study period. As a result, the generic molecules in 
this study were subject to the stipulated price cap percentages, which may have 
resulted in uniform pricing, to the extent that price caps act as price floors in practice.
3.3 Data Sources
The data used in the thesis come from Intercontinental Medical Statistics 
(IMS). IMS Health is a for-profit organization that contracts with pharmaceutical 
companies to provide pharmaceutical marketing research through a method of retail 
and hospital pharmacy sampling. For example, in the USA, IMS Health gathers its 
data by surveying 34,000 retail pharmacies, which includes independent pharmacies, 
chains, pharmacies within foodstores, mass merchandisers and mail order. In the 
USA, this accounts for over 60% of retail pharmacies and over 70% of the 
prescriptions filled (USA Department of Health and Human Services, 2000). This 
thesis has used IMS Health retail pharmacy (as well as food stores and mail order in 
the USA) price and sales data for omeprazole and paroxetine from 2000ql-2005ql 
on a quarterly basis. Price and sales revenue data can be used to arrive at 
corresponding volume data. Data is presented by drug molecule name, country, 
manufacturer, strength, package size, formulation, and generic/brand status. OTC 
status is also discemable via the manufacturer’s name. At this level, each 
observation is referred to as a presentation. Having access to data at this level of 
specificity is therefore highly valuable, as it enables subdivision of the omeprazole 
and paroxetine molecule markets into the relevant smaller markets such as generic 
markets, OTC markets, prescription markets and strength markets.
IMS Health is the gold standard data source for pharmaceutical market 
research, which is reflected in the fact that most of the above literature uses this data 
as well as the industry itself (USA Department of Health and Human Services,
2000). In addition, because it is the only consistent source of pharmaceutical market 
data that exists on an international level, it also allows comparisons across countries.
Because of the surveying method, the pharmacy retail prices are reflective of 
the actual purchased prices at the retail pharmacy level. This is therefore inclusive of 
pharmacy retail discounts in the USA as well as any discounts that are negotiated 
within the distribution chain in the USA and the UK. This makes IMS Health price 
data more reflective of the actual prices paid than the commonly quoted average 
wholesaler prices in the USA (see Appendix A for a description of average
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wholesaler prices). However, these retail prices do not reflect manufacturer rebates 
in the USA since this information is proprietary. To date, the specific USA 
manufacturer rebates that are tied to each drug do not exist in any data source that is 
accessible to the public. Moreover, the manufacturer rebates in Germany are also not 
reflected in this data. Thus, Germany’s and the USA’s prices may be biased 
upwards. However, since the manufacturer rebates in Germany apply evenly to all 
manufacturers, they should not distort price competition since manufacturers’ prices 
would still be the same, relative to one another. These data discrepancies are also 
discussed in the conclusion/policy implications chapter.
Finally, in the UK, the generic manufacturer’s association has reached an 
agreement with IMS Health that some of the generic manufacturers’ individual 
names be kept private. As a result, the UK is likely to have a few more generic 
manufacturers in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets than this data suggests, 
biasing the number of manufacturers downwards. These manufacturers’ 
presentations are all included in the dataset, however, under an anonymous 
manufacturer named “unbranded.” This dataset is therefore still inclusive of the total 
sales in the UK for these given molecules. None of the other variables are affected 
by this discrepancy.
3.4 Study Period
It is necessary to consider the study period, 2000ql-2005ql, in the context of 
the regulatory changes (see Appendix A for a full discussion). In the USA, there 
were not any large, centralized changes that should bias the analysis of 
pharmaceutical competition. Likewise in the UK, the 2000ql-2005ql time period 
does not include any significant regulatory changes. In France, the introduction of 
the reference price system did occur during the 2000ql-2005ql time period.
However, omeprazole and paroxetine were not included in the French reference 
pricing system during this time period. Thus, the analysis on pharmaceutical market 
competition in France is more relevant for the molecules that have remained outside 
of the reference pricing system. The authorisation of pharmacist generic dispensing 
in France did occur during this time period as well. However, since both omeprazole 
and paroxetine did not go off-patent until after substitution became legal in 2002, any 
changes in generic demand in France should not be distorted by this policy change. 
Finally, in Germany, the significant price freezes did not occur during the 2000ql-
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2005ql period for off-patent drugs.19 This is pertinent because the manufacturer 
price freezes in Germany would result in price freezes along the whole distribution 
chain since the margins are regulated. Thus, static retail prices could incorrectly be 
interpreted to reflect an uncompetitive market rather than the price freezes if  the 
prices freezes had occurred during this period. Finally, the introduction of 
therapeutic reference pricing in Germany did apply to omeprazole in 2004, which is 
during this study period. However, since omeprazole was the first drug in its PPI 
class to go off-patent, it would likely have been the lowest priced as well. Thus, the 
recalculation of the reference price would likely have reflected the omeprazole prices 
regardless, assuming they were in the lowest third of the PPI prices, as the oldest and 
most genericised PPI products on the market.
In conclusion, it is important to reiterate that the analyses in this thesis reflect 
the regulatory environments in these countries during the 2000ql-2005ql time 
period. Table 3-2 provides a summary of the key pharmaceutical policy components 
in these study countries during this study period.
19 Recall that in Germany, from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2004, patented drugs’ manufacturer 
prices were frozen at the October 1,2002 price level. In addition, the Act on Economic Provision 
with Pharmaceuticals introduced a manufacturer price freeze for all medicines (at the November 1, 
2005 level) from May 1, 2006 to March 31, 2008 (OBIG 2006).
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Table 3-2 Overview of Main Pharmaceutical Policies in the USA, UK, Germany 
and France during the 2000-2005 Study Period____________________________
Patented Drugs Off Patent: Generic and Original Brand
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Sources: The author, from OBIG 2006 and Kanavos and Gemmill 2005.
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3.5 Conceptual Framework
The nature of competition within a market differs depending on whether the 
products are heterogeneous (vertical competition) or homogeneous (horizontal 
competition) and on the way in which manufacturers may be able to product 
differentiate. Tirole’s book on industrial economics categorizes types of product 
differentiation into separate models of competition (Tirole, 1989). The commonality 
in all of these models, and in all areas of competition in this thesis, is that 
manufacturers try to avoid the Bertrand paradox of unbridled price competition by 
leveraging their distinctive product qualities. For example, drugs of differing 
molecules within the same therapeutic class are an example of vertical competition, 
whereby heterogeneous products can leverage their superior therapeutic efficacies.
Pharmaceutical competition within a molecule market, as is the case in the 
areas of competition that this thesis studies, is more nuanced since manufacturers of 
the same molecule must find ways in which to product differentiate other than 
quality. In the absence of product differentiation, manufacturers of homogeneous 
products may become vulnerable to the Bertrand model of unbridled price 
competition, which predicts that prices converge to marginal cost, while market 
shares distribute evenly. Under this scenario, pharmaceutical manufacturers of the 
same molecule would struggle to sustain a significant share of the market at 
profitable prices, thereby driving manufacturers out of the market. Since the product 
markets studied in these cases may be characterized as homogeneous (by nature of 
being the same molecule), the null hypothesis, in accordance with the Tirole’s 
Bertrand model, is that these manufacturers engage in a fierce battle of price 
competition, which results in prices converging to marginal cost and an even 
distribution of market shares. In practice, however, it is more likely that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers of the same product have discovered ways in which to 
product differentiate and fragment the market such that their products may no longer 
be considered to be perfectly homogeneous. Evidence from the literature review 
indicates such practices in the form of original brand manufacturers product 
differentiating by leveraging their accumulated goodwill (brand loyalty) and generic 
drugs sometimes enjoying a first mover advantage and/or finding nuanced ways in 
which to product differentiate. Thus, based on the preliminary evidence to date, it is 
expected that the null hypothesis of perfect price competition in these markets of
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supposedly homogeneous goods will be rejected in favour of a more complex 
picture, in which pharmaceutical products of the same molecule find ways to avoid a 
situation of Bertrand competition, whereby the degree of price competition is diluted 
by strategic product differentiation and fragmented markets. This then, is expected 
to result in an equilibrium of imperfect price competition whereby some 
manufacturers are able to hold on to significant shares of the market at relatively 
high prices.
This thesis assesses the nature and degree of competition within a molecule 
market amongst generics, within strength segments of a molecule and between the 
OTC and prescription market of a molecule. In the section below, a discussion on 
the relevance of Tirole’s models of Bertrand, Cournot and Experience Goods 
competition (in the case of competition between original brand and generic 
manufacturers within strength segments) precedes the research question in order to 
put the research question into context. In addition, a more detailed discussion on the 
application of current industrial organization models to these cases is provided in the 
cases themselves. In these cases, Tirole’s theoretical industrial economic models of 
competition are unlikely to apply perfectly. Instead, this thesis predicts that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are able to alter the conditions of what would 
otherwise be homogeneous markets by product differentiating and fragmenting the 
market. In addition, certain market-specific characteristics such as reimbursement 
schemes and different demand-side structures (as is the case in the OTC versus 
prescription market case) make the pharmaceutical market unique, resulting in 
models of competition that do not conform perfectly to Tirole’s models of Bertrand 
and Cournot competition (between homogenous products). Thus, in the process of 
assessing pharmaceutical competition in three, unstudied dimensions of the 
pharmaceutical market, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the literature 
by building new hypotheses on the nature of pharmaceutical competition in molecule 
markets. Further research on other molecule markets could then be conducted in 
order to support these findings.
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3.6 Research Questions and Methods
3.6.1 Case 1: Competition amongst generics in the retail omeprazole and 
paroxetine markets in Germany, France, the UK and the USA, 2000ql- 
2005ql
3.6.1.1 Economic Theory Applied to Case 1
Because generics of the same molecule are therapeutically equivalent and by 
definition, do not have the competitive advantage of brand loyalty, it would seem 
that generics compete almost solely on price. This type of price competition would 
be an example of the classic Bertrand model, where both the products and the firms 
are assumed to be homogeneous, resulting in prices that converge to marginal cost, 
and evenly distributed market shares. Under this model of perfect competition, firms 
do not profit, even in the case where there are only two firms competing. In reality, 
the Bertrand model is an imperfect application for the generic market (and most other 
markets), as competing firms do possess certain proprietary advantages. Evidence 
shows that the lowest priced generics do not achieve the highest market share, which 
is contradictory to Bertrand competition (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). Thus, it 
seems that some generics are able to retain market share while keeping their prices 
high, relative to the lowest price in the market. Two possible explanations for this 
that are offered in the literature are a first generic mover advantage and product 
differentiation, although current studies have yet to explore these concepts for 
individual molecule markets at the presentation level. It may be that since the 
unpredictable timing of the drug approval process often results in entry lags, the first 
entrant has an advantage. Alternatively, certain generic manufacturers may have the 
advantage of being more experienced in some therapeutic areas or being larger, and 
therefore having stronger client relationships in general. Thus, the current evidence 
indicates a market of imperfect Bertrand-like competition.
In determining whether competition amongst generics of the same molecule 
resembles the Bertrand model of perfect price competition, the Cournot model of 
competition between homogeneous goods must also be considered, whereby firms 
choose their quantities ex-ante due to sharply rising marginal costs. In this case, the 
outcome of sustainable market shares despite varying pricings seems to more closely 
resemble the Cournot model. However, because it seems unlikely that manufacturers 
of generic drugs face sharply rising marginal costs, considering that a well-known
62
study assumes the marginal cost of generics to be virtually zero (Caves, Whinston 
and Hurwitz, 1991), this case assumes the Bertrand model to be the most applicable 
model of competition for the generic industry. Nonetheless, the Bertrand model’s
onprediction of unbridled price competition seems an imperfect fit as well. Thus, this 
study expects to reject the Bertrand model’s null hypothesis of unbridled price 
competition in favour of a more complicated picture of product differentiation and 
fragmented markets.
What, then, are the drivers of price competition amongst generics? Some of 
the literature in Chapter 1 assesses competition in the off-patent market by analyzing 
determinants of entry, thereby treating generic entry as a proxy for generic price 
competition based on the evidence that average generic prices in the USA decline as 
generic entry increases. However, Tirole (1989) shows that while generic entry is a
pre-requisite for competition, it is only one explanatory variable, and is not a
0 1 00measure of competition itself. ’ Thus, this case models the determinants of 
generic prices themselves, in order to determine the variables that spur or inhibit 
price competition.
3.6.1.2 Case 1 Main Research Question
What were the determinants of generic prices in the omeprazole and 
paroxetine retail markets oyer the 2000ql-2005ql period in the USA, UK, Germany 
and France? To what extent did purchasers maximize generic savings and what is 
the potential for further savings?
3.6.1.3 Case 1 Methodology
This case assesses the factors that explain generic prices per defined daily 
dosage (DDD) at the presentation level across the study countries. The fixed-effects 
panel data method has been used, due to the Hausman Test’s rejection of the 
appropriateness of the random-effects method. In this case, the fixed-effects method
20 It should be noted that Tirole offers certain soft solutions to the Bertrand paradox, such as 
diseconomies o f scale.
21 For example, generic entry may be high, but average generic prices may also remain relatively high, 
as was the case in Germany (Monique 2001).
22 Generic entry is also an appropriate explanatory variable because evidence in the literature shows 
that there are few supply side barriers (such as low original brand pricing, high promotional 
expenditures, or burdensome approval requirements) for generic entry, making it an exogenous 
variable.
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likely controls for unobserved differences in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets 
since the explanatory variables are at the market level. Explanatory variables include 
the dominant generic manufacturer’s market share, the number of generic 
competitors, the number of presentations in the market (to indicate product 
differentiation) and the price of the originator brand. This case also analyses the 
distribution of generic omeprazole and paroxetine prices across study countries and 
calculates the savings that countries could have realized if  they had purchased more 
efficiently.
3,6.2 Case 2: Original brand versus generic competition within strengths 
market in the omeprazole and paroxetine retail molecule markets in 
Germany, France, the UK and the USA
3.6.2.1 Economic Theory Applied to Case 2
Competition between original brands and their generic equivalents is an 
example of Tirole’s ‘experience goods’ model of product differentiation, where 
competition between differentiated products occurs even though the products are 
physically identical. Therefore, it is possible that in an attempt to avoid the Bertrand 
paradox of unbridled price competition, original brand manufacturers use their
'J'Xaccumulated goodwill to establish market niches across different strengths of the 
same molecule through which they retain some market power. The space they 
occupy within each strength market, therefore, is where customers tend to be brand 
loyal, and hence face ‘customer inertia’ when it comes to switching to lower cost 
generics. In this product differentiation model, the original brands enjoy the first 
mover advantage of keeping prices high in exchange for some loss in market share.
A recent study acknowledges the possibility that this market harvesting strategy may 
operate within the context of a Stackelberg Model of competition (Kanavos, Costa 
Font and Seeley, 2008). In this model of competition, the original brand and generic 
manufacturers directly compete on quantity in a game-theory setting, where the 
original brand manufacturer chooses its quantity a priori (as the incumbent in the 
market) and sets its price accordingly, while the generic manufacturers (as the 
followers) respond by picking up the additional demand requirements and setting
23 On the role o f goodwill, “Consumers do not treat products they have experienced and products they 
have not experienced as identical even if the products are in fact the same. Consumers who have 
experienced a good match with a product or observed its high quality will not try a rival product 
unless it is considerably cheaper (Tirole 1989).”
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their prices accordingly. Without a comprehensive survey of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, it is difficult to assess the extent to which original brand generic 
manufacturers truly engage in this sort of strategic competition. Thus, this study 
does not attempt to prove or disprove whether the market harvesting strategy 
definitely fits within the context of the Stackelberg Model. However, it does briefly 
consider the likelihood that this type of competition is occurring, based on the 
findings of this study of competition at the ultra micro strength segment level.
In the market harvesting model of product differentiation, generics are left 
with the price sensitive portion of the market, and under this model, should 
theoretically be able to sustain prices above marginal cost as long as they too find 
ways to product differentiate, as discussed in the first case. Thus, similarly to the 
above case on competition amongst generics at the presentation level, competition 
amongst generics within strength segment markets is expected to resemble the 
Bertrand model more than the Cournot model due to expectation that marginal costs 
of production are fairly flat. However, also similarly to the model above, generic 
manufacturers are expected to product differentiate in order to avoid unbridled price 
competition.
In assessing the nature of competition between original brand and generic 
manufacturers and amongst generic manufacturers, the literature review shows that 
there should not be significant supply-side barriers to entry for generics since 
evidence shows that, first, original brand manufacturers scale back on their 
advertising shortly before patent expiration and do not attempt to deter generic entry 
by significantly cutting their prices and, second, regulatory requirements in the USA 
and Europe only require generics to prove bioequivalence to the original brand rather 
than requiring them to conduct their own clinical trials. Consequently, as long as 
drug approval requirements and sunk costs are low, generics may freely enter 
markets and should in theory face a marginal cost of production that is similar to that 
of original brands. In the case of competition within strength markets, generic 
manufacturers must conduct separate lab tests and in some cases, submit separate 
applications in order to gain approval for each strength product, although these fixed 
costs for generic manufacturers of gaining approval to market in different strengths 
should not be too high (reflecting the fact that in these study countries, they need 
only prove bioequivalence to the original band product of the same strength). Thus,
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in theory, generics should be free to enter into differing strength markets in order to 
compete for market share with the original brand products.
3.6.2.2 Case 2 Main Research Question
To what extent does the degree of competition between the original brand and 
generics within strength market segments differ across strength market segments of 
the retail omeprazole and paroxetine markets in Germany, France, the UK and the 
USA during the 2000ql -  2005ql period?
3.6.2.3 M ethodfor Case 2
This study compares the number of strengths and the strength market shares 
(as a percentage of the total molecule market) within these molecule markets across 
the study countries. This case assesses the factors that explain original brand prices, 
original brand market shares and generic prices within strength segments of the 
omeprazole and paroxetine markets in Germany, France, the UK and the USA during 
this study period. Of particular interest is the extent to which generic entry is 
associated with enhanced competition in each strength market. Similarly to the case 
on generics, this case uses a fixed-effects panel data method due to the Hausman 
Test’s rejection of the appropriateness of random effects. The unobserved factors 
that are likely controlled for include differences in the omeprazole and paroxetine 
market as well as any differences that are unique to each strength market. This study 
then estimates the increased purchasing efficiency that could have resulted if the 
degree of competition within each strength market had equalled the most competitive 
strength market. Finally, this study compares prices across strength segment markets 
and calculates the potential savings that these countries could have realized if they 
were to take advantage of nonlinear pricing by splitting pills or if the paroxetine 
controlled release line extension had not been introduced in the USA market.
3.6.3 Case 3: Competition between OTC omeprazole and prescription (retail) 
Omeprazole in the USA and the UK
3.6.3.1 Economic Theory Applied to Case 3
In order to determine the nature and degree of competition between drugs of 
the same molecule in the prescription and OTC markets, it is necessary to recall the 
theoretical implications of the Bertrand and Cournot models of competition. Under
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the Cournot model of competition, manufacturers would have predetermined 
capacities due to sharply rising marginal costs of production. Thus, under the 
assumption that both OTC manufacturers and prescription manufacturers of 
omeprazole would face fairly flat marginal costs of production, the Cournot model is 
not applicable to this case. Under a Bertrand Model, manufacturers would compete 
on price until the price of the prescription products equals the price of the OTC 
products. However, since the OTC products are theoretically differentiated from the 
prescription products by indication or strength (as required under regulatory 
approval), and since the payment side is structured differently in the OTC market 
(e.g. the payment is primarily through consumer out-of-pocket spending rather than 
third party payment), it is very unlikely that a perfect model of Bertrand competition 
would exist between the prescription and OTC markets. Nonetheless, in order to 
understand the nature of competition between the prescription and OTC markets, it is 
important to study the extent to which some degree of market share and price 
competition does exist, despite the demand-side fragmentation. Evidence of some 
degree of price competition between the two markets could suggest that 
manufacturers may use the OTC market as a form of product differentiation within 
the context of the broader molecule market.
It is important to note that in assessing competition between the prescription 
and OTC markets of the same molecule, there are barriers to entry for generic 
manufacturers in that although they may apply for OTC approval, the ultimate 
decision lies with the original brand manufacturers in these countries. In addition, 
where the original brand manufacturer initiates the switch in the USA, a 3 year 
exclusivity period (in the OTC market) may be awarded by the FDA, creating 
additional barriers to entry for the generic manufacturer. For these reasons, the 
original brand manufacturer may view the OTC market as a valuable opportunity to 
product differentiate, as long as it expects the profits it earns in this market to exceed 
any associated costs (including regulatory costs as well as any market share that its 
prescription products lose to the OTC products).
3.6.3.2 Case 3 Main Research Question
What was the nature and degree of competition between the OTC omeprazole 
and retail prescription omeprazole markets in the USA and the UK from market entry 
to 2005ql?
67
3.6.3.3 Method fo r  Case 3
This case first analyzes the growth of prescription original brand versus 
prescription generic versus OTC omeprazole from OTC omeprazole entry in the 
USA and the UK to 2005ql in order to determine whether the products are 
complements or substitutes. Evidence that they are substitutes suggests the existence 
of competition. Where there is evidence that the prescription and OTC omeprazole 
markets act as substitutes, this case uses a random-effects panel data model to assess 
the determinants of OTC prices. In this case, the Hausman test confirms the 
appropriateness of the random-effects model, indicating that there are not any 
unobserved factors that are unique to each observation. This is likely due to the fact 
that the explanatory variables are all at the market level, and since this case studies 
one market (the omeprazole market), there are no differences in markets to control 
for. In addition, this case compares OTC and prescription omeprazole prices in the 
USA and the UK, and calculates the potential savings that payors could have realized 
had they covered the OTC omeprazole version and shifted additional patients from 
prescription to OTC omeprazole.
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CHAPTER 4: COMPETITION IN GENERICS 
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS: THE PRICE THAT HEALTH 
SYSTEMS PAY FOR REGULATION
4.1 Background
Between 1998 and 2003, annual rates of growth in drug spending were nearly 
double the rate of health spending in the USA, France and Germany (OECD Health 
Data, 2005). Because of the scarcity of health care resources, these high levels of 
pharmaceutical spending and growth rates have significant opportunity costs. For 
example, rising pharmaceutical expenditures may result in policymakers shifting 
costs to patients through increased copayments, which could threaten access to 
treatment. Moreover, fewer resources may be left for the rest of the health care 
system, limiting the ability to cover other services. As a result, policy makers in 
many OECD countries have continued to grapple with the effects of pharmaceutical 
spending growth increases.
One of the policy options that should aid pharmaceutical expenditure cost 
containment is to switch to generic use once an originator drug’s patent has expired. 
While there has been some evidence to the contrary (Schwartzman, 1976)24, it is 
agreed upon that generics are of the same quality as their original brand equivalents, 
as they are identical molecules, have similar bioavailability , and are therefore 
determined by regulatory authorities to be bioequivalent to the originator molecule.
In theory, price competition between an originator brand drug and its generic 
equivalents should follow patent expiration, thereby driving down the price of that 
molecule without any compromise in access or quality. However, evidence suggests 
that this may not occur. During the 1980s and 1990s, originator brand prices did not 
decline after generic entry in the USA, and in some cases, even increased at a faster 
rate (Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz, 1991; Grabowski and Vernon, 1996; Frank and 
Salkever, 1997). This was described as the market harvesting strategy, maintaining 
premium prices while market shares erode over time (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992).
24 Because generic producers have less goodwill to lose, they may not invest as heavily in quality 
control. Recalls and failed inspections occur proportionally more in the generic industry, although 
final generic products have never shown evidence o f inferior clinical performance.
25 Bioavailability measures the quantity and rate at which the drug’s active ingredient reaches the 
bloodstream and the site o f  therapeutic action.
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Because of the originator brand’s continued price premium following patent 
expiration, much of the discussion on how to increase pharmaceutical purchasing 
efficiency within molecule markets has focused on the relationship between the 
original brand and generic. Supply-side policy responses have been implemented in 
North America and Western Europe to improve generic entry and hence generic 
penetration. An example of such a policy is the Hatch-Waxman Act in the USA, 
which permits generic manufacturers to prove bioequivalence to original brand 
equivalents in order to receive marketing approval, rather than having to conduct 
their own clinical trials. In addition, many countries across West Europe and North 
America have introduced a variety of demand-side policies that have been largely 
successful at promoting generic prescribing and use. Substitution laws and mark-up 
regulations have targeted pharmacists, while budgets and generic (INN) prescribing 
have targeted physicians. In the USA, many insurers have introduced tiered co­
payments based on generic/brand status in an attempt to make the consumer more 
cost conscious. The result was that by 2001, the share of generic volume had 
reached 52,47, 36 and 8.4 percent of the total prescription drug market in the UK, 
USA, Germany and France respectively (Mossialos, Mrazek and Walley, 2004). The 
variation in the share of generics across countries reflects differences in generic 
entry, different uptake of generic medicines, the variability in the supply- and 
demand-side policy-mix and differences in the implementation of policies favouring 
generic medicines. Thus, countries have had varying degrees of success in 
improving generic penetration. In addition, national regulations also vary in the way 
in which they attempt to achieve low generic prices. Some countries attempt to 
stimulate price competition amongst generics through a free market environment that 
allows free pricing of generics, while others attempt to control generic prices through 
reimbursement schemes such as generic price caps and reference pricing.
Studies observed that in the USA, the average generic price for a molecule 
tends to decrease as the number of generic competitors increases (Grabowski and 
Vernon, 1986; Caves et al., 1991; CBO, 1998; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 
2008); in 1994, the average prescription price of generic drugs that had 1 to 5 generic 
manufacturers (in their molecule markets) was $23.40, compared to the average price 
of $19.90 with 16 to 20 manufacturers (CBO, 1998). The relationship between 
generic price and market share is less clear. A USA study showed that generic prices 
varied significantly and in half of the 18 product markets the lowest price generic did
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not achieve the largest market share, while in some cases the first generic entrant 
captured the largest market share despite relatively high prices (Grabowski and 
Vemon, 1992). It is argued that there may sometimes be a first mover advantage due 
to pharmacist- and patient-switching costs, in which the first generic entrant sustains 
for at least four years a 25-30% higher market share than if it had not been first 
(Hollis, 2002). The benefits of the first generic entrant are sometimes reaped by 
pseudo-generics, which are marketed by the originator brand manufacturer, thereby 
discouraging future entry and hence generic competition (Hollis, 2002). This study 
also concludes that the Ontario Province’s reference price system, which reimburses 
the lowest priced generic, results in a disincentive for generic manufacturers to cut 
prices, as they would not achieve a larger market share in exchange for doing so 
(since most other manufacturers would also cut prices). This finding is consistent 
with another study (Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008), which also finds 
reference pricing to have a negative effect on generic price competition and that the 
lowest generic prices are up to 47% higher in reference priced systems, compared to 
nonreference priced systems (Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). Moreover, 
there is some preliminary evidence that product differentiation may lead to higher 
generic prices, although this phenomenon is not discussed specifically in light of 
countries’ differing regulatory systems (Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008).
Despite the sizeable amount of literature on originator brand versus generic 
competition, little is known about how the nature of price competition amongst 
generic products differs across settings. Studies have found that reference pricing is 
associated with relatively higher generic prices, but have not yet determined how 
individual market characteristics influence generic prices at the most disaggregated 
level within these different regulatory environments. The impact that supply-side 
pricing and reimbursement regulation might have on the amplitude and extent of 
competition among generic alternatives across different settings is also not yet well- 
understood. This is important because the distribution of generic prices partly 
determines the extent of savings to health insurance post generic entry, to the extent 
that the lowest priced generics do not necessarily achieve the largest market shares. 
Consequently, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of generic policies in 
delivering significant savings to health insurers.
This chapter studies the nature of competition and its determinants amongst 
generic medicines and the extent to which this is affected by regulatory practices in
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different regulatory settings, exemplified by the inclusion of the USA, the UK, 
Germany and France in the study. It also compares the distribution of generic prices 
across these four countries, and analyzes the extent to which health insurance 
succeeds in purchasing at low available generic prices. In so doing, it assesses 
whether further savings can be achieved and whether health insurers are currently 
optimizing their benefits from generic medicines. Section 2 discusses the conceptual 
framework; section 3 outlines the methodology used in the analysis; sections 4 and 5 
present the results and discuss them respectively and; finally, section 6 draws the 
main conclusions and policy implications.
4.2 Conceptual framework
Assuming that generics made from the same molecule are homogeneous, 
non-differentiated goods, and that generic manufacturers do not face significant 
capacity constraints, generic manufacturers would likely compete on price in the 
absence of price controls, where demand responds to price, in accordance with the 
Bertrand Model of price competition (Tirole, 1988). Economic theory predicts that 
two non-differentiated goods are perfect substitutes and because demand responds to 
price, firms at the same price achieve equal market shares. Since firms do not face 
capacity constraints, they always meet the demand they face at their given price. 
Market size is assumed to be constant as consumers demand the same quantity of the 
product, regardless of price. Under a Bertrand price competition model, the lowest 
priced generic should achieve the largest market share. Therefore, manufacturers 
have an incentive to compete on price until price equals marginal cost. Assuming 
two competitors with prices pi > P2 > c, where pi = the price of one generic 
manufacturer’s product, p2 = the price of the other generic manufacturer’s product 
and c = marginal cost, then under Bertrand competition, the manufacturer charging 
p2 will capture the entire market, leaving the manufacturer that charges pi with zero 
market. Demand is therefore denoted by:
r
D(pi)
D(pi ,p2) =  \  '/’ D(P.)
0
if Pi < P2 
if Pi = P2 
if Pi > P2
(1)
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This will result in the higher priced manufacturer undercutting the lower- 
priced manufacturer and the pattern will continue until,
P2 = P1 = C (2)
Where homogeneous goods face fairly flat marginal costs, manufacturers are 
more likely to compete on price than on market share, thereby making prices the 
better strategic variable to analyze over market share (Giralt, 2007; Tirole, 1988). 
However, the Bertrand model assumes that there are no switching costs—that 
physicians, pharmacist and patients are not resistant to switching between generic 
equivalents.26 The Bertrand Paradox also assumes that manufacturers are not able to 
tactically undercut their competitors, which is unrealistic, given the numerous ways 
in which pharmaceutical manufacturers may differentiate their products (e.g. 
branding, developing proprietary relationships with distributors and altering 
formulation, package sizes and strength).
A more realistic approach to the Bertrand model is one that recognizes 
manufacturers’ abilities to strategically prevent this unbridled price competition. 
Thus, most analyses of price rivalry will concern the determination of the factors that 
induce tough or soft competition (Tirole, 1988). One such factor that may prevent 
perfect price competition is product differentiation. The most well known way for 
manufacturers to differentiate their products is via branding. It is through brand 
loyalty that demand for homogeneous goods may become less price sensitive, 
thereby allowing manufacturers of branded products to maintain price premiums.
This can be seen in the case of originator brand versus generic competition. Another 
way in which manufacturers can differentiate their products is by packaging them 
differently. By concentrating on certain strengths, package sizes and forms, generic 
manufacturers may be able to carve out niche parts of the molecule markets, and 
therefore prevent rampant price competition. Hence, assessing the relationship 
between product differentiation within each generic market and generic prices may 
provide an indication of the extent to which product differentiation does soften 
generic competition. Finally, generic manufacturers may be able to undercut their 
competitors by developing proprietary relationships with distributors (i.e.
26 In reality, switching may incur significant costs. For example, pharmacists may be resistant to 
switching which generic product they dispense as a result o f having to inform patients o f these 
switches (Hollis 2002).
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wholesalers and retail pharmacies). To the extent that one manufacturer is able to 
gain a dominant market position, either as a result of being the first to enter the 
market, or as a result of having established contractual advantages over other firms 
(e.g. through historic relationships, etc.), it is also important to consider the effects 
that such presence may have on price competition.
A factor that may induce intense competition is the number of generic 
competitors. It is important to note that much of the research that assesses generic 
versus generic competition has identified the number of companies as the outcome of 
interest, under the assumption that the number of companies acts as a proxy for lower 
prices (Hollis, 2002). The first generic mover may deter further generic entry 
further, thereby assuming generic prices are likely to be higher where there are fewer 
competitors. In addition, the observational studies in the USA also focus on the 
number of generic competitors as the outcome that determines price (Caves et al, 
1991; CBO, 1998). However, evidence suggests that across countries, this negative 
correlation between number of companies and price does not necessarily hold 
(Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). Consequently, in order to assess the 
determinants of prices and the extent of price competition amongst generics, it is 
important to study the effect that the number of competitors has on generic prices, 
rather than assuming that this number acts as generic price proxy.
Finally, in generic pharmaceutical markets, regulation on the supply-side may 
altogether deter the extent of price competition amongst generic firms. Reference 
pricing may be an example in this context. By setting a maximum reimbursement 
ceiling, price competition may be inhibited because generic manufacturers have no 
financial incentive to cut prices below that ceiling, as they would not achieve a larger 
market share in exchange for doing so (Hollis, 2002).
Consequently, generic prices should, in principle, be determined by the 
degree of product differentiation within the context of otherwise homogeneous 
products, the presence of a dominant generic manufacturer, the number of generic 
competitors and countries’ different regulatory systems.
In light of the above, the model that may explain price competition in 
genericised markets deviates from the standard Bertrand model as shown in equation 
(3). The proposed structure results in an enhanced Bertrand model which allows for 
the effects of some price competition in the presence of regulation and attempts to 
product differentiate:
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Pi = f ( MS™ gen, NGEN,, P orig, REG;, APDIFFj) (3) 
i = 1,2, . . . ,  n
where Pj is the generic price per daily defined dosage (DDD) at the 
presentation level, MS™8™ is the market share of the dominant generic
manufacturer; NGEN/ is the number of generic competitors; P ong is the price of the
originator brand to determine the extent of price rigidity; REGj encompasses 
regulatory aspects and; APDIFFj relates to product differentiation. Equation (3) is 
therefore expected to allow for a new equilibrium:
p i > p 2> ... > pn> c  (4)
4.3 Methods
We test the amplitude and extent of competition in off-patent markets by 
analyzing competition patterns in two products across four OECD countries. The 
products studied are omeprazole and paroxetine, and the markets are the USA, UK, 
Germany and France. Both omeprazole and paroxetine treat chronic illnesses with 
high prevalence and incidence in developed countries; omeprazole treats gastro­
esophageal reflux disease and paroxetine treats depression, anxiety, and compulsive 
disorders. Both drugs are primarily sold on an outpatient basis through retail
7JI • •pharmacies. In addition, both drugs are dispensed on prescription, although
70omeprazole is also available over the counter (OTC) in the USA and the UK. 
Finally, both products have gone off-patent recently enough to enable generic price 
competition analysis in the context of relatively recent regulatory developments and
27 The term ‘daily defined dosage’ refers to a unit o f measurement that was first developed by the 
World Health Organization’s Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology in an effort to 
standardize pharmaceutical utilization measures across countries. In accordance with the World 
Health Organization’s definition, “The DDD is the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a 
drug used for its main indication in adults” (WHO, 2009).
28 Recall from Chapters 1-3 that the hospital market is excluded in this study as a result o f hospitals’ 
and retail pharmacies’ differing demand-side characteristics.
29 Specifically, 20mg omeprazole became available over the counter in the US in 2003Q3, while lOmg 
omeprazole became available over the counter in the UK in 2004Q1. In the US, omeprazole OTC was 
approved under the original brand name, Prilosec. In the UK, it was approved under a different brand 
name, Zanprol. As a result, OTC omeprazole in the US is considered an original brand drug, while 
OTC omeprazole in the UK is considered a generic drug. Thus, in the US, OTC omeprazole could 
have influenced prescription generic prices through the original brand prices variable, while in the 
UK, OTC omeprazole was part of the dependent variable, generic price. The effects o f omeprazole 
OTC switch in the US and the UK and its implications for the prescription market are analysed 
separately in chapter 7.
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long ago enough such that the generic market has had time to mature in the study 
countries, which offers insights into generic price competition over time.
The two products are suitable for this analysis because of their large market 
size and the chronic nature of the conditions they treat, as patients may need to 
continue their treatment for several years. Additionally, omeprazole and paroxetine 
represent novel treatments and belong to two advanced therapeutic classes, proton 
pump inhibitors (PPIs) and serotonin selective re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs) 
respectively. The molecules’ superior efficacies compared with previous treatments, 
combined with the chronic nature of the conditions they treat have resulted in high 
expenditure in all study countries. Between 2000 and 2005, the retail pharmacy 
generic paroxetine and omeprazole markets accounted for $5.5 billion in the USA, 
$5.4 billion in Germany, $1.0 billion in the UK and $0.7 billion in France. High 
expenditure, combined with these countries’ focus on generics, have, in principle, 
resulted in large generic markets, offering the opportunity for significant savings to 
health insurance through enhanced generic price competition and improved 
purchasing.
4.3.1 Data
The study uses Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) Health data. IMS 
collects pharmaceutical pricing and sales data across numerous countries and 
provides a robust source of comparative data, with data being subject to internal 
validation (IMS, 2002). Retail sales and price data was available for omeprazole and 
paroxetine on a quarterly basis from 2000Q1 to 2005Q1. The data was available at 
the most disaggregated level, namely the product presentation level, which includes 
various permutations of strength, formulation, and package size. The manufacturer’s 
name (both originator and generic) can also be distinguished at presentation level. 
This data allows for the calculation of market (molecule) level information, such as 
the number of presentations and manufacturers.
Using price and sales data, the quantity of packages sold was determined. 
Subsequently, the total volume of each presentation sold was arrived at by adjusting 
for package size (i.e. number of pills, tablets or capsules) and strength based on 
defined daily dosage (DDD). All prices were inflation-adjusted by each country’s 
consumer price index, and then converted to USA dollars based on the quarterly 
exchange rates.
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4.3.2 Choice o f study countries
The choice of study countries reflects differences in supply- and demand-side 
regulatory and incentive structures affecting the uptake and use of generic medicines. 
The USA represents a relatively free generic market in that there is no generic price 
control or regulation for the majority of generic drugs at the federal level, although 
requirements exist for discounts by different insurers and there exists a variety of 
measures incentivising the use of generics. Medicaid, the health insurance program 
for low-income people, does stipulate that generic prices be discounted 11% off of 
AMP (USA DHHS, 2007), whereas private insurers in the USA often categorize 
drugs into tiered formularies based on generic/brand status, price and therapeutic 
efficacy. They then use this leverage to negotiate rebates with the manufacturers. 
Private insurers then base patient co-payments on these tiers in order to promote 
generics and other cost-effective drugs. Finally, the USA Veteran’s Administration 
achieves the largest pharmaceutical discounts in the USA through the Federal Supply 
Schedule (see Appendix A), while the uninsured face full retail prices in the USA. 
Thus, with the exception of some discounting practices, manufacturers, wholesalers 
and retailers are able to price freely in the USA.
The majority of the generics market can also be characterized as free pricing 
in the UK, with the exception of the Maximum Price Scheme (see Appendix A), 
which was in effect from 1999 to 2005 and applied to several products which 
witnessed supply shortages (DH, 2000). The intention of this scheme was to protect 
the NHS against unpredictable price increases for certain products (such as 
antibiotics) (Kay, 2000). However, in most cases, the price caps under the Maximum 
Price Scheme were still determined by the generic manufacturers and wholesalers 
(OXERA, 2001). Today, the Drug Tariff (see Appendix A) in the UK establishes a 
generic reimbursement price for each molecule of a given strength that is based on 
reported manufacturer and wholesaler supply prices (The Drug Tariff, 2005). In the 
process of procurement, retail pharmacies are permitted to negotiate discounts off of 
this retail list price for their profit. They must then give a percentage of this discount 
back to the NHS in the form of a clawback. The clawback ranges between 5.93% 
and 12.52%, depending on the number of prescriptions dispensed on a monthly basis.
30 The role o f these private insurers has become especially significant recently in that the Medicare 
prescription drug benefit is also administered by these insurers. However, the Medicare prescription 
drug benefit had not yet been implemented during this study period.
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In the case of Germany and France, generic prices and reimbursement are 
more heavily regulated. Both countries have a reference pricing system. From 1989 
through 2004, Germany had a system of molecule-level reference prices, whereby 
upon patent expiry, all products of the same molecule were subject to the same 
reference price (Kanavos and Reinhardt, 2003).31 According to recent legislation, a 
generic is only cost-effective if it is in the lowest third of the price range for the 
molecule (Hausler, 2002). Similarly to other medicines, the prices of generic 
products can be freely set by their manufacturers. The manufacturer or importer of 
the original brand is free to choose whether to maintain its price or change it when 
generic competition appears. The implementation of reference pricing implies that a 
ceiling exists on reimbursement and that patients will need to pay the difference 
between the reference price and the drug of choice if the latter’s price is higher. 
Unlike the USA and the UK, Germany also regulates distribution chain mark-ups. 
Beginning in 2004, pharmacists receive a payment of €8.10, plus a fixed margin of 
3%, which represents a change over previous years, whence pharmacies were 
remunerated on a regressive margin basis (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005).
The reference pricing system in France is relatively new. Until 2003, France 
operated a system of direct generic price controls, whereby generic prices were not 
allowed to exceed 60-70% of the original brand price. However, in September 2003, 
France introduced molecule-level reference pricing for twenty nine molecules, 
translating into sixty one groups of generic drugs and corresponding to seventy two 
reference groups. These molecules were selected based on their generic penetration 
rates. Specifically, this reference group list included molecules with 2003 generic 
penetration rates of between 10 and 45 percent (FMOH, 2003). A further wave of 
molecules was added to the reference price system in 2005. Under this reference 
price system, once a drug loses its patent, the reimbursement price for all drugs of 
that molecule is set at the average generic price, not to exceed the original price cap
31 In 2005, the reference pricing system in Germany changed from being at the molecule level to the 
therapeutic level. Under the new regulations, IQWiG determines whether the product will become 
part o f the reference pricing system, depending on how innovative it is. In-patent products that are not 
the first in their therapeutic classes are therefore more likely to be included in the reference price 
system while still on-patent than the first entrants into the class. From 2005, in-patent products that 
are included in the reference pricing system are subject to the same reimbursement as other molecules 
that may be generic. However, this study does not capture the effect o f this switch.
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of 60-70% of the original brand price. In the case of this chapter, generic entry did 
not occur for omeprazole in France until 2004, and the generic penetration rate for 
paroxetine in France was still under the required 10 percent during the first half of 
2003. Thus, both study molecules were not included in the first wave of reference 
price groups. France also regulates distribution chain mark-ups and varies the 
stipulated mark-ups by price tiers, with a regulated margin of 10.74% for products up 
to a price of €22.90, and 6% for products with prices above this amount.
4.3.3 Variables
The dependent variable in this study is generic price per DDD, at the 
presentation level ( P gen). The explanatory variables are market share of the
dominant manufacturer ( MS(max gen), number of generic companies in the market 
(NGEN,), change in the number of presentations with a positive market share 
(ANPRES,) and the originator brand price (P ong ). The IMS Health dataset provides
full market data for the UK at the presentation level, but does not distinguish 
between some of the unbranded generic manufacturers (in the UK). As a result, it is 
not possible to determine the dominant generic manufacturer market share in the UK. 
All prices have been converted to USA dollars and adjusted by inflation, strength and 
package size. The definition of market is limited to the retail generic market only. 
The originator brand price is included in the analysis in order to identify whether it 
determines generic prices. All variables employed in the analysis are shown in* Table 
4-1.
32 A presentation is defined as a product o f a specific dosage, form and package size that is sold by a 
specific manufacturer. For example, a molecule in tablet form o f lOmg that is sold in a package size 
of 100 tablets by manufacturer A is considered to be one presentation.
Table 4-1 Variables and their Definitions for Generic Competition Econometric Analysis, 2000 Q1 -  2005 Q1
USA UK Germany France






































































(.515) (.137) (.143) (.074) (.428) (.197) (.275) (.135)
ANPRES, Number o f 1.333 5.667 .091 .385 5.700 3.650 1.333 .857
Presentation
s
(1.158) (4.157) (1.382) (.928) (6.150) (5.590) (1.90) (.840)





(2.879) (2.003) (3.459) (4.052) (6.056) (6.057) (1.123) (2.307)
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
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4.4 Econometric specification
In order to assess the determinants of generic prices, a linear model is 
estimated from equation (3):
/>*" = p 0 + P XMS™ gen + NGEN,. + P3P ong + /?4NPRES( + s  (5)
From equation (5) we first seek to determine the relationship between generic 
prices and the dominant generic manufacturer’s market share (MS'.maxge”). While
there is no evidence in the USA, Germany and France of a first mover advantage in 
the form of sustained higher market share by the first generic entrant, there is 
evidence of a dominant generic manufacturer in each market that is able to maintain
s
a higher market share than its competitors over time. If it is true that the presence of 
a dominant generic manufacturer deters price competition (Hollis, 2002), then the 
association between its market share and generic prices would be positive. On the 
other hand, industrial organization theory suggests that while evidence of 
concentration may be useful in assessing some degree of competition amongst firms, 
it does not show a systematic relationship with prices (Tirole, 1988). The number of 
companies (NGEN,) is included in the model as a supply side variable. In 
accordance with the Bertrand model of price competition, the number of companies 
should be independent of the number of generic manufacturers (Tirole, 1988).
Finally, the change in the number of presentations (ANPRES,) is also included in the 
model as a potential measure of the degree to which generic manufacturers are 
successfully able to avoid the Bertrand paradox through product differentiation. The 
change in the number of presentations may be a proxy for product differentiation, 
including separating the market into different strengths, changing the appearance of 
the product through different formulations (pills vs. tablets vs. capsules), colours and 
package sizes. Product differentiation of this nature may also have the knock on 
effect of decreasing price transparency, since it may be difficult for payors to adjust 
prices by these factors, thus, having an impact on price.
In order to avoid multicollinearity between the product differentiation 
variable and the number of generic companies, product differentiation is defined as 
the change in the number of presentations that are sold in the generic market in that 
given quarter. This also avoids the possibility of endogeneity that could exist 
between the total number of presentations sold in the market and generic prices.
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Some studies assume that the number of generic competitors is exogenous 
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Wiggins and Manes, 1994), while a different study 
assumes it to be endogenous (Frank and Salkever, 1997). In order to take both 
scenarios into account, the results are presented from both the non-instrumented 
model and a model where the number of generic competitors is instrumented by 
Timej, defined as the number Of quarters since generic entry. (In the UK, the 
variable Time has been added to the non-instrumented model as a proxy for the 
number of generic competitors since the number of generic competitors cannot be 
distinguished in the data.) The significance and direction of the relationships 
between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable are the same in both 
the non-instrumented and instrumented model.
Across all study countries, the Hausman test rejects the appropriateness of the 
random effects model. Fixed effects are used to control for the molecule- and 
presentation-specific effects. For robustness, both omeprazole and paroxetine have 
been included in the same model. However, all variables still reflect the separate 
omeprazole and paroxetine generic markets. In order to account for the 
heterogeneity across countries’ generic markets, e.g. their differing regulatory 
environments, the models have been run separately for each country. This allows for 
each independent variable’s slope to vary across countries. One limitation of the 
fixed effects method is that time-invariant characteristics that have not changed 
during the study period, such as Germany’s reference price regulation, cannot be 
dummied out since they are already implicitly controlled for.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptive analysis
A close examination of the data leads to three observations. First, in terms of 
generic penetration, omeprazole is highly genericised in the UK, Germany and 
France, but seemingly less so in the USA, whereas in the case of paroxetine, generics 
account for the vast majority of the market in all study countries (Figure 4-1). The 
low level of omeprazole generic penetration in the USA can be explained by the 
brand name’s (Prilosec) availability as an OTC, accounting for a large share of the 
brand category. In the case of paroxetine, France has managed to achieve a higher 
paroxetine generic penetration than the USA and UK, despite paroxetine’s patent
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expiration occurring later in France. In the case of the US, this may be due in part to 
the presence of paroxetine suspended release, which was still on patent during this 
study period. (See Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis on the implications of the 
introduction of paroxetine suspended release to the US paroxetine molecule market.) 
In Germany, the relatively high rates of genericisation can be explained by its earlier 
patent expirations than in the USA, UK and France, and by its reference pricing 
system. While there is still some room for improving genericisation, particularly in 
paroxetine in France, UK and the USA, it seems that the shift from originator brand 
to generic has been almost fully realized for omeprazole in Germany and the UK.
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Source: The author from IMS.
Second, Figure 4-2 shows entry and market shares of different generic 
competitors following entry and suggests that there may be a dominant generic 
manufacturer, which is not the first entrant in any of the cases, that is able to sustain 
a higher generic market share than its competitors over time. In half of the cases 
(omeprazole in Germany and France and paroxetine in the USA), there was not even 
a discemable first generic entrant. In markets where there were first generic entrants, 
such as for paroxetine in Germany and France and omeprazole in the USA, the 
market shares of these first movers collapsed within a year of other generics entering 
the market. This is particularly interesting in the USA, where one might have 







period that is granted to the first generic entrant. Notably, this finding challenges the 
literature that attributes the dominant generic manufacturer’s market power to being 
the first entrant (Hollis, 2005).33
33 This finding also has significant implications for the industrial organization o f  generic competition. 
Where there is evidence o f a first mover advantage, competition between the first generic entrant and 
other generics may resemble the Stackelberg coumot model (Hollis 2005), where the first mover may 
determine how much it wants to sell, leaving the subsequent entrants to compete for the remaining 
market share. Under this model, the assumption o f increasing marginal production costs would need 
















Figure 4-2 Evolution of Generic Market Shares in the USA, Germany and France, 2000ql-2005ql
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86
Third, in terms of intra-country variability, Table 4-2 shows that the dominant 
manufacturers’ prices were not necessarily lower than their generic competitors’ 
prices, as would be expected in a competitive market. In Germany, the dominant 
generic manufacturers’ prices were seven to eight percent lower than the generic 
median price. This likely reflects the fact that Germany’s reference price is based on 
the lowest third of the market, thus, resulting in the dominant manufacturer’s price 
being at or just below the reference price so as to not lose the inevitable market share 
that would ensue should patients have to pay the difference out of pocket. In France, 
however, the dominant generic manufacturers’ prices were equal to the median price, 
and in the USA, the dominant generic manufacturers’ prices were significantly 
higher than the median generic price, especially in the case of omeprazole, where the 
dominant generic manufacturer was able to maintain a price premium of 
approximately 25 percent above the generic median price. Interestingly, in the case 
of omeprazole in the USA, the dominant manufacturer’s price premium was similar 
to first generic mover’s price premium (1.26 percent above to the median price 
compared to 1.21 percent respectively), despite the dominant manufacturer’s ability 
to maintain a market share of 53% in 2005Q1 compared to the first generic mover’s 
collapsed market share of 13 percent in the same time period. Therefore, it seems 
that the dominant generic manufacturers are able to maintain their leading market 
shares over time for reasons other than relatively low prices and entry timing (i.e. 
resistance to switching), since in these cases, they are not first movers. The reason 
for the dominant manufacturers’ high market shares, despite their average or 
relatively high prices, could relate to vertical competition issues, such as the 
stickiness of contractual arrangements along the distribution chain (e.g. between the 
manufacturer and the wholesaler).
Table 4-2 Relative Price per DDD of Dominant Generic Manufacturer (Average 
Price per DDD of Dominant Generic Manufacturer / Median Generic Price per 
DDD) in 2005Q1 _________________ _________________ ________________
Germany France USA
Omeprazole .92 1.0 1.26
Paroxetine .93 1.0 1.03
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
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4.5.2 Econometric analysis
Table 4-3 shows the results of the multivariate models on the determinants of 
generic prices. In the USA, dominant manufacturer market share, originator brand 
price, the change in the number of presentations and the number of generic 
manufacturers were all significant predictors of generic price per daily defined 
dosage at the presentation level. In particular, the market share of the dominant 
manufacturer and the number of generic manufactures both correlate negatively with 
prices, while the change in the number of presentations and the originator brand price 
correlates positively. One possible explanation for the negative correlation between 
the dominant manufacturer’s market share and price is that as the dominant 
manufacturer’s market share increases, a larger portion of the market that is resistant 
to switching becomes tied up with this manufacturer, thereby leaving the other 
manufacturers with the most price sensitive customers, and hence spurring price 
competition in this portion of the market. These findings suggest that, as is found in 
the literature, an increase in the number of generic manufacturers in the USA 
omeprazole and paroxetine markets spurs price competition, while an increase in the 
number of presentations is associated with price increases, as one might expect from 
product differentiation. Meanwhile, originator brand prices correlate positively and 
significantly with generic prices. This could suggest a lack of price competition, 
since in theory, generic prices should be independent of originator brand prices in a 
price competitive market. However, since the original brand drug was also available 
in relatively low prices over the counter in the USA from 2003q3, it could be that 
lower original brand prices were associated with lower generic prices, which would 
suggest a price competitive market.
In the UK, all of the determinants correlate significantly with price. Time 
since generic entry correlates negatively with prices, perhaps reflecting the entry of 
more manufacturers and, hence, a negative correlation between the number of 
manufacturers and generic prices or changes in market concentration over time. 
However, since the time variable may also be picking up a number of other factors 
that may be changing in the market, the direction and significance of this variable are 
only indicative. Unlike the USA, the originator brand price correlates negatively 
with generic prices, perhaps reflecting the market harvesting strategy; when patents 
expire, originator brand prices sometimes increase in order to maximize profit on the
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most price insensitive portion of the market, while generics compete on price in the 
remainder, price sensitive segment of the market. Indeed, evidence confirms this 
phenomenon in the UK, where the average originator brand price of omeprazole 
increased from $1.90 in 2002Q1, the quarter before generic entry, to $2.36 in 
2005Q1. Similarly, in the case of paroxetine, the average originator brand price 
increased from $0.95 in 2001Q3, the year before generic entry, to $1.12 in 2005Q1. 
Similarly to the USA, the change in the number of presentations in the UK correlates 
positively with generic prices. This indicates product differentiation, through which 
companies can segment the market into a variety of strengths and pack sizes, thereby 
inhibiting price competition.
In Germany, all determinants are significant, and are positively correlated 
with generic prices, except the change in the number of presentations. As the 
dominant generic manufacturer’s market share increases, so does the price. This is 
consistent with the concern that a more concentrated market could inhibit price 
competition (Hollis, 2002). In addition, the findings show that as the number of 
companies increase, so does price. This correlation is inconsistent with the Bertrand 
model of price competition, under which the number of companies is expected to be 
independent of generic prices. One possible explanation could be that generic 
manufacturers have to spend more on marketing (since the generics market in 
Germany is a branded generics market) when the number of companies increase, 
thereby increasing their costs and hence prices. The change in the number of 
presentations correlates negatively with generic prices in Germany, although the size 
of the effect is very small. This could indicate that the change in the number of 
presentations reflects both some degree of product differentiation as well as 
increased supply and available choice, with combine to produce a net effect of 
slightly enhanced price competition. Thus, the effects of the dominant generic 
manufacturer and the number of companies are both indicative of a lack of 
competition in that since the dominant manufacturer’s market shares have levelled 
off over time, and the number of companies increased over time, there is little 
evidence of factors that spur price competition in this setting. This is not surprising, 
given the incentives under the reference pricing system, whereby the reference price 
is determined by the price in the lowest third of the price range. Under this 
reimbursement scheme, if generic manufacturers were to lower their prices, they 
would all need to follow suit in order to not lose market share, thereby reducing all of
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their profits. Instead they have the incentive to compete along different lines, such as 
branding and patient or physician loyalty. Meanwhile, the originator brand price 
correlates positively with generic prices, most probably because the reference pricing 
system forces originator brands to reduce their prices when generics reduce their 
prices, else loose market share when patients switch to products for which they do 
not have to pay the difference between the reference price and the reimbursed price. 
Even in cases where patients are willing to pay some difference, it is unlikely that 
patients would be willing to pay more and more, as would be the case if the 
originator brand price did not decrease with generic prices.
In France, the number of companies and the originator brand price correlate 
significantly with generic prices. The effect of regulations capping the generic prices 
as a percentage of original brand prices is that as the original brand price 
increases/decreases, so does the generic price. The result is that the price cap acts 
more as a floor than a ceiling. This is evidenced in the fact that in the vast majority 
of cases, the generic prices were between fifty five and sixty percent of the original 
brand price. Thus, over time, as the originator brand price increased, so did the 
generic prices, despite the increase in the number of generic manufacturers, resulting 
in the positive correlation between the number of generic manufacturers and generic 
prices. Nevertheless, the number of presentations correlates negatively with generic 
prices in France, although the effect is small. This is likely reflective of an increase 
in the supply choice of omeprazole and paroxetine, which is not surprising, given the 
fact that the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in France are less differentiated (e.g. 
have fewer numbers of strengths) than in the other study countries. Finally, it is 
important to note that the dominant generic manufacturer’s market share was not a 
significant fact in predicting generic prices. This finding is consistent with the price 
cap regulations, which resulted in generic manufacturers responding more to the 
original brand price than to each other’s prices. Thus, despite a small amount of 
evidence that an increase in supply may be associated with a small decrease in prices, 
the majority of the evidence in this model suggests that the generic omeprazole and 
paroxetine markets in France were not price competitive.
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Table 4-3 The Determinants of Generic Prices: a Fixed Effects Approach
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obs. 324 324 229 3202 3202 129 129
No. of 
groups 67 67 28 286 286 37 37
R2 within .587 .586 .737 .48 .47 .56 .56
Hausman
test 13.7’’’ 48.78” * 22.76’” 167.56*”
*p <0.10: **p < 0.05: ***p<0.01
In the USA, Germany and France, the Time variable serves as an instrument for the number 
o f generic companies. In the UK, the Time variable serves as a direct proxy for the number 
o f generic companies (in a non-instrumented model).
Note: NI stands for non-instrumented model and I stands for Instrumented model.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
4.6 Discussion
The analysis in the preceding section has shown that in the USA, there is 
evidence of price competition in the segment of the market that the dominant 
manufacturer does not control. There is also evidence of price competition in the 
fact that as the number of generic manufacturers increase, generic prices decrease. 
However, the change in the number of presentations is associated with upward price 
movements, which is indicative of product differentiation. In addition, the positive 
relationship between the originator brand price and generic prices suggests some
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price stickiness in the USA. In the UK, the negative relationships between generic 
prices and the dominant manufacturer’s market share, the originator brand price and 
time since entry suggests price competition, while the positive coefficient of product 
differentiation suggests limitations to competition. In France, the positive 
relationships between generic price and the number of companies and generic price 
and the originator brand price suggest lack of competition. However, the negative 
relationship between generic price and number of presentations, suggests that there is 
some competition at the presentation level, though the size of the coefficient is much 
smaller to balance the previous two effects. In Germany, the findings suggest that 
generic manufacturers do not compete on price. This is not surprising in a reference 
price system, where if one manufacturer reduces prices, the reference price may be 
adjusted accordingly, forcing all manufacturers to suffer. The can, in turn, 
accommodate greater number of firms without generic prices declining significantly 
and without significant impact on the dominant generic manufacturer’s market share. 
One important finding across all study countries is that regardless of regulation and 
generic market characteristics, there is no evidence of a first generic mover 
advantage in the form of first entrants’ sustained market share dominance, although 
dominant manufacturers do emerge across all markets.
Across all four countries, these findings reject the null hypothesis of 
unbridled price competition, as the Bertrand model would predict. Instead, a new 
hypothesis is generated, whereby price competition amongst generics becomes 
diluted, as a result of product differentiation and/or countries’ regulatory schemes, 
which may result in a new equilibrium of ranging prices and market shares. 
Specifically, in the case of the USA and the UK, it appears as though there is still 
some degree of price competition, despite manufacturers’ successful attempts to 
fragment the market with product differentiation strategies. However, in Germany 
and France, it seems that there is relatively little price competition, as a result o f the 
effects of the regulatory schemes affecting generic markets.
While the discussion so far offers insights into the factors that affect generic 
prices across countries, it does not address the issue of how prices range across 
countries and whether the lowest generic prices are the prices of choice for health 
insurance. As Figure 4-3 indicates, there is significant variability in prices for both 
products and across all study countries. In both the omeprazole and paroxetine 
markets, generic prices that are one standard deviation from the mean range
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significantly more in the USA than in the UK, Germany or France. An interesting 
finding that emerges from looking at the graphs in Figure 4-3 is that the USA has a 
larger range of prices, despite Germany having a larger number of generic 
competitors in these markets than the USA. This is likely reflective of the reference 
pricing system in Germany, which results in manufacturers clustering their prices. In 
addition, Figure 4-4 shows that the lowest prices in the USA omeprazole and 
paroxetine markets are significantly lower than in Germany, despite the fact that 
Germany has significantly more manufacturers competing in these markets. These 
findings support the econometric results, which show that the degree of price 
competition in generics markets is dependent on a number of factors besides just the 
number of generic manufacturers. In absolute terms, Figures 4-3 and 4-4 show that 
the UK exhibits some of the lowest omeprazole prices while the USA exhibits some 
of the lowest paroxetine prices among the study countries.
There are several ways in which countries could contain generic costs. One 
is to focus policies exclusively on the supply side determinants (described in the 
econometric models above) so that the entire distribution of prices is shifted 
downwards, keeping the generic mix (i.e. market shares) constant, but altering the 
prices themselves. Another way would be to focus policies on the demand side so 
that the lowest prices are actually purchased, keeping the prices constant, but altering 
the mix (i.e. market shares) of generic products. In order to determine whether 
health insurers have been successful at purchasing the lowest available generic 
prices, a weighted price was constructed for each product and country, taking into 
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Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
C ross Country C om parison o f 2005Q1 Paroxetine Prices, 
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One Standard Deviation from the Mean
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Figure 4-4 Cross Country Comparison of Lowest Generic Prices, 2005Q1
■ Omeprazole
■ Paroxetine
Germany France UK US
Source: The author from IMS.
A comparison of the weighted price34 for each product with the lowest 
generic price reveals interesting patterns (Table 4-4). Germany faces both the highest 
purchased prices and the highest lowest prices out of the four study countries. Its 
purchased price to lowest price ratios are 1.41 and 1.28 for omeprazole and 
paroxetine respectively. This is roughly consistent with the reference price system, 
where the generic reimbursement price is set equal to the lowest third price in the 
market.35 France seems to have achieved some of the better purchased price to 
lowest price ratios although this is not surprising, given the small standard deviation 
of prices. As a result, France paid the same per DDD for omeprazole in 2005Q1 as 
Germany, despite its lowest price being much higher than Germany. This is an 
example of where the mix (i.e. market shares) of products is just as important in 
influencing total spending as the availability of low prices. The ratios on Table 4-4 
illustrate that the USA was the worst at actually purchasing the lowest prices in the 
market, although comparatively speaking, the (weighted) price at which they 
purchased was lower than France and Germany (for omeprazole) and all other study 
countries (for paroxetine). The relatively high purchased price to lowest price ratio
34 The weighted generic price is an aggregated price index whereby each generic presentation’s price 
is weighted by its respective generic market share.
35 The prices are not expected to exactly equal the lowest third o f  the prices in the generic molecule 
market since the reference prices during this time period varied by strength, rather than being 
calculated on a per DDD basis, as has been done here.
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in the USA is not surprising, given the large range of prices in the USA and the 
nature of agreements between manufacturers and insurers, pointing at discount 
practices. Consequently, despite facing a lowest omeprazole price that was twenty 
percent lower than Germany’s lowest omeprazole price, the actual purchased price in 
the USA was only seven percent lower than Germany’s actual purchased omeprazole 
price. In the case of paroxetine, it is noteworthy that the USA was still able to 
achieve a lower purchased price than the UK, despite having a ratio of purchased 
price to lowest price that was more than twice that of the UK. This example shows 
the relative importance of the supply side, in that even though the purchasers did not 
successfully take advantage of the lowest paroxetine prices in the USA, many of the 
available prices were still so much lower than in Germany France and the UK, that 
the USA achieved the lowest purchased price. The UK was the most consistent 
country in achieving both some of the lowest prices, and some of the best purchased 
price to lowest price ratios. The standard deviation of paroxetine prices was larger in 
the UK than in Germany, but the UK still managed to achieve a better purchased 
price to lowest price ratio.





















Germany $1.66 $1.18 1.41 $1.48 $1.16 1.28
France $1.66 $1.56 1.06 $0.90 $0.86 1.05
USA $1.55 $0.94 1.66 $0.80 $0.34 2.39
UK $0.91 $0.87 1.04 $0.96 $0.85 1.13
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Overall, Germany and the USA face some of the highest supplied prices, 
although the USA also faces some of the lowest supplied prices. In both the USA 
and Germany, the high purchased-to-lowest-price ratios suggest there is still 
significant room for savings to health insurance for both omeprazole and paroxetine. 
The UK appears successful at both achieving low generic prices as well as 
purchasing at these prices, while generic prices in France fall in the middle across the 
study countries, and range very little. These observations suggest a larger degree of
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price competition in the USA and the UK than in Germany and France and are 
consistent with the econometric results.
Finally, it is worth considering the total savings that could have been realised 
had the lowest generic prices been purchased during the time following patent 
expiry, holding the generic penetration rate constant. Table 4-5 shows that during 
the time period following patent expiry, efficient omeprazole and paroxetine 
purchasing (defined as purchasing at the lowest available price in the generic 
molecule market) could have saved approximately $812 million in the USA, $61 
million in the UK, $682 million in Germany and $9 million in France. This 
represents a 30.2 percent savings in the US, a 12.0 percent savings in the UK, a 25.0 
percent savings in Germany and a 2.5 percent savings in France. Thus, the USA and 
Germany had the most to gain from efficient purchasing (as would be expected from 
their high purchased-to-lowest price ratios), although the savings were significant 
across all countries. Moreover, the total savings that could be realised from the 
efficient purchasing of all generic drugs would clearly be monumental in helping 
policymakers contain pharmaceutical costs.
Table 4-5 Cross Country Comparison of the Potential Savings from Purchasing
Date of Patent 
Expiry
Savings in USD if 
Purchased at Lowest 
Generic Price, 




Omeprazole 2000q1 650,362,096 25.4%
Germany Paroxetine 2000q1 31,783,452 19.0%
Total Savings 682,145,547 25.0%
Omeprazole 2004q2 3,084,441 1.2%
France Paroxetine 2003q2 6,166,919 5.5%
Total Savings 9,251,360 2.5%
Omeprazole 2002q2 55,403,568 14.1%
UK Paroxetine 2001q4 5,212,668 4.6%
Total Savings 60,616,236 12.0%
Omeprazole 2002q4 438,589,139 24.2%
US Paroxetine 2003q3 373,733,487 42.8%
Total Savings 812,322,626 30.2%
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
The analysis pursued in the previous sections is not without limitations. First, 
there are a small number of products in this study, although this is not necessarily a 
disadvantage because it enables a more thorough analysis, which leads to a better 
understanding of the complexities of generic competition as well as the range of
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generic prices available at the product presentation level. Findings from this case 
study analysis may be generalisable to other classes of drugs that are primarily 
concentrated in the retail market and treat chronic conditions. Second, the pricing 
data used are not able to capture fully the extent of discounts off list prices. While 
this is a limitation that affects the study countries, evidence suggests that where these 
discounts exist, they primarily affect the distribution chain and may operate 
horizontally across products and product presentations (Kanavos and Taylor, 2007; 
Kanavos, 2006).
4.7 Conclusion
In an environment of strong generic policies pursued by policy-makers in the 
USA, UK, Germany and France, the findings of this study may shed some light on 
how effective these countries’ policies are at improving the intensity of generic 
competition and optimising savings for health insurance through efficient 
purchasing. We find that all four countries have achieved significant levels of generic 
penetration, although, clearly, this could be enhanced further. What is disconcerting, 
however, are the numerous signs that price competition is weak, resulting in payors 
not reaping the benefits of the low generic prices that a competitive market would 
produce. It is surprising that generic markets, generally characterized by 
homogeneous products, can be associated with product differentiation and that this 
impacts positively on generic prices in some markets. Yet, this was a finding for the 
USA and the UK. It was also worrying that despite there being no evidence of a first 
generic mover advantage in these markets, the dominant manufacturers’ market 
shares are associated with increases in generic prices in Germany. Moreover, the 
number of generic competitors was associated with generic price increases in 
Germany and France rather than price decreases. The analysis also reveals that there 
is significant variability in generic prices and moreover, that generic prices may be 
linked to originator brand prices. Although this appears to be surprising for 
commodity products and may be indicative that payors may not be maximizing the 
pecuniary benefits from genericisation, it is partly due to regulatory action from the 
payors’ side.
In conclusion, evidence of product differentiation (in the form of altered 
strength, formulation and package size) inhibiting price competition in the US and 
the UK, regulations inhibiting price competition in Germany and France and the
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presence of a dominant generic manufacturer in all four study countries suggests that 
generic manufacturers are successful at carving out profitable niches within the 
generics markets of all four study countries. As a result, the null hypothesis of 
unbridled price competition, as the Bertrand model would predict, is rejected in 
favour of an enhanced model of Bertrand-like price competition, whereby price 
competition amongst generics becomes diluted, resulting in a new equilibrium of 
ranging prices and market shares. Relatively speaking, the degree of this Bertrand- 
like price competition appears stronger in the USA and the UK than in Germany and 
France, indicating that while generic manufacturers may differentiate their products, 
price competition still remains more intense than it would in more regulated markets.
Finally, the generic price variation within countries has shown that the USA 
and the UK achieve the lowest purchased prices, although all four study countries are 
purchasing above the lowest available generic price. This may be due to regulatory 
imperfections, such as reference pricing in Germany, or other bottlenecks in the 
system (e.g. invisible discounting practices at distribution level). The removal of 
such barriers could have resulted in significant savings to payors in all four countries.
Overall, it appears that where policymakers attempt to control generic prices, 
they have stopped short of implementing policies that stimulate price competition 
amongst generics with a view to achieving even lower generic prices and realizing 
further savings.
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CHAPTER 5: UNDERSTANDING PHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPETITION WITHIN STRENGTH SEGMENT MARKETS 
AND THE EFFECT OF THESE SEGMENTED MOLECULE 
MARKETS ON PURCHASING EFFICIENCY
5.1 Introduction
In an attempt to explain competition in the off-patent pharmaceutical market, 
numerous studies have analyzed the competitive pricing and market share dynamics 
between the original brand drug and their generic equivalents (Frank and Salkever, 
1997; Caves et al, 1991; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). The findings consistently 
show that oppositely from what one might expect, original brand manufacturers do 
not necessarily drop their prices when generics enter. Rather they keep their prices 
level and in some cases, even increase their prices, thereby retaining the brand loyal, 
price insensitive segment of the population and forgoing the price sensitive segment 
of the population to the generic market. This phenomenon has been called the 
market harvesting strategy and the generics paradox. While its name may sound 
esoteric, its implication is anything but. On a practical level, this research has helped 
policymakers come to understand that because original brand prices remain relatively 
high after generic entry, it is crucial that purchasers shift consumption to generics in 
order to contain pharmaceutical costs. As a result, literature often uses the barometer 
of generic penetration as a measure of countries’ successes in pharmaceutical policy 
cost containment (CBO, 1998; Haas, 2005; Express Scripts, 2005; Kanavos Costa- 
Font and Seeley, 2008). In these cases, generic penetration is defined as the 
percentage of a molecule market (measured in volume units such as daily defined 
dosages or prescriptions) that is dispensed generically. For example, a generic 
penetration rate of 90% for a molecule market would be high, compared to 50%.
This chapter argues, however, that solely using generic penetration rates at 
the molecule level is not a sufficient means by which purchasing efficiency can be 
achieved. The hypothesis behind this assertion is that there are likely submarkets of 
competition within a molecule market that must be studied and more closely 
understood before implementing genericisation policies. Consider the example 
where evidence shows a generic penetration rate of 70% in a given molecule market. 
With this level of information, policymakers could incorrectly conclude that they 
need to more aggressively target physicians, pharmacists or patients in order to
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increase the generic penetration rate. However, physicians prescribe appropriate 
dosages for their patients that are based on need, thereby segmenting a molecule 
market into submarkets. Thus, it could be that when stratifying the data, evidence 
further shows that the molecule is sold in two strengths, one of which has a generic 
penetration rate of 90 percent, while the other strength has a generic penetration rate 
of 50%. In this case, supply side regulations that target the strength market with a 
low penetration rate may be necessary instead of demand side regulations, to the 
extent that the generic penetration rates differ because of supply side factors such as 
original brand versus generic prices or generic entry in that strength segment. Thus, 
the nature of competition within these strength segment markets of a molecule needs 
to be understood in order to determine what factors should be influenced in the 
pursuit of purchasing efficiency.
This chapter contributes to the current understanding of pharmaceutical 
competition by stratifying strength market segments of a molecule and analyzing the 
degree to which competition between the original brand and generics differs within 
different strength market segments of the same molecule. This, then, will provide a 
more detailed level of understanding of pharmaceutical competition in the off-patent 
market. As part of the analysis, this study will also explore original brand and 
generic manufacturers’ motivations for entering into different strength market 
segments through a descriptive analysis and will discuss the nature of product 
differentiation and price discrimination within a molecule market as it applies to 
differing strengths and formulations. Through this analysis, a more complicated 
picture arises than the over-simplified one in which studies assume that 
manufacturers of the same molecule all engage in direct price or market share 
competition, regardless of the strength and formulation of their products.
Second 2 provides an overview of the literature that discusses product 
differentiation within molecule markets. Section 3 outlines the theoretical 
framework for assessing competition within strength segments of molecule markets. 
Section 4 outlines this study’s sample selection and research questions. Sections 5 
and 6 present the empirical as well as theoretical findings on competition within 
strength segments. Section 7 analyses the efficiency implications of these findings as 
well as the opportunity for costs savings that could result from increased competition 
within strength segments. Section 8 focuses on product differentiation and price 
discrimination across strength segments and section 9 models possible scenarios for
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cost savings in these product differentiated markets. Finally, section 10 draws the 
findings together from this study and discusses its broader policy implications.
5.2 Background and Literature Review
In order to analyze the nature of pharmaceutical competition in molecule 
markets, studies may convert the volume of drugs of the same molecule but different 
forms and strengths into standardized units, such as daily defined dosage36 (Chapters 
4 and 5; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). In doing so, it is assumed that 
competition occurs at the molecule level. Within that molecule market, they do 
acknowledge that there are certain segments of competition, such as competition 
amongst generics (Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008; Hollis, 2002; Frank and 
Salkever, 1997).
Another way in which studies have divided the molecule market into 
submarkets is by differentiating the degree of price competition in the hospital versus 
retail pharmacy market, noting that the hospital market is relatively more price 
sensitive than the retail market, and therefore is more biased toward generics or 
original brand manufacturers that are willing to offer significant discounts (Hurwitz 
and Caves, 1988; Caves et al, 1991; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Scott-Morton, 
2000).
One study argues that it is not appropriate to combine doses marketed in 
different forms and strengths when studying competition between original brand and 
generics because the FDA’s information on equivalency pertains only to pills of 
identical dosage form and strength (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988). However, rather than 
studying the various strength submarkets separately, the study only includes the most 
popular dosage form in its analysis. It is only recently that a few studies have turned 
attention toward the effect that the segmentation of a molecule market into various 
strengths and forms can have on pharmaceutical price competition and spending 
(Danzon, 2008; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008).
One of these studies seeks to explain the USA’s relatively high prices (for a 
given molecule) by highlighting the fact that the average strength consumed for a
36 Recall from Chapter 4 that the term ‘daily defined dosage’ refers to a unit o f measurement that was 
first developed by the World Health Organization’s Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics 
Methodology in an effort to standardize pharmaceutical utilization measures across countries. In 
accordance with the World Health Organization’s definition, “The DDD is the assumed average 
maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main indication in adults” (WHO, 2009).
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*xngiven molecule is higher in the USA than in most of the other study countries, 
except Spain, France and Canada (Danzon, 2008). The inference from this claim is 
that higher strength doses are consistently priced higher than lower strength doses 
across countries, although this study does not provide price data to support its 
assumption. It also justifies the USA’s high prices by the fact that relatively high 
priced long-acting formulations comprise a larger percent of the market volume in 
the USA—roughly 8 percent, compared to 1-7 percent in other countries. This study 
(Danzon, 2008) argues that these long-acting formulations substitute quality for 
quantity by improving compliance and leading to fewer total doses, hence justifying 
their higher prices.
The above studies find that the existence of submarkets within molecule 
markets changes the nature of competition, which affects prices and expenditures. In 
these cases, the segmentation of the molecule market is assumed to be the result of 
payor fragmentation (in the case of hospital versus retail markets) or clinical need, 
which the above study (Danzon, 2008) assumes is the driver of strength and 
formulation segmentation. However, some studies take the analysis of segmented 
molecule markets and their effect on competition a step further by finding that the 
segments are often the result of manufacturers’ attempts to distinguish their products 
from one another rather than just the result of payor fragmentation or clinical need—
i.e. product differentiation. Thus, in these studies, the outcome of interest— 
segmented molecule markets—is the same, but the driver of these segments is 
industry-led rather than payor or patient-led. These studies find that manufacturers 
seek to differentiate their products from each other by varying the form (i.e. method 
of administration, such as capsule, tablet, liquid, suppository), strength (e.g. 10 mg 
vs. 20 mg vs. 40 mg, etc.) and package size (100 tablets versus 500 tablets, etc) 
(Frank and Salkever, 1997; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). In this way, 
products compete by attempting to carve out niches within the molecule market so as 
to avoid the unbridled price competition that would occur in a market of homogenous 
products. Consequently, some evidence shows that this product differentiation 
within molecule markets adversely impacts price competition by contributing to 
downwards price rigidity (Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008).
37 Study countries include the US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, Japan, Australia, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
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5.3 Conceptual Framework
While the literature has acknowledged that segmented molecule markets—  
either because of manufacturers’ attempts to product differentiate or clinical need— 
may result in relatively higher overall purchased prices at the molecule level, none 
have gone so far as to actually study whether the degree of competition between 
original brand and generics differs within strength market segments of the same 
molecule. For example, they have not looked in depth at whether the degree of 
generic entry is different in some strength segment markets than other strength 
segment markets (of the same molecule) and whether the degree of competition 
between the original brand and the generics differs in some strength market segments 
than in other strength market segments. Moreover, research on competition amongst 
generics also has not stratified molecule markets by strength segments. To this end, 
researchers and policymakers that have primarily used genericisation at the molecule 
level as a barometer to measure whether policies are successful in containing costs 
do not yet understand where there may be a need to increase competition between 
original brand and generic equivalents within molecule submarkets, and 
consequently, whether policies that seek to increase purchasing efficiency are well- 
targeted.
Finally, one of the above studies (Danzon, 2008) makes the assumption that 
higher strength products are priced higher than lower strength products and that long- 
acting formulations are also priced higher than their immediate release competitors, 
which explains higher overall prices where demand for high strength and/or long- 
acting formulations is relatively high (in comparison with countries where it is 
relatively low). However, despite these assumptions, there is not yet any macro level 
research on the pattern of pricing across strengths and long-acting formulations 
within molecule markets. Therefore, this study also compares prices across strengths 
and a long-acting formulation within a molecule market in order to determine 
whether or not manufacturers are able to use these segmented markets to price 
discriminate. Where evidence suggests the possibility of price discrimination, 
substituting some strengths/formulations for others may offer additional opportunity 
to increase purchasing efficiency in molecule markets (in addition to increasing 
competitive dynamics within strength markets). However, this practice would have
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to very carefully consider clinical need and safety, which is discussed in the sections 
below.
5.3.1 Overarching Theoretical and Empirical Questions
On the competitive dynamics within strength markets, this study seeks to 
answer two broad theoretical and empirical questions. On a theoretical level: What 
form does competition take in this dimension and how do traditional industrial 
organization paradigms help explain competition between originator brand and 
generics within strength market segments? On an empirical level: To what extent 
does the degree of competition between the original brand and generics within 
strength market segments of the same molecule differ across strength market 
segments and what are the findings’ implications for purchasing efficiency?
On the role of product differentiation and price discrimination, this study 
seeks to answer two additional policy questions: 1) How do prices compare across 
strength/form segment markets (of the same molecule) and what implication does 
this have for the degree of price competition across strength segmented markets and 
2) What are the ways in which payors could take advantage of pricing disparities by 
substituting certain strengths (within a molecule) and what degree of savings could 
these strategies achieve?
5.3.2 Theoretical Framework
This study first seeks to understand the theoretical implications of strength 
segmented molecule markets on the industrial organization and degree of 
competition between original brand and generic equivalents. It then discusses the 
empirical implications these findings may have; where overall prices may appear 
higher than if the molecule market were not segmented into submarkets of strength, 
there may be room for increased purchasing efficiency.
In order to assess the degree of competition within strength segment markets, 
this study first assesses whether original brand manufacturers employ the market 
harvesting strategy in each strength segment market, and how the resulting original 
brand to generic price ratio compares across strength segment markets. This study 
then conducts a descriptive analysis of original brand versus generic market shares 
within strength submarkets of a molecule across countries with a view to comparing 
how the number of generic competitors differs across strength submarkets of a
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molecule. Finally, this study uses fixed-effects panel data analysis to model the
original brand market share within strength market segments and generic prices 
within strength segment markets.
5.3.2.1 Entry into Strength Segmented Markets
Before analyzing the degree of competition within strength segment markets, 
it is important to understand what factors may determine the number of strengths 
within a molecule market and how these factors (and hence the number of strengths) 
differ across countries.
First and foremost, for a strength market segment to exist, a manufacturer 
must have the financial incentive to enter into that strength. Entry would therefore 
depend on whether a manufacturer expects to profit from such a decision. In other 
words, in accordance with the profit function, the expected profit will be:
Where fc = fixed costs and vc = variable costs 
It follows that profit, and therefore a manufacturer’s decision to enter a strength 
submarket is a function of:
Where, represents a strength submarket
The volume (V,) of a product of a given strength that a manufacturer may sell 
depends on the size of the country’s patient population for the molecule, the size of 
the patient population for that specific strength, the culture of prescribing (i.e. 
whether physicians have the tendency to prescribe the DDD first, or start with the 
lowest strength first and then increase if need be), the payment system and the 
expected degree of competition in the market. Likewise, the price (P,) at which the 
manufacturer may sell the product of a given strength may differ across countries,
factors that determine the original brand prices within strength segment markets, the
n = R-c (1)
Where II = profit, R = total revenue and C = total cost 
Thus, II > 0 if R > C.
Then R = V x R
Where V = volume and P = price 





depending on the country’s regulations, the payment system, the type of market 
regulation and the degree of competition in the market. The fixed (fc/) and variable 
costs (vc,) associated with manufacturing the product of a given strength may be 
similar across countries , although the distribution costs associated with the 
wholesaler and retail mark-ups are known to differ significantly across countries. 
Finally, the fixed, sunk costs of obtaining marketing authorization and coverage 
approval may be a significant factor that differs across countries.
Although it is outside the scope of this study to analyze the effect of all of the 
above factors on expected profit (and hence original brand or generic entry into a 
strength segment of a molecule), this study discusses the dimension of how the costs 
of applying for marketing authorization for different strengths of the same molecule 
may differ across regulatory settings. In addition, it discusses the possible influence 
that countries’ coverage and payment systems may have on whether a manufacturer 
chooses to introduce multiple strengths into a market. This discussion of regulations 
is then combined with descriptive evidence in an attempt to explore possible 
explanations for the differing numbers of strengths in the study’s sample molecule 
markets across countries. Following the analysis on how the number of strength 
segment markets and their respective market shares (as a percent of the total 
molecule market) differ across countries, this chapter studies the degree of 
competition between the original brand manufacturer and generics of the same 
molecule within strength segmented markets, as outlined below.
5.3.2.2 Original Brand Prices and Market Shares within Strength Segment 
Markets
The current literature on competition between original brand and generic 
manufacturers of the same molecule clearly demonstrates that original brand 
manufacturers pursue the market harvesting model. This strategy has been 
characterised by the original brand manufacturer’s decision to keep their prices flat, 
or increase their prices, following patent expiry. In the process of doing so, they 
accept that they will lose the price sensitive portion of the market to generic 
manufacturers, but will retain the brand loyal segment. Thus, this decision to 
leverage the fact that because they held a patent for a number of years, they were
38 This pertains to developed countries where the cost o f labour is similar and pharmaceuticals may be 
manufactured in the same location and distributed afterwards.
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able to develop a branded product a priori to other firms’ entry into the market, may 
be considered product differentiation in the form of experience goods, whereby a 
certain share of the demand side may face an inertia to switching to generics based 
on their positive experience with the branded product (Tirole, 1988).
The market harvesting strategy predicts that original brand manufacturers do 
not engage in price competition with generics, but instead often increase prices and 
accept the inevitable loss in market share that accompanies generic entry. In order to 
determine whether the original brand manufacturers employ the market harvesting 
strategy within strength segment markets, this study assesses the extent to which 
original brand prices are a function of generic entry. In accordance with the market
t
harvesting strategy as the null hypothesis, it is expected that P°B is not significantly 
associated with Nfen. Oppositely, evidence that P°B is significantly associated with 
N fen would suggest that original brand manufacturers engage in some form of direct
price or market share competition with generic manufactures instead of 
independently pursuing their market harvesting strategy.
In addition to assessing the relationship between P°B and Nfen as a means of
determining whether original brand manufacturers pursue the market harvesting 
strategy within strength segments, the extent to which the original brand market 
share is associated with original brand prices is also assessed. Notably, an 
association in this case may not indicate a causal relationship, but rather, changes on 
the demand side. For example, assuming that a portion of the demand side that has 
historically been resistant to switching represents physicians who prefer to prescribe 
brands they are familiar with, it may be that as demand-side regulations increasingly 
favour generics (and in the process, provide additional information to these 
physicians that had previously had imperfect knowledge of such generic products or 
in other cases, mandate substitution), the original brand manufacturers loses 
additional market share, while they keep their prices flat. In accordance with the 
market harvesting strategy, it is therefore expected that either the relationship 
between P°B and MS°B be insignificant or negative. Evidence of a positive
relationship, whereby original brand manufacturers actually experience an increase 
in market share, despite keeping their prices flat and/or increasing prices, would
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suggest a more complicated model of competition between original brand and 
generic manufacturers that is not indicative of the market harvesting strategy.
In addition, it is necessary to assess the extent to which the variable strength 
market share is associated with original brand prices in order to capture any 
heterogeneity between more common strength market segments, such as the daily 
defined dosage, which has the largest strength market share, and the less common 
strength market segments (i.e. markets with the smallest strength market share). 
Finally, whether the brand name product is available over-the-counter may influence 
the competitive dynamics within strength markets. Thus, in order to assess whether 
original brand manufacturers employ the market harvesting strategy consistently 
within strength segments, this study assesses the extent to which the price of the 
original brand within strength segment markets is a function of:
P °B = f(  N f‘", MS?", SMS, , DOTC ) 
i=  1 , 2 , n
Where P°B represents the average price of the original brand in that strength 
segment market, Nfen represents the number of generic entrants in that strength 
segment market, MS°B represents the original brand market share within that 
strength segment market, SMSt represents the strength segment market share,
DOTC represents whether the drug is available over-the-counter in that strength and
i represents the strength segment market.
In addition, in order to understand the nature of competition between original 
brand and generic manufacturers within strength markets, it is important to examine 
the drivers of the original brand market shares within strength segments. Thus, this 
study examines the extent to which the original brand to generic price ratio within 
strength segments is associated with the original brand market share at the strength 
segment level as well as the number of generic companies in that strength, the 
strength segment market share and whether the molecule is available over-the- 
counter in that strength segment, such that:
MS°B =f(PRAT, , Nf " ,  SMS, , DOTC )
i = 1 , 2 , n
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Where MS°B represents the original brand market share within the strength 
market, PRATt represents the original brand to generic price ratio within the strength 
market, Nfen represents the number of generic companies within the strength 
market, SMSt represents the strength market share of the strength market,
DOTC represents whether the drug is available over-the-counter in that strength and
i represents the strength segment market.
A recent study assumes that the market harvesting strategy operates within 
the context of a Stackelberg Cournot model of competition, whereby the first mover 
advantage of high original brand market share is expected to erode as generics enter 
the market since companies compete on market share (Kanavos, Costa-Font and 
Seeley, 2008). In this case, it would be expected that MS°B is negatively associated
with N fen. However, this study argues that a positive association between the
original brand market share and the number of generic manufacturers does not 
necessarily indicate market share competition. Instead, it may reflect the fact that 
changes in the demand side (such as regulations that increase genericisation) act as a 
confounding factor between the two. Thus, this study briefly considers the extent to 
which the market harvesting strategy may operate within the context of the 
Stackelberg Cournot model of competition, which assumes that the first mover 
directly competes with followers by strategically setting its price, while at the same 
time maximizing its quantity, whilst the followers directly respond to the 
incumbent’s prices in the determination of their prices.
5.3.2.3 Generic Prices within Strength Segments
Consistent with the findings in chapter 4, generics of the same molecule in 
these product/country markets are assumed to be relatively homogeneous goods that 
product differentiate by carving out niches in the molecule market, either by entering 
into different strength segments, by gaining preferential status in the contractual 
process (as is assumed to be the case for the dominant manufacturers in case one) or 
by altering the packaging. Recall that a model of perfect Bertrand competition 
would predict that where generics of the same molecule are homogeneous, non­
differentiated goods, and where generic manufacturers do not face significant 
capacity constraints, generic manufacturers of the same molecule would likely
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compete on price until prices equal marginal cost, in accordance with the following 
model:
Assuming two competitors with prices pi > P2 > c, where pi = the price of one 
generic manufacturer’s product, p2 = the price of the other generic manufacturer’s 
product and c = marginal cost, then under Bertrand competition, the manufacturer 
charging P2 will capture the entire market, leaving the manufacturer that charges pi 
with zero market. Demand is therefore denoted by,
D (pi, p2 ) = <
D (pi) i f  Pi < P2
'ADCpO i f p i = P 2  (i)
i f  Pi >  P2o
This will result in the higher priced manufacturer undercutting the lower- 
priced manufacturer and the pattern will continue until,
P2 =  P i = c  (2)
Instead, product differentiation amongst generics allows for a new 
equilibrium, whereby,
Pi >  P2 >  •.. >  pn >  C (3)
To the extent that the strength segment market is significantly associated with 
generic prices, it may be that generic manufacturers strategically locate themselves in 
more or less common strengths as a means of trying to product differentiate, while at 
the same time, continuing to locate themselves where the demand is concentrated in 
accordance with spatial competition.
Similarly to Chapter 4, this model of price competition amongst generics at 
the strength segment level also includes the number of generic competitors as a 
variable in order to assess the extent to which the number of generic competitors 
induces tough competition as well as the original brand market share, in order to 
determine the extent to which generic manufacturers respond to original brand prices 
in addition to engaging in price competition with each other. Other variables that 
generic prices are likely to be a function of at the strength segment level include 
countries regulations (such as reference pricing) and whether or not the drug is
I l l
available over-the-counter in that strength. Thus, generic prices are assessed at the 
strength segment level, such that:
ps" = f( Nfv  > poo; SMS, ,REGi, DOTC ) 
i=  1,2, n
Where P*en is the average generic price within that strength market, Nfen 
represents the number of generic companies within the strength market, P°B 
represents the average original brand price within that strength market,
S M S represents the strength market share of the strength market, REG* encompasses
regulatory aspects and DOTC represents whether the drug is available over-the- 
counter in that strength and i represents the strength segment market.
5.3,3 Empirical Implications: Comparison of Prices across Strength 
Markets within a Molecule
This study then compares purchased prices across strength segments within 
molecule markets in order to determine the extent to which demand conditions differ 
across strength markets and whether there is evidence of manufacturers using 
segmented strength markets as an opportunity to reap larger profits through price 
discrimination.
5.4 Methods
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how competition 
differs within strength segments of off-patent molecule markets, this study analyzes 
competition between the original brand and generics within off-patent retail 
pharmacy strength market segments of omeprazole and paroxetine in the USA, UK, 
France and Germany during the 2000ql-2005ql time period. A case study approach 
is appropriate in this case in order to probe at a sufficient level of detail, which 
includes tracing manufacturers’ entry and exist decisions in each strength market 
segment over time and across countries.
Omeprazole is part of a broader therapeutic class of drugs called Proton 
Pump Inhibitors, which treat Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease (GERD), also known 
as heartburn. Paroxetine is part of a broader therapeutic class of drugs called 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), which treat anxiety and depression.
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These two molecules are particularly suitable for this study because their molecule 
markets are so large (in volume) that their strength submarkets are still conducive to 
a robust sample size. Moreover, because their strength submarkets are such large 
markets in and of themselves, the price and efficiency implications remain large in 
absolute terms even at this sublevel. This underscores the significance of studying 
competition at this disaggregated level. Finally, since retail omeprazole and 
paroxetine were only available in oral (whether pill, tablet or capsule) form, these 
two molecules provide a unique opportunity to isolate the effect that the existence of 
multiple strength market segments of a molecule may have (on the degree of 
competition within that molecule market and the likely implication for efficiency 
savings across countries), without being complicated by the influence of a different 
mix of formulations in different strengths.39 The one exception is in the case of the 
controlled-release version of paroxetine in the USA, which this chapter takes 
advantage of as an opportunity to do a case study on the cost implication of a 
product-line extension. Finally, these two molecules recently went off patent in all 
study countries, which enables an analysis across different countries’ regulatory 
environments that is reflective of modem pharmaceutical policies.
5.4.1 Data
The study uses Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) Health data. IMS 
collects pharmaceutical pricing and sales data across numerous countries and 
provides a robust source of comparative data, with data being subject to internal 
validation (IMS, 2002). Retail sales and price data was available for omeprazole and 
paroxetine on a quarterly basis from 2000Q1 to 2005Q1. The data was available at 
the most disaggregated level, namely the product presentation level, which includes 
various permutations of strength, formulation, and package size. The manufacturer’s 
name (both originator and generic) can also be distinguished at the presentation level. 
This data allows for the calculation of market (molecule) level information, such as 
the number of manufacturers and original brand market share. The detailed nature of 
the dataset results in a total sample size of N=11,210. Using price and sales data, the 
quantity of packages sold was determined. Subsequently, the total volume of each 
presentation sold was arrived at by adjusting for package size (i.e. number of pills,
39 Paroxetine and omeprazole were also available in liquid form in the hospital market, which is not 
included in this study.
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tablets or capsules). Because the analysis is at the strength sub-market level, the 
units do not need to be standardized into daily defined dosages (DDDs), but rather 
are on a per pill basis. All prices were inflation-adjusted by each country’s consumer 
price index, and then converted to USA dollars based on the quarterly exchange 
rates.
5.4.2 Choice o f Study Countries
This study focuses on original brand versus generic competition within 
strength sub-markets of omeprazole and paroxetine in the USA, UK, Germany and 
France. The choice of countries reflects differences in supply- and demand-side 
regulatory and incentive structures affecting the uptake and use of generic medicines. 
Specifically, the USA represents a relatively free market in that there is no 
centralized price control or regulation for the majority of drugs at the federal level. 
The majority of the pharmaceutical market can also be characterized as free pricing 
in the UK, with a system of profit control for patented drugs. In the case of Germany 
and France, however, pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement are more heavily 
regulated. Historically, Germany has allowed free pricing for patented drugs, but has 
been a pioneer of molecular-level reference pricing for off-patent drugs.40 Notably, 
there are separate reference groups for different strengths of a molecule in Germany. 
Reference pricing is a system in which a common reimbursement price is set for a 
group of drugs. Where the price of the drug is higher than the reference price, the 
patient must pay the difference. France, on the other hand, is the one country in this 
study that maintains direct control over the reimbursement prices of patented drugs, 
as well as generics, which it caps at a percentage (around 60%) of the original brand 
price (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005). As of 2003, France also has moved a number 
of its molecules into an off-patent reference price system, although they did not 
include omeprazole and paroxetine during this study period. (See chapter 3 on 
methods and Appendix A for a more detailed description of the pharmaceutical 
regulations in the USA, the UK, Germany and France.) These regulatory differences
40 In 2004, Germany expanded its molecule-level reference price system to the entire therapeutic class 
for certain drugs. In these cases, some patented drugs were included in the reference price system. 
PPIs, and therefore omeprazole, were included in the therapeutic class reference price system. 
However, since omeprazole was the first drug in its class, omeprazole prices within strength 
submarkets are unlikely to have been affected by the inclusion o f other PPIs into the reference group 
since omeprazole prices would likely have been the lowest as a result o f  being the first molecule in the 
PPI class to go off patent.
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enable a comparison of how competition within strength market segments of 
omeprazole and paroxetine differs across regulatory environments. Moreover, the 
regulatory differences across countries enables a descriptive comparative analysis on 
what factors may influence the number of strengths within molecule markets besides 
clinical need.
5.4.3 Research Questions
Recall from the conceptual method section above that there are four main 
empirical questions. On the competitive dynamics within strength markets: 1) To 
what extent does the degree of competition between the original brand and generics 
within strength market segments differ across strength market segments (of the same 
molecule) and 2) What are the findings’ implications for purchasing efficiency? On 
the role of product differentiation and price discrimination: 3) How do prices 
compare across strength/form segment markets (of the same molecule) and 4) What 
are the ways in which payors could take advantage of pricing disparities by 
substituting certain strengths (within a molecule) and what degree of savings could 
these strategies achieve?
Recall also that before launching into an analysis of competition within 
strength segment markets, it is first necessary to explore the ways in which in the 
number of strength submarkets of a molecule may differ across countries, as well as 
their corresponding strength market shares. Furthermore, this study conducts a 
descriptive analysis on how the number of strengths and their corresponding strength 
market shares differs across countries and what factors may influence the number of 
strengths within a molecule market.
The first two research questions are therefore:
1. How did the number of strengths and their corresponding strength market 
shares compare in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in the USA, UK, 
France and Germany during the patent expiry to 2005ql period?
2. What regulatory factors may influence the number of strengths in a molecule 
market in the USA, UK, France and Germany?
This study then conducts a descriptive analysis of original brand versus 
generic market shares within strength submarkets of a molecule across countries, and 
compares how the number of generic competitors differs across strength submarkets 
of a molecule. Finally, this study uses a fixed-effects panel data technique to model
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the factors that determine the original brand prices within strength segment markets, 
the original brand market share within strength market segments and generic prices 
within strength segment markets. Finally, recall that this study also analyses 
purchased prices in order to determine the extent to which manufacturers are able to 
price nonlinearly across strengths in order to maximize profits.
In order to answer the empirical questions using this sample selection, the 
remaining research questions are therefore:
3. What were the determinants of original brand prices within omeprazole and 
paroxetine strength segment markets in the USA, UK, France and Germany 
during the 2000ql-2005ql period and what does this evidence say about 
whether original brand manufacturer employed the market harvesting strategy 
within strength segment markets?
4. How do the original brand strength segment market shares relate to generic 
strength segment prices within and across omeprazole and paroxetine strength 
segments in the USA, UK, France and Germany during the patent expiry to 
2005ql period?
5. How did original brand strength segment market shares compare across 
paroxetine and omeprazole strength segments in the USA, UK, France and 
Germany during the patent expiry to 2005ql period and what were the 
determinants of the original brand strength segment market shares?
6. To what extent was generic entry associated with generic price declines 
across strengths in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in the USA, UK, 
France and Germany during the patent expiry to 2005ql period and what 
were the determinants of generic prices?
7. How much could countries have saved if original brand versus generic 
competition was equivalent within all strength segment markets (of a 
molecule) to the strength segment with the most competitive dynamics?
8. How did purchased prices compare within and across omeprazole and 
paroxetine strength submarkets in the USA, UK, France and Germany during 
the 2000ql to 2005ql period and what does this suggest about the degree of 
price competition within molecule markets?
9. What are the implications of payors taking advantage of nonlinear pricing 
patterns?
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10. What are the implications for payors of an original brand manufacturer 
introducing a line- extension, as seen in the case of paroxetine suspended 
release in the US?
5.5 The Implications of Strength-Segmented Molecule Markets on 
Original Brand versus Generic Competition
5.5.1 Empirical Analysis/Observations
5.5.1.1 A Comparison o f  Strengths across Molecule Markets and Countries
In order to address the first two research questions, this study begins by 
conducting a descriptive analysis on how the number of strengths and their 
corresponding strength market shares differs across countries and what factors may 
influence the number of strengths within a molecule market. The strength market 
share is calculated as the percentage of a molecule market (based on numbers of 
pills) that a strength accounts for. For example, a lOmg strength market share of 10 
percent would imply that for that given molecule, ten percent of the dispensed pills 
were lOmg.
Figure 5-1 shows how the number of strengths and their corresponding 
market shares in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets compared across the USA, 
UK, France and Germany in 2005ql.
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Figure 5-1 A Comparison of Omeprazole Strength Market Shares in each of the
Study Countries in 2005ql
Omeprazole Strength Market Shares 
in Germany, 2005Q1
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Figure 5-2 A Comparison of Paroxetine Strength Market Shares in each of the 
Study Countries in 2005ql
Paroxetine Strength Market Shares 
in the UK, 2005Q1
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Source: The author from IMS.
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In France and the UK, omeprazole was available in two strengths—20 mg 
and 10 mg. The 20 mg market comprised nearly three quarters of the total molecule 
market in both the UK and France, while the 10 mg market accounted for the other 
quarter of the market. In Germany and the USA, however, omeprazole was sold in 
three strengths— 10 mg, 20 mg and 40 mg. The 20 mg dosage comprised the vast 
majority of the molecule markets—84% and 95% in Germany and the USA 
respectively—while the 40 mg markets had the next largest market shares, followed 
by the 10 mg markets.
With regards to paroxetine, Figure 5-2 shows that Germany and the USA had 
the largest number of strengths, while the UK and France had the smallest. In 
France, paroxetine was only available in one strength—20mg—in 2005ql. In the 
UK, it was available in 20 mg and 30 mg, with the 20 mg strength comprising the 
vast majority of the market. Paroxetine was available in 20 mg, 30 mg and 40 mg in 
Germany, with the 20 mg market comprising the vast majority of the molecule 
market and the 40 mg market comprising most of the rest. Interestingly, the 30 mg 
market comprised only 0.1% of the molecule market in Germany. It was introduced 
in 2004ql by two generic manufacturers, which had 3% and 20% of the total 
molecule market share. Finally, in the USA, paroxetine was available in four 
strengths— lOmg, 20mg, 30mg, 40mg—and a fifth form/strength, 24 hour controlled 
release. Paroxetine controlled release was introduced into the market by the original 
brand manufacturer of paroxetine41, in 2002ql, roughly a year before the first generic 
entered the paroxetine market. The original brand manufacturer claimed that in 
comparison with immediate release paroxetine, its controlled release version was 
associated with a lower rate of nausea during the first week of treatment, thus, 
offering higher quality treatment (at a higher price). The 24-hour controlled release 
version had a unique rate of bioabsorption into the body, so could not be considered 
to be bio-equivalent to any of the other paroxetine strengths. As a result, it could not 
be grouped into any of the paroxetine strength submarkets. However, since its 
chemical ingredient is identical to other paroxetines, it is appropriate to group this 




Interestingly, none of the five paroxetine submarkets (lOmg, 20mg, 30mg, 
40mg and 24SA42) captured the majority of the molecule market in the USA in 
2005ql. The 20mg and 24SA presentations each comprised roughly a third of the 
molecule market. The remaining third of the market was relatively evenly split 
amongst the lOmg, 30mg and 40mg strengths.
Interestingly, the lower strengths have relatively high strength market shares 
in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in France and the UK. Specifically, the 
case of omeprazole shows that the lowest strength (lOmg) occupied a relatively 
higher market share in the UK and France than in the USA and Germany. Likewise, 
in the case of paroxetine, the highest strength (40mg) captured a significant share of 
the market in the USA and Germany, but did not even exist in the UK and France.43
5.5.1.2 Factors Influencing an Original Brand Manufacturer’s Decision to 
Enter/Create a New Strength Market within a Molecule
The two most obvious factors that influence the number of strengths in a 
molecule market and the corresponding strength market shares are clinical need44 and 
prescribing habits45. However, recall from the conceptual method section that a
42 24 hours suspended action
43 One hypothetical (albeit unsubstantiated) explanation for this could be that physicians in the UK 
and France follow step-therapy guidelines more closely than the US and Germany.
44 Intuitively, the most obvious factor that determines the number o f strengths is the size o f the patient 
population for that given molecule, or in other words, the clinical need. At first glance, the relatively 
static nature of the number o f strengths and their respective market shares in each country as seen in 
Figures 5-1 and 5-2 might seem to suggest that the number o f strengths is based largely on exogenous 
factors such as clinical need rather than on factors such as generic entry. However, a cross country 
comparison suggests that there may be other factors, in addition to clinical need, that determine the 
number o f strengths. Since all countries in this study share the Western Culture in common and have 
a similar level o f development, it seems unlikely that the disease profiles of heartburn and 
depression/anxiety differ enough to justify such significant differences in the number o f strengths and 
their market shares across the USA, UK, France and Germany. Thus, the extent to which clinical 
need (both in terms o f the incidence and acuity o f the diseases across countries) drives the number o f  
strengths and their corresponding market shares is an area that could benefit from further research.
45 Since physicians choose which strength to prescribe a patient, and since pharmacists are not allowed 
to change the strength that the physician prescribed, physicians’ prescribing habits are likely to be a 
strong determinant o f the number o f strengths in each market as well as the strength market share.
The driving factors behind physicians’ prescribing habits, however, likely differ across settings. 
Numerous factors may influence prescribing habits, including: pharmaceutical marketing/advertising 
and the role o f clinical guidelines and whether they give specific orders to use step-therapy (the 
practice o f trying the lower strengths first and then increasing the dosage if  the low strength is not 
effective). For example, in the UK, NICE issues guidelines on specific diseases/illnesses, which 
reflect the cost-effectiveness o f  various lines o f treatment. In 2000, NICE (The National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence) issued specific guidelines on the use o f PPIs. They state that: “In circumstances 
where it is appropriate to use a PPI and where healing is required, the optimal dose to achieve this 
should be prescribed initially. Once healing is achieved, the lowest dose o f the PPI that provides 
effective symptom relief should be used.... The least expensive appropriate PPI should be used”
(NHS NICE, 2000).
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manufacturer’s decision to enter into a strength market, which is a prerequisite for 
the existence of a strength market, is a function of a number of factors besides 
clinical need and prescribing patterns. It is also a function of the price which the 
manufacturer expects to receive as well as the expected costs of marketing the 
product. Certain costs associated with marketing a product may be similar across 
these study countries, such as manufacturing costs. However, other costs may differ 
with each country’s regulatory system, such as the costs of obtaining marketing 
authorization and coverage approval for a new strength.
In France, manufacturers of a new, branded product must prove the drug’s 
additional therapeutic value in comparison with other drugs on the market and must 
negotiate a price that is based on expected sales volume in order to be approved for 
marketing and included on the reimbursed list of drugs. Thus, the approval process 
and the pricing processes are intertwined. (See Appendix A.) In the UK, the 
marketing authorization process for additional strengths is relatively straightforward 
in comparison with France. In cases where original brand manufacturers wish to 
receive approval for a new strength or form, they need only prove the drug’s quality, 
safety and efficacy through an abridged application, which only requires the 
necessary pre-clinical and clinical data instead of forcing pharmaceutical companies 
to repeat the tests and trials on animals and humans (MHRA). They can then price 
freely and are only constrained insofar as NICE guidelines influence physicians 
towards or away from prescribing their product. Thus, the UK approval and 
marketing process is more liberal than France.
However, the approval and marketing process in the USA and Germany 
appear to be the most liberal. In the USA, original brand manufacturers do not even 
need to submit separate applications in order to receive approval for multiple 
strengths, as long as they are “intended for the same route of administration and the 
same general indication(s)” (FDA, 2004). (They do, however, have to submit a 
separate application for the approval of different dosage forms, such as oral vs. 
injectible vs. suppository, which requires its own clinical data.) This reduces the 
number of application fees they face as well as the cost of time that is associated with 
submitting a formal application. Moreover, once a drug has been approved in the 
USA, there is no centralized process by which the drug’s cost-effectiveness is
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assessed. Instead, most drugs are automatically covered by the pluralist system of 
private and public insurance groups.46
Similar to the USA, the criteria for licensing and marketing new drugs in 
Germany are quite liberal. Manufacturers need only demonstrate safety and efficacy, 
which requires only a marginal beneficial effect that is demonstrated with a small 
patient sample. Cost-effectiveness plays no role in the approval or coverage 
decision-making process (Busse and Riesberg, 2004).
Thus, the regulatory leniency in both Germany and the USA, both on the 
marketing approval and coverage sides, could be one contributing factor to the 
greater number of strengths in each molecule market that is shown below. Figure 5-3 
shows that in nine out of a sample of eleven molecules, either the USA or Germany 
had the most number of strengths. Meanwhile, France had the fewest number of 
strengths in six of the eleven molecule markets, whereas the UK lied in the middle of 
the spectrum. The extent to which the regulations governing marketing approval and 
coverage influence the number o f strengths in a molecule market must be interpreted 
with caution, however, since this is a simple piece of descriptive evidence that does 
not imply cause and effect.
Figure 5-3 The Number of Strengths in Molecule Markets in Germany, the 
USA, the UK and France, 2005ql
The number of Strengths in Molecule Markets in Germany, the US, the UK and France, 2005q1
Source: IMS Health Data.
46 Private insurers in the US, however, do often group drugs into tiers based on price and therapeutic 
superiority. Thus, manufacturers are at least somewhat limited on the reimbursement side. However, 
the private insurance companies are unlikely to tier drugs based on strength.
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5.5.1.3 Generic Entry into Strength Markets
The approval process for generic drugs is similar in the USA, the UK, France 
and Germany, where generic manufacturers are exempt from having to perform their 
own costly animal and clinical trials. Instead, generic manufacturers are simply 
required to meet good manufacturing standards and prove bio-equivalence. In the 
USA, the FDA states that generic drugs must fulfil the following obligations (FDA, 
2009):
• Contain the same active ingredients as the innovator drug (inactive 
ingredients may vary)
• Be identical in strength, dosage form, and route of administration
• Have the same use indications
• Be bioequivalent to the originator
• Meet the same batch requirements for identity, strength, purity and 
quality
• Be manufactured under the same strict standards of FDA’s good 
manufacturing practice regulations required for innovator products
Assuming the original brand molecule exists in that strength, there is a cost to 
the generic manufacturers for entry into additional strength market segments, 
although the marginal cost is not high (Scott-Morton, 2000). For approval in each 
strength market, generic manufacturers are only required to show the necessary 
laboratory work that meets the relevant batch requirements. It would, however, be 
more costly for generic manufacturers to receive approval for a strength that is not 
yet on the market. In this case, they would need to submit a full application with 
data on the safety of that strength. As a result, generic manufacturers are unlikely to 
segment the market into additional strengths that do not include the original brand 
manufacturer. Evidence of this is seen in Figures 5-4 and 5-5.
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Figure 5-4 Omeprazole Strength Market Shares in the Study Countries before 
Generic Entry and in 2005ql (end of study period)47
Omeprazole Strength Market Shares in Germany at the 
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Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
47 In Germany, generic entry for omeprazole and paroxetine occurred just before the study period. 
Thus, 2000ql data has been used instead of data just preceding generic entry.
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Figure 5-5 Paroxetine Strength Market Shares in the Study Countries before 
Generic Entry and in 2005ql (end of study period)
Paroxetine Strength Market Shares in Germany at the 
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Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
In Germany, generic manufacturers did introduce new strengths into the 
omeprazole and paroxetine markets. Specifically, the 40mg omeprazole market, as 
shown in Figure 5-4 and the 40mg and 30mg paroxetine markets, as shown in Figure
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5-5 were introduced by generic manufacturers. However, in the USA, UK and 
France, generic entry did not result in more strengths in the market. Moreover, in 
nearly every case, the overall strength market shares did not change substantially 
before and after generic entry. The one exception is France, where generic entry into 
the omeprazole market was associated with a significant shift in strength market 
shares; the 2 0 mg strength held only twenty percent of the omeprazole market share 
before generic entry, while the 1 Omg strength held the remainder 80 percent. After 
generic entry, the market shares nearly reversed, with the 1 Omg strength only 
accounting for 28 percent while the 20mg strength accounted for 72 percent. Figure 
5-6 shows the change in volume (measured as number o f pills) across omeprazole 
strength market segments in France. The volume of 1 Omg omeprazole decreased 
slowly from 2001 to 2005ql. A possible explanation for this shift is that during this 
time period, France introduced a number of policies that encourage the use of 
generics (see methodology chapter and Appendix A). It may be that patients who 
were taking other PPIs which were still on patent switched to the 20mg omeprazole 
once it experienced generic entry in 2004q2 instead of the 1 Omg omeprazole, which 
had not yet experienced generic entry as of 2005ql.
Figure 5-6 Change in Volume of Omeprazole and Strengths in France, 2000ql- 
2005ql
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Note: The solid line denotes the point of generic entry. 
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
In conclusion, generics did not create new strength segments in the 
omeprazole and paroxetine markets in the study countries, except in the case of 
Germany. Nor did generic entry seem to significantly change the strength market
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shares in most cases (with the exception of omeprazole in France), as evidenced by 
the relatively static market shares before and after generic entry. Rather, most 
generic manufacturers limited themselves to the strength market segments that 
already existed and strategically decided which strength market segments to enter 
into and when.
Thus, in the case of omeprazole and paroxetine, the patent expiration and 
subsequent entry of generic competitors does not seem to be a determinant for the 
number of strengths. (In Germany, the introduction of additional strengths occurred
A O
years after the first generic entered the molecule markets, making it unlikely that 
patent expiration/generic entry was the cause either.) This suggests that in the 
omeprazole and paroxetine markets, competition between the original brand and 
generics may not be one of the principal determinants of the number of strengths. In 
Germany, however, there seems to be some preliminary evidence that in the 
omeprazole and paroxetine markets, competition amongst generics may be result in 
more strength segments. It should be noted, however, that these findings can only 
contribute to hypothesis building theories since they are descriptive in nature. Since 
the number of strengths did not change in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in 
the USA, UK and France during the study period, this dataset is not conducive to 
running statistical models that test the relationship between the number of strengths 
and generic entry/competition.
5.5.1.4 A Comparison o f  the Competitive Dynamics across Strength market 
segments
5.5.1.4.1 Generic Entry and Average Generic Prices
One of the driving factors of prices and expenditures within strength markets 
is the competitive dynamics in that strength segment market. Thus, it is important to 
first understand the nature of generic entry into strength segment markets, which is a 
prerequisite for competition (CBO, 1998; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008).
48 Specifically, a generic manufacturer created the 40mg omeprazole segment in 2000q3, which was 
likely years after generic entry in the omeprazole molecule market, given the fact that there were 
already 13 generic entrants in 2000ql, the beginning o f this study period. In addition, two generic 
manufacturers created the 40mg paroxetine segment in 2002ql and one generic manufacturer 
(different from the two that created the 40mg market) created the 3 Omg paroxetine market in 2004ql, 
while generic entry occurred in the paroxetine molecule market before 2000ql.
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Figure 5-7 below describes how many strength market segments each generic 
manufacturer decided to enter into in each country’s molecule market and the 
sequence of entry.
Figure 5-7 Generic Entry into Strength Omeprazole and Paroxetine Strength 
market segments in Germany, France the UK and the USA __________
Germany France UK USA
Omeprazole •  14 manufacturers 
entered into 1 strength 
market (20mg)
•  1 manufacturer entered 
into 2 strength market 
segments
• 7 manufacturers entered 
into 3 strength market 
segments (a few 
entered them at the 
same time, most 
entered into one, then 
two, then three)
•  1 manufacturer entered 
into 3 strength market 
segments and then left 
the market*






•2  manufacturers 
entered into 1 
strength market 
•2  manufacturers 
entered into 2 
strength market 
segments (all 
entered into both 
at the same 
time)
•  1 manufacturer 





• 1 manufacturer 
entered into 1 
strength market
• 5 manufacturers 
entered into 2 
strength market 
segments (3 
entered at the 
same time and 2 
entered into one 
then two)
Paroxetine • 16 manufacturers 
entered into 1 strength 
market (20mg)
•  5 manufacturers entered 
into 2 strength market 
segments (all entered 
into one then two)
• 1 manufacturer entered 
into 2 strength market 








was only 1 
strength in 
the market)
•2  manufacturers 
entered into 1 
market (20mg)
•  1 manufacturer 
entered into 2 
markets (one, 
then two)
•  1 manufacturer 




•  7 manufacturers 
entered into 4 
strength market 
segments (5 
entered into four 
at the same time, 
1 entered into 3 
and then 4, and 
1 entered into 1 
and then 2 and 
then 4)
* The same generic manufacturer exited the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in Germany. 
**These were not the same company.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
In nearly every case, manufacturers first entered into the 20mg strength 
segment market upon entry into the omeprazole and paroxetine molecule markets, 
and remained in that 20mg strength segment market. Thus, in cases where 
manufacturers were only in one market, they were in the 20mg market. (The only 
exceptions were two manufacturers in the UK which only entered into the lOmg 
omeprazole market, one of which was the 1 Omg OTC omeprazole market.) In cases 
where manufacturers entered into multiple markets in step-wise fashion, they always 
entered into the 20mg first (sometimes just a quarter or two before entering into
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another strength market, while at other times a year or two before entering into 
another strength market).
Figures 5-8 and 5-9 show the evolution of the number of generic competitors 
over time in each strength segment market. It is clear that the number of generic 
competitors is consistently higher in the 20mg strength segment markets than in 
other strength segment markets. The two exceptions are in the case of the USA, 
where the number of generic competitors remains approximately equal across lOmg, 
20mg, 30mg and 40mg strength segment markets and in the case of the UK, where 
there were more generic competitors in the omeprazole lOmg strength segment 
market than the omeprazole 20mg strength segment market as of 2004ql. The 
legions in these graphs show the strength segment markets that exist (i.e. that have 
experienced either original brand or generic sales) in the molecule market. A lack of 
corresponding generic competitors in the graph indicates that generic entry had not 
occurred in that strength segment market as of 2005ql. This was the case in the 
lOmg omeprazole strength segment market in France and the 24SA paroxetine 
strength/formulation segment market in the USA.
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Figure 5-8 A Comparison of the Number of Generic Competitors in each 
Omeprazole Strength Segment Market across Study Countries, 2000-2005ql
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Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
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Figure 5-9 A Comparison of the Number of Generic Competitors in each 
Paroxetine Strength Segment Market across Study Countries, 2000-2005ql
Number of Generic Competitors in the Paroxetine, Germany 
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Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Since the 20mg markets for both omeprazole and paroxetine were the daily 
defined dosages, and likewise, had the highest strength market shares (as seen in 
Figure 5-1), it appears that the decision of which strength market to enter into is
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largely based on expected volume for generic manufacturers. Table 5-1 below 
provides evidence that there is a positive correlation between the number of generic 
competitors in each strength market and the strength market share in most 
omeprazole and paroxetine markets.
Table 5-1 The Correlation between the Number of Generic Competitors in each 
Omeprazole and Paroxetine Strength Market and the respective Strength
iq
Market Share (within the total molecule market), 2000ql-2005ql____________
Germany France* UK USA
Omeprazole .866 .262 -.003 .251
Paroxetine .541 — .351 -.203
*In France, the correlation statistic cannot be run for the paroxetine since there is only one 
strength in the market.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
It is not surprising that the correlation is the strongest in Germany, where a 
relatively large majority of the omeprazole and paroxetine markets are concentrated 
in one strength (as seen in Figures 5-1 and 5-2). In the UK, the very weak negative 
association between the number of generic competitors in each strength market and 
the strength market shares in the case of omeprazole is likely reflective of the two 
manufacturers that only entered into the lOmg market, and not the 20mg market, as 
mentioned in the discussion above. In the USA, the negative association in the case 
of paroxetine may reflect the fact that the 24SA formulation captured a large market 
share, but was still on patent and therefore not open to generic entry. Thus, the fact 
that every generic manufacturer entered into the 20mg market first and foremost and 
that the number of generic competitors across strengths correlates positively (in most 
cases) with the strength market share suggests that generic manufacturers base their 
entry decision primarily on the expected volume.
How, then, do average generic prices across strength market segments 
correlate with generic entry across strength market segments, and how does this 
compare across countries? Table 5-2 below shows the correlation between the 
number of generic manufacturers in each strength market and the average generic 
price. Nearly all of the generic manufacturers in these strength market segments
49 For example, this statistic measures the correlation between the number o f generic manufacturers in 
the 20mg omeprazole strength segment and the 20mg omeprazole strength market share (within the 
total molecule market) for each given country, the number o f generic manufacturers in the lOmg 
omeprazole strength segment and the lOmg omeprazole strength market share (within the total 
market) for each given country, and so on.
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remained in the market (until 2005ql) after entering, with the exception of the one 
manufacturer in Germany that exited the market, as mentioned in Figure 5-7 above. 
Thus, this correlation statistic provides evidence on whether an increase in the 
number of generic competitors in each strength market was associated with a 
decrease (or an increase) in the average generic prices in each strength market.
Table 5-2 The Correlation between the Number of Generic Manufacturers 
across Strength market segments and the Average Generic Price across 
Strength market segments in Germany, France, the USA and the UK, 2000ql- 
2005ql________ ______________ ____________ _________________________
Germany France UK USA
Omeprazole .009 .775 -.808 -.927
Paroxetine -.697 -.654 -.057 -.593
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
In Germany and France, the correlation between generic entry and average 
generic prices across strength market segments differs by molecule. Specifically, an 
increase in generic competitors is associated with a decrease in average generic 
prices in the paroxetine markets in Germany and France, but not the omeprazole 
markets. Rather, there does not seem to be a strong correlation in either direction in 
the omeprazole market in Germany, which may reflect the influence of the reference 
pricing system, which often prevents generic prices from decreasing over time 
(Danzon and Chao, 2000; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). In addition, the 
generic entry into omeprazole strength market segments in France is associated with 
an increase in the average generic price. However, the increase in average generic 
price is likely due to the increase in the original brand price, not the increase in the 
number of generic competitors itself. This is a result of France’s policy that the price 
of generics should not exceed a fixed percentage of the original brand price (50- 
60%), which effectively acts as a price ceiling.50
The USA and the UK, however, show consistent signs of generic prices 
decreasing when generic entry increases. This indicates that some degree of price 
competition amongst generics does exist within strength market segments, as would 
be expected.
50 This price ceiling phenomena is also discussed in case one o f this thesis.
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5.5.1.4.2 Original Brand Prices and Market Shares in Strength market 
segments following Generic Entry
Numerous studies of original brand versus generic competition at the 
molecule level show that original brand manufacturers pursue a market harvesting 
strategy post generic entry by either increasing or keeping constant their prices, 
thereby retaining brand loyal customers and accepting that the price sensitive portion 
of the market will switch to generics (Frank and Salkever, 1997; Caves et al, 1991; 
Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). Figures 5-10 and 5-11 show that in nearly all cases, 
the original brand prices either stayed the same or increased at the same rate across 
strength segment markets. Moreover, following patent expiration, original brand 
manufacturers of omeprazole and paroxetine employed this market harvesting 
strategy consistently across strengths, regardless of the number of generic entrants in 
each strength market or the average generic price.
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Figure 5-10 Original Brand Manufacturers’ Prices across strengths before and 
after Generic Entry in the Omeprazole Markets in Germany, France, the UK 
and the USA, 2000ql-2005ql
Omeprazole Original Brand Price Changes in Germany, 
2000q1-2005q1
10m g
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Note: Solid lines denote time of generic entry. In Germany, generic entry occurred before study period 
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
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Figure 5-11 Original Brand Manufacturers’ Prices across strengths before and 
after Generic Entry in the Paroxetine Markets in Germany, France, the UK and 
the USA, 2000ql-2005ql
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Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
The one exception was for 20mg omeprazole in the USA, where the original 
brand manufacturer decreased its price at the time of OTC switch. The original
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brand manufacturers even increased their prices in strength market segments where 
there was not yet generic entry. Examples of this include the lOmg omeprazole 
market in France, which had not experienced generic entry by 2005ql, despite 
generic entry occurring in the 20mg market in 2004q2, and the 30mg paroxetine 
market in the UK, which did not experience generic entry until 2004ql, despite 
generic entry occurring in the 20mg market in 200 lq4. Thus, on the one hand, the 
original brand manufacturers of omeprazole and paroxetine treated different strength 
products as though they were in the same market by increasing prices consistently 
across strength segments. However, on the other hand, some original brand 
manufacturers treated different strength products as though they were in different 
markets (and hence benefit from this segmentation) when they introduced the 
products to the markets with nonlinear (and sometimes discriminatory) prices (as 
discussed below) at the first instance.
Another way in which strength market segments benefited the original brand 
manufacturers was in their ability to retain a larger share of the strength market in 
strengths were there were fewer generic entrants. Table 5-3 below shows the 
original brand market shares across strengths alongside the number of competitors in 
that market and the original brand to generic price ratio (calculated as the average 
original brand price to average generic price ratio). The strength market share is also 
included in order to put the original brand market share in each strength market into 
the context of the larger molecule market.
Figures 5-7, 5-8, and Table 5-3 all show that in most omeprazole and 
paroxetine markets in Germany, France, the UK and the USA, the 20mg DDD has 
the largest number of generic competitors. This is not surprising given that strength 
market share correlates positively with generic entry (Table 5-1), and the 20mg 
strength market segments have the highest strength market share. Additionally, the 
original brand to generic price ratio differs across strength markets of the same 
molecule, which is also not surprising given that number of generic entrants 
correlates strongly (in most cases) with average generic prices across strength market 
segments (see Table 5-2). The most interesting finding in Table 5-2 is that original 
brand market shares are significantly different across strengths of the same molecule 
market. For example, for omeprazole in France, the original brand market share 
ranges from 5% for 20mg to 100% for lOmg. Meanwhile, in Germany, there are 
multiple strength market segments where the original brand is not even in the market.
Table 5-3 A Comparison of Original Brand and Generic Market Shares and Prices across Omeprazole and Paroxetine Strength market 






Original Brand {strength Number of
t
Original Brand {strength Original Number of Original Brandjstrength Number of Original Brand
Market Original Brand Generic to Generic [Market Original Brand Generic to Generic |Market Brand Market Generic to Generic |Market Original Brand Generic to Generic
Share Market Share Competitors Price Ratio J Share Market Share Competitors Price Ratio JShare Share Competitors Price Ratio ; Share Market Share Competitors Price Ratio
10mg 3% 19.6% 7 1.43; 28% 100.0% 0 ; 27% 8.0% 5 2.19; 1% 18.3% 5 1.99
20mg 84% 0.1% 22 1.27{ 72% 5.3% 14 2.85{ 73% 10.9% 4 2.26{ 95% 60.2% 6 1.34
40mg 12% 0.0% 8 1 0% _______ J_____ | 4% 100.0% 0






Original Brand {strength Number of Original Brand {strength Original Number of Original Brandjstrength Number of Original Brand
Market Original Brand Generic to Generic |Market Original Brand Generic to Generic |Market Brand Market Generic to Generic IMarket Original Brand Generic to Generic
Share Market Share Competitors Price Ratio |Share Market Share Competitors Price Ratio JShare Share Competitors Price Ratio JShare Market Share Competitors Price Ratio
10mg
° i
■ 10% 7.9% 7 2.30
20mg 86% 16.1% . 21 1.18! 100% 36.2% 8 1.51 { 81% 38.2% 3 1.24; 35% 8.8% 7 2.24
30mg 0% 0.0% 1 1 1 -19% 44.5% 2 0.931 9% 8.5% 7 2.48
40mg 12% 0.0% 3 11
•
1 1 12% 7.4% 7 2.82
SAtabs 1 34% 100.0% 0
total market 14% 21 1.091 36% 8 1 .5 lT 39% 4 1.121 39% 7 2.36
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
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The only cases where the original brand strength market shares are within a 
few percentage points of each other are paroxetine in the USA and omeprazole in the 
UK. At first glance, it seems that it could be due to the number of generic 
competitors being relatively equal across strength market segments. However, the 
case of omeprazole in the USA shows that the original brand market shares can still 
be significantly different across strength market segments even when the number of 
generic competitors is relatively similar across markets. What, then, are the 
determinants of original brand market share?
5.5.2 Econometric Analysis
Since the average original brand prices are significantly higher than the 
average generic prices, as seen in the original brand to generic price ratios, high 
original brand market shares at the strength level are likely to lead to inefficient 
spending for purchasers. Thus, it is of utmost policy significance to understand what 
determines the original brand prices and original brand market shares within strength 
segment markets as well as the generic prices within strength market segments. The 
following models test the likely determinants of original brand prices, original brand 
market shares and generic prices within omeprazole and paroxetine strength segment 
markets in Germany, France, the UK and the USA from 2000ql-2005ql51:
P°B = p 0 +P xN fen + P2MS°b + P3SMS, + DOTC + £
MS°b = p Q + P xN?en + p 1PRATi + P3SMSt + DOTC + s  
P gen = p 0 + P xN fen + P2P°b + P3SMSi + DOTC + e 
Where P gen represents the average generic prices within strength segments, 
P.)B represents the average original brand price within the strength segment market, 
Nfen represents the quarterly number of generic competitors in each strength, MS?8 
represents the original brand market share within that strength segment,
SMSj represents the quarterly strength market share (in the context of the broader
molecule market), DOTC represents a dummy variable for whether the original
51 Notably, the strength market segments for both paroxetine and omeprazole have been combined 
into the same model across all countries for rigor, as some o f  the markets, such as those in France, 
only had one or two strengths and therefore could not be run separately. Thus, while regulatory 
aspects were implicitly controlled for through fixed-effects, they cannot be displayed separately as 
they were in the first case.
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brand drug was available over the counter in that strength for that given quarter and
PRATl represents the quarterly average original brand to average generic price
ratios in each strength, as described in Figure 5-12 below.







The average price o f the original brand in that strength segment market 3.015 (1 .627)
p g e n
i
The average generic price in that strength segment market 1.731 (.693)
m s °b The original brand market share within the strength segment market .653 (.410)
flTgen




Number o f quarters since generic entry in that strength segment market
The ratio o f the average original brand price to average generic price in 
that strength segment market
The lagged ratio (by one quarter) o f the average original brand price to 
average generic price in that strength segment market





The strength market share (percentage o f total pills o f that molecule 
that are dispensed o f that strength)
Dummy for Availability o f the original brand drug OTC in that 
strength segment market
.414 (.368)
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
With a total of 22 strength market segments over a 21 quarter time frame, this 
study uses a fixed effects panel data regression method. A fixed effects model is 
appropriate in these three models in order to control for the strength-specific 
disturbances, where the explanatory variables’ disturbance terms correlate with the 
strength level residuals. The Hausman test for the appropriateness of the random 
effects model versus the fixed effects model confirms this, as shown in Figure 5-12, 
Table 5-4 and Table 5-5.
This study presents the results for two versions of the models that test the 
determinants of the strength segment original brand market shares and the average 
generic prices within strength segment market shares. The Nfen variable in the
model that tests the determinants of the original brand prices within strength segment 
markets is treated as exogenous in accordance with the market harvesting strategy, 
which predicts that original brand prices are independent of the degree of generic 
entry following patent expiration.
52 This dummy variable for original brand OTC is different from the OTC dummy variable in case 
one, which includes both original brand OTC products (as was the case with OTC omeprazole in the 
US) and generic OTC products (as was the case with OTC omeprazole in the UK).
140
The first version for the original brand market shares model is a single­
equation panel data fixed effects regression where variables N fen, PRA Tt , SMSi and
DOTC  are all treated as exogenous.53 The second version o f this model is a two-
staged least-squares panel data fixed effects regression which treats N fen and PRA 7]
as endogenous by using Tt as an instrument for N fen and LAGPRATi in place
ofPRATt ,54
Similarly, the first version of the generic price model is a single-equation 
panel data fixed effects regression where variables N fen, P ™, SMS, and DOTC  are 
all treated as exogenous. The second version of this model is also a two-staged least- 
squares panel data fixed effects regression which treats N fen as endogenous by using
7] as an instrument for N fen. Notably, Table 5-5 and 5-6 show that the significance
and direction of the associations between the explanatory and dependent variables 
are the same in both the instrumented and non-instrumented versions, rendering the 
results consistent regardless of whether exogeneity or endogeneity is assumed.
Table 5-4 Model testing for the Determinants of the Average Original Brand 
Prices across Strengths in the Omeprazole and Paroxetine Markets in Germany, 
France, the UK and the USA, 2000ql-2005ql_______
Dependent variable: P™ Fixed Effects Model




No. of observations 369
No. of groups 18
R2 (within for fe model) .421
Hausman test 9.55**
*p < 0.10: **p < 0.05: ***p < 0.01
53 For other literature that treats the number of generic companies as an exogenous variable, see 
Grabowski and Vernon 1992 and Wiggins and Manes 1994.
54 For other literature that treats the number of companies as an endogenous variable, see Frank and 
Salkever 1997. In addition, for other literature that lags relative prices in order to deal with potential 
endogeneity see Aronsson & Bergman 1998.
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Table 5-5 Model testing for the Determinants of Original Brand Market Shares 
across Strengths in the Omeprazole and Paroxetine Markets in Germany,
France, the UK and the US^t, 2000ql-2005ql






Tt (instrument for N fen) -.074***
(0.009)






-6 .0 2 1 ***
(1.162)
DOTC .300***
(.1 1 0 )
.600***
(0 .1 1 0 )
No. of observations 158 143
No. of groups 15 15
R2 (within for fe model) .5213 .5513
Hausman test 42.50***
*p < 0.10: **p < 0.05: ***p < 0.01 
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
142
Table 5-6 Model testing for the Determinants of Original Brand Market Shares 
across Strengths in the Omeprazole and Paroxetine Markets in Germany,
France, the UK and the US i^, 2000ql-2005ql





(.0 1 1 )
Ti (instrument for N fen) -.1 0 0 ***
(0.017)








DOTC -1 092*** 
(.219)
- 9 4 5 *** 
(0.236)
No. of observations 158 157
No. of groups 15 15
R2 (within for fe model) .5067 .4871
Hausman test 228.18***
*p < 0.10: **p < 0.05: ***p < 0.01 
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
The results from the first model (Table 5-4) show that there is a significant, 
negative relationship between the original brand market shares within strength 
segments and the average original brand prices within strength segments. These 
results are consistent with Figures 5-10 and 5-11, which suggest that the original 
brand manufactures are pursuing the traditional market harvesting strategy, whereby 
they often respond to the inevitable decrease in market share (of their original brand) 
by increasing their prices so as to profit more (on the margin) from the brand loyal, 
price insensitive segment of the market. However, there is not a significant 
relationship between the number of generic competitors and the average original 
brand prices within strength segment markets. In this respect, the degree of generic 
entry does not affect the average original brand prices within strength segment 
markets. Additionally, the relationship between the strength segment market shares 
and the average original brand prices within strength segment markets is also not 
significant. This is consistent with the findings in Figures 5-10 and 5-11, where the
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original brand manufacturers seem to employ their market harvesting strategy 
consistently across strength segment markets, regardless of the strength market 
shares. Finally, there is a negative, significant relationship between the dummy 
variable OTC availability (within that strength segment market for that given quarter) 
and the original brand price. This is consistent with the results in the OTC case, 
which show Prilosec OTC priced significantly lower than prescription Prilosec.
The results from the second model (Table 5-5) show that there is a 
significant, negative relationship between the number of generic competitors and the 
original brand market share at the strength level, reflecting the fact that as additional 
generic competitors enter the market, the original brand manufacturer loses more 
market share, possibly because of the increased availability of drug manufacturers, 
and the increased supply of generic products to choose from. This effect is separate 
from the effect of the average generic price being lower than the average original 
brand price, which is captured through the PRAT variable. In this case, the 
association is also significant and negative, reflecting the likelihood that as the price 
gaps between the original brand and generic manufacturers increase, a larger share of 
the price sensitive payors switch to generics. Finally, there is a significant, negative 
relationship between the strength market share and the original brand market share. 
This reveals that in high strength market segments, the original brand is not as able to 
hold onto its market share. One possible explanation for this is that pharmacists and 
payors are more conscientious of substituting generics for original brand drugs for 
the more popular strengths because that is where the most significant savings lie. It 
could also be that generic substitution in the more popular strength market segments 
is more common because generics are more likely to exist in these markets (separate 
from the number of generics that exist).
In the third model (Table 5-6), there is a significant, negative relationship 
between the number of generic manufacturers and the average generic prices within 
strength segment markets. This is consistent with the findings in Table 5-2, which 
show a negative correlation between the number of generic manufacturers and the 
average generic prices with most omeprazole and paroxetine strength segment 
markets in the study countries. These findings within strength segment markets are 
also consistent with the literature, which finds that generic price competition 
increases with generic entry within molecule markets (Chapter 4; CBO, 1998; Frank 
and Salkever, 1997; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). Meanwhile, there was
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not a statistically significant relationship between the average original brand price 
and the average generic price, indicating that the generic manufacturers and original 
brand manufacturers operate independently in the price sensitive and price 
insensitive portions of the strength segment markets respectively. There was a 
significant relationship between the strength market shares and the average generic 
prices within strength markets, which is consistent with the findings in the second 
model above, whereby it could be that generic competition in the more popular 
strengths is more intense because pharmacists and payors tend to focus more on 
achieving cost savings in these strength segment markets. Finally, there was a 
significant, negative relationship between the dummy variable OTC availability 
(within that strength segment market for that given quarter) and the average generic 
prices. This is consistent with case one, which found that in the USA 20mg 
omeprazole market, Prilosec OTC competed with both the prescription original brand 
and prescription generic omeprazole products.
5.5,3 The Theoretical Implications o f the degree o f Competition within 
Strength Segmented Molecule Markets
The above findings show that in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in 
the study countries, original brand manufacturers seem to employ the market 
harvesting strategy consistently across strength segments by responding to patent 
expiration with similar price changes across strength segment markets, despite the 
simultaneous decrease in market share and regardless of the degree of generic entry 
within strength segment markets. However, the extent to which they are able to hold 
on to their original brand market share differs significantly across strength market 
segments. In general, they are more able to hold on to a larger share of the market 
where fewer generics have entered, their prices are not as high (relative to generics) 
and the strength is not as common. Thus, where the regulatory process is not too 
burdensome, and where there is a prospect of significant sales, original brand 
manufacturers should theoretically have the incentive to introduce various strengths 
into the molecule market while their drug is still on patent. Where original brand 
manufacturers are able to employ this strategy of product differentiation in the form 
of segmenting molecule markets into strengths prior to patent expiration—provided 
this can be justified on clinical grounds—they may be able to capitalise on a larger 
share of the total molecule market after patent expiration than if their drug were only
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available in the standard daily defined dosage. While the market harvesting strategy 
remains the primary industrial organization model that original brand manufacturers 
use in response to patent expiration, evidence that the degree of competition between 
original brand and generic manufacturers differs across strength segments of a 
molecule markets suggests that original brand manufacturers may sometimes be able 
to surreptitiously use their first mover advantage to strategically locate themselves in 
various strength segments where they have a greater chance of retaining their 
dominant market positions following patent expiry. In order to determine the extent 
to which this phenomenon of perpetuated original brand manufacturer dominance in 
the less common strength segments is a result of the original brand manufacturers’ 
strategic decisions earlier in the product life versus the passive result of generics not 
entering into this product space, further research would need to be conducted that 
better explains original brand manufacturers’ decisions surrounding entry into (and 
creation of) strength segments.
Meanwhile, the degree of price competition amongst generics appears to be 
greater in more common strength markets and also appears to increase as generic 
entry increases within strength markets. There is no evidence of generic prices being 
dependent on original brand prices in the omeprazole and paroxetine strength 
submarkets.
This evidence of generic prices operating independently of original brand 
prices is contradictory to the findings in the first case, where there seemed to be 
some price stickiness between original brand and generic prices. Thus, this analysis 
demonstrates the importance of conducting studies of pharmaceutical competition at 
the micro level. By running the models at the strength segment levels, generic and 
original brand prices have not been distorted by the DDD standardizations most 
studies use when analyzing competition at the molecule level. As a result, 
confounding factors that may exist at the molecule level (when calculating average 
original brand prices) such as nonlinear pricing and differing original brand versus 
generic strength segment market shares are eliminated in this model, which reveals a 
clearer picture of competition amongst generics.55 Thus, the evidence that original 
brand manufacturers employ the market harvesting strategy consistently across
55 It is likely that this price stickiness did exist in these markets in France, as a result o f the price caps 
(which stipulated that generic prices not exceed a given percentage o f original brand prices).
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strength segments, regardless of the degree of generic entry, along with the evidence 
that price competition amongst generics appears to be independent of original brand 
prices, suggests that original brand and generic manufacturers operate side by side in 
the same molecule market, but do not engage in direct price or market share 
competition with one another. Rather, the market share shift from original brand 
products to generics may be driven more by the demand side (e.g. increasing 
regulatory attempts to genericise, improved information for physicians and 
consumers about the quality equivalence of generics, improved availability of 
generics in the supply chain for pharmacies to contract with, etc.) than by strategy 
quantity competition on behalf of the manufacturers. The implication of these 
findings are that the original brand market harvesting strategy is separate from the 
Stackelberg Model that is briefly referenced in a few studies, which would require 
that original brand and generic manufacturers strategically respond to each others’ 
decisions in an attempt to compete directly for market share (Tirole, 1988).
In the case of competition amongst generics, the less common strength 
segment markets that tend to have relatively high original brand market shares, 
despite the relatively high original brand prices, should theoretically be as conducive 
to generic competition and, therefore, lower prices as the more common strength 
segment markets. The relatively lesser degree of generic entry into these less 
common strength segment markets may be a result of generic manufacturers 
weighing the trade-offs between locating themselves where demand is concentrated 
(i.e. the DDD strength segment) versus product differentiating by strategically 
locating themselves in a less saturated area of the product space, similarly to the 
linear city model (Tirole, 1988). However, the notion that entry into multiple 
strength markets may be a trade off implies that entering into multiple strength 
markets at the same time would incur additional fixed costs for generic 
manufacturers, which may depend on characteristics of the market, such as drug 
approval regulations.
In conclusion, this analysis of competition amongst generics at the strength 
segment level supports the conclusion in case one that competition amongst generics 
appears Bertrand-like in that generics compete on price, but that generic 
manufacturers are able to soften competition by product differentiating (in this case, 
by strategically deciding which strength markets to enter into, and when) so that their
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products are no longer perfectly homogenous. This results in a range of generic 
prices and market shares within and across strength segment markets.
5.5.4 The Efficiency Implications o f Relatively High Original Brand Market 
Shares in Some Strength Markets
This larger original brand market share in various strength market segments 
may explain the downward price rigidity (at the molecule level) that one study 
attributes to product differentiation (Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). In 
general, generic prices do continue to decline as generics enter into individual 
submarkets, especially in the USA and the UK. However, since original brand prices 
remain higher, larger original brand market shares in some strength submarkets 
contribute to higher weighted purchased prices for those strengths (and thus, higher 
weighted purchasing prices at the molecule level), resulting in inefficient spending 
for payors. A weighted purchased price for a strength submarket is calculated as the 
sum of the drugs’ strength segment markets shares times their prices. In other words,
WPPsm = P*rand x MS™ + P*en x m s ™ 
i=  1,2, . . . ,n
Where WPPsm is the weighted purchased price for a strength market, p brand is 
the price of an original brand presentation, MS™ is the market share of that 
presentation within the strength segment, P*en is the price of the generic presentation 
and MS I" is the market share of that presentation within the strength market. This
equation shows that with relatively high original brand prices, in comparison with 
generic prices, a high corresponding original brand market share (and consequently 
relatively low generic market share) within less common strength segments results in 
a higher overall weighted purchased price for payors. Thus, the weighted purchase 
price reflects demand through the market share variable and supply through the price 
variable. Since this case pertains to equivalent drugs within strength submarkets of a 
molecule, a higher original brand market share in some strength submarkets results in 
purchasers paying unnecessarily high prices for the same total volume (and quality), 
in comparison with the alternative scenario of a higher generic market share in that 
strength submarket. This is what makes a higher weighted purchased price for 
certain strength submarkets inefficient.
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Figure 5-13 compares the weighted purchased prices across omeprazole and 
paroxetine strength market segments in Germany, France, the UK and the USA. 
Consistent with the findings in chapter 4, the UK purchases at relatively low prices 
while Germany purchases at relatively high prices. The high purchased prices in 
Germany likely reflect the reference price system, which provides a disincentive for 
price competition, as discussed in chapter 4. However, the evidence in this chapter 
shows that in both the omeprazole and paroxetine markets, the USA faces the highest 
total weighted purchased price. This is contradictory to the USA’s relatively low 
generic prices (Chapter 4; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008). A likely 
explanation for the USA’s relatively high weighted purchased prices is the high 
original brand prices seen in certain strength market segments where there was no 
generic competition. Specifically, there were no generic competitors in the USA’ 
40mg omeprazole market and the 24SA paroxetine market (see Table 5-3), which 
was still on patent. The high purchased price in the 24SA paroxetine market—nearly 
three times the purchased 2 0 mg price— along with its high strength market share of 
34% (see Table 5-3) drives the total weighted paroxetine purchased price 
significantly higher in the USA than Germany, France or the UK.
Figure 5-13 A Comparison of Weighted Purchase Prices per Pill across 
Strength market segments in the Omeprazole and Paroxetine Markets in 
Germany, France, the UK and the USA in 2005ql
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Source: The author from IMS.
In conclusion, there is evidence of competitive, low weighted purchased 
prices in the 20mg DDD omeprazole and paroxetine markets in the USA, while 
product differentiation in the form of segmented strengths and forms in the USA 
appears to result in higher weighted purchased prices at the omeprazole and 
paroxetine molecule level, and hence, inefficient spending. It could be that the 
relatively competitive omeprazole and paroxetine generics markets (see Chapter 4) in 
the USA is one of the driving factors behind original brand manufacturers’ decisions 
to segment the omeprazole and paroxetine markets into various strengths and forms. 
Additionally, relatively liberal regulations and the fragmented payment system in the 
USA further enable this market outcome. In Germany, product differentiation in the 
omeprazole and paroxetine market appears common as well, although it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which some of Germany’s high purchased prices are due to 
product differentiation versus their reference price system, which contributes to 
downwards price rigidity (see Figure 5-11; Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008).
The UK and France seem to avoid the degree of product differentiation (in 
the form of multiple strength market segments) in the omeprazole and paroxetine 
molecule markets that exists in the USA and Germany. This could be due to a 
stronger emphasis on clinical- and/or cost-effectiveness in their health care systems. 
However, the overall prices seem lower in the UK omeprazole and paroxetine 
markets, where there is evidence of more price competition (see chapter 4), and 
somewhat mixed in France, where the market did not determine the prices of 
omeprazole and paroxetine during this study period. Rather, original brand prices 
were initially agreed upon by the France Economic Committee (CEPS) and 
subsequent generic entrants were prohibited from exceeding 60% of this price.
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5.5.5 The Opportunity for Cost Savings if  Genericisation within Strength 
Submarkets was Improved
The previous section explains that the original brand market shares remain 
relatively high in some of the strength market segments within a molecule, resulting 
in higher total purchased prices in these strength submarkets (since the original brand 
prices remain significantly higher than the generic prices within strength 
submarkets), and consequently, inefficient spending. How much, then, could payors 
have saved if the original brand market shares within strength segments had been 
equivalent to the original brand market share in the strength segment market with the 
lowest original brand market share for that given molecule, for each respective 
quarter? In other words, how much could payors have saved if  the genericisation 
rates within every strength submarket were equal to the strength submarket (of that 
molecule) with the highest genericisation rate for each respective quarter, in 
accordance with the following equations?
SAV"°‘ = SUM ( ActSpnd"0' - HypSpnd 
i = quarterl,2, . . . , n 
ActSpndI""' = TotQ™1 X WPP"0'
H y p S p n d = SUM(HypSpnd’m) 
sm = strength segment markets 1,2, ...
HypSpnd™ = {TotQ™ X MINMS^randsm X WPPibnmdm) + ( TotQ,™ X (1 - 
MINMS-randsm) X WPPigensm)
Where SAVmo1 is the total savings for the molecule during this study period, 
ActSpnd1”01 is the actual spending on a molecule in that given quarter, i,
HypSpnd1”01 is the hypothetical spending for that molecule in that given quarter,
TotQ™°l is the total quantity (number of pills) purchased for that molecule in that 
given quarter, WPP,imo1 is the molecule level weighted purchased price for that given 
quarter, HypSpnd™ is the hypothetical spending for that strength segment in that 
given quarter, TotQ™ is the total quantity (number of pills) purchased for that 
strength segment in that given quarter, MINMS-randsm is the minimum (lowest) 
original brand market share within strength segments of that molecule, jypp.brandsm [s
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the weighted purchased price for the original brand for the given strength segment in 
the given quarter and WPPigensm is the weighted purchased price for the generic for
that given strength segment in the given quarter.
Table 5-7 shows the possible genericisation savings across the omeprazole 
and paroxetine strength markets in Germany, France, the UK and the USA in 
accordance with these calculations (such that all of the strength market segments 
within the omeprazole and paroxetine molecules experienced the same degree of 
generic penetration as the strength market in that molecule for that country with the 
lowest original brand market share). The greatest total savings (in absolute value) 
would have been in the omeprazole market in Germany, which amounted to over $37 
million and in the paroxetine market in the USA, which amounted to over $17 
million during the 2000ql-2005ql time period. In Germany, the savings from 
maximizing genericisation in the lOmg omeprazole market were over 18% of what 
was actually spent, largely because genericisation was assumed to be 100%, as was 
the case in the 40mg omeprazole market. In most country’s strength submarkets, the 
percentage savings were relatively low, representing a few percent or less. However, 
Table 5-7 shows that because absolute spending was so large in these molecule 
submarkets, even a fraction of a percent savings would have represented hundreds of 
thousands, and often millions of dollars. Thus, to the extent that other molecules also 
experience uneven genericisation rates across strength segment markets, there could 
be room for significant savings that together add up to hundreds of millions and even 
billions of dollars over a large sample of drugs. Moreover, this study uses 
conservative parameters to estimate improved genericisation in that markets without 
generic entry (such lOmg omeprazole in France and 40mg omeprazole in the USA) 
were held constant at zero genericisation.56 In addition, the lowest original brand 
market share was used in each quarter to represent the maximum point of 
genericisation. These improved genericisation rates across strength markets should 
therefore be achievable since they actually existed in one of the strength markets of 
that molecule.
Notably, the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in France would not have 
achieved savings under this scenario since both markets had only one strength
56 This takes into account the possibility that patents in those strength markets may not have expired, 
or that there was a specific economic reason that generics chose not to enter that strength market 
which is not clear in this study.
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segment market that experienced generic entry. It is also interesting to note that in 
two strength markets—20mg omeprazole in the USA and 30mg paroxetine in the 
UK—the improved genericisation rates would actually have cost payors more rather 
than resulted in savings. Figure 5-14 shows that in both cases, the generic purchased 
prices were actually higher than the original brand purchased prices. This is because 
in the 20mg omeprazole market in the USA, the original brand had already started 
marketing its product over the counter as Prilosec OTC, which was lower priced than 
prescription generic omeprazole. In the 30mg paroxetine market in the UK, the 
anomaly of the generic purchased price being higher than the original brand 
purchased price was likely a result of the fact that there were only two generic 
competitors in the 30mg market, which may have given them the market power to 
price similarly to the original brand manufacturer. Thus, in addition to improving 
genericisation rates across strength submarkets, it would be prudent to first ensure 
that the generic purchased prices are in fact lower than the original brand purchased 
prices.
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Table 5-7 Possible savings if genericisation were maximized across all strength markets of omeprazole and paroxetine in Germany, 
France, the UK and the USA, 2000ql-2005ql
O m eprazole
Germany* France** UK*** US****
Savings % Sav Savings % Sav Savings % Sav Savings % Sav  
10m g $21 ,363 ,512  18.51% $274 ,902  0.09% $1,634,384 0.45%  
20m g $15 ,717 ,683  0.66%  $0 0.00% $2,581,911 0 .22% -$130 ,303 ,742  -0.96%  
30m g
40m g $0 0.00%  : $84 8 .3 4 % K § 8 S ^ § % S § § § ^ § § § g
24SA  f
Total $37 ,081 ,196  $0 $2 ,856 ,897  -$128,669,358
Paroxetine
Germany* France** UK US 
Savings % S av Savings % Sav Savings % S av  Savings % Sav
$3 ,093 ,187  0.25%
$7,884,770 2.77%  | $0  0.00% | $0 0.00% $12,338,011 0.24%  
$0 0 .0 0 % g  -$25 ,057  -0.01%  $1 ,615 ,062  0.16%  
$0 0 .00% | S670.893 0 05%
$7,884,770 $0 -$25,057 $17 ,717 ,154
* In Germany, a generic manufacturer created the 40m g om eprazole market segm ent in 2000q3, so  the lowest original brand market share w as 0% in all quarters following 2000q3. 
** In France, there w ere no generics in the 10mg om eprazole market, rendering the 20m g om eprazole market the only market with generic entry.
*** In the UK, the 40m g om eprazole market only existed in 2004q3, at which point one generic entered and then exited the market in the subsequent quarter.
**** In the US, there were no generics in the 40m g om eprazole market, rendering that market unsuitable for this model.
* In Germany, a generic manufacturer created the 40m g paroxetine market segm en t in 2002q2, so  the lowest original brand market share w as 0% in all quarters following 2002q2. 
** In France, 20m g w as the only strength sold in the paroxetine market, rendering this m olecule market unsuitable for this model.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Figure 5-14 A comparison of the Original Brand and Generic Purchasing 
Prices in 20mg omeprazole market in the USA and the 30mg paroxetine market 
in the UK
Generic versus Original Brand Omeprazole Prices in the 20mg US, 
2000q1-2005q1
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5.6 Product Differentiation by Strength, and Price Discrimination
The previous section analyzes original brand and generics price and market 
share dynamics within strength segment markets of omeprazole and paroxetine in 
order to assess the nature of competition within strength segment markets and to 
determine where there is room for increased purchasing efficiency within segmented 
molecule markets. This section furthers the discussion of strength segmented 
markets by assessing the extent to which the existence of strength segment markets 
may affect the overall degree of price competition within molecule markets (i.e. 
across strength segmented markets) and the ensuing implication for purchasing 
efficiency. In some cases, manufacturers may be able to capitalise on the existence 
of strength segment markets by price discriminating. In these cases, strength 
segmented markets may symbolize another way in which product differentiation may 
lead to less competitive molecule markets. (Recall from the previous section that 
strength segmented markets may also lead to lower degrees of original brand versus 
generic competition within molecule markets.) This, then, may lead to higher prices 
and hence higher expenditures.
Consequently, this section studies the extent to which price discrimination 
across strength segment markets may exist as another example of how product 
differentiation may negatively impact competition within a molecule market, and 
then estimates the potential savings that could accrue to payors that encourage pill 
splitting practices or limit coverage of line-extensions. This study does not have data 
to prove or disprove the existence of price discrimination, as strength-level cost data 
would be needed. However, it is able to use pricing evidence to determine whether 
some degree of price discrimination looks likely. In addition, it must also be noted 
that the pill-splitting and line-extension purchasing efficiency scenarios in this 
section may have significant clinical, ethical, safety and quality implications. To this 
end, this study does not advocate such practices, but rather, considers the 
clinical/safety issues alongside the purchasing efficiency estimates in order to assess 
the effectiveness of these payors’ cost containment strategies.
In Figures 5-15 and 5-16, unit prices have been converted into prices per 
DDD (20mg in both the omeprazole and paroxetine markets) in order to enable a 
direct price comparison across strengths. The graphs show that the average original 
brand price per DDD for lOmg omeprazole is higher than the average original brand
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price per DDD for 20mg omeprazole in all four study countries. The same is true for 
the average original brand price (per DDD) of lOmg paroxetine in the USA, which is 
higher than 20mg. Similarly, the average original brand price (per DDD) of 20mg 
paroxetine is higher than the average original brand price (per DDD) of 40mg 
paroxetine in the USA, and the average generic price (per DDD) is higher for 20mg 
than for 40mg in the omeprazole market in Germany and the paroxetine markets in 
Germany and the USA. These are examples of nonlinear pricing across strengths, 
where the higher strengths are not priced proportionally more than the lower 
strengths in order to reflect their relative strengths. Instead, they cost more, but 
disproportionally so. That is, they are more expensive on a per pill basis, but are 
actually cheaper on a per daily defined dosage basis. There are two possible 
explanations for this. One is that the strength segment markets are sufficiently 
competitive such that the price differences mostly reflect cost differences. If this 
were the case, then the nonlinear pricing would result from a nonlinear cost 
manufacturing structure where the fixed costs of manufacturing are the same for pills 
of different dosages, but the ingredient costs are higher for higher dosages, resulting 
in disproportionally higher costs for higher strengths.
. The other possible explanation for nonlinear pricing is price discrimination. 
Where products are homogeneous, any difference in price that cannot be explained 
by cost differences reflects price discrimination (Clerides, 2004). Without data on 
how the manufacturing costs differ across strengths segments in the omeprazole and 
paroxetine markets, claims of price discrimination cannot be made in the above cases 
where prices increase disproportionately with strength (since this could be reflective 
of cost differences). However, there seems to be evidence of price discrimination in 
the USA, where the original brand and generic prices per pill of lOmg omeprazole 
are actually higher than their respective original brand and generic prices per pill of 
20mg. Similarly, the generic prices per pill for lOmg and 20mg paroxetine in the 
USA are both higher than the generic prices per pill for 30mg and 40mg paroxetine. 
In these cases, it seems unlikely that the manufacturing costs of lower strength pills
c n
would exceed the manufacturing costs of higher strength pills. Rather, the lower
57 Another possible explanation for the lower strength pills being marketed at higher retail prices than 
the higher strength pills is that the distribution chain has higher mark-ups for lower strength 
medicines. This analysis assumes that this is not the case— that the distribution chain does not 
systematically apply different market-ups by strength segments.
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strength omeprazole and paroxetine markets in the USA are either less price 
competitive than the higher strength markets, or the lower strength omeprazole and
r o
paroxetine markets are more price insensitive than the higher strength in the USA.
In either of these cases, the manufacturers would be able to price discriminate across 
omeprazole and paroxetine strength segments, which would result in higher profits 
(in the lower strength markets) and on the other side of the coin, inefficient 
purchasing for payors. Based on this logic, it is likely that manufacturers may be 
able to use strength segmented markets as an opportunity to reap larger profits 
through price discrimination practices without there necessarily being a clinical 
reason for this non-linear pricing structure.
Figure 5-15 A comparison of Average Original Brand Prices per DDD in the 
Omeprazole market across Study Countries in 2005ql
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Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
58 One possible explanation for the lower strength products being priced disproportionately less than 
higher strength products is that payors are relatively price insensitive at the bottom end of the price 
range for the daily cost of treatment, but quickly become price sensitive to higher prices for higher 
strengths, whose marginal benefit may be difficult to estimate (unless physicians adhere to strict step- 
therapy, whereby they ensure that patients are taking the minimal doses necessary for clinical 
efficacy).
Figure 5-16 A comparison of Average Original Brand Prices per DDD in the
Paroxetine market across Study Countries in 2005ql
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5.6.1 Product Differentiation and the Opportunity fo r  Cost Savings
Because product differentiation in the form of strength segmented markets 
may lead to price discrimination, which in turn implies a lesser degree of price 
competition within molecule markets, there may be opportunities for payors to 
improve purchasing efficiency within molecule markets. This section models certain 
substitution scenarios in order to quantify the extent of these savings. Due to 
clinical, ethical, safety and quality considerations, it does not advocate such 
practices, but rather attempts to provide policymakers and payors that are currently 
implementing these strategies with information on the degree to which they may be 
effective.
5.6.1.1 P ill Splitting and Price D iscrim ination
The practice of splitting pills in order to save on costs has sprung up in the 
recent decades in the USA and elsewhere. Its intention is to help purchasers and 
patients save on costs by taking advantage of the fact that manufacturers often pursue 
flat or discriminatory pricing strategies across strength segments, rather than making 
prices linear with increasing strengths. It may often be the case that it would be less
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expensive to the third party payor for a patient to split a higher strength pill into two 
doses than to take two doses of a lower strength pill. Moreover, the incentive to split 
pills is compounded by the nature of flat co-pays, which would halve in cost to 
patients.
In order for payors and/or patients to benefit, however, physicians must be 
willing to prescribe the medication at twice the strength of the desired dose.
Research shows that physicians believe it is important to take patients’ costs into 
account when prescribing drugs (Khan and Sylvester, 2008). However, physicians’ 
willingness to prescribe a different dose than the one required so that patients can pill 
split requires that they feel confident in their patients’ abilities to split the pill, and 
adhere to the desired dose regime. The American Pharmaceutical Association, the 
American Medical Association and the American Pharmacists Association are 
against pill splitting because of their concern about patients’ pill splitting abilities 
and poor adherence implication (Consumer Reports, 2006). Such concern was 
validated by a study where the authors attempted to split 45 tablets with a kitchen 
knife and 45 with a pill splitter, only to find that they were not able to split the pills 
evenly in either case (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, 2004). Moreover, the size 
of the split pills ranged from 50% to 150% of the intended size. Their conclusion 
was that patients would not be able to guarantee that they consumed the proper dose 
of medicine if they split their pills.
Despite these findings, there have not yet been any studies which provide 
evidence that pill splitting has a negative impact on health outcomes (Consumer 
Reports, 2006). Instead, a number of studies show that under the right 
circumstances, pill splitting can be safe, and can save payors and patients money 
(Cohen and Cohen, 2002; Stafford and Radley, 2002; Choe and Stevenson, 2007). 
These circumstances require that patients to be capable of splitting their pills, which 
young to middle-aged adults are more (likely) able to do, compared to seniors who 
may suffer from chronic debilitating conditions, such as Parkinson’s disease, 
arthritis, poor eyesight, dementia and other conditions which make pill splitting 
difficult. In addition, the type of drug is pertinent in whether it is a good candidate 
for being split. Drugs that enter and are metabolized by the body quickly are 
unlikely to be suitable since variations in the pill doses (after being split) would 
result in uneven levels of the drug in a person’s body. Some drugs that treat chronic 
conditions, however, remain active in the body for days, so small fluctuations in the
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doses would not significantly change the level of the medication in the person’s body 
at any one point in time, and would therefore not alter the clinical efficacy. 
Conversely, some drugs have a narrow therapeutic index, which means that in order 
to be effective, very specific doses need to be administered, e.g. HIV drugs. These 
types of drugs make pill splitting impractical and potentially dangerous. Other drugs 
that would need to be excluded from splitting practices include extended-release 
pills, pills that combine two drugs or more and capsules. Thus, the practice of pill 
splitting is only safe in certain instances. However, studies do show that in these 
instances, pill splitting can be a very safe and effective mechanism for saving money 
(Cohen and Cohen, 2002; Stafford and Radley, 2002; Choe and Stevenson, 2007).
Antidepressants have been identified as ideal for pill splitting because their 
efficacy depends on long-term alterations in neurotransmitters, rendering small 
fluctuations in doses insignificant (Cohen and Cohen, 2002; Stafford and Radley, 
2002). One of these studies focuses on the cost savings that could accrue to the USA 
health care system from splitting eligible antidepressants (e.g. excluding time-release 
forms, etc.). This represented 42% of antidepressant medications in 2000. The 
findings concluded that in 2000, purchasers could have saved over $1.7 billion, with 
the bulk of savings coming from sertraline, paroxetine and citalopram (Cohen and 
Cohen, 2002).
Another study used data from a private health plan with 19,000 members to 
estimate the possible savings that could result from pill splitting (Stafford and 
Radley, 2002). First, eligible drugs were selected based on the above criteria (e.g. no 
polypharmacy drugs, no extended-release drugs, no capsules, etc.). The eleven 
medications that were determined to offer significant cost savings and be clinically 
appropriate for pill splitting included: clonazepam, doxazosin, atorvastatin, 
pravastatin, citalopram, sertraline, paroxetine, lisinopril, nefazadone, olanzapine and 
sildenafil. The study found that for these medicines, pill splitting could save the plan 
as much as $259,500 annually, in comparison with the current practice of pill 
splitting, which was only saving the plan $6,200 annually, representing only 2% of 
potential savings.
In another study, a group of researchers conducted a prospective randomized 
controlled trial, in which a group of relatively well educated patients from a 
university-based health plan were asked to participate in a statin spill-splitting 
program (Choe and Stevenson, 2007). After 6 months, 89% of the trial participants
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said that they would continue splitting.their statin pills for a 50% copayment 
reduction. Regarding safety, there were few reported problems, and the low density 
lipoprotein cholesterol levels in participating patients were found to be roughly 
equivalent to the control group of patients who did not split their pills. Thus, the 
authors concluded that if patients were given financial incentives, pill splitting could 
be a safe and effective practice under the right circumstances (e.g. with relatively 
educated patients who are taking eligible medicines).
Due to the findings in these studies, and health plans’ incentives to cost save, 
a number of pill splitting programs currently exist in the USA. The University of 
Michigan used the findings from the above statin study to justify the introduction of 
a pill splitting program into their health plan in 2006. The result was a savings of 
$195,000 in the first full year, and a savings of $25,000 in co-payment costs for 
patients (University of Michigan Health System, 2007). In addition, Kaiser 
Permanente has introduced a voluntary pill-splitting plan, as well as United 
Healthcare and the Veteran’s Administration, which was able to save $46.5 million 
in 2003 by requiring patients to split Zocor (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, 
2005).
Thus, most studies on pill splitting have estimated the savings that accrue to 
specific plans. Few have looked at the opportunity for savings on a national level, 
and none have compared the opportunity for savings across countries. This study 
models the total nationwide savings that could have accrued to purchasers during the 
2000ql-2005ql time period for omeprazole and paroxetine, assuming for the 
moment, that omeprazole and paroxetine are both safe to split, and that all 20mg and 
40mg pills are eligible for splitting (i.e. that they are not in capsule form, etc.). With 
these assumptions, Table 5-8 shows that splitting 20mg pills into lOmg halves would 
result in cost savings for omeprazole in Germany, France, the UK and the USA and 
for paroxetine in the USA. (There were no savings opportunities for splitting 20mg 
paroxetine in Germany, France and the UK because there was no lOmg strength 
market.) For the USA, the percentage cost savings for splitting paroxetine 20mg into 
lOmg was 6%, representing over a half a billion dollars during this time period for 
just paroxetine. Potential cost savings for omeprazole in Germany, France, the UK 
and the USA were also significant, with the largest possible percentage savings 
existing in the UK.
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Table 5-9 shows the model that also assumes that all 20mg pills are 
substituted with split 40mg pills results in cost increases for Germany and the USA. 
(The results are the same for the UK and France for both models because they do not 
have 40mg strength market segments.) This suggests that on average, the quarterly 
weighted purchased price for 40mg pills is actually cheaper per daily defined dosage 
than the quarterly weighted purchased price for 20mg in Germany and the USA. 
Thus, if the purchasing practices remained unchanged, pill splitting could actually 
cost more in certain cases, as indicated by the negative savings estimates in Table 5- 
9. It is therefore crucial that purchasers carefully study the price differences across 
strengths before advocating pill splitting.
Table 5-8 Savings from Pill Splitting if Everyone Taking lOmg Splits 20mg
pills.*
Omeprazole Paroxetine
Spending Savings % Savings Spending Savings % Savings
Germany $2,761,293,134 $61,661,477 2% $305,482,035 $0 0%
France $1,174,547,439 $49,407,159 4% $1,134,638,717 $0 0%
UK $1,445,669,368 $75,397,968 5% $504,941,272 $0 0%
US $15,317,927,205 $169,604,460 1% $9,704,183,226 $594,988,758 6%
♦This model assumes that the 30mg pills and the 24SA pills are not eligible for splitting. 
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Table 5-9 Savings from Pill Splitting if Everyone Taking lOmg Splits 20mg pills 
and Everyone Taking 20mg Splits 40mg pills.* __________________________
Omeprazole Paroxetine
Spending Savings % Savings Spending Savings % Savings
Germany $2,761,293,134 -$18,135,498 -1% $305,482,035 -$6,048,273 -2%
France $1,174,547,439 $49,407,159 4% $1,134,638,717 $0 0%
UK $1,445,669,368 $75,398,260 5% $504,941,272 $0 0%
US $15,317,927,205 -$79,999,226 -1% $9,704,183,226 -$432,175,728 -4%
♦This model assumes that the 30mg pills and the 24SA pills are not eligible for splitting; 
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Moreover, this model assumes that all 20mg and 40mg omeprazole and 
paroxetine pills are eligible for splitting. In reality, however, some of these pills are 
capsules, which are not eligible for splitting. In addition, while studies list 
paroxetine as one of the safe pills for splitting (Consumer Reports, 2006; Stafford 
and Radley, 2002), omeprazole is actually listed as unsafe for splitting (Consumer 
Reports, 2006). Thus, it is worth modelling omeprazole pill splitting in order to 
compare hypothetical cost saving opportunities across countries. However, in 
practice, policies need to first carefully determine which drugs may be safely split. 
Once purchasers have selected drugs that can be safely split and have determined
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which higher strength market segments offer potential for cost savings, they then 
need to think about how to encourage the practice of pill splitting.
The financial incentives of pill splitting may vary, depending on the health 
system. For example, patients who are uninsured, as is the case for roughly 15% of 
people in the USA (Kaiser State Health Facts, 2007), would find pill splitting to be 
cost savings as long as the price per dose is lower for the higher strength pill than the 
lower strength pill. Where patients have private or public health insurance and there 
are co-payments for prescription drugs, there is potential for both the patient and the 
third party payor to benefit financially from pill splitting. The payor would benefit 
as long as the price per DDD is lower for the higher strength pill, while the patients 
benefit in the form of halved co-payments (since a month supply of pills at double 
the strength that they need can last for two months, once cut). This is especially the 
case in the USA, where co-payments are often significant. In the USA, the average 
2004 monthly co-pay for private health plans was $10 for generics and $21 for 
preferred drugs (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004). Thus, on average, patients with 
private health plans in the USA could have saved $60 per year in 2004 if the drug 
was generic and $126 per year if the drug was a preferred brand (assuming they 
consume one pill per day). Even low income populations on Medicaid usually face 
small co-pays of $1 or $2 per monthly supply. In the UK, the roughly 15% of the 
population that faces prescription co-pays (Robinson, 2002) would benefit, along 
with the populations that face co-pays in Germany and France. Finally, where 
patients are insured and do not face co-payments, such as in the case of the 85% of 
the population in the UK that is exempt from co-payments (Robinson, 2002), payors 
would save as long as the price per DDD was lower for higher strength drugs, while 
pill splitting would be cost neutral for patients. In this instance, payors would need 
to provide patients or pharmacists with a financial incentive to split pills. Otherwise, 
patients and/or pharmacists would likely err toward the less time consuming option 
of taking the lower dose pill that doesn’t require splitting. In addition, it is important 
that patients consult with their physicians on how to safely pill split. For example, 
patients are advised to split pills the day they intend to consume them rather than 
splitting many days supply at once since some pills can deteriorate once exposed to 
air (Consumer Reports, 2006).
Finally, other ways in which purchasers could encourage pill splitting, 
besides providing patients with financial incentives, include providing pharmacists
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with financial incentives to split pills for patients, requiring pharmacists to fill 
physicians’ prescriptions for split doses and mandating that manufacturers score all 
pills that are eligible for splitting (Cohen and Cohen, 2002). Purchasers would need 
to be careful when introducing such large-scale policies, however, as it is possible 
that pharmaceutical companies could respond by increasing the price of higher 
strength products, at least to the extent that the higher strength market is not price 
competitive.
5.6.1.2 The Example o f  Suspended Release Paroxetine in the USA
GlaxoSmithKline introduced Paxil Controlled Release®, the original brand 
name for 24SA paroxetine, into the market during the second quarter of 2002. It is 
associated with a lower rate of nausea than the original immediate release version. 
However, one study shows that the treatment discontinuation as a result of nausea 
was not significantly different for the controlled release version than the immediate 
release version, which calls into question its therapeutic advantage (Golden and 
Nemeroff, 2002).
Figure 5-17 shows that the original brand paroxetine prices remained constant 
across all strength/formulations in the USA during this study period. Interestingly, 
the original brand manufacturer introduced Paxil CR® at a price that was lower than 
all of its immediate release versions, despite claiming its (Paxil CR®) therapeutic 
advantage. This pricing behaviour suggests that the original brand manufacturer 
attempted to shift volume from its immediate release version to its new, controlled 
release version.
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Figure 5-17 A Comparison of Average Original Brand Prices across 
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Note: The dashed line denotes the point of 24SA entry and the solid line denotes the point of generic 
entry in the immediate release versions.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Figure 5-18 shows that following the 
introduction o f Paxil Controlled Release® in 2003ql, the volume (measured as the 
number of pills) of the conventional 2 0 mg immediate release version declined at a 
rate similar to the rate at which the 24SA version increased. Meanwhile, the volume 
of conventional lOmg, 30mg and 40mg immediate release versions remained roughly 
constant during this period. Moreover, Table 5-10 shows that from 2002q2 to 
2005ql, there was a near perfect negative correlation between the 20mg segment 
market share and the 24SA segment market share. This descriptive evidence 
strongly suggests that the 24SA controlled release version acted as a substitute for 
the 20mg immediate release version. Notably, the total volume of the molecule 
market seemed to increase at a relatively steady rate from 2 0 0 0 ql until the patent 
expiry of the immediate release version in 2003q3, after which point the total 
paroxetine market volume decreased. One possible explanation for this is the 
introduction of another SSRI into the market at this time, although this is beyond the 
scope of this study.
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Figure 5-18 A Comparison of Volume Changes across Strengths/Forms in the








Note: The dashed line denotes the point of 24SA entry and the solid line denotes the point of generic 
entry in the immediate release versions.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Table 5-10 The Relationship between the market share of 20mg and 24SA 
paroxetine in the USA_____________________________________________
0 2 q 2 02 q3 02 q 4 03q1 03q2 03  q3 03q4 04q1 04q2 04 o 3 04  q4 05q1
2 0m g m ark e t s h a re 58% 53% 4 7 % 4 3 % 40% 39% 34% 35% 34% 33% 32% 35%
24SA  m arke t sh a re 5% 12% 2 0 % 2 6 % 30% 30% 38% 38% 38% 39% 39% 34%
c o r re la tio n  b e tw e e n 2 0 m g  m a rk e t  s h a r e  a n d  2 4 S A  m a rk e t s h a r e -0.99717
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Meanwhile, Figure 5-19 shows that after experiencing generic entry in 
2003q3, the weighted purchased prices (which are weighted price indices that 
aggregate both generic and original brand products59) declined in all of the 
immediate release paroxetine strength submarkets. The purchased price of Paxil 
CR® remained constant since this version was still on patent as of 2005ql and 
therefore did not experience generic entry during this study period. Because the total 
weighted purchased price of paroxetine at the molecule level takes into account the 
market shares of the various products and because Paxil CR® achieved a large share 
of the market, the total weighted purchased price of paroxetine at the molecule level 
was rigidly downward following patent expiry of the immediate release versions.
59 See “The Efficiency Implications of Relatively High Original Brand Market Shares in Some 
Strength Markets” section above for how weighted purchased prices are calculated.
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Figure 5-19 A Comparison of Purchased Prices across Strengths/Forms in the


















Note: The dashed line denotes the point o f  24SA entry and the solid line denotes the point o f  generic 
entry in the immediate release versions.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
The 24SA paroxetine example in the USA shows the advantage that original 
brand manufacturers can reap if they introduce line extensions with incremental 
therapeutic benefits, such as a new form of a molecule already on the market, as was 
the case with Paxil CR. As seen in Figure 5-15, the original brand manufacturer was 
able to capture over one third of the molecule market with its Paxil CR®, despite 
generic entry, and therefore the availability of significantly lower prices, in the 20mg 
DDD segment. This ability to retain a relatively high market share with a product 
that was priced significantly above generic products in the molecule market allowed 
the original brand manufacturer to secure a stronger position in the paroxetine 
molecule market following patent expiry (of the immediate release versions) than if 
they had only pursued the market harvesting strategy.
Thus, the case of Paxil CR is evidence of the additional profits original brand 
manufacturers can reap if they introduce new forms of their molecule, and on the 
other side of the coin, the forgone savings that payors may face as a result of these 
original brand manufacturers’ decisions. The result was that in the aggregate, payors 
spent significantly more on paroxetine than they would have had Paxil CR® not been 
introduced. Moreover, the debatable therapeutic superiority o f Paxil CR®, in 
comparison with the immediate release version, suggests that the introduction of
168
Paxil CR® may have lead to purchasing inefficiencies for payors (since the higher 
spending on Paxil CR® may not have been cost-effective).60
This study estimates the savings that payors would have realized in the USA, 
had Paxil CR® not been introduced into the market, as was the case in the other 
study countries. Assuming all of the 24SA pills were substituted for 20mg pills at 
the quarterly 20mg segment purchased prices, the payors in the USA would have 
saved approximately 40% of the money the total money they spent on paroxetine 
during the 2004q4 and 2005ql quarters, as seen in Table 5-11. In total, the 
accumulated savings would have been over a half a billion dollars on paroxetine 
alone from the point of generic entry in the immediate release versions in 2003q3 to 
2005ql. Notably, since the original brand manufacturer introduced Paxil CR® at a 
lower price than its other original brand immediate release versions, substituting the 
20mg immediate release version for the 24SA version would not have been cost 
saving until generic entry occurred in the 20mg segment in 2003q l.
Table 5-11 The Possible Savings from substituting 20mg Paroxetine for Paxil 
CR during the 2002q2-2005ql time period
Prior to Gorwrk Entry In tho Immodate R»li—  Versions
02q2_______ 02q3_______ 02a4_______ 03q1________03q2 ]03q3
Poet Generic Entry In the Immediate Release Versions
03q4_______ 04q1________ 04q2________04q3________04q4________05q1
Spnd with 24mg 
Spnd If 20mg was subet for 24SA 
Total savings from subst 

















































Total savings during the 2003q3-2005q1 period $553,976,828
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
5.7 Conclusion
In summary, the number of strengths and their relative strength market shares 
in molecule markets differs across countries, depending on a number of factors, 
including the countries’ marketing approval process for various strengths and the 
health care systems’ willingness to pay for various strengths, once approved. 
Evidence reveals that the omeprazole and paroxetine molecule markets in Germany 
and the USA are fragmented into more strengths than in the UK and France, and that 
in general, the lower strengths have relatively larger strength market shares in the 
UK and France.
In most cases, the strength market shares in the omeprazole and paroxetine 
markets in Germany, France the UK and the USA did not change significantly after 
patent expiration and subsequent generic entry. In addition, once the patents expired
60 Notably, the fact that Paxil CR was not available in Germany, France or the UK as of2005ql 
supports the hypothesis that the introduction o f Paxil CR in the US may have been a result o f 
marketing strategy rather than just an innovative response to clinical need.
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in the study countries’ omeprazole and paroxetine molecule markets, evidence shows 
that original brand manufacturers implemented the market harvesting strategy 
consistently across strengths. That is, they either keep constant or increase their 
prices at the same rate across all strengths, regardless of the differing degrees of 
generic entry across strengths. However, the degree to which the original brand 
manufacturer experienced (market share) competition from generic entry did seem to 
significantly differ within strength market segments. Specifically, generic 
manufacturers tend to enter into the daily defined dosage market first and foremost; 
some entered into other strength market segments simultaneously, while others 
entered into other strength market segments (in addition to the DDD strength 
segment) in a step-wise fashion over time, and others remain only in the DDD. The 
result was that in general, generic penetration, and hence, generic versus original 
brand market share competition, was lower in the less common strength market 
segments, resulting in higher original brand market shares. Specifically, the number 
of generic competitors, the strength market share and the original brand to generic 
average price ratio were all negatively associated with the original brand market 
share. Where generic penetration did occur, the nature of competition amongst 
generics within strength markets appears to be similar to that described by studies 
that focus on generic competition at the molecule level (Chapter 4; Kanavos, Costa- 
Font and Seeley, 2008). That is, additional entry of generic manufacturers seems to 
have intensified price competition amongst generics in that segment, especially in the 
most common strength submarkets, such as the DDD segment market.
Thus, to the extent that it is in the power of original brand manufacturers to 
do so, segmenting a molecule market into various strengths may be a profitable 
strategy that allows them to hold on to a larger share of the market at their relatively 
high prices than if the entire molecule market only consisted of one strength. 
Moreover, where the competition from generics appeared to be competitive across all 
strength markets, it seems that the strategy of introducing a line-extension, such as 
Paxil CR® may be another way in which the original brand manufacturer may hold 
on to a relatively large share of the molecule market at a high price. The implication 
of these segmented molecule markets is purchasing inefficiency for payors. If 
genericisation was maximized within all of the omeprazole and paroxetine strength 
markets, these study countries could have saved millions of dollars during this study 
period. Thus, to the extent that other molecule strength segment markets resemble
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omeprazole and paroxetine, savings to countries’ health care systems from increased 
genericisation within strength segment markets could easily approach hundreds of 
millions, and even billions of dollars. Certain policies could help to achieve such 
savings, such as mandating generic substitution across all strengths and encouraging 
generic entry across all strengths by making the approval process as quick, easy and 
inexpensive as possible.
Finally, evidence reveals a nonlinear pricing structure across strength 
segments of omeprazole and paroxetine, which could reflect some degree of price 
discrimination across strength market segments within molecules, especially in the 
USA. The prices of different strengths segments within a molecule do not seem to 
directly reflect the relative strength itself. In some markets, pills of different 
strengths are close in price, despite their different strengths, while in other markets, 
lower strength pills are actually priced above higher strength pills. Moreover, since 
generic entry is inconsistent across strength market segments, prices are often not the 
result of competitive market forces, but are rather kept at inflated levels that result in 
inefficient spending for purchasers.
Analysis on the opportunity for cost savings across strength market segments 
shows that where a line extension has been introduced, and not yet exposed to 
generic entry, such as the case of Paxil CR® in the USA, total molecule spending 
can be approximately 40% higher than it would otherwise be. In a market as large as 
the USA, this represents millions of dollars per year of expenditures that may not be 
cost effective, to the extent that the incremental therapeutic benefits of the new line 
extension do not justify these costs. Thus, purchasers may want to carefully consider 
which forms of a molecule they are willing to cover and at what prices.
Finally, one way in which patients, pharmacists and physicians may 
collaborate to save on the cost of certain drugs, such as paroxetine, is by introducing 
pill splitting programs. This takes advantage of the industry’s lack of uniform 
pricing (per daily defined dosage) across strengths, and produces savings that often 
could benefit both the third party purchaser and the consumer. However, it is crucial 
that these programs only apply to drugs that can be split safely and that purchasers 
first determine which strength market segments would result in savings in the case of 
pill splitting as opposed to increased costs.
The analysis pursued in the previous sections is not without limitations. First, 
there is a small number of products in this study, which enables the data to be
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explored on a detailed level by, in some cases, manually tracing patterns over time, 
such as the order that generic manufacturers enter into the different strength markets 
of a molecule. The trade off for being able to analyze the data at such a 
disaggregated level, however is that the small number of products necessitate that the 
four study countries be combined into one model in order to achieve a rigorous 
sample size. As such, the effect of country-specific regulations such as reference 
pricing is implicitly controlled for through the fixed effects method, but cannot be 
separated out in the results. Nonetheless, the finding that original brand versus 
generic competition varies across strength categories of these molecules seems to 
hold across these study countries, regardless of their regulatory differences. Findings 
from this case study analysis may be generalisable to other classes of drugs that are 
primarily concentrated in the retail market and treat chronic conditions. Second, the 
pricing data used are not able to capture fully the extent of discounts off list prices. 
While this is a limitation that affects both the USA and the three European countries, 
evidence suggests that where these discounts exist, they primarily affect the 
distribution chain and may operate horizontally across products and product 
presentations (Kanavos and Taylor, 2007; Kanavos, 2007).
In conclusion, this study on segmented strength markets offers an enhanced 
understanding of how competitive dynamics and pricing patterns differ within and 
across submarkets of molecules. Once purchasers have a more detailed 
understanding of pharmaceutical competition and pricing within molecule markets, 
they can respond by introducing policies that increase price competition within 
strength segments and that substitute lower priced products, when appropriate, 
resulting in lower prices and more efficient spending.
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CHAPTER 6: THE VALUE OF AN OTC SWITCH: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION
6.1 Introduction
As seen in the introduction chapter, literature on competition within the 
pharmaceutical market usually defines the market to be at the level of the therapeutic 
class or the molecule. Within the molecule market, research often divides 
competition into two submarkets, the original brand market and the generics market. 
A closer look at the molecule market reveals there to be strength segment 
submarkets, which exhibit differing degrees of original brand versus generic 
competition (as shown in Chapter 5). Analysis at this level has the opportunity to 
offer insights on the determinants of pharmaceutical competition and how payors can 
purchase more efficiently. However, there is an additional submarket within the 
broader molecule market that may exist, which the majority of research on 
pharmaceutical competition has not yet addressed—the over-the-counter market. 
Increasingly, regulatory bodies in developed countries are becoming more receptive 
to approving chronic disease medicines for over-the-counter status, while still 
allowing those medications to be available on prescription as well. While safety 
concerns remain at the forefront of every OTC approval decision, the motivations 
that initiate such a switch include manufacturers’ desires to create new profit 
opportunities, payors’ desires to contain costs and an increasing trend toward patient 
self-management.
Studies of pharmaceutical competition within a molecule market often 
deliberately exclude OTC products, presumably to avoid the complexities that arise 
when studying competition within the framework of different regulations, payors and 
insurance coverage. Moreover, OTC versions of a molecule may be intended for a 
subset of patients, such as lower-risk patients who do not need the medicine long­
term. (It should be noted, however, that there are usually populations of differing 
acuity within the prescription market as well, which reflects the differing strengths.) 
A consequence of omitting this OTC submarket when studying a molecule is that 
little is known about the extent to which an over-the-counter product acts as a 
substitute with its prescription counterparts, or in other words, the extent to which the 
over-the-counter market competes for some of the same patients as the prescription
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market. To this end, there has been no research on the extent to which the over-the- 
counter and prescription markets engage in competition within a molecule market 
when a molecule becomes available over-the-counter, while simultaneously retaining 
its prescription status, and there is little research on the macroeconomic implications 
of this type of OTC switch.
This chapter takes a case study approach to analyzing and comparing the 
macroeconomic implications of a chronic disease medicine becoming available in 
both the OTC and prescription markets in the context of two different health systems 
and regulatory frameworks. The intention is to determine whether, on a theoretical 
level, an OTC switch may be a form of product differentiation on behalf of original 
brand manufacturer and/or generic manufactures in their attempt to soften 
competition versus a result of payors’ desires to improve purchasing efficiency and 
regulatory bodies’ desires to increase patients’ self-care. This study may also 
provide policymakers with information on the effect of regulations and health system 
incentives on patients accessing these OTC products as well as whether the goal of 
cost containment is achieved.
Section 2 provides an overview of general regulatory aspects involved with 
the approval of an OTC switch. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on the 
financial implications of an OTC switch. Section 4 discusses the aims and 
conceptual framework of this study and gives a detailed explanation of how the OTC 
regulations work in these study countries. Section 5 presents the findings and results 
from this study. Section 6 simulates possible savings scenarios that could result from 
this OTC switch and section 7 concludes with a discussion on whether some of the 
goals of the OTC switch may have been achieved in these study cases.
6.2 Overview of the Regulations and Motivations behind OTC 
Switches for Chronic Disease Medication
6.2.1 Regulatory Overview
In most countries, the legal/regulatory system allows medicines to be 
distributed via two different channels; one category requires a physician prescription, 
while the other category, called over-the-counter medications, does not require a 
physician prescription. The term over-the-counter is used broadly to describe drugs 
that are either sold behind the counter of a pharmacist and/or, are available on the 
general shelves of stores. Where a drug has first been available as a prescription-
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only medicine and later receives approval to be marketed in the over-the-counter 
category, this is called an “OTC switch.” It is important to note that some OTC 
switches result in the product no longer being available through the prescription 
channel, while in other OTC switch cases, products may retain their prescription 
availability while also gaining the dual status of over-the-counter availability. In this 
case, if prescribed by a physician, it is up to the payor to decide whether to reimburse 
the product.
Table 6-1 shows how OTC product availability can vary across countries as a 
result of countries’ differing legal, regulatory and health system frameworks. There 
is no centralized OTC switch approval process in Europe. However, the EC 
Directive on medicinal products for human use (2001/83/EC) did include guidance 
principles for the OTC market, with which member states must comply. The UK’s 
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) summarizes the 
criteria for which prescription control is required as follows:
• a direct or indirect danger exists to human health, even when 
used correctly, if used without medical supervision; or
• there is frequent incorrect use which could lead to direct or 
indirect danger to human health; or
• further investigation of activity and/or side effects is 
required; or
• they are normally prescribed by a doctor to be administered 
parenterally—that is, by injection (MHRA, Changing the 
Legal Classification in the United Kingdom).
The decision of whether a drug meets these criteria will therefore depend on the 
evidence a country uses during the approval process, as well as subjective opinion, 
resulting in differing ranges of OTC availability across countries.
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Table 6-1 Availability o f Over-The-Counter Products, 2005
Percentage of total molecules, with
OTC only 
availability




U.S. 17.1% 10.0% 72.9%
Canada 3.7% 5.4% 90.0%
France 17.1% 10.9% 72.0%
Germany 30.6% 7.4% 62.0%
Italy 11.4% 8.9% 79.7%
Spain 10.3% 7.0% 82.7%
U.K. 20.8% 8.9% 70.3%
Japan 2.2% 6.1% 91.7%
Australia 25.6% 10.7% 63.7%
Brazil 3.4% 10.4% 86.2%
Chile 29.2% 9.8% 61.0%
Mexico 7.1% 9.3% 83.6%
* It is important to note that in the case o f some countries, particularly developing countries, 
medicines that are only meant to be available with a prescription may be sold informally by 
pharmacists, who may profit from such cases. This study, however, is only concerned with regulatory 
frameworks in which the legal status o f medicines is enforced.
** This study does not disclose the number o f  molecules that are included in the calculations.
Source: IMS Health data 2005, adapted from Danzon 2008
Historically, regulatory agencies in developed countries have concentrated 
primarily on OTC switches for drugs that treat non-chronic conditions, such as 
ibuprofen. It is important to note that similar to the prescription market, OTC 
products can be both branded and generic, as seen in the case of Advil and Neurofen, 
the branded versions of ibuprofen in the USA and the UK respectively.
The primary criterion for OTC switches is safety, notably that patients can 
easily self-diagnose and can follow the treatment course without being at high risk of 
significant side effects. The requirements ensuring that these safety criteria are met 
differ across countries; some countries heavily involve the pharmacist in ensuring 
safety, while others require actual OTC use studies before a drug is approved for the 
OTC market. While safety remains the key concern during the approval process, 
regulatory agencies have recently begun to approve OTC switches for drugs that treat 
chronic, and, sometimes, serious illnesses. This shift is primarily motivated by three 
main factors—industry strategy, payors’ desire for cost containment and a broader 




In developed countries, a drug is often not eligible for OTC approval until it 
has gone off patent. Once the patent has expired, .however, both original brand and 
generic manufacturers may petition to have the drug approved over-the-counter. A 
manufacturer’s application for an OTC switch demonstrates the desire to carve out a 
niche market position through OTC status, through which they have potential to reap 
substantial profits above what they would have had in the prescription market. Of 
course, the size of profits that a manufacturer may make from an OTC product 
depends on a number of factors, including the degree of substitution from the 
prescription market, and the degree of competition within the OTC market. It also 
depends on timing. A switch that is initiated by the original brand manufacturer in 
the USA may enjoy a three year market exclusivity period, as discussed more 
extensively in Appendix B. This would enhance the original brand manufacturer’s 
degree of product differentiation in the molecule market. Even without market 
exclusivity, a first OTC mover advantage may exist, in which the first manufacturer 
to enter the OTC market is able to set prices.
Besides competition and timing, two other significant factors that influence a 
manufacturer’s decision to apply for an OTC switch may include the costs of 
applying for OTC status and the probability of approval (Hollenbeak, 1999). The 
direct costs of applying for OTC status may differ across regulatory agencies. In 
most developed countries, there are user fees associated with applying to have a drug 
approved in the OTC market. In addition, in the USA, manufacturers must conduct 
studies that demonstrate the safety of the drug in the OTC market, which could be 
very costly. For example, in an attempt to receive OTC approval for the statin 
Mevacor, Merck commissioned a pivotal study under FDA guidelines to demonstrate 
that patients are capable of choosing when to use and when to discontinue use (i.e. 
selection and deselection) of OTC simvastatin. As part of this study, Merck provided 
a consumer telephone question and answer service to 11,000 people, as well as 
opening up storefronts with trained personnel that could mimic pharmacies (Sipkoff, 
2004). They then recorded the incidence of people who were able to accurately self- 
diagnose and self-treat with simvastatin. Ultimately, Merck’s application was denied 
on the grounds that not enough users were able to properly select and deselect the 
drug (see Appendix B). This is an example of a case in which a manufacturer faced
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large costs that it was not able to recover through higher profits in the OTC market. 
Because of the large costs that manufacturers in the USA may face in receiving OTC 
approval for a prescription drug, it may be that smaller manufacturers, or generic 
manufacturers with a less profitable portfolio, are less able to take these risks, 
creating a barrier to entry for these companies.
This then leads to the next point that manufacturers must consider, the 
probability of an application being approved. Since the shift from OTC medicines 
treating acute conditions to OTC medicines treating chronic conditions has occurred 
in the past decade, it may be difficult to predict the probability that a new drug in a 
new therapeutic class will be approved for OTC use, as regulatory bodies do not have 
standardized criteria for an acceptable risk-benefit ratio, forcing them to evaluate the 
risks and benefits on a case by case basis. Moreover, it may be difficult to measure 
certain long term benefits, such as in the case of Mevacor. Finally, regulators need 
to decide whether the OTC population should be for the same indication as the 
prescription population.
Lastly, another factor manufacturers must consider is the extent to which they 
expose themselves to potential litigation should OTC availability reveal 
undiscovered harmful adverse effects. This was the case with phenylpropanolamine, 
a decongestant that was withdrawn from the USA OTC market due to evidence that 
it increased the risk of stroke in young women (FDA, 2009).
All of these factors must be taken into account by manufacturers when 
making the decision of whether to apply for OTC switch. Ultimately, the expected 
profit in the OTC market and the probability of approval must be sufficiently high to 
justify the costs associated with making the switch.
6.2.3 Payors* Desire for Cost Containment
In addition to industry strategy, cost containment is a factor that catalyzes 
OTC approval. The desire for cost containment could be achieved either by delisting 
drugs once they become available OTC (i.e. shifting the costs to the patients), or by 
shifting demand to the OTC market and continuing to cover these OTC drugs, 
assuming OTC drugs are on average cheaper than prescription drugs. An OTC 
switch could also help payors save on physician costs, as long as patients are in fact 
able to accurately self-diagnose and self-treat such that they do not end up needing 
more acute care down the road. Cost savings could be substantial for payors under
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these circumstances, particularly in the case of OTC medicines treating chronic 
conditions.
An example of where a payor initiated an OTC switch can be seen in the case 
of loratadine (Claritin ®) in the USA. WellPoint, a health insurer, petitioned the 
FDA to switch loratadine, certirizine and fexofenadine while they were still on 
patent, due to their high costs. Despite the FDA’s overall positive recommendation 
in 1998, the original brand manufacturers were still granted the right to make the 
final decision. Only loratadine was switched in November 2002, in an attempt by its 
manufacturer (Schering-Plough) to avoid the impending generic competition. At the 
time of approval, five different formulations of Claritin® were approved for OTC 
use.
6.2.4 An increasing Trend toward Self-Care and Increased Access
The third main motivation behind the OTC switch for drugs that treat chronic 
conditions is a cultural shift toward more self-care, which is propagated by 
availability of information. Increasingly, patients are assuming more responsibility 
for their own health, including the prevention and maintenance of chronic conditions. 
In the case of OTC drugs, this assumes that patients are capable of self-diagnosing, 
medication selection, adherence, and discontinuation, in the event of an adverse 
reaction or should the medication not be effective.
Finally, another motivation behind OTC switch is to improve health 
outcomes, to the extent that the OTC switch increases access. If a lower dosage 
becomes available through OTC switch, then it may introduce a market for 
preventative treatment, as was intended in the case of OTC simvastatin in the UK. It 
is important to note, however, that it is difficult to measure the extent to which OTC 
medications may safely prevent adverse health outcomes in the long run, making it a 
contentious issue. Reflecting the sentiments of cost containment and increased 
access in a press release following the Prilosec switch, the FDA commissioner at the 
time (McClellan) said “As has been the case for many other over-the-counter 
switches, the availability of Prilosec® OTC will help reduce costs and expand the 
availability of treatment options for millions of Americans” (FDA News, 2003).
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6.3 Literature Review
The above section describes how two of the motivations behind a recent 
increase in OTC switches are a trend toward increased access to medicines so that 
patients can play a larger role in managing their own health care and cost 
containment for payors. Despite there being evidence that regulators in many 
developed countries have become more receptive to OTC switches on these grounds, 
relatively few studies have been conducted to measure the extent to which these 
goals are accomplished. This section reviews the literature that does exist on the 
economic implications of an OTC switch.
There have been two recent studies in the USA on the financial impact that 
OTC switches may have on health plans. One of these evaluates the cost savings that 
result from a payor’s coverage of OTC Prilosec (omeprazole) (West, 2006). 
Specifically, on March 1, 2004, the Arkansas State Employee Benefits Division 
(EBD) decided to add OTC omeprazole to its benefits, with a $5 copayment. This 
was in response to the persistently high omeprazole prices it faced ($123.40 per 
month for branded omeprazole and $91.71 per month for generic omeprazole), even 
after patent expiry. With PPIs accounting for 12% of the EBD’s pharmaceutical 
costs in 2003, switching patients to lower OTC omeprazole price of $18.90 per 
month offered significant opportunity for cost savings. Initially, the EBD eliminated 
coverage of 20mg brand and generic omeprazole (in the prescription market) 
altogether. However, there was a shortage of OTC omeprazole in retail outlets, 
which necessitated the reintroduction of generic omeprazole coverage. Since both 
prescription generic and OTC omeprazole were covered benefits, the EBD attempted 
to steer patients toward OTC omeprazole by requiring a co-pay of $5, compared to 
$10 for the generic prescription. The EBD also incentivized pharmacists to make the 
switch by increasing the omeprazole dispensing fee from $2.50 to $13. This 
financial incentive was intended to cover the increased time costs that pharmacists 
faced when they obtained permission from the physician and when they explained 
the switch to the patient. The result of these integrated policies was that within 15 
months of the coverage change, OTC omeprazole accounted for 41 percent of all PPI 
claims (down from the 55 percent of claims that was achieved before the OTC 
omeprazole shortage occurred). After netting out the increased dispensing fees and 
the loss in patients’ cost sharing revenue, this policy change produced an annualized
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savings in 2004-2005 of $43.4 million, representing a 38% cost savings on PPI 
expenditures. These savings were achieved without a decrease in overall PPI 
utilization. It is important to note, however, that the EBD’s policy focused on 
switching patients to omeprazole OTC who were already taking a PPI. It did not 
seek to open up a new market by providing omeprazole coverage to patients without 
prescriptions.
The second study on the financial impact of an OTC switch on health plans 
found that providing some coverage of OTC antihistamines, while still keeping 
prescription antihistamines as a second-tier prescription benefit, would be cost- 
effective for payors (Sullivan and Nichol, 2004). Specifically, managed care 
organizations and employers would face increased costs per member per month of 
approximately $0.30 and $0.13 respectively, compared to the alternative of shifting 
all antihistamine coverage to the third-tier prescription benefit. Medicaid, on the 
other hand, was projected to actually save $.02 per member per month. This increase 
in expenditures for private payors reflects the net effect of losing the high third-tier 
co-payments. Despite costing private payors’ marginally more, the move to OTC 
coverage, with second-tier prescription benefits, was found to be more cost-effective 
than the third-tier benefit alternative because of higher utilization and lower OTC 
prices. Moreover, managed care organizations and employers could benefit from 
hard-to-measure benefits, such as increased labour productivity.
In a more comprehensive study on the economic implications of OTC 
switches at the national level, the Association of the European Self-Medication 
Industry (AESGP) estimated the total potential savings that could accrue to society 
as a result of shifting eligible drugs to OTC status. In this case, prescription drugs 
were only deemed eligible for OTC status if they treated minor illnesses (defined as 
illnesses lasting less than three days), which was estimated to be the case for at least 
5 percent of all prescribed medicines. At this assumed 5 percent substitution rate, the 
study concludes that the total annual savings across seven European countries would 
exceed 16 billion Euros. In particular, in the UK, the savings of €1.4 million was 
thought to be an underestimate since the British Market Research Bureau reports that 
14 percent of all prescriptions in 1996 were related to minor ailments, making the 5 
percent assumed substitution rate very conservative. These savings figures took into 
account the costs of physician treatment, treatment with medicines, patient co­
payments, freed up doctor’ time, work absenteeism due to treatment, work
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absenteeism due to illness and patient travel time. It is important to note, however, 
that this study assumes there to be a direct 1 to 1 substitution effect between 
prescription and OTC drugs, based on evidence that there is a strongly negative 
relationship between the volume of prescriptions for minor illnesses and the volume 
of OTC medicines for these illnesses (AESGP, 2004). To the extent that countries’ 
health systems vary in regulatory frameworks and pharmaceutical prices, this effect 
may be stronger or weaker on a national, product level.
Finally, there have been a few studies on the economic effect of OTC 
switches for acute conditions versus chronic conditions. In a cost-benefit analysis, 
the deregulation (i.e. switching from prescription to OTC status) of loperamide and 
hydrocortisone were estimated to save the UK NHS £4.2 million and £2 million 
respectively in 1987 (Bond, 2004). However, some studies reveal that the potential 
cost savings from switching a drug to OTC status may not be quite as clear cut. For 
example, for acute conditions, such as the case of topical acyclovir, which treats cold 
sores, data shows the after a drug has been switched to OTC status, prescribing for 
that drug falls, and the government saves money (Bond, 2004). Nevertheless, this 
study does not, however, take into account whether prescribing for other similar 
drugs changes. In the case of H2 blockers, which treat chronic ulcer conditions, 
prescribing for this condition actually increased over the long-run (Bond, 2004).
This could be because patients who purchased through the OTC market were first 
time H2 blockers users who had previously purchased simple antacids. Once the 
patients learned of the improved effectiveness of H2 blockers, however, they had the 
financial incentive to go their physician to obtain a prescription for longer term use 
(Bond, 2004). Thus, in this case, the OTC switch of H2 blockers did not result in a 
substitution effect from the prescription to the OTC market, but rather increased the 
size of the H2 blockers market. Similar results were found for antihistamines (Bond, 
2004). Thus, the switch of drugs that treat chronic conditions from prescription to 
OTC status may have different financial implications for payors than the switch of 
drugs that treat acute conditions.
A Johnson and Johnson Merck-commissioned study on the potential effect of 
a low-dose statin switch on managed care plans and pharmacy benefit management 
companies in the USA shows that where the drug also remains available in the 
prescription market, an OTC switch could increase costs (Sipkoff, 2004). In its 
findings, the majority of payors expected the switch to significantly increase overall
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plan costs as a result of the increased awareness of the dangers of high cholesterol 
that the low-dose OTC availability would precipitate. It was projected that a certain 
population of new users would try the low-dose OTC statin, but would eventually 
move up the spectrum of care by visiting their physician and obtaining a higher-dose 
statin in order to achieve better control. However, the study also acknowledged that 
access to OTC low-dose statins could produce cost savings in the long run by 
preventing cardiac events. Thus, the short and long term budgetary effects may be 
different for OTC drugs that treat chronic conditions than for OTC drugs that treat 
acute conditions.
In conclusion, while there have been a few studies on the budgetary effects 
that OTC switches have had or may have on payors, there is a lack of literature that 
compares the economic implications of an OTC switch for a chronic disease 
medicine across differing regulatory and health systems. Moreover, no studies have 
compared prices in the prescription versus OTC market for these chronic disease 
medicines as well as the extent to which these two markets of a molecule may act as 
substitutes or compliments. That is, despite potential differences in indications, 
policymakers do not yet understand whether this interface of OTC versus 
prescription chronic disease medications of the same molecule offers an opportunity 
for enhanced competition within a molecule market (as would exist in the case of 
substitution) or whether they remain two separate markets with little overlap. It is 
only through this enhanced understanding of the OTC versus prescription market 
dynamics that policymakers can know the lull macroeconomic effect of these types 
of switches (of chronic disease medicines becoming available in both the prescription 
and OTC markets) and whether they have successfully contained costs and/or 
increased access for patients.
6.4 Methods
The above studies show that the budgetary implication of an OTC switch in 
which a chronic disease medicine becomes available through both the prescription 
and OTC markets largely depends on whether the patients are substituting the OTC 
drug for the prescription drug, or whether the patients who are purchasing the OTC 
drug are new users. If there is no evidence of substitution between the prescription 
and OTC markets, then this suggests that users in each market are separate (i.e. that 
the OTC and prescription products do not compete for patients), and there are no
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societal savings. Thus, in order to answer the policy questions of how much money 
payors (government and private health insurance) and consumers save when a 
chronic disease medicine is approved for OTC status and how the switch affects 
patients’ access to the medicine, the nature and degree of competition between the 
prescription and OTC markets (of the same molecule) must first be studied 
determined. Where there is a substitution effect between the prescription and OTC 
markets, this is evidence that the two markets may compete for some of the same 
patients, which may in turn produce a cost savings to payors. The extent of the cost 
savings to payors and access for consumers will then depend on the price difference 
between the prescription drug and the OTC drug, and who pays (i.e. the government 
and private payors versus the consumer).
6.4.1 Sample Selection
This analysis takes a case study approach that analyzes the effect of the 
omeprazole OTC switch in the USA and the UK. The USA and the UK are 
particularly suitable for this study because their regulatory approaches to ensuring 
safety in the OTC omeprazole market resulted in differing incentives for 
manufacturers and differing degrees of access for patients. Moreover, the set of 
financial incentives for patients to purchase OTC products also differs in the USA 
and the UK, which further enables this study to compare the effect of an OTC switch 
in the context of two different health systems and regulatory frameworks. A 
description of how the USA and the UK’s OTC market regulations compare and 
contrast is provided in the sections below and, more extensively, in Appendix B.
Omeprazole is a drug in the proton pump inhibitor therapeutic class that treats 
heartburn and GERD. Approximately 33-44% of the population experiences 
heartburn at least once a month, while 4-7% of the population suffers from heartburn 
on a daily basis (MHRA, 2003). It is estimated that roughly 25% of people who 
experience heartburn consult with their GP in the UK, while the majority self- 
medicate with over-the-counter drugs from various therapeutic classes, including 
antacids and H2-Receptor Antagonists (MHRA, 2003).61 Thus, in theory, there is a 
significant population who may be interested in purchasing a therapeutically superior
61 OTC omeprazole had not yet been marketed when this MHRA report was released.
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(in comparison with antacids and H2-Receptor Antagonists) drug such as omeprazole 
in the over-the-counter market.
Nationwide in the USA and the UK, omeprazole spending totalled $4.09 
billion and $241.92 million respectively in the 12 months prior to omeprazole OTC
f t )marketing. Therefore, to the extent that there is some degree of competition (i.e. 
substitutability) between the prescription and OTC markets, payors have the potential 
to realize significant cost savings from an omeprazole OTC switch.
6.4.1.1 OTC Market and Regulations Overview in the USA and the UK
In the USA, there are currently about 80 therapeutic categories of OTC drugs 
on the market, amounting to a market size of $10 billion a year (as of 2004, at the 
manufacturer level) (Sipkoff, 2004). OTC drugs as a percent of total unit volume 
range from 1 percent in Japan to 43 percent in Mexico (Danzon, 2008). The USA 
and the UK fall roughly in the middle, at 28% and 25.5% respectively.
The USA and the UK also seem to exhibit similar OTC availability rates with 
OTC-only molecules accounting for 17.10% and 20.80% of total molecules in the 
USA and UK respectively and dual status (OTC and prescription approved) 
molecules accounting for 10.0% and 8.9% of total molecules in the USA and UK 
respectively (Danzon, 2008). Finally, the OTC markets in the USA and the UK are 
similar in that prescription requirements for medicines are enforced so that products 
are not available in the OTC market unless they have been officially approved for 
such use by each country’s regulatory body.
Given the similar percentage volumes of OTC medicines in the two countries, 
it is interesting that OTC prices in the USA and the UK are comparatively so 
different. A recent study calculated that OTC prices in the UK are roughly twice that 
of OTC prices in the USA (Danzon, 2008). (When comparing the USA with other 
countries, a similar trend emerges, with prices being at least 80% higher in all other 
countries studied (Danzon, 2008).) This is in contrast with price differences in the 
prescription market, where UK prices are reportedly 23% lower (Danzon, 2008). 
According to the study, part of the reason for the relatively low OTC prices in the 
USA in comparison with other countries may be due to the USA’s large chain
62 Moreover, for the average US health plan in 2004, PPIs accounted for about 9% o f total drug 
benefit spending, with prescription omeprazole accounting for roughly 1.8% o f total drug benefit 
spending (Curtiss 2004).
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pharmacies, which can produce their own OTC products and benefit from large 
economies of scale. However, OTC prices are only one factor that may determine 
the size of the OTC market. Regulations and the degree of competition between the 
prescription and OTC markets are also likely to play a large role. Before discussing 
the conceptual framework for this study, it is first important to provide a brief 
explanation of the OTC regulations in the USA and the UK and additional 
background information on the OTC omeprazole switch in the USA and the UK.
(For a comprehensive overview of OTC regulations in the USA and the UK, see 
Appendix B.)
OTC regulations in the USA and the UK are similar in three key ways. First, 
the primary concern of both countries’ regulatory agencies in approving a switch is 
safety. Second, a product may be available via both the prescription and OTC 
channels as long as it is marketed at a lower dosage and/or is approved for a different 
use. Third, in both countries, applicants need support from a manufacturer in order 
to receive approval. In the case of the USA, the FDA defers to the original brand 
manufacturer before granting OTC marketing authorisation to an applicant.
The main way in which the countries differ is how they ensure OTC safety. 
The USA requires that applicants conduct patient label comprehension studies as 
well as, in some cases, actual use studies. Upon approval, the OTC product is then 
available on the shelves of foodstores, pharmacies and through mail order. In 
compensation for performing the actual use studies, manufacturers in the US may 
receive 3 years of OTC marketing exclusivity rights, as was the case with Prilosec® 
OTC. In the UK, actual use studies are not required. However, the MHRA retains 
the option of either approving the drug for general sales list status (GSL) or 
pharmacy status (P), whereby OTC drugs are only available behind-the-counter of 
pharmacists, who act as professional intermediaries in ensuring safety. In addition, 
in most cases, the MHRA requires that OTC products be marketed under different 
brand names than their prescription equivalents as a result of receiving their own 
marketing licenses.
63 However, there are also large chain pharmacies in the UK, which produce their own OTC products. 
OTC prices may therefore also depend on nations’ demand-side factors, such as patients’ incentives to 
purchase OTC products.
186
Finally, it is worth noting that for reasons discussed in the above sections, 
both the USA FDA and the UK MHRA have become more receptive to over the 
counter switches with medicines that treat chronic diseases (see Appendix B).
6.4.'1.2 Background on the Omeprazole OTC Switch
One study has shown that omeprazole is particularly suitable for the OTC 
market because patients are capable of adhering to the guidelines on when to 
purchase OTC omeprazole and when to consult with a physician (Fendrick et al, 
2004). A recent study in the UK reveals that pharmacists feel that there are fewer 
risks associated with selling OTC (behind the counter) omeprazole to patients than 
OTC (behind the counter) simvastatin due to concerns that patients in the OTC 
simvastatin market would not be as capable of adherence and cardiovascular risk 
assessment (Stewart et al,. 2007).
It is not surprising, then, that Prilosec®, the original brand version of 
omeprazole, was approved for OTC status in the USA in June 2003.64 In this case, 
20mg omeprazole was approved OTC in 14, 28 and 42 pill package sizes, based on 
the OTC guidelines that a patient is not to exceed 3 courses per year of a 14 day (one 
pill per day) treatment unless he or she consults a physician (US DOHHS, 2003). 
Notably, 20mg omeprazole was also able to retain its prescription status because the 
prescription indication was for the treatment of Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease 
(GERD) in more serious cases that require a physician’s supervision.
The FDA announced that two clinical studies performed by AstraZeneca 
showed that Prilosec was “effective in increasing the proportion of patients with no 
heartburn over 24 hours and that the effectiveness of Prilosec OTC increases from 
Day 1 to Day 14” (FDA News, 2003). Thus, in compensation for having performed 
these studies, the FDA awarded three years of over-the-counter omeprazole 
exclusivity to Astrazeneca/Proctor & Gamble.
Meanwhile, omeprazole lOmg was approved for the pharmacy (P) category 
by the UK MHRA in early 2004.65 Similarly to the USA, the MHRA approved the
64 This was in response to Proctor and Gable Co.’s application, in partnership with AstraZeneca. 
AstraZeneca partnered with Proctor and Gamble in order to leverage their large consumer marketing 
division.
65 This was in response to an application by GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, in partnership 
with Galpharm Healthcare Ltc. Galpharm is a generics manufacturer that has significant experience 
with POM to P switches, and the heartburn OTC market itself, as the marketer o f Zantac.
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omeprazole switch with a limited package size of 14 pills for relief of “reflux-like 
symptoms (e.g. heartburn) in sufferers aged 18 and over” (MHRA, 2003). However, 
in this case, the lower strength of lOmg (compared to 20mg in the USA) was 
approved in order to ensure that OTC availability would not mask more serious 
cases.
In addition, it is important to note that because UK regulations require that 
lower strength OTC medicines be marketed under a different brand name from their 
prescription counterparts, and since the original brand manufacturer (AstraZeneca) 
was not involved with the switch, OTC omeprazole in the UK could not use the 
Losec® brand name as was done with Prilosec® in the USA. Instead, OTC 
omeprazole in the UK is marketed under the trade name Zanprol.
6.5 Data
This study uses Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) Health data. IMS 
collects pharmaceutical pricing and sales data across numerous countries and 
provides a robust source of comparative data, with data being subject to internal 
validation (IMS, 2002). Specifically, national-level OTC data was available for 7 
quarters in the USA (from 2003q3 to 2005ql) and 5 quarters in the UK (from 2004ql 
to 2005ql). In the USA, 9 different presentations of OTC omeprazole were sold 
over the 7 quarters, the presentations varying by package sizes of 14, 28 and 42 pills, 
and three different distribution channels—retail pharmacies, food stores and mail 
order. Meanwhile, in the UK, the restriction of the pharmacy category results in only 
one distribution channel, retail pharmacies. In addition, only one package size of 14 
pills is sold in the UK. In both countries, there was only one manufacturer in the 
market since Proctor & Gamble retained a license for market exclusivity during this 
time period in the USA, while in the UK, Galpharm Healthcare Ltc was the only 
manufacturer that had received a marketing license during this time period.
This data allows for the calculation of market (molecule) level information, 
such as the OTC market share (as a percentage of the total molecule market). Using 
price and sales data, the quantity of packages sold was determined. Subsequently, 
the total volume of each presentation sold was arrived at by adjusting for package 
size (i.e. number of pills, tablets or capsules), which enabled all omeprazole products 
to be standardized into daily defined dosages (DDDs) in order to compare across 
strength categories in the prescription market. All prices were inflation-adjusted by
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each country’s consumer price index, and then converted to USA dollars based on 
the quarterly exchange rates.
6.6 Research Questions
The main questions this study seeks to address are: To what extent did the 
OTC omeprazole switch achieve the goals of cost containment and improved patient 
access? In addition, how could the USA and the UK better utilize their omeprazole 
OTC markets in order to achieve improved omeprazole purchasing efficiency? In 
order to answer these questions, this chapter will first focus on three sub questions:
1 What is the nature (e.g. market share versus price competition) and degree 
of competition between the OTC omeprazole and prescription omeprazole 
markets in the USA and the UK?
2 How do prices in the OTC omeprazole market compare with prices in the 
prescription omeprazole market in the USA and the UK?
3 What savings can payors and consumers achieve when a prescription drug 
is approved for OTC status?
6.7 Conceptual Framework
In order to understand the nature of competition between OTC omeprazole 
and the prescription markets, it is first important to understand the incentives 
manufacturers would face in deciding whether to apply for OTC marketing status. In 
recent literature, one study models the incentives a manufacturer must face in order 
to apply for a switch, and concludes that generics will apply for a switch only if  
being a leader in the OTC market is more profitable than being a follower in the 
prescription market. It also concludes that original brand manufacturers will apply 
for a switch only if there is an advantage to being first in the OTC market—i.e. if the 
OTC market is a Cournot model with a Stackelberg leader (Hollenbeak, 1999). 
However, this study does not consider the possibility that a manufacturer may chose 
to sell the molecule in both the prescription and OTC markets (assuming the 
regulations allow this) and that competition may therefore exist at the molecule level 
between original brand prescription medicines, generic medicines and OTC 
medicines.
To the extent that competition does exist at the molecule level between 
prescription and OTC medicines, manufacturers’ incentives would be very different
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than if competition does not exist, in that they would need to carefully consider 
whether marketing an OTC product would threaten the sales of their prescription 
product.66 Moreover, the implications of an OTC switch for payors would also be 
different if competition exists between the prescription and OTC markets than if it 
does not. On a theoretical level, if there is no competition between the prescription 
and OTC markets, and if the manufacturer is allowed to market in both categories 
(because of the different OTC approved use and/or strength) then a manufacturer 
would have the incentive to apply for OTC approval in addition to retaining its 
prescription version as long as the expected profit in the OTC market exceeds the 
costs of applying. This is because the manufacturer’s prescription version would not 
experience additional market share or price competition as a result of the OTC 
switch. At the same time, payors that only cover prescription medicines would see 
no change in their expenditures, while a new population of users purchase the OTC 
medicines. If payors do cover OTC medicines, then their expenditures would 
theoretically increase. Oppositely, where some degree of competition (i.e.
substitutability) does exist between the prescription and OTC markets, 
manufacturers’ profits would depend on their competitive position in the broader 
molecule market, whereas payors should theoretically experience cost savings, 
assuming purchased prices are, on average, lower (due to a shift to lower priced OTC 
products).
On a theoretical level, this chapter therefore first discusses the possibility of 
competition between the prescription and OTC market. This is assessed as part of a 
two-part framework which, first, seeks to understand whether the prescription and 
OTC markets are complements or substitutes, and second, seeks to understand the 
nature of competition, given the degree of substitutability. Where competition is 
likely, this chapter assesses the empirical implications that this competition between 
prescription and OTC market may have on payors.
66 This analogy is similar to the scenario where original brand manufacturers market generics o f  the 
same molecule, and must therefore carefully weigh the profitability o f its generic product versus any 
potential loss with its original brand product.
67 Under this scenario, payors would therefore only have the incentive to cover an OTC medicine if  
there was a significant health benefit for the OTC population.
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6. 7.1 Are Prescription and OTC Omeprazole Substitutes in the USA and the
In other to assess the implications of an OTC switch (where the drug also 
remains available on prescription) on the degree competition within a molecule 
market, this study must first assess the extent to which OTC omeprazole is a 
substitute for prescription omeprazole. If OTC omeprazole is a substitute for 
prescription omeprazole, then:
j = i-l. ..n
Where A Q?10 is the change in total volume of OTC medicine in a given 
quarter, i, A Q°B is the change in total volume of original brand medicine in that 
respective quarter and A Qfen is the change in total volume of generic medicine in that 
respective quarter.68 Evidence of a negative relationship between A Q°ir and A Q°B 
and between A Q°rc and A Qfen, where the prescription volumes decrease as the
OTC volume increases may suggest that there is substitution away from the 
prescription market into the OTC market. Evidence of the prescription market 
volume increasing after generic entry may suggest that new users switch from the 
OTC market into the prescription market. Because of the above study’s assumption 
that the prescription and OTC markets are mutually exclusive (Hollenbeak, 1999) 
and because the FDA and MHRA have approved OTC omeprazole with the intention 
of short-term use (versus the intended long-term use in the prescription market), the 
null hypothesis in this study is that OTC and prescription omeprazole are not 
substitutes, and therefore do not compete with one another. If this is the case, then 




i = 1,2, . . . ,  n
(2)
68 In order to capture substitutability instead o f total volume effects that may result from extraneous
factors such as the introduction o f other molecules into the therapeutic class, the relationships between
volumes’ deltas should be assessed rather than volumes themselves.
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Alternatively, there may be evidence that OTC and prescription omeprazole 
are not substitutes (and therefore do not compete) if the relationship between A
and A Q°B and/or between A Q-)TC andA Qfen is positive, which may suggest that the
products are complements. Because OTC omeprazole in the USA is assumed to be 
easily accessible (as a result of there being no behind-the-counter category in the 
USA, and of the massive distribution network of foodstores and pharmacies that may 
stock the OTC product), this study expects to reject the null hypothesis that OTC and 
prescription omeprazole are not substitutes. This implies that the products are in fact 
substitutes and do engage in a certain degree of competition with one another. In the 
UK, however, this study does not expect to reject the null hypothesis that OTC and 
prescription omeprazole are not substitutes due to the more restrictive behind-the- 
counter category, which likely enforces (at least to some extent) the shorter-term use 
indication.
6.7.2 Price Competition between the OTC and Prescription Omeprazole 
markets in the USA and the UK
If OTC and prescription omeprazole are not substitutes (i.e. if  they are 
complements or there is no discernible relationship), then the next question is 
whether competition exists between them. Theoretically, a perfect model of Cournot 
competition would assume that manufacturers have predetermined capacities. In the 
case of medicine production, however, it is unlikely that the marginal cost would 
increase significantly with scale, restricting capacity. Thus, market share 
competition between the prescription and OTC markets would likely face fewer 
constraints than the Cournot model implies. As a result, it is more realistic that 
where manufacturers of homogeneous products do not face constrained capacities, 
they engage in price competition (Giralt, 2007). Recall that in a perfect model of 
Bertrand price competition, the following conditions hold:
r
D(Pi)
D(pi ,P2)= < '/*d (p0
0
if Pi < P2 
if Pi = P2 
if Pi > P2
(3)
Resulting in a market equilibrium where:
P2 = Pi = c (4)
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Thus, in a model of Bertrand price competition:
p2=f(pi,c) (5)
and likewise,
pi = f(p2, c) (6)
However, since the OTC products are differentiated by indication (as required 
under regulatory approval), and since the payment side is structured differently in the 
OTC market (e.g. the payment is primarily via consumers rather than third party 
payors), it is unlikely that a perfect model of direct price competition would exist 
between the prescription and OTC markets. Thus, where there is evidence of 
competition between the OTC and prescription omeprazole markets (i.e. where this 
study is able to reject the null hypothesis that these products do not act as 
substitutes), this study expects to reject the null hypothesis of a Bertrand model of 
perfect price competition in favour of an equilibrium that would reflect a market of 
homogeneous goods with product differentiation, such that:
p2 > pi > c (7)
In accordance with the Bertrand model, whereby prices are a function of one 
another, this study seeks to understand whether OTC omeprazole prices are a 
function of prescription generic and original brand prices in order to determine 
whether there is in fact some degree of price competition between OTC and 
prescription omeprazole, such that:
p o r e  =  f ( p o B m s ot c  m o  p s )  ( g )
i=  1 ,2 , . . . , n
Where P°n equals the price of the OTC product at the presentation level,
Pt0B equals the average original brand price and P*en equals the average generic
price. Evidence of a positive association between the prescription original brand 
and/or generic omeprazole prices and OTC prices may suggest some degree of price 
competition between the two sectors. This study has also included MS°TC, OTC
market share (as a percentage of the total molecule market), as an explanatory 
variable in order to capture any influence that a change in the market position of the
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OTC manufacturer may have in the OTC omeprazole prices. Finally mail order and 
food store dummy variables have been added to assess the effect that the different 
distribution channels may have had on OTC omeprazole prices in the USA.
6.8 OTC Omeprazole vs. Prescription Omeprazole in the USA 
and the UK
6.8.1 Empirical Observations
Because the total volume of OTC medicine is a market-level variable, there is 
not enough data to regress the volumes on each other in the USA or the UK. This is 
because the presentation-level data would be lost in the USA, reducing the number of 
observations to 7 quarters in the USA and 5 quarters in the UK, which is not 
conducive to a rigorous time series econometric analysis. Moreover, simple 
correlation statistics between the OTC volume and the generic and original brand 
volumes would not separate out how the three-way relationship—that is, the extent to 
which the prescription original brand and generic markets were substitutes (separate 
from the effect of the OTC market), the extent to which the prescription original 
brand and OTC market were substitutes (separate from the effect of the generic 
market) and the extent to which the prescription generic and OTC market were 
substitutes (separate from the effect of the original brand market). However, it is 
possible to develop hypotheses about whether the original brand and generic 
prescription versions are substitutes with the OTC versions through graphical 
analysis.
Figure 6-1 shows that in the USA, the original brand volume decreases 
steadily over time, with the steepest drop occurring after generic entry. Generic 
volume increases rapidly in the first few quarters, and then plateaus upon OTC entry, 
at which point OTC volume increases steadily over time. By 2005, generic volume 
seems to be holding steady, while original brand volume continues to decrease and . 
OTC volume continues to increase. Generic omeprazole seems to lose volume to 
OTC omeprazole, whereas original brand omeprazole seems to lose volume both to 
generic omeprazole and OTC omeprazole. The decline in original brand omeprazole 
volume can be partly attributed to generics because it started before OTC entry, 
when generic volume was increasing; it can also be attributed to OTC entry because 
it continues to decline when generic volume declines and OTC volume continues to 
increase. This is not surprising, given the fact that the original brand omeprazole
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product and the OTC omeprazole product in the USA are marketed under the same 
brand name, Prilosec, which likely makes the products close substitutes.69 At first 
glance, it may seem surprising that a manufacturer (e.g. AstraZeneca) would initiate 
an OTC switch for a product that could compete so intensely with its original brand 
product. However, the high rates of generic penetration in the USA prescription 
omeprazole market suggest that the original brand would likely lose market share to 
generic competition if there were no OTC product available. Thus, it may be an 
optimal strategy for the original brand manufacturer to introduce a competitive 
advantage into the molecule market via the OTC switch, and accept a decline in its 
original brand market share as inevitable. The total size of the omeprazole market in 
the USA remains relatively level around the point of patent expiration, and it 
subsequently declines for a period of time. This indicates that OTC omeprazole may 
not increase the total size of the market, but instead competes with the prescription 
market.70 The result is that in the USA, OTC omeprazole market share increases 
substantially from 11% during the quarter of OTC entry to 43% in 2005ql, as shown 
in Figure 6-2.
Figure 6-1 Comparison of Brand versus Generic versus OTC Omeprazole 
Growth in the USA
Comparison of Brand Vs Generic Vs OTC 
Omeprazole Growth in the US
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Note: The vertical line denotes the point o f patent expiration.
69 If it weren’t for the differing payment arrangements between the prescription and OTC markets, 
they may be near perfect substitutes.
70 It may also be that some of the users from the prescription market switched to other PPIs during this 
period, while new users entered into the OTC market, thereby keeping total volume steady. An 
analysis of the entire therapeutic class would be required to validate this possibility. In practice, it is 
likely that this occurred as well as some users switching from the prescription omeprazole market to 





Figure 6-2 Generic versus Brand versus OTC Omeprazole Market Shares in
the USA
Generic vs Brand vs OTC omeprazole market 















Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Similarly to the case of omeprazole in the USA, Figures 6-3 and 6-4 show 
that in the UK, original brand omeprazole volume decreases steadily over time with 
the steepest drop occurring after generic entry. Meanwhile, generic volume increases 
steadily over time. In contrast to the case of omeprazole in the USA, however, OTC 
volume in the UK does not increase significantly upon OTC entry. In addition, both 
trends of decreasing original brand volume and increasing generic volume in the UK 
continue unabated after OTC entry, indicating a lack of competition between OTC 
omeprazole and prescription omeprazole in the UK. Interestingly, the total size of 
the omeprazole market in the UK decreased after patent expiration, but then 
increased significantly around the time of OTC entry, despite the OTC market’s 
relatively insignificant size. One possible explanation is that new users of the OTC 
version were able to quickly switch to the generic prescription market, resulting in a 
constant revolving door in the OTC market and an increase in the total omeprazole 
market size. Figure 6-4 provides further evidence of the relatively insignificant OTC 
omeprazole market share in the UK, in comparison with generic and original brand 
market shares; by 2005Q1, OTC omeprazole market share in the UK had not even 
reached 1%.
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Figure 6-3 Comparison of Brand versus Generic versus OTC Omeprazole
Growth in the UK
Comparison of Brand Vs Generic Vs OTC
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Note: The vertical line denotes the point of patent expiration.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Figure 6-4 Generic versus Brand versus OTC Omeprazole Market Shares in 
the UK
Generic vs Brand vs OTC omeprazole market 





Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Where prescription and OTC drugs are substitutes, as shown in the US case, 
competition between the two markets may exist. In contrast, where the products do 
not appear to be substitutes, as is the case in the UK, there seems to be a lack of 
competition between OTC and prescription omeprazole.
Figure 6-5 suggests that the OTC omeprazole market may have engaged in 
price competitive behaviour with the prescription omeprazole market in the USA, but
100%





not the UK. From OTC entry (2004Q1 in the UK, 2003Q3 in the USA) to 2005Q1, 
real OTC omeprazole prices decreased in the USA, while they increased slightly in 
the UK.
Figure 6-5 Comparison of OTC Prices in the UK and the USA at Market Entry 
Point and 2005Q1
C om parison o f OTC prices in the UK and US at 




Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
6.8.2 Econometric Analysis
To determine the type of competition (i.e. Bertrand-like or Cournot-like) that 
exists between OTC and prescription omeprazole in the USA, it is important to 
assess the extent to which competition is based on price. 71 Evidence that the price of 
one product drives the price of another product may suggest the presence of 
Bertrand-like competition in the USA. Thus, the degree of price competition 
between OTC and prescription omeprazole in the USA is tested using the below 
model, which follows from equation (8 ):
P °TC = p a + fi]Piavrggen + P 2P “vrgong + / ? 3 M S°1X + /?4MO + /?5FS + £ (9)
where Pion represents the quarterly price of the OTC medicine at the presentation 
level, p.avrggen represents the quarterly average generic price (calculated across all 
generic competitors), p.avrgong represents the quarterly average original brand price,
71 Testing the nature of competition between the prescription and OTC markets in the US is 
worthwhile due to the preliminary investigation that suggests a strong degree of competition. Such a 
test is not necessary in the UK, given the strong evidence which suggests that the OTC market is not 
competitive with the prescription market. Moreover, the single distribution channel does not provide 
enough data in a five quarter time period to run a rigorous model of price competition in the UK.
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MS?10 represents the quarterly OTC market share, MO is a dummy variable for the
mail order distribution channel and FS is a dummy variable for the food stores
distribution channel. (See Figure 6-6 for exact variable definitions.) With 9
presentations over a 7 quarter time frame, this study uses a random effects panel data
regression method. A random effects model is appropriate in this case because the
explanatory variables are all market level variables. As a result, the explanatory
variables’ disturbance terms do not correlate with the presentation level residual.
The Hausman test for the appropriateness of the random effects model versus the
fixed effects model confirms this, as shown in Table 6-2 below. Notably, because a
random effects model is appropriate, the mail order and food stores variables can be
dummied out of the equation in order to assess their effects.
Figure 6-6 Variables and their Definitions for OTC versus Prescription 








The OTC price per DDD at the presentation level 
The average generic price per DDD
The average prescription original brand price per DDD
The share o f the total omeprazole market (percentage o f DDD) that 
was purchased OTC.
Dummy variable for medicines that were purchased through the mail 
order service distribution channel







Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
The results from the model testing for Bertrand-like price competition 
between OTC and prescription omeprazole in the USA are presented in Table 6-2 
below. There is a significant, positive relationship between the average generic price 
and the presentation-level OTC prices, reflecting the fact that a decrease in the 
average generic price is associated with a decrease in the presentation-level OTC 
prices. Meanwhile, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between the 
average original brand price and the presentation-level OTC prices. This suggests 
that price competition may exist between the generic and OTC omeprazole markets, 
but not between the original brand and OTC omeprazole markets.
The relationship between the OTC market share (within the context of the 
entire molecule market) and the presentation-level OTC prices is significant and 
negative. Thus, an increase in the OTC market share is associated with a decrease in
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the presentation-level OTC prices, possibly reflecting economies of scale in the 
production of OTC omeprazole. Finally, the mail order dummy variable is 
significant and negative, while the food store dummy variable is not significant. This 
reflects the fact that mail order OTC omeprazole is lower priced than retail 
pharmacies’ OTC omeprazole, while the price of OTC omeprazole in food stores is 
not significantly different from that of retail pharmacies. This is not surprising, as 
the mail order distribution channel is able to avoid the bricks and mortar costs of 
production, while food stores and retail pharmacies would likely face a similar 
structure of production costs.
To the extent that the case of omeprazole is reflective of other molecules, this 
study therefore suggests that there may be competition between the OTC and 
prescription markets in the USA. However, it is important to note that the small 
sample bias may question the validity of these results. These findings are therefore 
more useful in generating the hypothesis that competition between OTC and 
prescription markets may exist in the US, than they are generalizable.
Table 6-2 Model testing for Bertrand-like price competition between OTC and




(.0 2 0 )
pavrgorig .003
(.008)






No. of observations 63
No. of groups 9
R2 (within for re model) .59
Hausman test 1 .0 0
*p <0.10: **p < 0.05: ***p < 0.01
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6.8.3 A Comparison of OTC and prescription Omeprazole Prices in the USA 
and the UK
The previous section discusses OTC versus prescription omeprazole volume 
effects in the USA and the UK and explores the relationship between the prices of 
OTC and prescription omeprazole in the USA. It is also important to understand 
how prices in the OTC market compare with prices in the prescription market in 
order to determine whether OTC switch can be used as a vehicle for cost savings. 
Figure 6-7 shows that in 2005Q1, the weighted purchased OTC omeprazole price per 
DDD in the USA was significantly lower than the weighted purchased omeprazole 
prices per DDD in the original brand and generic prescription markets. Meanwhile, 
in the UK, the weighted purchased OTC omeprazole price per DDD was lower than 
the weighted purchased original brand price per DDD, but higher than the weighted 
purchased generic price per DDD. Thus, in the USA, purchasers are receiving better 
value for their money in the OTC omeprazole market than in the generics 
omeprazole market, whereas in the UK, purchasers are receiving better value for 
their money in the generics omeprazole market than in the OTC omeprazole market.
Figure 6-8 shows that the weighted purchased OTC omeprazole price is 
nearly the same in the UK as the lowest available OTC omeprazole price because of 
the single distribution channel and package size. In the case of the USA, Figure 6-8 
shows that OTC omeprazole was available at a lower price ($0.57 per DDD) than the 
weighted purchased price of $0.69 per DDD. Specifically, in 2005Q1, OTC 
omeprazole in the USA was available by mail order, at retail pharmacies and at food 
stores, and came in package sizes of 14,28 and 42 pills at each distribution channel. 
In 2005Q1 prices therefore ranged from a high of $0.78 per DDD for a 14 pill 
package at retail pharmacies to a low of $0.57 per DDD for a 42 pill package by mail 
order. However, despite these low mail order prices, the total percentage of 
omeprazole (as a percent of DDD) that was purchased through the mail order channel 
in 2004 was only 22.6%, while 64.9% was purchased through retail pharmacy stores 
and 12.5% was purchased through food stores. Thus, purchasers of OTC omeprazole 
in the USA could achieve greater savings by shifting a larger share of their 
purchasing to mail order OTC omeprazole.
When comparing the lowest available omeprazole prices per DDD in the 
OTC, generic and original brand markets, the picture remains the same in the UK as 
when comparing the weighted purchased omeprazole prices per DDD— generic
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omeprazole is the lowest priced, with OTC omeprazole available at a significantly 
higher price per DDD (than generic omeprazole) and original brand omeprazole 
available at the relatively highest price per DDD. However, in the USA, the lowest 
generic omeprazole price is lower than the lowest OTC omeprazole price, which 
suggests that if payors in the USA want to save money, they could either switch 
coverage to the OTC product, or could attempt to improve their generic purchasing 
efficiency by purchasing generic omeprazole at a lower price.
Figures 6-7 and 6 - 8  also show that the omeprazole price per DDD was 
significantly lower in the USA than in the UK in 2005Q1. Specifically, the 2005Q1 
OTC omeprazole weighted purchased price per DDD was $0.69 in the USA, 
compared to $1.48 in the UK. This number needs to be interpreted with some 
caution, though, since prices are expressed per daily defined dosage. If compared on 
a per pill basis, weighted and lowest OTC omeprazole prices in the USA are $.69 and 
$.28, compared to $.74 and $.74 in the UK respectively. (For a more in-depth 
analysis on the role of strength in product markets across countries, refer to the 
previous chapter.) Thus, on a per pill basis, the weighted purchased omeprazole 
prices in the USA and the UK are more closely aligned, although the USA OTC 
omeprazole market still offers greater value than the UK OTC omeprazole market.
Figure 6-7 Comparison of Purchased Brand, Generic and OTC Omeprazole 
Prices in the UK and the USA, 2005Q1
Com parison o f P urchased  Brand, Generic and  












Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
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Figure 6-8 Comparison of Lowest Brand, Generic and OTC Omeprazole Prices
in the UK and the USA, 2005Q1
Com parison o f L ow est Brand, Generic and OTC 




Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
6.8.4 Competition between OTC and Prescription Omeprazole in the USA 
and the UK: Theoretical Implications
Based on the rejection of the null hypothesis that OTC and prescription 
omeprazole are not substitutes, the findings in this study suggest that there may be 
some degree of competition between the prescription and OTC omeprazole markets 
in the USA. In the case of the UK, this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and 
concludes that there is no evidence of direct competition between the OTC and 
prescription omeprazole markets in the UK. Instead, there seems to be preliminary 
evidence that the OTC and prescription omeprazole markets may actually act as 
complements—that the OTC omeprazole market may be funnelling some patients 
into the prescription omeprazole market.
In regards to the degree of competition in the USA, findings from this study 
reject the null hypothesis of Bertrand price competition, as expected. Instead, 
evidence indicates the presence of Bertrand-like price competition between the 
generic and OTC omeprazole markets in the USA, where the OTC market may act as 
a form of product differentiation (on behalf of the original brand manufacturer, in 
this case) that allows for an equilibrium of ranging prices and market shares, as seen 
in Figures 6-7 and 6 - 8  above. Notably, the lack of evidence of price competition 
between the prescription original brand and OTC omeprazole is not surprising, given 
the fact that they are manufactured by the same company. It seems that the original 
brand manufacturer pursues the relatively passive market harvesting strategy for its
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prescription original brand product, while at the same time, using the OTC market as 
a strategic means by which to further product differentiate (beyond just leveraging 
itself as an experience good) and in the process, compete with the prescription 
generic product.
6.8.5 Models o f Potential Cost Savings from an Omeprazole OTC Switch in 
the USA and UK
The total omeprazole expenditure decreased from $4,094,610,000 in the 12 
months preceding the OTC switch to $2,212,964,000 in the 12 months following the 
OTC switch in the USA. This reflects both the decrease in the average purchasing 
price and the decreased total omeprazole utilization, as seen in Figure 6-1. 
Meanwhile, in the UK, the total omeprazole expenditure decreased from 
$241,980,000 in the 12 months preceding the OTC switch to $180,053,000 in the 12 
months following the OTC switch. This largely reflects the increased generic 
penetration, as seen in Figures 6-3 and 6-4. Thus, the changes in total utilization and 
original brand versus generic mix make it difficult to separate out the effect that a 
shift to OTC omeprazole had on total expenditures.72
However, it is possible to simulate what the financial implications of a policy 
could have been, had it shifted a larger percentage of people from the prescription 
omeprazole market to the OTC omeprazole market, holding total omeprazole 
utilization constant. Tables 6-3 and 6-4 show the possible additional cost savings 
(beyond what was actually saved) to society in the USA and the UK in 2004 
following the approval of omeprazole OTC. At a 50% OTC market share in 2004, 
purchasers in the USA would have saved an additional 22% if OTC omeprazole was 
purchased at the 2004 weighted OTC purchased price and 26% if the OTC 
omeprazole was purchased at the 2004 lowest OTC price. This represents a 
nationwide savings of approximately $394 million and $461 million respectively. 
Notably, a 50% OTC omeprazole market share in 2004 would have cost UK 
purchasers 18% more at the OTC weighted purchased price due to the higher OTC 
weighted purchased price relative to the generics weighted purchased price and 17%
72 This could be modelled in an econometric regression. However, because the dependent variable in 
this case, total omeprazole utilization, is market level (instead o f presentation level), there would only 
be one presentation o f data, rendering the results insignificant since there are only seven and five 
quarters o f data in the US and UK. For a rigorous time series regress, there would need to be years of  
additional data.
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more at the lowest 2004 OTC omeprazole price. (The small discrepancy between the 
18% and 17% increased costs is due to the fact that the weighted purchased price 
represents an annual weighted average, whereas the lowest purchased price reflects 
the lowest quarterly price available in 2004.) Table 6-4 below shows that if the OTC 
market share were to increase to 75%, even further possible savings in the USA 
could have amounted to as much as 43%, while the cost increase in the UK could 
have been as much as 29%.
Table 6-3 Potential Cost Savings from the OTC Omeprazole Approval in the USA and the UK in 2004, assuming a 50% OTC Market 
Share
A Substitution o f 50% OTC Market Share at 
the Weighted Purchased OTC Price*
A Substitution o f 50% OTC Market Share at 





















USA 1,766,782,000 31.72% 1,373,102,370 393,679,630 22% 1,306,017,871 460,764,129 26%
UK 184,847,199 0.29% 218,083,207 -33,236,008 -18% 216,420,159 -31,572,960 -17%
♦Assumes all substitution comes from generics
Note: Market share, and therefore substitution, is based on daily defined dosage units. 
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Table 6-4 Potential Cost Savings from the OTC Omeprazole Approval in the USA and the UK in 2004, assuming a 75% OTC Market 
Share
A Substitution o f 75% OTC Market Share at 
the Weighted Purchased OTC Price*
A Substitution o f 75% OTC Market Share at 





















USA 1,766,782,000 31.72% 1,098,959,488 667,822,512 38% 998,332,739 768,449,261 43%
UK 184,847,199 0.29% 239,363,578 -54,516,379 -29% 236,869,006 -52,021,807 -28%
♦Assumes all substitution comes from generics
Note: Market share, and therefore substitution, is based on daily defined dosage units.
Tables 6-3 and 6-4 assume that the total omeprazole volume remains 
constant, and that an increased OTC market size is the result o f substitution from the 
generic prescription market to the OTC market. In reality, it is likely that the FDA 
and MHRA’s decisions to approve different strengths of omeprazole OTC have 
significant implications for the degree of substitutability between the prescription 
and OTC markets in the USA and the UK, and Thus, for the potential cost savings 
for payors and consumers. In the USA, the approval of the most common dosage, 
20mg, implies a larger degree of substitutability, especially since pharmacists are not 
required to restrict the OTC patient population in the USA (since there is not a 
behind the counter category). Specifically, roughly 50% of the total omeprazole pills 
dispensed in 2005 in the US were 20mg prescription products, which indicates that 
there was still ample room for substitution from the prescription market to the OTC 
market, assuming patients remained under the guidance of their physician, when 
necessary. (The prescription lOmg and 40mg strengths only accounted for just over 
5% of the total number of omeprazole pills dispensed in the USA in 2005ql.) One 
study noted that “the availability of omeprazole OTC in the same strength as 
omeprazole Rx presents a potential opportunity for health plans to cover an OTC 
product” (West, 2006).
Meanwhile, the approval of a lower dose version in the UK represents a more 
intentional aim to open up a new preventative market for lower risk people, rather 
than to encourage substitution from the prescription market to the OTC market. In 
addition to the prescription and OTC markets having different brand names, the 
requirement that the pharmacists must ensure that the OTC version is sold in 
accordance with the OTC license (in cases of P status) further prevents the OTC 
omeprazole market from acting as a substitute to the prescription omeprazole market 
in the UK. Theoretically, there was still significant room for substitution from the 
prescription to OTC omeprazole market in the UK since 27% of the total omeprazole 
pills dispensed in 2005 were lOmg prescription products. However, in practice, 
consumers in the UK are more apt to enter into the OTC market and then funnel into 
the prescription market if they discover that they are unresponsive to the 14-day 
course or want to take the drug long-term. This study shows evidence that this may 
have happened, given that the generic market increases significantly after OTC entry.
Consequently, the 50% and 75% OTC omeprazole market shares in Tables 6- 
3 and 6-4 above are more realistic in the USA than in the UK. In the UK, the
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introduction of the OTC omeprazole market does not seem to offer possible cost 
containment through substitution (from the prescription to the OTC market), but 
rather may actually have increased costs for the UK by increasing the size of the 
generic market.
Another factor that Tables 6-3 and 6-4 do not take into account is the costs of 
physician visits. According to Richard Stevens, GP and chairman of the Primary 
Care Society for Gastroenterology, roughly 5% of all consultations are for 
GERD/heartbum (The Pharmaceutical Journal, 2004). Thus, to the extent that there 
is a shift from the prescription market to the OTC market, as was the case in the 
USA, there would also likely have been large cost savings to the health care system 
from decreased physician visits. This assumes that patients are capable of 
determining when physician visits are necessary, and therefore do not jeopardise 
their health in the long run by going to the physician less in the short run. Such was 
the concern in the case of OTC simvastatin. Evidence shows, however, that in the 
case of GERD/heartbum, patients are capable of adhering to OTC guidelines on 
when to visit a physician (Fendrick et al, 2004).
In the UK, it is possible that the introduction of the OTC omeprazole market 
actually increased the number of physician visits, if new patients were in fact 
funnelled into the health care system. Notably, a study on the effect of an H2- 
receptor antagonist OTC switch found that the mean number of prescriptions 
dispensed for H2-receptor antagonists was reduced by 1.5 prescriptions and that the 
OTC switch did not result in an increase in physician visits overall or for GERD- 
related conditions (Andrade, Gurwitz and Fish, 1999). This finding is in contrast 
with the findings in this study, which imply an increase in generic omeprazole 
prescriptions after the OTC switch. One possible explanation for this is that the H2- 
receptor antagonist OTC was available for general sales and at the same strength 
instead of behind-the-counter and at a lower strength, thereby rendering the OTC H2- 
receptor antagonist a better substitute for the prescription product.
6,8.6 OTC Switch Financial Implications for Private and/or Government 
Purchasers
The above section discusses the possible total cost savings of an OTC switch 
on a societal level. However, whether public/private purchasers benefit most, or 
whether the patients themselves benefit depends on the purchasers’ coverage
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decisions. In an attempt to understand the financial implications that an OTC switch 
could have on the purchasers and patients, table 6-5 below models the four coverage 
scenarios:
• the payor continues to cover the prescription version of the drug and does 
not cover the OTC version of the drug
• the payor continues to cover the prescription version of the drug and does 
cover the OTC version of the drug
• the payor discontinues coverage of the prescription version of the drug 
and does not cover the OTC version of the drug
• the payor discontinues coverage of the prescription version of the drug 
and does cover the OTC version of the drug
The possible revenue and possible forgone revenue from co-payments also 
needs to be considered. Table 6-5 below simulates what the financial implications 
would have been for payors and patients in 2004 under each coverage scenario.
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Table 6-5 The Costs of Prescription and/or OTC Omeprazole Coverage in 2004
Coverage o f Coverage o f No coverage No coverage
prescription, prescription o f Of
no coverage and OTC prescription, prescription,
o f  OTC coverage o f no coverage































Total Cost Bore by 
Patients $263,840,043 $126,585,347 $1,384,115,304 $1,521,370,000
Coverage o f  
prescription, 
no coverage 
o f  OTC




















OTC costs $0 $682,000 $682,000 $0
Revenue from OTC 
co-pays
Total
$0 $177,576 $177,576 $0
Public/Private 
Payor Costs
$ 174,652,445 $ 175, 156,869 $504,424 $0
Total Cost Bore by 
Patients $6,082,555 $5,578,131 $180,230,576 $180,735,000
* Assumes a 32% OTC Market Share, 22% Original Brand Market Share and 47% Generic Market Share, which 
is based on the average 2004 omeprazole market share distribution in the USA.
**Based on the average weighted purchased prices and volumes for OTC, original brand and generic omeprazole 
in the USA.
*** Based on the average 2004 generic drug co-pay of $10 and preferred drug co-pay of $21 and the assumption 
that there were only co-pays from private health plans, which represents 53% of the population and therefore 
prescriptions (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004).
****Assuming the OTC co-pay equals the generics co-pay.
5 Assumes a .29% OTC Market Share, 15.75% Original Brand Market Share and 83.96% Generic Market Share, 
which is based on the average 2004 omeprazole market share distribution in the UK.
Based on the average weighted purchased prices and volumes for OTC, original brand and generic omeprazole 
in the USA.
§§§ Based on a co-pay of 6pounds in the UK in 2004 and the assumption that only 15% of the patients actually 
paid this co-pay (Robinson, 2002).
«§§§ Assuming the OTC co-pay equals the generics co-pay.
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Based on these figures, if  USA purchasers had decided to cover prescription 
and OTC omeprazole in 2004 rather than just prescription omeprazole, they could 
have offset the $137,254,696 cost increase by shifting 9.47% of the total omeprazole
73market from generic omeprazole to OTC omeprazole. These figures are derived 
from the following equations:
• Cost increase to USA purchasers = total public/private payor costs for 
coverage of prescription and OTC -  total public/private payor costs for 
coverage of prescription but not OTC
• Cost increase to USA purchasers = $ 1,394,784,653 - $ 1,257,529,957 = 
$137,254,696
• Percentage Generic to OTC Shift that is Necessary in Order to Save
$ 137,254,696 = (Cost increase to USA purchasers/ (weighted generic 
purchased price per DDD -  weighted OTC purchased price per DDD)) / 
total number of DDDs in the USA omeprazole market
• Percentage Generic to OTC Shift that is Necessary in Order to Save 
$137,254,696 = ($137,252,696 / ($3.67 - $.69)) / 487,557,211 = 9.47%
This cost neutral policy would then save patients $137,254,696, while 
maintaining the same utilization level. The UK, on the other hand, could not offset 
an OTC coverage cost increase by shifting patients from generics to OTCs since 
generic omeprazole is less expensive than OTC omeprazole in the UK.
In order to illustrate the financial implications of coverage decisions, Table 6- 
5 above assumes a constant omeprazole market size and constant OTC, brand and 
generic market shares. Of course, in practice, patients’ financial incentives would 
differ significantly under each coverage decision, which would in turn influence the 
OTC and prescription market shares. The following factors in Table 6-6 may 
influence patients’ purchasing decisions:
73 This assumes that there is not a large increase in total omeprazole utilization as a result o f the 
coverage decision. To offset the cost increases o f any new patients entering into the market, a larger 
shift from prescription to OTC medicines would need to occur.
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Table 6-6 A comparison of the Costs Associated with Obtaining Medicine in the
USA and the UK
Costs Associated with Obtaining the 
Prescription Drug
Costs Associated with Obtaining 
the OTC Drug
Direct Costs Indirect Costs Direct Costs Indirect Costs
USA • The cost o f the 
prescription drug 
itself if  uninsured 
or a copayment o f  
at least $10* for 
30 day supply if  
private insurance
•  Physician visit full 
payment or 
copayment o f $ 15 * *
•  Travel time to and 
from doctor’s office 
and waiting time 
(usually during work 
hours)
• Travel time to pick 
up drug at pharmacy
• Time and financial 
costs o f obtaining 
prescription renewal
•Cost o f the 
OTC drug 
itself: roughly 
$21 for 30 day 
supply in the 
USA
•
•  Travel time to pick up 
drug at pharmacy or 
food store; or no 
travel time if  mail 
order
UK •A  copayment o f  
roughly $11 for 90 
day supply for 
about 15% o f  the 
population; no 
charge for the 
other 85% o f the 
population
•N o  charge for 
physician visit.
•  Travel time to and 
from doctor’s office 
and waiting time 
(usually during work 
hours)
•  Travel time to pick 
up drug at pharmacy
•  Time costs o f  
obtaining prescription 
renewal
•  Cost o f  the 
OTC drug 
itself: roughly 
$67 for 90 day 
supply in the 
USA***
•
•  Travel time to pick up 
drug at pharmacy; 
possible conversation 
with the pharmacist
* In 2004, 84% of covered workers faced prescription drug co-pays for generics, preferred and non-preferred 
tiers. The average co-pay for generic drugs in the USA was $10; for preferred drugs was $21, and for non­
preferred drugs was $33 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004).
** In 2004, 80% of people in all plans in the USA faced an office visit of at least $15 per visit (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2004).
***The $67 cost for a 90 day supply is based on the cost of 90 lOmg pills, rather than the daily defined dosage 
comparison.
Source: The Author, using IMS Health data.
Additional factors may include:
• Whether they are aware of the drug’s availability OTC
• Whether they want to consult with a physician
• Whether a physician would be willing to write them a prescription for the 
drug
• Whether the patient was already taking prescription omeprazole at the 
time of the switch, and therefore faces an inertia cost
In the case of the USA, the 15% of patients without health insurance (Kaiser 
State Health Facts, 2007) would have a much stronger incentive to purchase the drug 
over-the-counter since the direct costs of the physician’s visit and the prescription
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omeprazole drug itself would be significantly higher than the direct cost of the OTC 
omeprazole drug. For patients with insurance, one study found that eight out of 
twelve leading managed care organisations in the USA dropped omeprazole from 
their formularies74 (Cohen, Paquette and Cairns, 2005). This finding is especially 
interesting, given that the FDA intended for OTC omeprazole to be only be used on a 
short-term basis, and therefore did not necessarily intend for health plans to treat it as 
a perfect substitute for prescription omeprazole. (Health plans may be less apt to 
remove a drug from their formulary if the OTC version is only available in a lower 
strength, as was the case in the UK.) Thus, in these cases, the patients would face 
similar costs to uninsured patients, except that they would only have to pay a co­
payment for the doctor’s visit, rather than the full cost. Thus, since the cost of 
prescription omeprazole in the USA was significantly higher than OTC omeprazole, 
and since there would be a physician visit co-payment and higher indirect costs 
associated with purchasing the prescription omeprazole, these patients would likely 
purchase the OTC omeprazole. Furthermore, where managed care organizations in 
the USA continued to cover the prescription omeprazole and do not cover the OTC 
version, the patient would still have a strong incentive to switch given the fact that 
the price of 30 days of OTC omeprazole in 2004 was $21, which was only $11 more 
than the average generic prescription co-pay, before taking into account all of the 
indirect costs. Thus, in the USA, many patients would have the incentive to switch, 
including a significant percentage of those with prescription coverage.
The story is very different in the UK, where the NHS continued to cover 
prescription omeprazole. Roughly 15% of patients would have faced a prescription 
co-pay of approximately 6 pounds for 90 days worth, but this is only a small fraction 
of the $67 cost (for 90 days worth) they would have faced if purchasing the OTC
n c
omeprazole directly (Robinson, 2002). Moreover, in accordance with licensure 
regulations, the pharmacist would be unlikely to give the patient more than two 
packages at a time. Thus, instead of having the incentive to purchase the OTC 
omeprazole, new users in the UK who try the OTC omeprazole and who could have
74 None eliminated the entire PPI class from their formularies, although seven raised PPI copayments. 
This is somewhat different from the case o f OTC loratadine, where all twelve organisations removed 
loratadine from their formularies and one third took all second generation antihistamines o ff their 
formulary.
75 The $67 cost figure is for 90 days o f lOmg pills. A patient taking the daily defined dosage o f  20mg 
would face double the OTC cost.
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safely self-medicated, would have a strong financial incentive to obtain the drug 
through the prescription market. This type of moral hazard leads to inefficient use of 
health system resources in that prescribing becomes driven by social consideration 
rather than out of medical necessity (Bond, 2004).
6.9 Discussion
In summary, in the USA, empirical evidence seems to suggest that OTC 
omeprazole is a substitute for prescription original brand and generic omeprazole, 
with the strongest substitution effect between the original brand and OTC products. 
The result was that in the USA, OTC omeprazole had achieved a 43% omeprazole 
market share by the end of this study period—2005ql. In the USA, there is also 
evidence of price competition between the OTC omeprazole market and the generic 
omeprazole market. Given the evidence that a large percentage of health plans 
dropped prescription omeprazole from their list of covered benefits, it could be that 
generic manufacturers responded to OTC entry with price decreases in hopes of 
remaining on health plans’ formularies.
Conversely, in the UK, evidence of the generic omeprazole market share 
increasing after OTC entry while OTC omeprazole achieved less than a one percent 
market share suggests that OTC omeprazole does not act as a substitute for 
prescription omeprazole. Rather, evidence of the total omeprazole market size 
increasing—particularly the generic omeprazole market size—after OTC entry 
suggests that OTC omeprazole may be drawing new patients into the omeprazole 
market who eventually switch into the prescription omeprazole market. Thus, the 
OTC omeprazole market in the UK does not show signs of competing with the 
prescription omeprazole market.
In the USA, the weighted purchased OTC omeprazole price is significantly 
lower than the weighted purchased generic and original brand prices. However, the 
lowest generic price is lower than the lowest OTC omeprazole and original brand 
omeprazole price. Within the USA OTC omeprazole market, the larger package 
sizes offer better value than smaller package sizes, as does the mail order distribution 
channel, in comparison with the food stores and pharmacies.
In contrast, in the UK, both the weighted purchase OTC omeprazole price 
and the lowest available OTC omeprazole price are more than 50% higher than the 
weighted purchased and lowest available generic omeprazole prices.
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Table 6-4 shows that if the OTC omeprazole market shares were to increase 
to 75%, purchasers in the USA could realise a 43% savings (assuming constant 
omeprazole prices and total omeprazole volume), while the UK would face a 29% 
increase in costs. Thus, at the current prices, purchasers in the USA may want to 
encourage more patients to switch to OTC omeprazole, assuming they continue to 
receive guidance from physicians. One study shows that many purchasers are 
forcing a shift from prescription to OTC omeprazole by dropping prescription 
omeprazole coverage. However, the result from this could either be that patients 
switch to a different (and often more expensive) prescription PPI (The Economic and 
Public Health Value of Self-Medication; AESGP) in order to avoid the OTC 
omeprazole costs, or that patients are forced to take on larger direct financial costs in 
the OTC market, which could reduce necessary utilization (and therefore threaten 
long term health). Thus, in order to ensure that necessary utilization does not 
decline, purchasers may want to consider covering OTC omeprazole, similarly to the 
Arkansas State Employee Benefits Division’s experiment as a model. By 
introducing a copayment for OTC omeprazole and shifting ten percent of the total 
omeprazole market from generic to OTC omeprazole, purchasers could offset cost 
increases associated with the OTC coverage and still provide patients with cost 
savings as well (since the indirect costs associated with the OTC market are so much
* lfklower than the prescription market).
One possible unintended effect that could result from payors covering OTC 
omeprazole in the USA is that new patients could enter into the omeprazole market, 
thereby increasing utilization. However, this would still be a pareto optimal move in 
that the health plans would likely save on physician visit costs, as discussed above, 
as well as the long term costs that could result from patients’ GERD going untreated 
(such as Barret’s esophageal, a pre-cancerous condition that can develop if GERD 
goes untreated). In addition, potential may exist for health plans to further offset 
increased utilization by switching an even larger percentage of patients from the 
prescription market to the OTC market.
76 There is some concern in the health care industry that managed care plans would find it too 
administratively difficult to cover OTC drugs due to possible reporting problems and ensuring that the 
consumer is the one actually using the drug (Sipkoff 2004). However, one study shows that about a 
third o f health plans in the US already cover at least one OTC medicine (Sipkoff2004). In addition, 
pilots such as the Arkansas State Employee Benefits Division demonstrate that it is possible (West 
2006).
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In addition to encouraging more patients to switch from prescription 
omeprazole to OTC omeprazole, regulators in the USA may want to consider 
measures that will stimulate more price competition amongst OTC products such as 
omeprazole. While the three-year exclusivity reward provides a good incentive for 
manufacturers to incur the necessary application costs (including the safety studies, 
etc.), it also deters competition, which results in high OTC prices. In theory, health 
plans should have the incentive to petition for the switch, in which case the OTC 
manufacturer would not receive the three-year exclusivity, and price competition in 
the OTC market could ensue.
However, the incentive for a health plan to apply for this switch may be 
stymied by the fact that the original brand manufacturer must agree with the petition. 
Assuming that the product has gone off-patent, it is unclear why the ultimate 
decision should lie with the original brand manufacturer (as long as safety studies are 
conducted by whichever party applies). Thus, the FDA may want to re-evaluate this 
bias toward the original brand manufacturer in favour of a more competitive OTC 
market by allowing purchasers and third party organisations to petition for switches 
of off-patent products without needing ultimate approval from the original brand 
manufacturer.
In the UK, coverage of OTC omeprazole could provide a huge financial 
incentive for patients to switch from the prescription market (and may also 
encourage price competition between prescription generic omeprazole and OTC 
omeprazole). However, this financial incentive would be inconsistent with the 
MHRA’s intention for OTC omeprazole to be used by a different population of 
patients than prescription omeprazole. To ensure this, the behind-the-counter barrier 
prevents the prescription to OTC switch, as does the availability of OTC omeprazole 
in the lOmg strength rather than the daily defined dosage. Finally, the requirement 
that OTC omeprazole have a different brand name than prescription omeprazole 
likely prevents widespread recognition of the product by prescription omeprazole
77users. Thus, it seems that the MHRA’s dual goals of allowing low-risk patients to 
self-medicate while luring high-risk patients into the prescription omeprazole market
77 In this case, OTC omeprazole is not marketed by AstraZeneca, so would not likely be called Losec 
even if this regulation did not exist. However, if NHS policies encouraged more patients to use OTC 
omeprazole, then AstraZeneca may have petitioned for the switch in the UK, as they did in the US, in 
which case, marketing under the brand name may have helped to expand the omeprazole OTC market.
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through OTC omeprazole is convoluted in that there are likely many low-risk 
patients who would switch into the prescription market due to financial incentives 
despite being capable of managing their risks themselves. Thus, if the MHRA’s 
intention is to make omeprazole more widely available to patients, and to promote 
increased self-management of GERD to low risk patients, then it may want to 
consider approving omeprazole in the general sales category, as well as making the 
product more financial affordable to patients, either by providing NHS coverage, or 
by encouraging additional manufacturers to enter the market, which may-drive down 
the OTC price.
The analysis pursued in the previous sections is not without limitations. First, 
there is only one product in this study, for which data was only available for a 
relatively small number of quarters following OTC entry. As a result, the results 
from the econometric model must be interpreted with some caution. Moreover, the 
single distribution channel and package size in the UK does not offer the opportunity 
to conduct panel data regressions, as this study was able to do in the USA. 
Nonetheless, this study was still able to utilize the data in such a way that reveals 
profound differences between the UK and USA OTC markets for the same drug. 
Moreover, the need to conduct a macroeconomic study on the implications of a 
chronic disease medicine OTC switch far outweighs the data limitations. The 
strength of this case, then, it that is has generated hypotheses in this relatively 
unstudied area of OTC switches, which further studies may build on with additional 
examples and data. Findings from this case study analysis may be generalisable to 
other chronic disease medicine OTC switches that are subject to similar regulations 
and health insurance coverage structures. Second, the pricing data in the USA is not 
able to capture fully the extent of discounts off list prices. These discounts off of list 
prices would only affect the original brand and generic products; the OTC product 
prices would not be subject to the same discount structure, but rather reflect the 
actual price that patients face.
6.10 Conclusion
In conclusion, OTC approvals are an increasing phenomena in both the USA 
and the UK, which are likely to increase in the years to come due to the 
manufacturers’ financial incentives to profit in the OTC market, the purchasers’ 
incentives to cost save through the OTC market and an increasing tendency for
217
patients to become more active in their health care management. The Association of 
the European Self-Medication Industry describes some of the challenges facing 
regulatory agencies and society in a recent statement: “While the value of self-care in 
general terms is widely recognized, a systematic debate on the skills needed to 
practice self-medication responsibly has not really taken place. This is in sharp 
contrast with the growing willingness of people to take more responsibility in 
moving from a passive patient to an active “self-care manager” (AESGP, 2004).
The OTC omeprazole example in the USA shows that in cases where 
government regulators are able to give autonomy to patients, and to the extent that 
patients have the financial incentive to purchase and manage their medication, 
competition may exist between the OTC and prescription markets, which may create 
significant room for cost savings to society, both for purchasers and patients. 
However, where there are multiple barriers, including both direct financial costs and 
indirect regulatory obstacles, such as in the case of the UK, the role of the OTC 
market is unclear and provides little opportunity for the targeted population of 
patients to become better self-care managers.
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CHAPTER 7: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapters in this dissertation outlined and analyzed unstudied 
dimensions of competition within the omeprazole and paroxetine molecule markets 
in the USA, UK, France and Germany during the 2000ql-2005ql period. 
Specifically, the main analytical chapters focused on: 1) competition amongst 
generics manufacturers in these molecule markets, 2) competition between the 
original brand and generics manufacturers and amongst generics within strength 
segments of these molecule markets and 3) competition between the prescription 
original brand manufacturer, prescription generics manufacturers and OTC 
manufacturers (whether original brand or generic). In light of the findings on the 
nature and degree of competition between these suppliers, these studies also 
estimated the implications for increased purchasing efficiency in these markets. This 
chapter begins by discussing the key empirical findings of these studies as well as 
their main contributions to the literature. In addition to the case-specific findings, 
there were two main cross-cutting themes that emerged from all three analyses—the 
role of segmented molecule markets as they relate to pharmaceutical competition and 
the role that product differentiation (in molecule markets) plays in preventing a 
Bertrand model of unbridled price competition. This chapter then provides an 
overview of the theoretical implications that these findings may have on industrial 
organization within pharmaceutical molecule markets, followed by a discussion on 
the empirical findings from each study.
A stakeholder analysis is then provided in order to shed light on the ways in 
which these findings may affect the pharmaceutical industry, payors, physicians, 
pharmacists and patients. Finally, this chapter concludes by discussing the 
limitations to the analyses followed by areas for further research.
7.2 Overview of Key Findings and Contributions to the Literature
The three studies on dimensions of competition within the off-patent 
omeprazole and paroxetine markets in the USA, the UK, Germany and France during 
the 2000ql -2005ql period offer new perspectives that further the current
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understanding of competition and purchasing efficiency within molecule markets. 
Below is an overview of these studies’ key contributions to the literature.
7.2.1 An Overview of Empirical Findings
7.2.1.1 Price Competition amongst Generics
This study contributes to the literature on competition amongst generics with 
the following new findings:
• There are dominant generic manufacturers in the omeprazole and 
paroxetine markets that are not the first generic entrants, nor do they sell
7 Q
at the lowest price.
• Price competition amongst generics seems imperfect in all four study 
countries, although there are more signs of competitive behaviour in the 
USA and the UK than in France and Germany. Although this finding has 
recently been identified in another study on competition amongst generics 
(Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley, 2008), this thesis has further 
contributed to the weak body of evidence by investigating the 
determinants of prices at presentation level separately for each of the four 
countries in order to arrive at a more detailed understanding of how the 
determinants of price competition differ across countries. This allows 
varying intercepts for each country, which reveals which determinants 
spur versus inhibit competition in each country. For example, the 
findings that product differentiation is associated with higher generic 
prices at the presentation level in the USA and the UK, but not Germany 
and France, and that the number of generic manufacturers does not drive 
lower generic prices in Germany and France, but does in the USA and the 
UK, is new to this literature.
• Finally, this is the first study of its kind to compare the distribution of 
generic prices within a molecule market across countries and to analyze 
the extent to which these countries take advantage of the lowest prices by 
purchasing efficiently. Previously, the only studies that have compared 
prices across countries have done so using weighted purchased prices and
78 This phenomenon points to the possibility o f preferential contracting between purchasers and 
manufacturer that is based on unknown criteria, such as the size or reputation o f the manufacturers. 
For further discussion on this finding, see the section on areas for further research.
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lowest prices. However, they have not looked at the standard deviation of 
prices in order to understand the full range of prices supplied within 
markets. Thus, this study has been able to show that generic prices may 
range significantly in the USA and Germany, despite the generics markets 
appearing more price competitive in the USA than Germany.
Additionally, there are some countries, such as the UK, where the market 
appears relatively price competitive and prices range little. Thus, as 
shown by this study, in order to understand purchasing efficiency, 
policymakers must understand how to lower the full range of prices and 
how to purchase at the best available prices on the market.
7.2.1.2 Original Brand versus Generic Competition within Strength Segment 
Markets
The study on competition within strength segment markets is the only of its 
kind. To date, no other study has disaggregated competition within a molecule 
market by identifying each strength segment as a submarket that may exhibit a 
differing degree of original brand versus generic competition than other strength 
segments of the same molecule. Thus, all of the findings in this case contribute to 
the understanding of competition within molecule markets and purchasing efficiency. 
Some of the most significant findings include:
• The number of strength segments in the omeprazole and paroxetine 
markets, as well as their respective strength segment market shares differs 
across countries. Thus, the extent to which clinical need versus 
prescribing patterns versus industrial strategy determines the existence 
and relative market shares of strength segments is unclear.
• In all four study countries, original brand manufacturers of omeprazole 
and paroxetine applied the market harvesting strategy consistently across 
strength segments, regardless of the degree of generic entry or 
competition within that strength segment.
• The degree of generic entry and the ensuing degree of market share 
competition amongst original brand and generic manufacturers differed 
within strength segments of omeprazole and paroxetine in all four study 
countries. This finding of uneven generic penetration rates reveals
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significant purchasing inefficiencies within the omeprazole and 
paroxetine molecule markets.
• Where generic entry did occur, the nature of competition amongst 
generics seems similar to that described in the case on competition 
amongst generics in this dissertation.
• The example of Paxil CR® in the USA is the first case study on the 
macroeconomic financial implications of a line-extension. Thus, the 
findings on the relatively large market share of Paxil CR® within the 
context of the broader molecule market, along with the relatively high 
prices (compared to the generic, immediate release versions) suggests that 
line-extensions may result in significant purchasing inefficiencies to the 
extent that their higher costs do not justify their therapeutic benefits.
7.2.1.3 Market Share Competition between the Prescription and OTC  
Omeprazole Markets
The study on market share competition between the prescription and OTC 
omeprazole markets in the USA and the UK is the first of its kind. To date, there 
have not been any macroeconomic studies analysing the competitive dynamics and 
purchasing efficiency within a molecule market following the OTC approval of a 
chronic disease medicine that continues to be available through the prescription 
channel. Moreover, this is a comparative study across countries, which offers 
insights to researchers and policymakers on the effects of contextual factors (such as 
OTC regulations and broader health system characteristics) on the degree of market 
share competition between OTC omeprazole and prescription omeprazole and the 
implications for purchasing efficiency. Some of the key findings from this case are 
as follows:
• The approval of OTC omeprazole resulted in OTC omeprazole 
comprising a large share of the market in the USA, compared to a tiny 
share of the market in the UK. Corresponding with these findings, it 
seems that OTC omeprazole directly competed for market share with 
prescription omeprazole in the USA, but not the UK.
• Since the price of OTC omeprazole was relatively low in the USA, the 
substitution from prescription omeprazole to OTC omeprazole resulted in
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cost savings to society, although care needs to be taken to ensure that 
these costs do not fall disproportionately on patients.
•  In the UK, OTC omeprazole was priced higher than prescription generic 
omeprazole, indicating that it would not increase purchasing efficiency to 
shift some of the omeprazole market from the prescription market to the 
OTC market.
• In conclusion, the differences in the USA and UK’s OTC regulations as 
well as their differing health systems lead to the approval of OTC 
omeprazole having totally different purchasing efficiency implications in 
the two countries. Interestingly, in the case on competition amongst 
generics, one of the countries that seem to succeed in balancing 
regulations with free market incentives (in the interest of achieving price 
competition) is the UK. However, this study shows that in the case of 
OTC omeprazole, the structure of the UK’s OTC behind-the-counter 
market offers little opportunity for an OTC switch to result in cost 
savings, oppositely from the USA. Thus, while the case on generic 
competition hails the UK as superior to the USA when it comes to 
achieving purchasing efficiencies, the case of OTC omeprazole shows 
that there are areas where the USA is superior to the UK in achieving this.
7.2.1.4 Pharmaceutical Competition and Segmented Molecule Markets within 
differing Regulatory Frameworks
The literature review shows that most studies that analyze competition within 
molecule markets standardize the different permutations of strengths, forms and 
package sizes into daily defined dosages in order to analyze market dynamics at the 
molecule level. However, in the process of assuming that products within molecule 
markets all engage in direct price competition, any existence of segmented, 
submarkets within these broader molecule markets is ignored. The one main 
exception to this is in the case of original brand versus generic products, which most 
studies have separated from each other in order to understand competitive dynamics. 
This dissertation is the first to explore the competitive dynamics within strength 
segment markets of a molecule and between OTC and prescription segments of a 
molecule within the context of countries’ differing regulatory systems.
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The findings show that the degree of competition between original brand and 
generic manufacturers differs significantly within strength segments of the study 
molecules in all study countries. In the omeprazole OTC switch case, findings show 
that the nature and degree of competition between the OTC omeprazole and 
prescription omeprazole markets differs due to countries’ varying regulations and 
health system incentives. Thus, while standardising products’ volumes into DDDs 
can facilitate direct volume comparisons within molecule markets, thereby enabling 
analysis on competition within broader molecule markets, it also may mask the 
layers of competition that exist within molecule markets. This dissertation therefore 
shows that it is difficult to define the market in which pharmaceutical competition 
occurs, and that in order to understand the various dimensions of pharmaceutical 
competition, molecule markets may be standardized and studied as one market, but 
must also be disaggregated and studied at this more detailed level.
This is seen in the case of omeprazole in the USA. The case on competition 
amongst generics shows that the original brand price in the USA was positively 
associated with generic prices in the USA during this time period. At the outset, this 
may lead to the conclusion that this is a sign of anticompetitive behaviour, as it is in 
Germany and France, where generic prices seem to float upwards over time, along 
with original brand prices. However, the case on OTC omeprazole in the USA 
shows that since OTC omeprazole was marketed by the original brand manufacturer, 
and since OTC omeprazole was priced relatively low, the evidence of the positive 
relationship between the original brand price and the generic prices in the USA may 
have been evidence of some degree of price competition between the OTC and 
generics market, rather them anticompetitive behaviour.
7.2.1.5 The Role o f  Product Differentiation within Molecule Markets
To the extent that segmented molecule markets represent manufacturers’ 
attempts to prevent price or market share competition by carving their own, separate 
niches within the molecule market, this may be thought of as product differentiation. 
On a broader level, the cumulative effect of all types of product differentiation may 
be proxied by the number of presentations, including permutations of products with 
different forms, strength and package size that are manufactured by original brand 
and generic companies. Or, product differentiation may be studied in greater detail,
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for instance by studying products that are differentiated by strength and line- 
extensions, and OTC versus prescription status respectively.
At the outset, one might expect that product differentiation would lead to 
higher expenditures in a market, reflecting the manufacturer’s greater ability to profit 
as a result of having carved out these niches. This was the case in some instances. 
For example, the case on competition amongst generics reveals that the cumulative 
effect of all types of product differentiation within the generic market seems to be 
associated with higher generic prices in the USA and the UK. Moreover, when 
studying the strength segmented markets, it seems that across all four countries, 
original brand manufacturers experienced less generic entry in less common strength 
markets, and therefore lesser degrees of market share competition in these strength 
markets, which drove up expenditures since original brand prices remained higher 
than generic prices. However, the case of OTC omeprazole in the USA shows that 
some types of product differentiation actually have the potential to reduce overall 
costs. In this case, the original brand manufacturer was able to secure significantly 
higher omeprazole market share than it otherwise would have. However, from the 
payor perspective, the lower prices in the OTC market actually offered an 
opportunity to save on costs (assuming the total volume is held constant). Thus, 
these studies reveal that while manufacturers’ attempts to product differentiate may 
sometimes have the effect of driving up expenditures for payors, there are instances 
where it may actually benefit payors.
7.2.2 Theoretical Implications for the Industrial Organization of 
Pharmaceutical Molecule Markets
7.2.2.1 The Perpetuation o f  Original Brand Manufacturers ’ Market 
Harvesting Strategy at Micro-levels
Recall that the literature has shown that original brand manufacturers usually 
pursue the market harvesting strategy, whereby they are able to retain brand loyal 
customers at high prices, while accepting the inevitable loss of the price sensitive 
portion of the market. This is an example of original brand manufacturers leveraging 
their products as Experience Goods, whereby a certain share of customers face 
inertia to switching to generics as a result of their positive experience with the 
original brand product. The study of competition between the original brand and 
generic products within strength segments of the omeprazole and paroxetine markets
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in these countries shows that original brand manufacturers seem to employ the 
market harvesting strategy consistently across strength segments, despite the fact that 
strength segments seem to experience differing degrees of genericisation rates. The 
result is that in the relatively less common strength segment markets, original brand 
manufacturers are able to retain a relatively large share of the strength segment 
market, despite refusing to reduce their prices. Thus, by studying original brand 
versus generic competition at the ultra-micro strength level for the first time, a new 
way is revealed in which original brand manufacturers may be able to perpetuate the 
effectiveness of this market harvesting strategy, despite payors’ increasing number of 
policies that seek to encourage generic substitution. That is, by entering into 
multiple strength segments, where the regulations allow and where demand is 
expected to be significant, original brand manufacturers may be able to continue 
marketing a number of their products post patent expiration where there has been 
little (and in some cases, no) generic entry. Thus, even where policymakers stipulate 
that generics must be substituted, original brand manufacturers are sometimes 
shielded from this occurrence due to the lack of generic substitutes available. In 
conclusion, this case offers a new dimension to the relatively simple market 
harvesting model, whereby original brand name products may be able to leverage 
both their brand names (as experience goods) across all markets as well as the 
fragmentation of the market itself in order to retain their space (and hence higher 
prices) within the broader molecule market.
7.2.2.2 Generic Price Competition in the Presence o f  Product Differentiation
Discussions throughout this thesis have used industrial organisation models 
of competition between homogeneous goods as a theoretical reference point. The 
Bertrand model of unbridled price competition appears to be the most applicable to 
competition amongst generics because unlike the Cournot model, it assumes fairly 
flat marginal costs, which is likely the case in the production of off-patent molecules 
such as omeprazole and paroxetine. However, the Bertrand model assumes a market 
in which there is perfect price competition, such that prices converge to marginal 
cost and market shares distribute evenly. In reality, evidence shows that this is not 
the case in generic molecule markets. Rather, as the study on competition amongst 
generics reveals, prices in most countries tend to range, along with market shares, 
which do not necessarily reflect relative price positions in the market. That is, the
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lowest priced products do no necessarily achieve the highest market shares, and 
conversely, the manufacturers with the highest market shares are often not the lowest 
priced products in these countries’ molecule markets. This therefore suggests that 
while some of the assumptions of the Bertrand model may apply to competition 
amongst generics, there are additional, more complicated factors that may soften 
competition. These more complicated factors may be classified as product 
differentiation, whereby generic manufacturers may have the ability to leverage 
unique product characteristics that allow them to carve out space within the market. 
Industrial organization models of competition within homogenous markets offer 
some examples of product differentiation, such as spatial models, whereby firms 
strategically choose their geographic locations, etc. However, none of the industrial 
organization product differentiation models seem to apply perfectly to these cases, as 
a result of the pharmaceutical industry’s unique regulatory and market 
characteristics. Examples of product differentiation that are specific to these cases 
include: 1) characteristics that are unique to the dominant generic manufacturer, 
possibly reflecting the size of the manufacturer or the manufacturer’s experience in 
certain disease categories, 2) strategically choosing which strength segments to enter 
into, and when, as well as engaging in nonlinear pricing (as well as possible, price 
discrimination) practices across strength segments, 3) packaging pills differently in 
the form of package sizes and/or forms (e.g. in this case, pills versus capsules versus 
tablets) and 4) fragmenting the demand side by marketing the product over-the- 
counter (after having achieved authorisation).
The case on OTC versus prescription competition in the omeprazole markets 
in the USA and the UK has shown that both original brand and generic manufactures 
may attempt to distinguish their products from those in the prescription market by 
applying for over-the-counter status. This may be another example of an original 
brand manufacturer’s attempt to leverage its power as an Experience Good. Or, it 
may be another example of a way in which the generic manufacturer attempts to 
differentiate its product in order to compete with the other generic manufacturers.
In conclusion, industrial organization amongst generics of the same molecule 
seems Bertrand-like in that generics of the same molecule are relatively 
homogeneous products that face fairly flat marginal costs. However, evidence from 
these cases suggests that the nature of price competition amongst generic 
pharmaceuticals of the same molecule may differ from the Bertrand model due to
227
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ unique abilities to product differentiate. As a result, 
these studies provide evidence that supports a new theory about competition amongst 
generics, which is that in the process of product differentiation, generic 
manufacturers may be able to distinguish their products in such a way where they are 
no longer perfectly homogeneous, resulting in a Bertrand-like model of competition 
between “homogeneous” goods, where product differentiation results in an 
equilibrium of ranging prices and market shares.
7.3 Stakeholder Analysis
The findings on the nature of competition within these molecule markets and 
how it differs across these countries’ regulatory environments may have significant 
implications for pharmaceutical manufacturers’ abilities to profit. The stakeholder 
analysis therefore begins with a discussion on the implications of these findings for 
the industry during this time period, separating out the original brand and generic 
manufacturers. It then considers the implications that each study’s findings may 
have on purchasing efficiency for payors. As part of the stakeholder analysis for 
payors, this section also reviews potential policy options in light of each study’s 
findings. Finally, the stakeholder analysis acknowledges the implications that these 
findings and policy options may have on physicians, pharmacists and patients.
7.3.1 Implications for Original Brand Manufacturers: Competition and the 
Potential to Profit
7.3.1.1 The implication o f  Competition within Strength Segment Markets on 
Original Brand Manufacturers
The evidence in the study on competition within strength segments shows 
that in most cases, the number of strengths and the respective strength market shares 
did not change significantly before and after patent expiration. Moreover, the 
original brand manufacturers pursued the market harvesting strategy consistently 
across strength segment markets by either keeping constant, or increasing, their 
prices. Thus, original brand manufacturers seemed to treat different strength 
products as though they were part of the same broader market of competition. 
However, a closer look at the data revealed that the generic penetration, and therefore 
the original brand market shares, varied significantly within strength segments of the 
same molecule.
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Specifically, this study found that in nearly all cases, generic manufacturers 
entered into the strength markets with the largest market share (which was the daily 
defined dosage for both molecules across all four study countries). In some cases, 
generic manufacturers simultaneously entered into other strength segment markets, 
while in other cases, generic manufacturers entered into other strength segment 
markets in a more step-wise fashion. The results from the econometric models 
showed that the strength market share, the number of generic competitors and the 
ratio of original brand to generic prices were all negative predictors of the original 
brand market shares. This implies that original brand manufacturers were able to 
retain larger shares of the strength segment markets in less common markets, where 
generic entry and overall competition from generics was less, thereby profiting more 
in these markets (since their prices remained high). Notably, in some cases, there 
were as few as one or even zero generics in the strength markets, allowing the 
original brand manufacturers to retain the majority of the strength segment market 
after patent expiration.
Furthermore, in the case of Paxil CR® in the USA, the original brand 
manufacturer was able to retain as much as a third of the total molecule market by 
introducing this line extension shortly before the immediate release version lost 
patent. This strategy seemed particularly successful in this case since all of the 
immediate release paroxetine strength segment markets in the USA experienced 
intense competition from generics shortly after patent expiration (unlike the less 
common strength segment markets in most of the study countries’ omeprazole and 
paroxetine strength segment markets during this study period), which drastically 
reduced the original brand market shares in these immediate release strength segment 
markets.
Thus, to the extent that it is in the power of original brand manufacturers to 
do so, segmenting a molecule market into various strengths and forms seems to be a 
profitable strategy that enables the original brand manufacturer to retain a larger 
share of the overall molecule market at relatively high prices post patent expiry.
7.3.1.2 The Implication o f  an OTC switch on Original Brand Manufacturers
Besides entering into less common strength markets, these studies reveal that 
another way in which original brand manufacturers of chronic disease medicines may 
retain a larger share of the market after patent expiration is by applying for an OTC
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switch, where a medicine retains its status as both a prescription and OTC medicine. 
However, the extent to which an OTC product is able to achieve a large share of the 
broader molecule market is dependent on the country’s OTC regulations as well as 
the incentives patients face under the public or private health insurance system.
Original brand manufacturers’ incentives to apply for an OTC switch depend 
on a number of factors, including the costs of applying for approval and the expected 
profit in the OTC market, which is largely dependent on the expected OTC price and 
the potential OTC market size once approval for marketing is achieved. In the USA, 
any manufacturer or private payor may initiate a switch. However, the FDA defers 
to the original brand manufacturer before making the final decision, regardless of 
which organization made the actual application. In addition, OTC regulations in the 
USA require that the applicant conduct OTC use safety studies, which may be costly. 
The reward, however, may be a three year exclusivity period in the OTC market, 
allowing the applicant of the OTC-switched medicine to deter direct price or market 
share competition in the OTC market.
The OTC omeprazole switch case in the USA is an example of where, within 
the context of the right regulatory and health system environment, an original brand 
manufacturer may use the OTC switch route as a strategy to retain a significantly 
higher market share than it otherwise would have. Evidence seems to suggest that 
although 20mg (the DDD) OTC omeprazole was initially approved for patients to 
use only on a short term basis, in practice, the OTC version may have acted as a 
substitute with prescription original brand and prescription generic omeprazole, 
largely due to patients’ financial incentives to purchase through the OTC market.
The result was that the original brand manufacturer’s OTC omeprazole, which 
retained the same brand name as its well-known prescription product, Prilosec®, was 
able to achieve a 43% market share by 2005ql. Although it may seem 
counterintuitive that the original brand manufacturer would introduce an OTC 
product that would compete for market share with its own prescription product, it is 
likely that the original brand manufacturer’s prescription product would have lost the 
majority of its market share to competition from prescription generics had it not 
introduced the OTC product. Thus, in the USA, applying for an OTC switch has the 
potential to be a very profitable strategy for original brand manufacturers.
In contrast, evidence from the UK shows that the omeprazole OTC switch 
probably would not have been a profitable strategy for the original brand
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manufacturer. In this case, a generic manufacture applied for the switch. However, 
instead of having the 20mg DDD version approved, as it was in the USA, the MHRA 
approved a lower dose, 1 Omg version, which was also intended (similarly to the 
USA) for patients to try on a short-term basis. In addition, OTC omeprazole was 
only approved for behind-the-counter status in the UK, which requires that 
pharmacists act as a intermediary for patients who want to purchase the drug. 
Notably, many OTC products in the UK are required to be marketed under different 
names than their branded equivalents, so that patients do not confuse them as direct 
substitutes. Finally, because the majority of patients do not face co-pays under the 
NHS (and those who do face lower prescription co-pay costs than the direct OTC 
costs), patients do not have the financial incentive to purchase OTC products on a 
long-term basis like they may in the USA. The result of all of these factors was that 
the original brand manufacturer did not apply for an OTC omeprazole switch in the 
UK. Rather, a generic manufacturer applied, and achieved less than a one percent 
market share (compared to the 43% in the USA). This suggests that the OTC 
omeprazole product in the UK did not compete for market share with the prescription 
omeprazole products. Instead, the prescription generic omeprazole market continued 
to increase after OTC entry, both in absolute size and as a percentage of the total 
molecule market. OTC omeprazole in the UK may therefore have been drawing new 
patients into the omeprazole market who eventually switched from the OTC version 
to the prescription generic version. Regardless of whether the new prescription 
generic users were coming from the OTC market or not, the evidence strongly 
suggests that an original brand manufacturer would be unlikely to profit significantly 
from receiving approval to market its chronic disease medicine in the behind-the- 
counter OTC market.
In conclusion, findings from these studies reveal that there are some ways in 
which original brand manufacturers may be able to retain a larger share of the total 
molecule market that is relatively consistent across countries, such as by entering 
into strength segment markets that have a relatively low strength market share and 
have therefore not experienced comparable levels of competition from generic 
equivalents, in comparison with the DDD strength segment. However, other original 
brand manufacturers’ strategies may vary across countries, depending on the 
regulatory environment and health system characteristics. For example, the original 
brand manufacturer was able to receive approval for a paroxetine line extension and
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subsequently, retain a large share of the market. However, there was not evidence of 
this line extension in the other study countries during this time period. In addition, 
the original brand manufacturer of omeprazole was able to retain a large share of the 
molecule market in the USA by receiving approval to market its OTC version. 
Evidence of a generic manufacturer receiving omeprazole OTC approval as a behind- 
the-counter product shows, however, that this strategy probably would not have been 
as successful for the original brand manufacturer in the context of the UK regulatory 
environment and health care system. Thus, original brand manufacturers may have 
the opportunity to retain a larger share of the molecule market after patent expiration 
than the simple market harvesting strategy may imply, although the extent to which 
certain opportunities exist differs across countries.
7.3.2 Implications for Generic Manufacturers: Competition and the 
Potential to Profit
For generic manufacturers, it seems that competition is more complicated 
than theory might predict in a market o f homogenous goods. Firstly, the evidence of 
a preferential generic manufacturer that is not necessarily based on them having the 
lowest price or being the first entrant reveals that some generic manufacturers may 
have significantly more market power than others. It is very interesting that in these 
two molecule markets across these study countries, this pattern emerged, regardless 
of the differing regulatory frameworks. Moreover, in Germany the dominant generic 
manufacturer was associated with negative generic prices.
Other findings also emerged that suggest limitations to competition amongst 
generics, especially in Germany and France, where there was a positive relationship 
between the number of generic manufacturers and generic prices. In general, the 
omeprazole and paroxetine generics markets in the USA and UK appeared to 
experience larger degrees of price competition. However, even in these markets, 
there was evidence of product differentiation that impacted positively on generic 
prices. In addition, evidence that generic prices may have been linked to originator 
brand prices in the USA, France and Germany causes increasing reason for concern.
Although generic manufacturers were consistent in entering into the strength 
segment with the largest market share (the DDD market, in these cases) first and 
foremost, their decisions to enter into the other strength segment markets varied, 
which further implies that generic manufacturers market strategically rather than just
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engaging in unbridled price competition across all sub-markets. Where generic 
penetration did occur within strength segment markets, competition amongst 
generics seemed to intensify with generic entry in most markets. In the case of the 
line extension, Paxil CR®, generics were shut out of a third of the molecule market 
because the patent for Paxil CR® had not yet expired. In this case, generic 
manufacturers did not have the opportunity to compete in a large share of the market, 
so were not able to optimize any diversification strategies.
Finally, in addition to Paxil CR®, certain other exogenous factors, such as 
whether the original brand manufacturer applies for the OTC switch in the USA, 
seem capable of significantly undercutting the generics market. In the USA, there 
was evidence that OTC omeprazole acted as both a substitute for prescription 
original brand and prescription generic omeprazole, reaching a 43% market share. 
There was also evidence that after the OTC switch, OTC price decreases were 
associated with generic price decreases, which may have represented an attempt by 
prescription generic manufacturers to prevent health plans from dropping coverage 
of their products.
Thus, it seems that the FDA’s approval of original brand OTC omeprazole 
significantly affected the profitability of many prescription generic omeprazole 
manufacturers. In theory, generic manufacturers could prevent such a loss by pre­
empting the original brand manufacturer’s OTC switch application with their own 
OTC switch application. However, there may be barriers to entry in the USA OTC 
market, such as costly safety studies on OTC use, that discourage generic 
manufacturers from applying. Even if the studies do not discourage generic 
manufacturers from applying, the incentive for a generic manufacturer to apply for 
an OTC switch for a chronic disease medicine may be stymied by the fact that the 
FDA ultimately defers to the original brand manufacturer before approving such a 
switch.
In contrast with the USA, evidence indicates that the OTC omeprazole switch 
may have positively impacted generic omeprazole manufacturers. Firstly, the 
manufacturer that received authorisation to market the OTC omeprazole behind-the- 
counter product was a generic manufacturer. Although this generic manufacturer 
achieved less than a one percent market share, the high price of the OTC omeprazole 
product suggests that it may still have been a profitable endeavour for this generic 
manufacturer. For prescription generic manufacturers, the prescription generic
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market size (in absolute terms) and the prescription generic market share (as a 
percentage of the total molecule market) both increased significantly after the OTC 
switch approval. This indicates that either the OTC switch approval actually 
increased the prescription generic market size by funnelling patients into the 
prescription market, or that the prescription generic market size increased for reasons 
that were unrelated to the OTC switch. Either way, the omeprazole OTC switch in 
the UK did not appear to threaten the profitability of generic manufacturers in the 
omeprazole market the way it did in the USA market.
In conclusion, it seems that generic manufacturers have their own strategies 
that help moderate or altogether eliminate the extent of unbridled price competition. 
A clear pattern of a dominant generic manufacturer emerged in all of these product 
markets, across all countries. For the remaining generic manufacturers, such profit- 
maximizing strategies differ across regulatory environments, and may include 
product differentiation, piggy-backing off original brand prices and strategic entry 
into different strength segments. Moreover, a generic manufacturer in the UK 
attempted to carve out its own niche in the omeprazole market by marketing OTC 
omeprazole. Despite these strategies, there was evidence that in some cases, original 
brand manufacturers’ successful attempts to product differentiate may have 
significantly threatened generic manufacturers, as was the case with Paxil CR® and 
Prilosec OTC in the USA. Thus, countries’ differing regulatory environments 
surrounding generic pricing and reimbursement, and marketing authorization of 
specialised products, may result in the generic industry profiting significantly more 
in some markets than in others.
7.3.3 Implications for Payors: Purchasing Efficiency and Policy 
Recommendations
7.3.3.1 Implications fo r  Generic Purchasing Efficiency on the Supply Side
By focusing on the supply-side determinants of generic prices, policymakers 
could shift the entire range of generic prices downwards, thereby achieving increased 
purchasing efficiency. The econometric model on the determinants of generic prices 
offers insight on some of these levers that policymakers could pull. Specifically, 
evidence that the number of generic companies was not associated with lower 
generic prices in Germany and France casts doubt on whether the generic pricing and 
reimbursement policies during this time period were conducive to competition
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amongst generics. Moreover, the positive relationship between the original brand 
price and generic prices, during a time when the original brand prices actually 
increased (as opposed to the positive relationship indicating simultaneous original 
brand and generic price decreases), also calls into question the competitiveness of the 
generics market.
Meanwhile, although the generics markets in the USA and the UK appear 
more price competitive than in France and Germany, evidence of product 
differentiation driving generic price increases in the USA and the UK suggests a 
need for policies that may further improve generics price competition in these 
markets as well. Finally, the presence of a dominant generic manufacturer that does 
not sell at one of the lowest prices raises a red flag for policymakers in all four study 
countries, especially Germany, where there is a positive association between the 
dominant generic manufacturer’s market share and the rest of the generic prices in 
the molecule market.
7.3.3.1.1 Supply-Side Generic Policy Considerations to Increase Purchasing 
Efficiency
To increase the degree of price competition in generic markets, policymakers 
during this time period had the option to revise their supply-side generic policies in 
the following manner:
• In Germany, the reference price system may have been largely
responsible for an increase in the number of generic manufacturers not 
resulting in lower generics prices. This would be due to the disincentive 
that manufacturers had in lowering prices, and the outcome of generic 
prices floating upwards with original brand pries. The German 
government could have abolished the reference price system in favour of 
freer market incentives, such as allowing distribution chain discounts, 
while implementing a percentage clawback system, as in the UK (see 
Appendix A). Alternatively, the Germany government could have 
devised broader pharmaceutical policies in a way that incentivised lower 
generic prices, such as by retaining the reference price system, but 
deregulating the distribution chain mark-ups to incentivise lower cost 
drug dispensing.
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• In France, abolishing the price capping system in favour of freer market 
incentives could potentially have addressed the anticompetitive signs in 
the generics market. It is not surprising that generic prices increased with 
original brand prices when the price cap was effectively treated by 
generic manufacturers as a percentage price peg. Moreover, since they 
had pegged their prices to the original brand prices, it was also not 
surprising that an increase in the number of generic manufacturers did not 
reduce generic prices.
• Finally, in all four study countries, policymakers may want to address the 
presence of a dominant generic manufacturer that is not price competitive. 
In order to do so, additional information would be needed about what 
factors make the market conducive to the presence of this market power.79
7.3.3.2 Implications fo r  Generics Purchasing Efficiency on the Demand Side
In addition to considering supply-side policy options that influence generic 
prices, policymakers may want to consider demand-side options that improve the 
degree to which the lowest available prices are actually purchased. Findings from 
the study on generic competition show that the USA exhibited the largest range of 
prices in the omeprazole and paroxetine markets, thereby having some of the highest 
and lowest available prices. Meanwhile, the UK exhibited relative low prices, while 
Germany exhibited some of the highest prices and France’s price lied in the middle.
In terms of the actual prices paid by health insurance, Germany had the 
highest prices. The purchased prices in the USA were low in comparison with the 
other countries, although the USA’s high purchased price to lowest price ratios 
reflect relatively weak purchasing efficiency. France had a good purchased price to 
lowest price ratio, although this was more a reflection of the small standard deviation 
of prices than strong purchasing policies. The UK was the one country that exhibited 
strong purchased price to lowest price ratios, as well as low prices in absolute terms.
Regardless of the countries’ differing degrees of demand-side purchasing 
efficiency, there was significant room for increased purchasing efficiency in all four 
study countries, resulting in significant gains to payors. It is important to note that 
the high degree of savings in the USA and Germany reflects both their weaker
79 For further discussion on this, see the Further Research section.
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purchased price to lowest price ratios as well as their larger market size and 
relatively early patent expirations, in comparison with France, which did not 
experience generic entry until later in the study period.
7.3.3.2.1 Demand-Side Generic Policy Considerations to Increase Purchasing 
Efficiency
To increase the degree of purchasing efficiency in generic markets, a number 
of policy options are available, as follows:
• In Germany, the purchased price to lowest price ratios of 1.41 and 1.28 
for omeprazole and paroxetine respectively were likely reflective of fact 
that the reference pricing system set the generic price reimbursement 
equal to the lowest third price in the market. Thus, the calculation of the 
reimbursement price under the reference price system could have been 
revised to reflect the lower prices, for example, by reimbursing the lowest 
price within each strength segment. However, care would need to be 
taken in order to ensure that this didn’t further disincentive generic 
manufacturers from reducing prices, the way research shows it may have 
in Canada (Hollis, 2005), where the reference price was adjusted to the 
lowest price.
• In France, the fact that the price cap acted as a price floor resulted in little 
distribution in prices. In this case, there was less opportunity for 
improved demand-side purchasing policies to achieve cost savings. Thus, 
it would have been necessary to first improve the supply-side policies in 
order to see how effective the demand-side really is within the context of 
Frances’ regulatory schemes.
• The UK seemed relatively successful at achieving demand-side 
purchasing efficiency. One way in which the UK could have improved its 
purchasing efficiency was by changing the equation it used to calculate 
the reimbursed generic price, so that greater weight was given to lower 
available prices. However, care would have needed to be taken so that 
this did not result in a disincentive for all of the generic manufacturers to 
lower prices, as may occur in reference price systems. The UK also could 
have achieved greater purchasing efficiency by increasing the percentage 
of the discount that it claws back from the pharmacies. However, care
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would also need to be taken here in order to ensure that the percentage 
clawback balances the incentive for pharmacists to negotiate lower 
generic prices with the need for improved purchasing efficiency. One 
way to improve this clawback system may be to increase the clawback 
percentage for chain pharmacies since there is speculation that chain 
pharmacies are retaining a larger percentage of their discounts under the 
current system than individual pharmacies (Kanavos, 2007).
• Finally, in the USA, the relatively weak purchased price to lowest price 
ratios may be reflective of pricing transparency problems, or pricing 
accessibility problems, whereby there are preferential arrangements 
between purchasers and manufacturers, pointing at discount practices. 
One policy option toward addressing these pricing ambiguities is that 
greater price transparency be legislated. Again though, care would need 
to be taken in order to ensure that great pricing transparency does not 
result in manufacturers being less willing to offer rebates.
7.3.3.3 Implications fo r  Purchasing Efficiency within Strength Markets
The findings from this study on competition within strength markets show 
that original brand manufacturers apply their marketing harvesting strategy by 
keeping flat or increasing their prices consistently across strength segments. Where 
generic entry occurs in strength segments, evidence shows that increases in the 
number of generic manufacturers and an increase in the original brand to generic 
price ratio are associated with a decrease in the original brand market shares.
Strength segment markets that are less common are also likely to retain larger 
original brand market shares. In most of this study’s molecule markets, an increase 
in the number of generic entrants is associated with a decrease in generic prices 
themselves. Notably, consistent with the findings in the study on competition 
amongst generics, this relationship does not seem to apply to both the omeprazole 
and paroxetine molecule markets in Germany and France, which may be a reflection 
of the anticompetitive effects of Germany’s reference price scheme and France’s 
generic price caps. Regardless of whether additional generic competitors drive down 
generic prices, two constant findings across countries were that there were fewer 
generic entrants in less common strength segments and original brand market shares 
remained higher in these strength segments.
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Savings that would have accrued to the study countries if generic penetration 
within each strength segment market was equal to the strength segment market with 
the highest generic penetration were found to be significant in Chapter 5. These 
estimated savings were conservative estimates since strength segment markets 
without any generic entry were excluded from the analysis on the grounds that the 
patents may not have expired yet in these strength segment markets. Interestingly, in 
the omeprazole market in the USA and the paroxetine market in the UK, increasing 
the generic penetration rate would have actually cost payors more money since the 
original brand prices were lower in these strength segment markets, which, in the 
USA, was reflective of the original brand omeprazole OTC switch. Thus, 
policymakers need to carefully examine the original brand and generic price 
differences before encouraging further generic substitution. Assuming that generic 
prices are in fact lower than original brand prices, policymakers may have 
implemented the following policies.
7.3.3.3.1 Policy Considerations to Increase Generic Penetration within 
Strength Segment Markets
• In order to improve generic penetration rates within strength segments, 
policymakers would first need to ensure that the approval process 
facilitates generic entry into additional strength segments. One way to do 
this may be to allow generic manufacturers to apply for the license to 
market in multiple strengths within only one application fee.
Additionally, where generic manufacturers want to enter into strength 
segments in a step-wise fashion, which would require separate 
applications, regulators could reduce the fees for subsequent applications 
and may want to fast-track this approval process.
• On the demand side, payors may want to mandate or provide financial 
incentives for pharmacists to substitute generics in every strength segment 
where generics exist. By increasing generic penetration, the hope would 
be that an increase in the generic market size would also encourage 
further generic entry.
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7.3.3.4 Nonlinear Pricing and its Implication for Purchasing Efficiency
Evidence from the omeprazole and paroxetine markets in the study countries 
reveals a pattern of nonlinear pricing across strength categories. That is, in some 
cases, products of differing strengths are priced similarly on a per pill basis. In other 
cases, such as in the USA, lower strength products are priced above higher strength 
products, which indicate the possibility of price discrimination. Moreover, the fact 
that the degree of competition differs within strength segment markets suggests that 
these nonlinear prices may in some cases be inflated, rather than the result of 
competitive market forces.
As a result, some health plans in the USA have promoted pill splitting in 
order to save on costs. In addition, individuals may initiate the practice of pill 
splitting in order to save directly on costs if they are uninsured, or to save on the 
costs of co-pays if they are insured. This study modelled the potential cost savings to 
society from splitting pills and found that in certain cases, such as splitting 20mg 
paroxetine in the USA, savings of as much as 6% (representing nearly $6 billion 
dollars) of total paroxetine expenditures were possible. However, in other cases, 
such as splitting 40mg pills instead of purchasing 20mg pills, estimates show that in 
many cases, countries would have actually spent more than the status quo of patients 
purchasing the actual desired dosage. This reveals that despite evidence of nonlinear 
pricing, pill splitting cannot be assumed to be cost saving to society in all cases 
(although it may still be cost saving to patients who face standard monthly co-pays).
7.3.3.4.1 Policy Considerations for Using Pill Splitting Programs to Increase 
Purchasing Efficiency
• Formalised pill splitting programs would require the collaboration of 
physicians, pharmacists and patients in order to ensure safety. First and 
foremost, both physicians and pharmacists would need to have access to 
reliable information on which types of medicines are conducive to safe 
and effective pill splitting programs. Physicians would then need to be 
willing to prescribe in accordance with the scheme (i.e. prescribing half 
the number of pills at twice the desired dosage), where clinically 
appropriate. The next step would be for pharmacists to confirm the safety 
of splitting that pill and to help determine the best way for that patient to 
actually split the pill. Either pharmacists could split the pills themselves
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or they could help educate patients on how they could split pills. This 
would likely require increased pharmacists payments in order to 
compensate them for their time spent pill splitting and/or educating 
patients. Finally, in addition to physicians and pharmacists understanding 
which medications can be safely split, they would also need to understand 
which populations of people are capable of participating in pill splitting 
programs. For example, middle-aged educated people would be more 
likely to successfully split pills themselves than seniors who may not have 
steady hands, clear vision or be in a clear mental state.
• Once these safety measures of engaging physicians and pharmacists are 
put into place, policymakers must carefully study pricing data in order to 
determine which strength market segments would result in savings from 
pill splitting as opposed to increased costs. In addition, policymakers 
would need to ensure that where individuals attempt to engage in the 
practice of pill splitting independently, their individual financial 
incentives are not in contrast with that of the payors’. In other words, it is 
possible that individuals and physicians may collaborate to split pills 
across strengths segments in such a way that patients save on co-pay 
costs, but the health plan pays more. To prevent this purchasing 
inefficiency, health plans could inform physicians and patients that were 
they are engaging in pill splitting schemes, they should notify health plans 
in the event that the health plan may be able to alter the patients’ co-pays
O A
so that patients may save the same amount without pill splitting.
• Finally, another unintended consequence of splitting pills on a large-scale 
basis is that it may incentivize manufacturers to alter their pricing patterns 
so that it’s not beneficial for payors to engage in pill splitting practices. 
Manufacturers’ abilities to respond in this way would depend on how 
competitive the strength segments are, and the extent to which they are 
price setters in the market. Thus, payors would need to be aware of 
manufacturers’ possible responses and would need to carefully monitor
80 Under this scenario, health plans would need to ensure that they are able to detect the occurrence o f  
pill splitting without encouraging new practices o f pill splitting in clinically inappropriate cases.
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the data in order to ensure that overall costs do not increase as a result of 
pill splitting.
7.3.3.5 Line Extensions and their implication fo r  Purchasing Efficiency
The evidence on Paxil CR® shows that where an original brand manufacturer 
has introduced a line-extension of a product shortly before patent expiry, and where 
this line-extension acts as a substitute with the original product, payors may face 
millions of dollars in increased costs on an annual basis. In the case of Paxil CR®, 
the total spending on paroxetine in the USA was as much as 40% higher than it 
would have been, had Paxil CR® not been introduced. In order to justify this degree 
of cost increase, the additional therapeutic benefits of the line-extension product over 
the original product would need to be substantial. While the degree of cost- 
effectiveness my be debatable in some cases, evidence on Paxil CR® suggests that 
this controlled-release version of paroxetine may not be worthy of its price premium, 
which was roughly 3 times its 20mg immediate release substitute.
7.3.3.5.1 Policy Considerations for Preventing the Possible Purchasing 
Inefficiencies o f Line-Extensions
Before automatically covering line-extensions at their available price, 
purchasers in the USA may want to be more discemable about these purchases by 
basing their coverage decisions on cost-effective criteria. This could mean not 
covering Paxil CR® if a comprehensive review of its comparative therapeutic 
benefits shows that it is not therapeutically superior to the immediate release version. 
Alternatively, if there is evidence of this line extension’s therapeutic superiority, then 
payors may want to determine how much more they are willing to pay for this 
marginal benefit and set the price accordingly. During this study period, Paxil CR® 
had only been introduced in the USA. However, were it to receive marketing 
authorisation in these other study countries, the purchasing efficiency implications 
would likely differ than in the case of the USA. In Germany, their reference pricing 
scheme would have only reimbursed this controlled-release line-extension at the 
lowest price of the immediate release version, assuming that policymakers would 
have placed this line-extension product into the same reference price group as its 
immediate release version. However, in this case, policymakers in Germany would 
need to take care that they are not eliminating access to a product if it offers
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therapeutic benefits above its comparators. Under France’s pharmaceutical pricing 
and reimbursement system, the price negotiation agreement between the original 
brand manufacturers and CEPS may be more likely to achieve the balance of 
preserving access while not overpaying, although even in France, the lack of explicit 
cost-effectiveness criteria may hinder this balance from being achieved. The UK is 
the only country in this study where their system of formalised NICE evaluations 
may have resulted in efficient purchasing strategies and unlikely coverage of this line 
extension.
7.3.3.6 The Financial Implications o f  the OTC Omeprazole Switch in the USA 
and the UK
The findings from this study reveal that the original brand version of OTC 
omeprazole in the USA, called Prilosec OTC, competed for market share with the 
prescription original brand and prescription generic omeprazole products. As 
described in the above section on the implication o f an OTC switch for original 
brand manufacturers, the result was that Prilosec OTC had achieved 43% of the 
omeprazole molecule market by the end of this study period. There was also 
evidence of some degree of price competition between the prescription generic 
omeprazole manufacturers and the OTC omeprazole manufacturer, which may have 
reflected generic manufacturers’ attempts to stay on health plans’ lists of covered 
drugs.
In contrast, in the UK, the generic version of OTC omeprazole, called 
Zanprol, achieved less than a one percent market share by the end of this study 
period. In this case, evidence showed that instead of competing with the prescription 
market for omeprazole market share, it is possible that the availability of OTC 
omeprazole as a behind-the-counter product in the UK may have resulted in patients 
funnelling into the prescription market, resulting in an increased overall size of the 
prescription—in particular, the generic—omeprazole market.
On prices, evidence shows that the weighted purchased price for OTC 
omeprazole was significantly lower in the USA than the weighted purchased price 
for prescription original brand or generic omeprazole, although the lowest 
prescription omeprazole generic price was lower than the weighted purchased OTC 
omeprazole price. This indicates that in practice, OTC omeprazole was better value 
than prescription omeprazole for society, although there was potential for the
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prescription generic omeprazole market to be better value than the OTC omeprazole 
market. Moreover, larger package sizes and the mail order distribution channel (in 
comparison with food stores and retail pharmacies) were associated with lower OTC 
omeprazole prices in the USA. In the UK, the weighted purchased OTC omeprazole 
price was more than 50% higher than the weighted purchased prescription generic 
omeprazole price, pointing toward better value for payors in the prescription market 
in this case.
Because the OTC original brand omeprazole market offered better value than 
the prescription generic omeprazole market in the USA, estimates show that an 
increase in the OTC omeprazole market share to 75% would have resulted in a 43% 
cost savings in the USA; in the UK, this scenario would have resulted in a cost 
increase of 29%.
The substantial difference in OTC omeprazole market shares in the USA and 
the UK and the OTC omeprazole price versus prescription omeprazole prices in the 
USA and the UK were likely a result of both regulatory factors and the countries’ 
respective health systems, which resulted in differing financial incentives for 
patients. Below is a list of these regulatory and health care system differences, as 
they related to OTC omeprazole in the USA and the UK:
• OTC omeprazole was approved in the 20mg DDD strength in the USA, 
while it was approved in the lOmg strength in the UK. This approval of a 
lower strength in the UK was part of the MHRA’s intention that the OTC 
omeprazole product only be marketed to patients with relatively less 
severe symptoms that required a short-term omeprazole regime. The 
remainder of patients who needed the prescription on a long-term basis 
were intended to purchase the product under the guidance of a physician 
in the prescription market.
• In order to ensure that patients safely adhere to the OTC omeprazole 
guidelines, OTC omeprazole was approved for behind-the-counter status 
in the UK, which resulted in it only being available for purchase under the 
supervision of pharmacists, in comparison with the general sales OTC 
category, through which OTC medicines may be available in the UK on 
the shelves of pharmacies and food stores (without the supervision of 
pharmacists). In contrast, an OTC product in the USA only has one
244
category, which is the equivalent of the general sales category in the UK. 
As a result, there were no checks and balances on the purchase of OTC 
omeprazole in the USA like there were in the UK, although the USA 
version was also only intended for patients who needed to purchase the 
medicine on a short-term basis. Meanwhile, the USA has its own safety 
measure, whereby actual OTC use studies must be conducted by the 
applicant prior to the OTC approval; the UK does not require such 
studies.
• The FDA allows OTC products to retain the original brand name where 
the original brand manufacturer has marketed or licensed the marketing 
for the product. In the UK, the MHRA stipulates that the product be 
marketed under a different name than the prescription version, regardless 
of whether the manufacturer is the original brand or a generic 
manufacturer. As a result, patients in the UK may be less likely to know 
that the product is available OTC.
• In lieu of conducting the OTC omeprazole actual use studies in the USA, 
the original brand manufacturer of OTC omeprazole was granted a three- 
year exclusivity period in the USA, during which manufacturers were not 
permitted to enter the market. The generic manufacturer of OTC 
omeprazole in the UK was not granted an exclusivity period, although 
regulations stipulated that any information used from its application not 
be used in the event of applications from other manufacturers, which may 
have discouraged entry to some degree.
• Patients in the USA had larger financial incentives to purchase 
omeprazole OTC than patients in the UK. This was due to the fact that a 
larger percentage of the population in the USA faced prescription co­
payments as well as the roughly 15 percent uninsured population in the 
USA, the delisting of omeprazole by some health plans in the USA and 
high indirect costs to obtaining prescription medications in the USA, such 
as physician office co-payments.
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7.3.3.6.1 Policy Considerations for Using the OTC Omeprazole Switches to 
Increase Purchasing Efficiency in the USA and the UK
In line with the findings from this study and the above regulatory differences, 
policymakers may want to consider the following measures:
• Given the lower weighted purchased prices in the OTC omeprazole 
market than the prescription market in the USA during this time period, 
payors could have increased purchasing efficiency by adding OTC 
omeprazole to its list of covered benefits, similarly to the way Arkansas 
State Employee Benefits Division did. Notably, this study found that by 
shifting ten percent of the total omeprazole market from prescription 
generic omeprazole to OTC omeprazole, and by introducing a copayment 
for OTC omeprazole, both third party purchasers and patients could have 
realized cost savings (since, for patients in the US A, the indirect costs of 
obtaining an OTC medicine are significantly lower than those of 
obtaining a prescription medicine), which, in turn, would increase access 
for patients who faced delisting of prescription omeprazole, but could not 
afford OTC omeprazole. An increase in OTC omeprazole coverage could 
therefore result in increased utilization. While this increase in benefits 
(e.g. improved health for GERD patients) from increased access would 
likely justify the increased costs (i.e. would be an example of purchasing 
efficiency), health plans in the USA would still have the option of 
offsetting these higher costs by shifting an even larger share of the 
prescription market to the OTC market.
• In addition to discussing the financial implication of purchasers in the 
USA shifting prescription patients to the OTC omeprazole product, it is 
critical that the safety of such a switch be considered. While the FDA 
may have intended for OTC omeprazole to only be used by patients on a 
short-term basis, evidence shows that in practice, patients who take 
omeprazole on a long-term basis may have switched from the prescription 
market to the OTC market. At the outset, this may appear to threaten the 
safety of these patients. However, an actual OTC omeprazole use study 
in the USA clearly showed that patients were capable of determining 
when to consult with a physician. Thus, it may be that patients who
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switched from prescription omeprazole to OTC omeprazole were still 
receiving guidance from their physicians on the use of omeprazole, 
despite no longer receiving prescriptions. If this were not the case, then 
health plans may want to devise a mechanism to ensure that patients who 
purchase OTC omeprazole visit their physicians (such as receiving proof 
that the patient has visited his/her physician every year) before continuing 
to cover the OTC version.
•  On another safety note, evidence that a significant percentage of health 
plans in the USA dropped omeprazole from their list of covered benefits 
suggests that some health plans may have been ignoring the FDA’s safety 
guidelines that OTC omeprazole be used on a short-term basis. On this 
note, the FDA may want to clarify whether they view long-term use of 
OTC omeprazole as safe, under the assumption that patients are still 
capable of eliciting guidance from their physicians when clinical 
necessary. If the FDA does not take this position, then the financial 
incentives that encouraged (if not forced) patients to switch from the 
prescription to the OTC omeprazole may threaten their health, in which 
case the USA legislature may want to consider passing a law that makes it 
illegal to drop coverage of a chronic disease medicine that has been 
approved for both prescription and OTC use for different populations of 
patients.
• Although the OTC omeprazole weighted purchased price was lower than 
the prescription omeprazole weighted purchased prices in the USA, 
purchasers in the USA would likely have faced even lower OTC 
omeprazole prices if generic manufacturers had been permitted to enter 
the market shortly after the original brand OTC entry. On the other side 
of the coin, the OTC marketing exclusivity period may serve as fair 
compensation for the actual use studies that the applicants are required to 
perform. Thus, the FDA may want to reconsider whether the length of 
the marketing exclusivity period could be shortened in order to encourage 
quicker price competition within the OTC market, while still offering 
some degree of compensation for costs incurred by the first applicant.
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• In addition, to encourage health plans and generic manufacturers in the 
USA to incur the necessary costs involved with applying for an OTC 
switch, the FDA may want to reconsider whether the ultimate decision 
should continue to lie with the original brand manufacturer. It is difficult 
to imagine that actual use studies that are performed by health plans or 
generic manufacturers would be of lesser quality than actual use studies 
performed by the original brand, which, in theory, should provide all of 
the necessary safety information to the FDA for consideration of such a 
switch. Thus, it seems unlikely that the original brand manufacturer 
needs to consent in order to ensure safety.
• In contrast to the OTC omeprazole switch in the USA, such a shift in 
coverage from the generic prescription omeprazole market to the OTC 
omeprazole market in the UK would have resulted in cost increases to 
both purchasers and patients, so would not have improved purchasing 
efficiency.
• In a recent survey, pharmacists in the UK cited the “excessive cost” of 
OTC omeprazole as a problem (Stewart, 2007). This is consistent with 
the findings and analyses in this study, which clearly shows that the OTC 
omeprazole prices are very high, in comparison with the costs patients 
face in the prescription market. In order to ensure that OTC (behind-the- 
counter) omeprazole is accessible to the population of patients in the UK 
that the MHRA intended, policymakers need to make the price more 
affordable to patients. Supply-side policies could include making the 
behind-the-counter market more attractive to manufacturers by allowing 
them to promote their products. In 2003, the MHRA did take steps 
toward allowing OTC products treating a greater range of disease areas, 
including serious gastrointestinal diseases, to be advertised to the public 
(MHRA, 2003). In addition, the MHRA may want to consider allowing 
original brand manufacturers to market the product on their brand name 
so that patients are more aware of the OTC product availability, thereby 
creating a bigger market and incentivizing more manufacturers to enter 
into the market.
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• In addition, the NHS may want to consider actually covering the cost of 
these chronic disease OTC medicines on a long-term basis, as long as the 
pharmacists have documented that the patients are receiving guidance 
from them and their physicians. Such a measure would require that the 
MHRA clarify whether they perceive the long-term purchase of OTC 
medicines to be safe for relatively lower risk patients, as long as 
pharmacists act as a source for consultation and patients continue to 
receive guidance from their physicians. Continuing to allow only the 
lOmg product to be available OTC may serve as a good filtering 
mechanism where the lower risk patients retain the ability to self- 
medicate Such a decision would allow relatively low risk patients to 
manage their own symptoms while funnelling higher risk patients (who 
require higher dosages) into the prescription market.
• Finally, given the studies on OTC omeprazole actual use safety in the 
USA, the UK may want to reconsider whether switching OTC 
omeprazole to the general sales category would be safe. It so, then this 
measure would likely make the product more accessible for patients.
7.3.4 Physicians and Pharmacists: Their role in Improving Purchasing 
Efficiency within Molecule Markets
The studies in this dissertation have focused on the supply side determinants 
of competition within molecule markets. However, policy considerations must take 
into account the role of physicians and pharmacists, who act as the proxy demand 
side by prescribing, guiding and dispensing medications for patients. The above 
discussion alludes to the importance of physicians’ and pharmacists’ involvement 
with improving purchasing efficiency. A comprehensive analysis on the influences 
and roles of physicians and pharmacists could easily lend itself to its own 
dissertation. However, without their participation, the above schemes could not be 
successfully implemented. Thus, it is worth briefly considering the ways in which 
these policy considerations require buy-in from physicians and pharmacists.
7.3.4.1 Physicians
• On improving generic penetration within strength segments, physicians 
must be willing to prescribe by the generic name in countries such as the
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UK, where pharmacists are not allowed to substitute generics for brand 
name prescriptions. In countries where generic substitution is permitted, 
such as the USA (as o f the 1980s) and France and Germany (in more 
recent years), physicians must be willing to allow generic substitution to 
occur by not overriding such practices (by writing dispense as written, 
etc.).
• On prescribing line-extensions, such as Paxil CR® over the immediate 
release version, it is crucial that physicians have updated knowledge on 
the extent to which these follow-on products really offer improved health 
outcomes. Guidelines, such as those issued by NICE, may help assist 
physicians in determining the cost-effectiveness of prescribing such 
follow-on products to different populations of patients.
• On.pill splitting programs, physicians must have knowledge of which 
medications may be split and which patients are capable of splitting the 
medications themselves versus needing assistance. Where pill splitting is 
deemed to be safe and effective, physicians must be willing to prescribe 
patients twice the desired dosage at half volume (i.e. one month supply of 
20mg paroxetine instead of two months supply of lOmg paroxetine).
• On the prescription to OTC switch, physicians must be knowledgeable on 
which medications are available over-the-counter and which populations 
of patients are suitable for this OTC market. They must then keep 
updated records of which patients have switched from prescription to 
OTC medications and should initiate periodic appointments with these 
patients in order to ensure that they continue to receive appropriate 
guidance. They should also communicate with patients during well-visits 
or any sick visits, regarding whether the patient has initiated taking an 
OTC medication, and if so, whether a prescription version may be more 
effective.
7.3.4.2 Pharmacists
• On purchasing some of the lowest priced generic medications (within a 
molecule), the role of pharmacists is instrumental. Pricing and 
reimbursement policies must be consistent with the incentives that 
pharmacists face in dispensing medications. First and foremost,
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pharmacists must have the incentive to contract with the lowest price 
generic manufacturers. Germany and France have moved toward these 
policy goals in recent years by progressively tiering mark-ups allowances. 
However, these may still result in pharmacists receiving higher margins 
for higher priced medications in some cases. Thus, it may make more 
sense for Germany and France to deregulate the distribution chain mark­
ups. Alternatively, it may prove effective to allow pharmacists set mark­
up amounts for different ranges of prices, rather than percentage mark­
ups, although these set-amounts would need to be carefully determined so 
that pharmacists overall fees are not reduced.
• Regarding the dispensing of their lowest priced generics, pharmacists 
must either be neutral in which generic they dispense, thereby allowing 
the payor to determine which generic is dispensed, or they must be given 
the financial incentive to dispense the lowest priced generic that they 
stock. Thus, payors may want to act more deliberately and directly by 
either requiring pharmacists to dispense one of the lowest priced 
medications or by providing pharmacists with higher dispensing fees for 
dispensing lower priced generics, similarly to the way payors in the USA 
sometimes offer pharmacists higher dispensing fees for dispensing a 
generic over a brand name.
• On improving genericisation within strength segments, policymakers may 
want to ensure that pharmacists dispense generics over original brand 
consistently across strength segments. In order to accomplish this, it is 
first important to ensure that pharmacists stock at least one generic for 
each available strength in the market. Higher dispensing fees for 
generics, as discussed above, may help to provide this incentive.
• On pill splitting, the role of pharmacists in ensuring safety for patients is 
crucial. Because pill splitters are likely to be purchased at pharmacists, 
they have the ability to counsel patients when they are making such 
purchases in order to ensure that the practice is safe. In addition, where 
medications may be safely split, but where certain populations are not 
capable of splitting them, it may be beneficial for pharmacists to split the 
medications. All of these practices would require additional time on
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behalf of pharmacists, both in terms of speaking with patients, 
communicating back to physicians and at times, splitting the pills 
themselves. Thus, payors would need to offer increased compensation to 
pharmacists, which could come from a portion of the savings that they 
reap from such practices.
• The role of pharmacists in patients purchasing medications over-the- 
counter is also instrumental. In the case of the behind-the-counter 
category in the UK, they are at the forefront of ensuring that patients’ 
purchases are appropriate and safe. In this way, they act as gatekeepers to 
behind-the-counter OTC medications in the UK, making them capable of 
determining the extent to which patients are correctly following the 
guidelines (by asking patients questions at the point of purchase) and by 
assessing the extent to which patients turn away from purchasing the 
product once they learn of the price. Surveys, such as the one recently 
conducted in the UK, demonstrate that pharmacists have their fingers on 
the pulse of issues around access, safety and prices of OTC chronic 
disease medications in the UK. Thus, it is crucial that policymakers defer 
to pharmacists on the issues and challenges associated with patients 
appropriately accessing this behind-the-counter category of medications.
• On the issue of general sales OTC medication in the USA, the role of 
pharmacists remains important, despite their involvement not being as 
direct as in the case of behind-the-counter medications in the UK. Given 
that a large percentage of patients in the USA likely purchase their OTC 
medications from retail pharmacies (65% in the case of OTC omeprazole 
in the USA in 2004), they may still defer to pharmacists with questions. 
Thus, pharmacists may still play a role in ensuring that OTC chronic 
disease medications are safely purchased in the USA as well as the UK.
7.3.5 Patients
7.3.5.1 Access
In the pursuit of purchasing efficiency, access for patients should remain the 
number one public health priority. This study focuses on purchasing efficiency 
within molecule markets by assessing the determinants of competition amongst
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manufacturers, which drives prices, and by measuring the extent to which payors 
actually purchase at the lowest prices. It then considers the possible cost savings that 
could result from substituting the less expensive products for the more expensive 
products, such as by 1) substituting original brand products with generic products 
within strength categories, 2) substituting higher priced generics with lower priced 
generics, 3) substituting lower strength pills with higher strength pills that are 
cheaper per daily defined dosage and may be safely split, 4) substituting Paxil CR® 
with 20mg paroxetine immediate release and 5) substituting prescription omeprazole 
with OTC omeprazole in the USA. In nearly all of these cases, the exact same 
molecule is being substituted, which results in the patients receiving the same 
therapeutic benefit. The only case in which there is a slight altercation of the 
molecule being substituted is the case of Paxil CR®. The policy considerations 
above therefore acknowledge that to the extent that Paxil CR® is therapeutically 
superior to the immediate release version, patients’ access to this product should be 
preserved, when clinically necessary. In this case, instead of substituting the 20mg 
immediate release version, purchasing efficiency should be achieved through 
reimbursement mechanisms that link the price to the relative therapeutic benefit.
Thus, under this set of policy considerations, patients should retain the same 
degree of access to the medications they were already purchasing during this study 
period. Moreover, certain policy considerations, such as payors adding OTC 
omeprazole to their list of benefits could improve patients’ access, thereby increasing 
utilization and total public health benefits. Patients using pill splitting as a 
mechanism to reduce their copayments also has the potential to increase access to the 
degree that these medications become more affordable, thereby increasing 
prescription fill rates, etc.
7.3.5.2 Safety
In assessing the effect that the above policy options have on patients, there is 
another dimension, in addition to access, that must be considered, that of safety. 
While the volume and type of medicine that patients are consuming is not changing, 
the way in which they consume these medications does change in certain instances.
In the case of substituting prescription original brand drugs with generics or in 
substituting higher priced generics with lower priced generics, there are no safety 
issues (assuming good manufacturing practice for generics). However, in the case of
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pill splitting and purchasing OTC products, safety is called into question. The
studies and policy considerations above discuss these safety issues in depth. To
summarize, on the issue of pill splitting, certain medications may be safely and
effectively split, while other medications may not. It is therefore crucial that payors,
physicians, pharmacists and patients all be aware of which medications may be
safely split and that there is open communication between these stakeholders during
the process of pill splitting in order to ensure checks and balances. In addition,
certain populations, such as middle-aged, educated individuals are more capable of
successfully splitting pills, while other populations, such as the elderly, are not. It is
therefore also crucial that pill splitting programs only require the participation of
individuals who are capable (of participating), and that where individuals are not, the
pills be split for them (e.g. by pharmacists).
In addition to pill splitting, safety issues also lie at the forefront of patients
purchasing OTC medications, especially in the case of patients purchasing chronic
disease medications on a long term basis, as seems to be the case with OTC
omeprazole in the USA. The instructions label on Prilosec OTC read:
Do not use for more than 14 days unless directed by your doctor.
Repeated 14-Day Courses (if needed): You may repeat a 14-day 
course every 4 months. Do not take for more than 14 days or more 
often than every 4 months unless directed by a doctor. (CVS 
Omeprazole OTC)
Thus, under the assumption that the FDA had to approve this label, it seems 
that patients’ long-term use of OTC omeprazole is in fact consistent with the FDA’s 
safety guidelines, as long as patients are still under the supervision of their doctors. 
And, since OTC omeprazole actual use studies show that patients are capable of 
determining when they need to see a doctor, this study further assumes that switching 
a percentage of patients from prescription to OTC omeprazole is also consistent with 
the safety guidelines.
The safety of OTC omeprazole is less in question in the UK, where evidence 
of OTC omeprazole not even achieving a one percent market share suggests that 
there was likely little use of OTC omeprazole on a long-term basis. Moreover, the 
relatively high price of OTC omeprazole means that a shift from the prescription 
omeprazole market to the OTC omeprazole market would not have increased 
purchasing efficiency (but rather would have been inefficient). However, to the 
extent that the price of OTC omeprazole was to decrease in the future, it seems that
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pharmacists could guide a larger number of low-risk patients on the safe 
consumption of OTC omeprazole (Stewart et al, 2007). Finally, another point to 
consider is that while access to omeprazole in the UK is not hindered by high OTC 
omeprazole prices (because the NHS continues to cover all available strengths of 
prescription omeprazole), the extent to which a certain population of low-risk, 
capable patients may safely become responsible for their own self-care is hampered. 
To this end, as long as the consumption of OTC omeprazole is safe and access for 
patients is not threatened, the UK may want to alter the economic incentives so that 
the low-risk population that OTC omeprazole was intended to reach is able to 
become more responsible for their own medication.
7.3.6 In conclusion
The above discussion offers insight into policies that may be considered, in 
the interest of purchasing efficiency, while keeping in mind the role of physicians 
and pharmacists as well as issues of access and safety for patients. What this 
discussion does not give strong consideration to, however, is the effect that these 
policies may have on the pharmaceutical industry. The beginning of this stakeholder 
analysis discusses these studies’ findings in light of the incentives original brand and 
generic manufacturers may face in their pursuit of profit. On one side of the coin, 
policies that seek to increase purchasing efficiency may reduce costs for payors. 
However, on the other side of the coin, these same policies may threaten the profit of 
original brand and generic manufacturers. And, while some degree of profit 
trimming may be equitable to the health system at large, replacing manufacturers’ 
abilities to profit with markets of unbridled price competition may not be in the best 
interest of society to the extent that they do not allow for a viable pharmaceutical 
industry. Thus, policymakers may want to strive for a balance, whereby 
manufacturers can safely cover their costs and profit enough to invest in other 
pipelines, while payors may purchase more efficiently than they do today. This 
balance is likely to be more of an art than a science, which must take into 
consideration aspects such as the political environment of the pharmaceutical 
industry within countries, these countries’ abilities to sustain a profitable 
pharmaceutical industry, while at the same time ensuring fair prices.
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7.4 Limitations
IMS Health data is commonly considered to be the golden standard for 
pharmaceutical market research due to its large sample size and internal validations, 
as well as the fact that it is the only comprehensive pharmaceutical market data 
available across countries. While some countries have national sources of data, 
certain countries, such as the USA, do not have any other source of national level 
data. Indeed, most of the data limitations that are involved in research that is 
conducted with IMS Health data pertains more so to the extent to which researchers 
have access to IMS Health’s full dataset, rather than to the nature of the data itself. 
This is because IMS Data can be very costly and therefore difficult to obtain. 
Nevertheless, IMS Health data is not without its imperfections.
The first limitation to IMS Health data is that it does not capture the effect of 
discounts off of retail prices. In Germany, France and the UK, discounts primarily 
occur within the distribution chain, so have a limited affect on the retail purchased 
prices. However, in the USA, discounts are often negotiated between the 
manufacturer and the purchaser in the form of rebates. Information on these rebates 
is proprietary in nature, so is not available to the public or researchers. The only 
body with full information on these rebate levels is the federal government, which 
requires that information on rebates be submitted by manufacturers in order to ensure 
that Medicaid is in fact receiving the best price. However, because research shows 
that discounts operate horizontally across products and presentations, rebates are 
unlikely to bias these studies’ findings on the factors influencing pharmaceutical 
competition (Kanavos and Taylor, 2007; Kanavos, 2007). Rather, the likely effect of 
rebates in the USA is that the actual prices may be lower than data reveals. 
Consequently, a comparison of prices across countries may render somewhat inflated 
USA prices. However, in the study on competition amongst generics, the USA 
appears to purchase at some of the lowest prices, even before rebates have been taken 
into account. As a result, this study’s analyses on how generic prices compare across 
countries is unlikely to be affected by the lack of rebate data.
The one case that may be affected by the lack of information on rebates in the 
USA is the OTC omeprazole case. Rebates occur in the prescription market as a 
result of payors’ abilities to leverage their purchasing power. However, they do not 
occur in the over-the-counter retail market due to the fact that people are responsible
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for purchasing these medicines on an individual basis. Thus, the comparison 
between the prescription original brand, prescription generic and OTC omeprazole 
prices may slightly overstate the price differences between the OTC and prescription 
markets in the USA. Nevertheless, the fact that the prescription omeprazole was 
higher priced than OTC omeprazole in the USA was still likely to be the case since 
prescription purchased prices were roughly four times the OTC purchased prices, 
which was much larger than the estimated two to thirty five percent range of rebates 
(Report to the President, 2000).
The second limitation to this data is that some of the generic manufacturers in 
the UK cannot be distinguished due to an agreement that was made between the 
generic manufacturers’ association and IMS Health. As a result, the number of 
generics manufacturers variable and the dominant generic manufacturer’s market 
share variable were not able to be calculated in the case of the UK. Consequently, 
this study used the time variable in order to capture any time-related changes in the 
market, including the change in the number of generic manufacturers. Notably, the 
dataset for the UK still included all of the presentations that were purchased, so did 
not exclude any market data in the process of omitting the names of some generic 
manufacturers. As a result, none of the other calculated variables in the UK should 
have been affected.
In addition to data limitations, another limitation is that the country-specific- 
regulations such as their generic reimbursement systems and their distribution chain 
mark-up regulations on pharmaceutical competition cannot be quantified due to their 
time-invariant nature. In the case on competition amongst generics, the cumulative 
effect of countries’ regulations and other unobservable factors can be seen in their 
differing explanatory variables’ intercepts. However, in the case of competition 
within strength categories, the regulatory effects have been implicitly controlled for 
with the fixed-effects method. As a result, the analyses on the effect of these 
countries’ regulatory differences are conjecturing in nature (based on these findings 
and other existing literature) and cannot be considered to be reflective of actual 
causes and effects.
A final limitation is the small number of products in these studies. In the case 
of the OTC omeprazole analysis, this study only had access to data for one product, 
which was only available over a small number of years. This limited the degree to 
which rigorous econometric models could be run, especially in the UK where there
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was only one distribution channel, in comparison to the USA’s multiple distribution 
channels. However, in an era where regulatory bodies are increasingly approving 
chronic disease medicines for dual status (prescription and OTC) availability, it is 
crucial that a body of literature be built around the implications of such a switch.
This study therefore derives its value from its pioneering nature and its keen policy 
significance, despite being limited in data. Moreover, the selection of a small 
number of products in the other studies have enabled a more in-depth analysis, which 
leads to a more sophisticated understanding of issues such as the range of generic 
prices within countries and the order of generic entry into strength markets. With the 
small number of products in these studies, these analyses are more case-based in 
nature, and are therefore able to generate new hypotheses on dimensions of 
competition that have never before been studied. It may also be that findings are 
generalisable to other classes of drugs that are sold primarily in the retail market and 
treat chronic conditions.
7.5 Areas for Further Research
Exploration begets unto itself the need for more exploration. During the 
process of this thesis, many questions arose which lend themselves to areas of further 
research. Below is a discussion of these areas.
7.5.1 Dominance amongst Generic Manufacturers
The case on competition amongst generics reveals the existence of a 
dominant generic manufacturer in both molecules and across all four study countries. 
In all cases, dominant generic manufacturers did not offer the lowest priced generics, 
nor were they the first generic entrant. Thus, it would be interesting to conduct 
further research into the factors that determine which manufacturers are able to 
achieve this dominant role. In the USA and the UK, where there are large chain 
pharmacies, it may be whichever generic manufacturer achieves these nationwide 
contracts. It may also reflect large chain pharmacies vertically integrating with 
wholesalers and producing their own generic products. However, France and 
Germany do not have the same degree of concentration in their retail pharmacy 
network, suggesting that it may be some other factor besides achieving contracts with 
large chain pharmacies.
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Another potential explanation for this preferential contracting may be that 
larger generic manufacturers have stronger contractual relationships with 
pharmacies, thereby biasing pharmacies toward them even if their generic prices are 
not the lowest. The study on competition amongst generics did not have data on the 
size of each generic company in each country during each respective quarter during 
this study period, so could not measure this effect. However, after requesting this 
information from IMS Health, I received the following graphs via email (from IMS 
Health). They indicate the strong likelihood that the size of the generic manufacturer 
may be one of the determinants of the generic market share a generic manufacturer is 
able to achieve after it has entered into the market. In Figures 7-1 and 7-2, IMS 
Health plotted the relationship between generic manufacturers’ total generic sales in 
Germany in 2005 (a proxy for the size of the manufacturer) on the x-axis against the 
manufacturers generic market share for the given molecule on the y-axis. (IMS 
Health did not disclose how market shares were calculated in these graphs.)
Figure 7-1 Generic Manufacturers’ Total Generic Sales in Germany versus 
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Figure 7-2 Generic Manufacturers’ Total Generic Sales in Germany versus 
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The evidence of such a strong relationship supports the assertion that the size 
of the generic manufacturer may be a strong determinant of its market share. Thus, it 
would be interesting to obtain full information on the size of the generic 
manufacturers in these study countries over time in order to quantify the extent to 
which these determines the dominant generic manufacturer’s market share. Evidence 
of such a determinant may suggest stickiness in the distribution chain contractual 
process that inhibits competition. Furthermore, evidence on the role of wholesalers 
would need to be incorporated into this analysis on the determinants of the dominant 
manufacturer’s market share.
7.5.2 The Determinants o f  the Number o f  Strength and the Respective 
Market Shares
In order to better understand the nature of segmented strength markets and 
their effect on competition within the broader molecule market, it would be 
worthwhile to gain a greater understanding on the degree to which strength segments 
are formed as a result of clinical need and prescribing practices versus
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manufacturers’ attempts to product differentiate. This information, however, would 
be difficult to obtain quantitatively. Instead, it would likely require original 
qualitative research in the study countries, including surveying original brand 
manufactures on their decisions to enter into different strength segment markets 
across countries, as well as surveying physicians on the practice of prescribing 
differing strengths. As part of this, it would be particularly interesting to determine 
whether it is more or less difficult for original brand manufacturers to receive 
approval and health insurance coverage (as well as to be able to freely set prices 
across different strength categories) for various strengths in some countries over 
others, especially in the case of France, where the pricing process following 
approvals appears somewhat less transparent than in the other study countries. 
Informally, I spoke about this issue on what determines the number of strengths in a 
molecule market with a few contacts from Merck who work in France. They, 
however, were not knowledgeable on the subject and referred to possible marketing 
differences across countries (with physicians) as being the explanation for countries’ 
differing strengths and strength market share.
7.5.5 An OTC Switch Case in the USA and the UK where the Product is 
Available in the General Sales Category in the UK
In addition to researching the OTC omeprazole switch in the USA and the 
UK, it would be interesting to research the economic implications of a switch in the 
USA and the UK where the MHRA has approved the product for general sales status 
instead of behind-the-counter status. Notably, patients’ financial incentives would 
still differ in the USA and the UK due to the countries’ differing health care systems. 
However, such a case would provide a more apples to apples comparison with OTC 
availability in the USA on a regulatory level in terms of patients not having to go 
through a pharmacist to obtain access. This study did not have access to data for a 
product that fulfils these criteria. However, an example of one such product is 
loratadine, which is available over-the counter in the USA and both behind-the- 
counter (in larger package sizes) and as general sales (in smaller package sizes) in 
the UK.
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7.5.4 Other Types of Product Differentiation within a Molecule Market
The cases in this thesis analyse the effect of product differentiation on 
purchasing efficiency. An addition type of product differentiation that is not 
included in these analyses as a result of not existing in the omeprazole and 
paroxetine retail molecule markets is form. That is, some molecules are available in 
the retail pharmacy market in the form of pills, liquids, creams, nasal inhalers, etc. 
Studying the effect that this type of product differentiation has on purchasing 
efficiency within a molecule would be another interesting dimension of competition 
to explore.
7.5.5 Competition within a Therapeutic Class
These studies contribute to the literature by delving into pharmaceutical 
competition within the molecule market. However, it would also be interesting to 
research competition within the broader therapeutic market. There is already a body 
of literature that has studied the degree of competition between in-patent drugs. 
Specifically, these studies have found that despite entry of competing drugs (i.e. me- 
too drugs), first entrant (i.e. breakthrough drugs) prices continued to increase in real 
terms (CBO, 1998). Meanwhile, me-too drugs tend to enter at prices lower than the 
first entrant into the therapeutic class; however, once they gain brand recognition, 
they increase their prices substantially, usually at rates that far surpass the price 
increases of breakthrough drugs (Lu and Comanor, 1998). Thus, competition at the 
therapeutic class level is characterized by product differentiation in the form of 
quality and branding (Kanavos, Costa-Font and McGuire, 2007). The result is that 
both prices and therapeutic efficacy (i.e. quality) must be taken into account in this 
model of competition. Moreover, in order to differentiate their products in the 
therapeutic market, firms also heavily invest in promotional spending. Promotional 
spending is therefore a significant factor that should also be taken into account when 
analyzing competition in this third sphere (Danzon and Chao, 2000).
This above literature models competition between two patented molecules 
within a therapeutic class. However, to date, no studies have analyzed the degree of 
competition between off-patented drugs and patented drugs in the same therapeutic 
class. If generic entry causes patients to switch from a patented drug of one 
molecule to generic drugs of another molecule, then this may be another way in
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which generic entry reduces costs (in addition to reducing the expenditures on that 
molecule itself).81 This could be the case in Germany, where, under their new 
therapeutic reference pricing scheme, certain drugs of differing molecules have been 
classified into the same reference pricing group. Studying competition between off- 
patent drugs and in-patent drugs of differing molecule would also be interesting in 
the case of the OTC omeprazole switch in the USA, where some patients may have 
switched to a different PPI after their health plan delisted omeprazole in order to 
avoid the OTC omeprazole costs. Thus, it could be that an OTC switch for one drug 
actually caused a competing patented drug to gain market share. It is important to 
note, however, that similarly to the scenario of studying competition between in­
patent molecules, discussions on the purchasing efficiency implications of 
competition between off-patent and in-patent drugs within a therapeutic class would 
need to account for these molecules’ quality differences, possibly through methods 
of cost-effectiveness analyses.
7.5.6 Assessing the Effects o f the Most Recent Regulatory and Market 
Changes in these Study Countries
These studies had access to data during the 2000ql-2005ql period. Thus, in 
some of these study countries, there have been significant pharmaceutical policy 
changes since this study period. As the methodology chapter discusses in more 
detail, Germany introduced a therapeutic reference pricing scheme for certain 
molecules in 2005ql. In addition, France introduced a molecule-level referencing 
pricing scheme in 2003, although omeprazole and paroxetine were not included in it. 
The effect of France’s reference pricing system may be similar to Germany’s 
molecule-level reference pricing system that is reflected in these studies, although 
this depends on the extent to which other regulations such as distribution chain mark­
ups influenced price competition as well. In Germany, the therapeutic reference 
system may not have had a significant effect on the price of omeprazole since it was 
the first drug in its class, and therefore probably the lowest price in the PPI 
therapeutic class, making it the reference price setter. However, for paroxetine, since 
it was not the first in its class, the introduction of the therapeutic reference price 
system may have resulted in lower paroxetine prices. The effect of the therapeutic
81 While the implication o f substitution away from patented molecules could imply lower costs for 
payors, it could also imply less ability for manufacturers to recoup R & D costs.
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reference pricing system would also depend on the way in which the prices were 
calculated and the degree of standardization across different strengths and molecules.
In addition to assessing the effects of the recent policy changes, it would also 
be interesting to study the effects of recent market changes. For example, generic 
versions of omeprazole OTC were approved for marketing by the FDA and the 
MHRA in 2008. Thus, it would be interesting to analyse the degree of price and 
market share competition amongst OTC omeprazole products.
7.5.7 A Qualitative Analyses on the Industrial Organization o f Competition 
Within Molecule Markets
The methodology chapter and the studies themselves relate models of 
industrial organization to the relevant dimensions of competition between these off- 
patent products. Specifically, under the assumption that generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers do not face increasing marginal costs of production, the study on 
competition amongst generics assumes a Bertrand-like model of competition, where 
generic manufactures engage in a form of price competition that is diluted by product 
differentiation and other bottlenecks in the market, including regulations. In the case 
of competition between the original brand and generic manufacturers within strength 
segments of a molecule, this study assumes a Market Harvesting/Experience Goods 
model of market share competition, whereby the original brand manufacturers keep 
flat (or increase) their relatively high prices and accept that they will retain the brand 
loyal segment of the market, while forgoing the price sensitive portion of the market 
to generics. Finally, the case on competition between the prescription and OTC 
market segments of a molecule researches the extent to which competition may be 
partially based on price (where there is evidence that some degree of market share 
competition does exist), which may reflect Bertrand-like competition.
In conclusion, these cases test for the nature and degree of competition 
between differing segments of a molecule market under the assumption that while 
competition between the original brand and generics may resemble a Market 
Harvesting/Experience Goods model, competition amongst generics is more likely to 
resemble a Bertrand model. In these cases, results from quantitative analyses are 
used to generate hypotheses on the way in which manufacturers of the same 
molecule compete—i.e. on the industrial organization of these dimensions of 
competition. It would therefore be interesting to conduct a more thorough analysis
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on the industrial organization of these types of competition by surveying strategists 
who work for a wide range of pharmaceutical manufacturers across a number of 
countries on the extent to which they predetermine how much they want to sell and 
set their prices accordingly (resembling Cournot competition), despite facing fairly 
flat marginal costs of production, versus the extent to which they strive for the 
highest market share possible by basing their prices on other competitive prices in 
the market (resembling Bertrand competition). This qualitative information could 
then add to the quantitative findings from these studies to generate entirely new 
industrial organization theories, to the extent that the pharmaceutical industry does 
not conform to these existing theoretical models.
7.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, findings from this thesis show that competition within the off- 
patent omeprazole and paroxetine molecule markets exists at a micro-level in these 
study countries. Despite products appearing homogeneous in nature, manufacturers 
are able to prevent Bertrand competition by maximizing their prices in certain 
regulatory environments, such as reference pricing in Germany and price caps in 
France. In regulatory environments that are relatively free market oriented, such as 
the US and the UK, a larger degree of price competition exists. However, even in 
these environments, evidence shows that generic manufacturers are able to 
differentiate their products by altering strength, formulation, package sizes and in 
some cases, by receiving approval to market their products over-the-counter.
In addition, evidence shows that original brand manufacturers may retain a 
larger degree of market power than the passive market harvesting strategy suggests. 
In all four study countries, they benefit from locating their products in less common 
strength markets, where there appears to be less competition from generics. In 
certain cases, the original brand manufacturer may also be able to retain a large share 
of the molecule market post patent expiry by marketing their drug OTC or 
introducing a line-extension.
The effect of these regulations and product differentiation strategies is that 
off-patent molecule markets exhibit a lesser degree of price competition than 
economic theory might predict, resulting in an enhanced Bertrand-like model which 
results in ranging prices and unevenly distributed market shares. This, then, may 
result in purchasing inefficiencies for purchasers. To the extent that policymakers
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are able to encourage a greater degree of price competition, as explored in this thesis, 
and to the extent that purchasers are able to improve purchasing efficiency, the 
opportunity for additional cost savings in off-patent molecule markets is ripe. These 
savings could then assist policymakers in making more optimal resource allocations, 
particularly during times of economic distress.
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APPENDIX A: PHARMACEUTICAL POLICIES OVERVIEW IN 
STUDY COUNTRIES 
The USA: A Relatively Free Market Approach to Pharmaceutical 
Cost Containment
In the USA the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for 
approving pharmaceutical products for marketing. Historically, once a drug has been 
granted permission to be market in the USA, it has automatically been covered by the 
majority of third party purchasers, without any formal evaluation of cost- 
effectiveness or a drug’s relative therapeutic benefit. However, in the past decade 
both public and private purchasers have introduced mechanisms to contain the cost 
of drugs by encouraging lower cost, generic, products.
Pharmaceutical spending and cost containment measures in the USA are as 
varied as the country’s insurance system. As of 2006,44% of pharmaceutical 
expenses were paid for by private health insurers, while 34% were paid for by the 
government and 22% were paid in the form of patients’ out-of-pocket expenses. The 
majority (53%) of government’s pharmaceutical expenditures came from Medicare 
in 2006, with the next largest source of public funds (26%) coming from Medicaid. 
The rest of government pharmaceutical expenditures were sourced through programs 
such as the Veteran’s Administration and the Federal Employees Health Benefit.
The share of public expenditures that comes from Medicare increased from 7% in 
2005 to 53% in 2006 as a result of the Medicare Part D implementation, which 
provides prescription drug coverage to the elderly and disabled (Kaiser Family 
Foundation Prescription Drug Trends Fact Sheet, 2008).
Unlike most countries in Europe, there are no centralized regulations that 
seek to contain pharmaceutical expenditures. Instead, separate payors leverage their 
market power in various ways in order to improve efficient purchasing. The majority 
of Americans (59% in 2007) obtain their health insurance coverage through their 
employers. As of 2007, 60% of employers were offering health insurance to their 
employees, with almost all plans including a prescription drug benefit (Kaiser Family 
Foundation Prescription Drugs Trends Fact Sheet, 2008). The administration of 
employers’ prescription drug benefits is often outsourced to pharmaceutical benefit 
managers (PBMs), who negotiate discounts and rebates with manufacturers in 
exchange for increasing that drug’s market share amongst its beneficiaries. Of the
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portion of the population that receives its health benefits through their employers, 75 
% were subject to a formulary structure in 2007 (up from 27% in 2000), which 
integrates cost-sharing with 3 or 4 tiers. Generics are usually placed on the first tier, 
which has the lowest cost-sharing requirement, while preferred branded drugs (which 
includes either branded drugs of significant therapeutic value that have no generic 
equivalents or branded drugs that offer significant rebates) are placed on the second 
tier and non-preferred drugs on the third tier, which has the high cost-sharing 
requirement. Over time, the tiered copayments have been increasing, with the 
average preferred drug copayment increasing from $15 in 2000 to $25 in 2007 and 
the average non-preferred drug copayment increasing from $29 in 2000 to $43 in 
2007 (Kaiser Family Foundation: Prescription Drug Trends Fact Sheet, 2008). Thus, 
PBMs use formularies to contain pharmaceutical expenditures by negotiating rebates 
and discounts with manufacturers and retail pharmacies respectively and by shifting 
a portion of the costs to patients
Because rebates/discounts are part of private, proprietary negotiations 
between PBMs and manufacturers/pharmacies, the extent of savings is not made 
public. As a result, it is impossible to calculate the effective price (list price minus 
rebate/discount) that PBMs actually pay for pharmaceuticals. The list price in the 
USA is often based on a concept called the Average Wholesale Price (AWP). The 
AWP is not what the name suggests, however. Rather than being the average price at 
which wholesalers sell to retailers, the AWP is a published “list price,” which the 
manufacturer suggests to the wholesaler. In practice, manufacturers sell their drugs 
to wholesalers at a significantly discounted rate (off of AWP), which also allows 
wholesalers to sell their drugs to retailers at a discounted rate (off of AWP) as well, 
while still retailing a percentage for profit. In practice, the AWP is a benchmark that 
is used in negotiating prices in the USA. One report suggests that the actual price 
charged by the manufacturer to the wholesaler is 20% less than the AWP, on 
average, which the wholesaler then marks-up approximately 2-4% before selling to 
pharmacies (USA Department of Health and Human Services, 2000).
Because pharmacies pay less than AWP in most cases, PBMs are often able 
to negotiate a percentage off of the AWP—the pharmacy discount. They also 
usually include a fix-rate payment called the dispensing fee, which averaged $2.50 in 
the late 1990s (USA Department of Health and Human Services, 2000). The 
intention of this dispensing fee was to cover pharmacists’ operating costs where
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negotiated discounts were significant. In general, the ability of PBMs to negotiate 
discounts with pharmacies depends on a number of economic factors such as how 
large and powerful the PBMs is versus how large and powerful the pharmacy 
network is. Industry experts claim that the payments to pharmacies for most brand 
name drugs and for some (roughly 25%) of generic drugs in the late 1990s was in the 
range of AWP minus 13 to 15 percent plus a $2.50 dispensing fee. For the other 
75% of generic drugs, PBMs are often only willing to reimburse pharmacies at the 
cost of the lowest priced generic equivalent sold by that pharmacy. This report, 
however, does not offer any information on the average number of generic 
equivalents that a pharmacy stocks. Thus, the MAC system would presumably 
achieve lower prices for the PBM in cases where pharmacies stock multiple generic 
equivalents versus one or two. Under this pricing system, called the maximum 
allowable cost, the payment to pharmacies reportedly averaged AWP minus 50 to 60 
percent (USA Department of Health and Human Services, 2000). In addition, the 
PBMs sometimes offered higher dispensing fees for generics in order to encourage 
generic substitution. (The majority of states in the USA gave pharmacists the right to 
substitute generic drugs in the 1980s, around the same time that the Hatch Waxman 
Act encouraged generic entry by allowing generic manufacturers to prove 
bioequivalence to the original brand rather than conduct their own clinical trials.)
In addition to the pharmacy discount, PBMs negotiate rebates directly with 
manufacturers. The size of the rebate depends on the bargaining power of the 
manufacturer. For example, a manufacturer of a drug that is innovative and has no 
close substitutes is less likely to give a large rebate than the manufacturer of an 
original brand drug that has multiple generic substitutes. These rebates may come in 
various forms, such as a fixed payment from the manufacturer to the PBM for each 
prescription dispensed, or a specific sum of money once the market share of the drug 
has increased to a certain target. In an attempt to quantify the savings that PBMs and 
health plans make from manufacturer rebates and pharmacy discounts, the General 
Accounting Office found that Blue Cross/Blue Shield paid $1.4 billion in 
pharmaceutical expenditures for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 
compared to the $1.9 billion in expenditures that they would have paid had they not 
contracted with the PBM. Of the $505 million in savings, 21.2% was attributable to 
manufacturer rebates and 52.3% was attributable to retail or mail-order pharmacies 
discounts. The other savings was attributable to MAC reimbursement for generics,
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prior authorization programs, etc. This savings translated into an average retail 
pharmacy discount of 14% off of AWP and an average manufacturer rebate of 5-6% 
off of AWP (USA General Accounting Office, 1997). Notably, the manufacturer 
rebate may have been slightly higher to the extent that the full savings were not 
passed on from the PBM to Blue Cross Blue Shield. However, contractual terms 
between health plans and PBMs usually require that 70-90% of the rebates are passed 
on to the health plan (USA Department of Health and Human Services, 2000). 
Despite these requirements, PBMs often also receive addition manufacturer rebates 
that are not tied to specific drugs, such as rebates in return for the PBMs promoting 
the manufacturers’ drugs to physicians, etc. These rebates are even more difficult to 
estimate, although some experts believe they can even exceed the value of the drug- 
specific rebates discussed above (USA Department of Health and Human Services, 
2000).
In addition to PBMs leveraging the purchasing power of their beneficiaries, 
various payors have formed purchasing pools, which combine the purchasing power 
of multiple health plans in order to negotiate higher rebates and discounts. For 
example, there are purchasing pools in which multiple states combine their Medicaid 
and state employees’ programs to achieve better prescription drug prices.
Medicare is the federal health plan that covers seniors (aged 65 and older) 
and the disabled, representing 15% of the population in 2008 (Kaiser State Health 
Facts, 2008). It did not provide prescription drug coverage until 2006. Thus, prior to 
2006, roughly three quarters of seniors obtained drug coverage separately through 
supplemental plans or employee retirement benefits, while the remaining quarter of 
seniors had no drug coverage. Since the start of 2006, however, all Medicare 
beneficiaries have been entitled to prescription drug coverage (90% of which had 
coverage as of 2008), which the federal government has outsourced to hundreds of 
private prescription drug and Medicare Advantage plans (which includes the private 
administration of all health benefits) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). As a result, 
the covered drugs and accompanying cost-sharing requirements range (within a 
stipulated framework) for Medicare drug beneficiaries. Their commonality, 
however, is that most of them are subject to formulary (tiered prescription drugs with 
progressive co-pays) arrangements similar to employees in private health plans. In 
fact, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
which established Medicare part D, made it illegal for the federal government to
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directly negotiate prices with pharmaceutical manufacturers. Thus, if policymakers 
were to want a more centralized form of pharmaceutical cost containment for 
Medicare, they would first need to change legislation.82
After Medicare, the next largest government health insurance program is 
Medicaid, representing 13.2% of the population. Medicaid is the public health 
insurance program for the low-income that is funded by both federal and state 
revenues. States receive matching dollars that are progressively higher for lower- 
income states. State Medicaid programs must cover a comprehensive set of health 
benefits, including prescription drugs, although they are at liberty to determine their 
own eligibility rules, payment arrangements to providers and cost-sharing structure 
(within certain parameters). Under federal law, pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
obligated to provide rebates to the Medicaid program. Under the Medicaid Best 
Pricing rule, for branded, patented drugs, manufacturers must offer Medicaid the 
lower price of either the best price in the private market or 15.1% off the average 
manufacturer price. For multisource original brand and generic drugs, manufacturers 
must offer 11% off the average manufacturer price. In addition to these mandatory 
rebates, some states have pursued additional rebates, called Supplemental Rebates.
In this case, the Federal government agrees to allow state Medicaid programs to 
achieve higher rebates (through negotiating or creating state laws) than they would 
under Federal law, without forcing manufacturers to extend these rebates to other 
states or the federal government. As of 2006, about 75% of state Medicaid programs 
had introduced preferred drug lists and prior authorization programs (under which 
physicians must obtain authorization from the payor before prescribing a non­
preferred drug); 70% had negotiated supplemental rebates; 60% had Maximum 
Allowable Cost programs for off-patent drugs (a program in which the payor only 
reimburses up to a certain amount for each drug, molecule-level reference pricing 
policies in Europe); 25% had joined multi-state purchasing pools, and 20% had 
created limits on quantities dispensed per prescription (Kaiser Family Foundation: 
Prescription Drug Trends, 2008).
The largest rebates given to public payors in the USA, however, are through 
the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). Under the Veterans’ Health Care Act of 1992, 
the Veterans’ Administration negotiates prices directly with manufacturers, which
82 Various democrats have attempted this, but have not succeeded.
281
must be supplied to the VA, Department of Defense, the Public Health Service and 
the Coast Guard, which together comprised only 1.1% of the insured population in 
2007 (Kaiser State Health Facts, 2007). The prices for brand name drugs must be at 
least as low as the best price sold in the private market, and no more than 76% of the 
average manufacturer price—the federal ceiling price. In practice, however, they are 
reported to be even lower than these stipulations. Specifically, one government 
study states that average FSS prices are more than 50% below the average 
manufacturer price (USA Department of Health and Human Services, 2000). Some 
explanations offered as to why the VA has been able to achieve such low prices 
include the fact that the VA only comprises such a small percentage of the insured 
population, that the VA is well skilled in price negotiation and that manufacturers 
want to ensure that their products are marketed in these federal facilities and 
agencies, where many physicians receive part of their training (USA Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2000).
Finally, the last federal rebate program is the 340B program, which 
manufacturers must comply with in order to participate in the Medicaid program. 
Under the 340B program, pharmaceutical companies provide community health 
centers and disproportionate share hospitals (hospitals that treat a disproportionate 
share of Medicaid/low income patients) with discounted prices.
The remaining share of the population— 15.3% in 2007—in the USA is 
uninsured, and therefore has no prescription drug coverage (Kaiser State Health 
Facts, 2007). In addition to not having drug coverage, uninsured individuals in the 
USA face higher pharmaceutical prices than third party purchasers due to their 
inability to negotiate discounts with retailers. One study found that in 1999, the price 
for the average uninsured individual was approximately 15% higher than the price 
for the average insured individual (the majority of which was paid for by the third 
party purchaser (USA Department of Health and Human Services, 2000). Thus, it is 
not surprising that this population is often forced to go without needed medications 
as a result of facing the full and relatively high cost of drugs. A survey of nonelderly 
adults shows that the uninsured are twice as likely as the insured to not fill a 
prescription (45% versus 22%) or to cut pills or skip doses (38% versus 18%)
(Kaiser Family Foundation: Prescription Drug Trends, 2008). Even patients who do 
have insurance in the USA are forced to reduce their cost-sharing burden by 
requesting generic drugs at the pharmacy, purchasing discount drugs over the
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internet, switching to over-the-counter medications, buying drugs in larger quantity 
and pill splitting, using mail-order pharmacies, and taking advantage of 
manufacturers’ or governments’ assistance programs. Specifically, purchases of 
mail-order pharmaceuticals in the USA rose 54% from 2003 to 2007, increasing from 
13% of total prescription sales in 2003 to 16% in 2007 (Kaiser Family Foundation: 
Prescription Drug Trends, 2008).
Finally, another way in which individuals sometimes attempt to save on the 
cost of drugs is by purchasing drugs from Canada. Until recently, such a practice 
was illegal due to safety concerns and uncertainties surrounding how importation or 
reimportation (reimporting drugs that were made in the USA and exported to other 
countries at lower prices than they would be sold in the USA) could distort 
manufacturers’ pricing and supply incentives. (Specifically, the concern was that 
manufacturers could respond to importation by restricting the supply of drugs in 
other countries and/or could increase the price of their products in other countries to 
match USA prices.) However, the government usually turned a blind eye when 
individuals (often the elderly) crossed the border to buy drugs, and in 2006, new 
legislation made it legal for USA residents to transport up to a 90-day supply of 
prescription drugs from Canada to the USA. Although the percentage of drugs 
imported from Canada was small during this study period (.3% in 2003), the absolute 
dollar value ($700 million in 2003) still constituted a large market (Kaiser Family 
Foundation: Prescription Drug Trends, 2008).
France: A tighter regulatory approach to pharmaceutical cost 
containment based largely on negotiation and price controls
Figure 2-1 is a diagram of the pharmaceutical regulatory process in France. 
There are three different avenues through which a pharmaceutical company can 
obtain an authorization to market its product in France—a centralized procedure 
through the EMEA (European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products), a 
decentralized procedure of mutual recognition whereby France must accept a 
marketing authorization from another country and a national procedure through the 
French Agency for the Medical Safety of Health Products (AFSSAPS). All 
procedures require that the manufacturers’ demonstrate quality, safety and efficacy, 
similarly to receiving approval from the FDA.
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Once a manufacturer has received marketing authorization for its product, the 
Transparency Committee is responsible for determining whether it should be put on 
the positive list of reimbursable drugs, which is required for coverage by the 
statutory health insurance system. The decision of whether or not the product should 
be prescription-only or available OTC is first made by the Transparency Committee, 
followed by a review of whether or not the drug should be reimbursed, which is 
based on the rating of its “improvement on the medical benefit” (the ASMR rating) 
(OBIG, 2006). According to a recent report (OBIG, 2006), the ASMR rating is 
based on the following scale:
ASMR 1: significant therapeutic value
ASMR 2: significant improvement in terms of efficacy, and/or reduction of 
adverse effects
ASMR 3: modest improvement in terms of efficacy, and/or reduction of 
adverse effects, as compared with existing products
ASMR 4: minor improvement of benefit (e.g. user-friendliness, small 
interaction risk), as compared with existing products
ASMR 5: no therapeutic improvement of benefit, as compared with existing 
products (still recommended for reimbursement)
ASMR 6: negative opinion regarding inclusion into reimbursement 
Drugs that receive an ASMR rank of 1-5 are deemed reimbursable, while a 
drug that is ranked ASMR 5 is not. OTC versus prescription status is independent of 
the rank that a drug receives. Thus, OTC products can be on the positive list of 
reimbursed drugs, although medicines approved for self-use in France are sometimes 
referred to as “useless” drugs by the press and the government since they have 
received the lowest ASMR rank (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005). As a result, OTC 
products are sometimes not valued by the public in France to the extent that they are 
in countries like the USA.
Once a drug has received its ASMR rank and has been put on the positive list 
of reimbursed drugs, the Transparency Committee must then decide on a 
reimbursement rate for the drug. As of 1999, the manufacturers must provide 
information on the medical service rendered (SMR) by their product in accordance 
with the following criteria:
• The effectiveness of the drug and its possible side effects
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• Its place in the therapeutic process, in relation to the alternative therapies 
available
• The seriousness of the condition in question
• The curative, preventative or symptomatic properties of the drug
• Its importance in terms of public health (Sandier, Paris and Polton, 2004)
A score of (A) means that the Transparency Committee has deemed the
medical service of a product to be “major or considerable,” which is usually the case 
with non-substitutable medicines that treat life-threatening or disabling conditions. 
The reimbursement rate for these products is 100%. A score of (B) is given to drugs 
that make a moderate impact, usually by treating serious conditions (but are not as 
vital as category A). These drugs are reimbursed at a rate of 65%. Drugs that are 
classified into category (C) often treat the symptoms of illnesses that are not as 
serious, such as common acute conditions. These are reimbursed at a rate of 35%. 
After five years on the positive list, drugs’ SMRs must be re-evaluated since its place 
in the therapeutic process may have changed. Drugs that were previously on the 
positive list before 1999 were also subject to this evaluation process for the first time. 
As a result, for 617 drugs, the reimbursement rate dropped from 65% to 35% for 
drugs that were determined to be of low medical value, including some drugs from 
therapeutic categories such as anti-fimgals, antiseptics, anti-acne, anti-histamines and 
gastro-oesophageal reflux (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005). In addition, 84 of the 
drugs on the positive list were de-listed, including drugs from categories such as 
antacids, anti-bacterials, expectorants, etc (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005).
Once the Transparency Committee has evaluated a drug for reimbursement 
status, it then passes the information its used in determining the SMR and ASMR 
ranking to the Comite’ Economique des Produits de Sante (CEPS). Drugs with an 
ASMR ranking of I-III and an assumed projected turnover of less than 40 million 
Euros in the third year have the price notification scheme option or the traditional 
price negotiation option. Under the price notification scheme option, the 
manufacturer must propose a price that is consistent with other large European 
markets (CEPS, 2005), which the CEPS then has 15 days to decide whether or not to 
accept (for a five year period). In addition to proposing a price, the manufacturer 
must forecast sales for the first four years, which, if exceeded, require pay-backs.
The CEPS may reject the price proposal, in which case the traditional price
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negotiation procedure is followed. Although the price notification procedure was 
intended to enable the pricing of innovative pharmaceuticals in France to be more 
consistent with other markets (OBIG, report), in practice most manufacturers still opt 
to negotiate prices, although the use of the price notification procedure seems to be 
increasing. Specifically, in its first year, Abbott’s protease inhibitor Kaletra was the 
only product to initiate the price notification system. In 2003, manufacturers of two 
new products chose to pursue the traditional price negotiation route instead, although 
eight drugs entered into the price notification procedure in 2004 (OBIG, 2006). (It is 
not necessarily surprising that some manufacturers preferred the price negotiation 
route, as drugs with ASMR rankings of I or II were usually allowed higher prices in 
negotiations anyways (OBIG, 2006).)
Under the traditional negotiations route between manufacturers and CEPS, 
prices are based on the Transparency Commission’s determination of the drug’s 
improvement in medical service rendered (ASMR), the price of similar drugs on the 
market, the forecasted sales/volume and the expected conditions of use (CEPS,
2005). Once approved, if the actual sales/volume exceeds the forecasted 
sales/volume, then manufacturers may face penalties in the form of pay­
backs/rebates to the government, price reductions or even having their drug de-listed. 
These rebates are often significant, amounting to 454 million Euros in 2003 (CEPS, 
2005).
The cost containment procedures (e.g. price negotiations, limited 
reimbursement rates) described above apply primarily to patented pharmaceuticals. 
However, one policy that has applied equally to branded drugs and generics is price 
cuts. Over the past five years, France has used price cuts to contain the costs of 
innovative drugs, drugs with minor therapeutic benefits and generics (OBIG, 2006). 
Specifically, drugs determined to have low medical benefits (i.e. low SMRs), faced 
an average price cut of 20% over a three year period between 2000 and 2003 
(Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005). In addition, at the start of 2006, price cuts of 15% 
were introduced for original brand drugs and their generic equivalents with further 
10% and 4% cuts planned for original brand and generics respectively (OBIG, 2006).
Another way in which pharmaceutical policies in France have changed over 
the past five years is in the shift toward generics. In 1999, the generic market share 
in France was only 2% and generic prices were capped at 30% lower than the 
original brand drug (Sandier, Paris and Polton, 2004; Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005).
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However, in 2003, the law on financing the social security system authorized the 
introduction of a reference price system for a select group of drugs. As is the case 
with reference price systems in other countries, the government sets a specific price 
that it will reimburse for each group of drugs. In the case of France, this is calculated 
as the average generic price in each reference group, where the generic prices are 
capped at 30-40% of the original brand price at the time of patent expiration 
(Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005). If a manufacturer prices its drug above this reference 
price, then patients must pay the difference between the price and the reference price. 
This reference pricing system in France applies only to certain drugs that are off- 
patent. Originally in 2003, 29 molecules were chosen, which corresponded to 61 
different groups of generic drugs and 71 reference prices, since in some cases there 
were multiple different dose and/or formulation combinations for the same molecule 
(CEPS, 2005). The criterion for a drug being included in this first wave of reference 
prices was a generic penetration of between 10% and 45% (based on penetration 
rates in April 2003). However, the second wave of 11 additional molecules that were 
included in June 2005 was based on generic penetration rates of 60%. Notably, the 
original intention was to include 18 additional molecules in the second wave. 
However, the government spared some of these drugs, possibly because they showed 
signs of strong rates of generic penetration (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005).
A government report evaluated the effect of the reference pricing system on 
the pharmaceutical prices and expenditures for the relevant drugs in the first year of 
implementation. It found that in 70% of cases, the original brand manufacturers 
immediately reduced their prices to the reference prices. In only one case, the 
original brand manufacturer pursued the generics paradox strategy of increasing its 
price (CEPS, 2005). There is also evidence that despite the original brand price 
reductions, generic penetration doubled from roughly one quarter in 2003 to one-half 
in 2004 (CEPS, 2005). Thus, the reduction of original brand prices did not crowd 
out an increase in generic penetration. Moreover, it was estimated that net of the 
sales taxes on pharmaceuticals, the lower original brand prices resulted in a cost 
savings of 25 million Euros in 2003, and the reduction in generic prices an additional 
7 million Euros (CEPS 2005).
There have been a number of attempts in France to encourage physicians to 
prescribe generic products. In 1997, an agreement between the social health 
insurance and doctors’ associations introduced a program called “reference doctors,”
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(also called the French “gate-keeper” system) in which participating doctors agreed 
to prescribe less expensive pharmaceuticals for 15% of their prescriptions in 
exchange for an annual fee per patient. In 2002, this program was revised to target 
generic prescribing more aggressively by increasing the annual fee in exchange for 
physicians committing to prescribe by the international non-propriety name (INN) or 
a specific generic for at least 25% of their prescriptions (OBIG, 2006). Consistent 
with this program, it was first made legal in 2002 for physicians to prescribe a drug 
by its generic name instead of its brand name (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005).
In addition, there have been a number of policy changes that target 
pharmacists in an attempt to increase generic use. There are tight regulations 
surrounding pharmacies in France. Mail order and internet sales of pharmaceuticals 
are prohibited, as is the ownership of pharmacy chains. In 1999, a Decree made it 
legal for pharmacists to substitute branded medicines for generics, which the 
pharmacist association agreed to do in at least 35% of cases. In return for meeting 
this target, pharmacists were guaranteed a generic profit margin that was at least 
equal to the brand equivalents (Sandier, Paris and Polton, 2004). Another policy 
change targeting pharmacists was the move from a linear mark-up scheme to a two- 
scale regressive mark-up scheme in 1999 and the addition of a third scale in 2004.
As a result, the current mark-up framework is 26.1% for drugs beiween 0 and 
€22.90, 10% for drugs between €22.91 and €150 and 5% for drugs greater than €150. 
There is also a flat rate of €0.53 that is given to pharmacists. Additionally, for 
generic drugs that are not part of the reference price system, the pharmacists are 
allowed to mark-up the same amount that they would for the original brand 
equivalent (OBIG, 2006). This negates any financial incentive that pharmacists 
would have had to dispense original brand drugs over generics. Similarly, the 
wholesale mark-up scheme is also regressive in an attempt to encourage generics: 
10.3% for drugs between €0 and €22.90, 6% for drugs between €22.91 and €150 and 
2% for drugs between €150. In addition to the wholesale and retail mark-ups, there 
is a value-added tax of 2.1% for reimbursable pharmaceuticals and 5.5% for 
nonreimbursables. This compares to the standard VAT of 20.6% (OBIG, 2006). 
Finally, pharmacies and wholesalers are permitted to negotiate discounts. For 
pharmacies, the discounts are not to exceed 2.5% of the original brand manufacturer 
prices and 10.74% of the generic manufacturer prices. Thus, this is yet another 
example of a policy that encourages the use of generics.
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Unlike in the USA, pharmaceutical cost sharing in France is not heavily 
utilized as a cost containment mechanism (either in the form of revenue raising or in 
reducing demand). There are no flat prescription co-payments in France, although in 
theory, cost-sharing rates are high for the drugs that are not reimbursed (representing 
over half of all pharmaceuticals marketed in France) and for drugs that are only 
reimbursed at 35% and 65% (OBIG, 2006). However, in practice the majority of the 
population has supplementary insurance called Mutuelles, which covers these cost 
sharing requirements. In addition, patients who have serious diseases and/or 
disabilities are exempt from cost-sharing requirements, which represents roughly 
12% of the population (CEPS, 2005). Finally, the introduction of the reference price 
system theoretically exposes patients to a greater share of pharmaceutical costs, 
where drugs are priced above the reference price. However, because most patients in 
France are not accustomed to having to share in pharmaceutical costs, evidence 
shows that patients are rarely willing to pay the difference (between the reference 
price and the actual price), which effectively reduces the market share of drugs above 
the reference price down to almost zero. This explains the above finding that the 
majority of original brand manufacturers reduced their prices to the reference price in 
2003.
Finally, parallel export has been a common practice in France due to its 
relatively lower patented drug prices (in contrast with parallel importing, which is 
used as a cost containment mechanism in the USA, Germany and the UK).
However, the introduction of the price notification system may result in patented 
prices aligning more closely with other major pharmaceutical markets, thereby 
reducing the practice of parallel exporting in France. Figure 2-1 summarises 
pharmaceutical regulations in France as of 2006.
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Figure 0-1 Pharmaceutical Regulations in France, 2006
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Germany: A relatively free market approach to pharmaceutical cost 
containment, combined with reference pricing
Similarly to France and the USA, the criterion for marketing authorization in 
Germany is safety and efficacy. There are three ways a manufacturer can receive 
marketing authorization—through the EMEA, through the mutual recognition 
process in the EU (by obtaining marketing authorization in one of the other relevant 
countries first, in which case the Federal Institute for Pharmaceuticals and Medical 
Devices can only deny the transferred approval if there is a threat to the public’s 
safety) and through Germany’s national Federal Institute for Pharmaceuticals and 
medical Devices. One report claims that since the national process only requires 
demonstration of a marginal therapeutic benefit, using a small sample, many active 
substances of “merely minor modifications rather than real product innovations” are 
approved (Busse and Riesberg, 2004). The result is that the German pharmaceutical 
market consists of many presentations (i.e. strength/form/package size permutations) 
for a given molecule, which resulted in more than 9,449 presentations, of which 90% 
related to only 2,300 molecules (Busse and Riesberg, 2004).
Once a manufacturer has received marketing authorization for its drug, it may 
price feely and in most cases, is covered by the sickness funds. (The caveat to this 
free market approach is the reference pricing system, discussed below.) Until the 
2003, the only drugs that were excluded from reimbursement for adults were those 
that treated “trivial” diseases, such as common colds, laxatives and motion sickness, 
and inefficient pharmaceuticals, such as certain combination drugs (OBIG, 2006; 
Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005). Thus, many over-the-counter drugs were covered. As 
a result, there was a large OTC market in Germany, amounting to €922 million OTC 
sales in 2002, which accounted for 21% of the total pharmaceutical purchases that 
year (Busse and Riesberg, 2004).
However, the 2004 SHI Modernization Act excluded the majority of OTC 
drugs from coverage, while retaining coverage of 36 specific OTC drugs that treat 
serious conditions (OBIG, 2006). In addition, coverage of most OTCs was also 
retained for children under the age of 12. In addition to OTCs and the original 
exclusions of trivial and inefficient drugs, “lifestyle” drugs, such as drugs that 
increase sexual drive, appetite suppressants and hair restorers, were also put onto the 
negative list in 2004 (OBIG, 2006). At the same time that most OTC drugs were
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delisted, the distribution chain margins were also liberalized for these drugs, 
allowing pharmacies to price OTC drugs freely.83 Meanwhile, the 36 OTC drugs that 
retained coverage are subject to the distribution chain regulations and the 
reimbursement system (i.e. the reference price system), similarly to the covered 
prescription medicines.
Unlike many other countries in Europe, Germany allows its manufacturers to 
set their own prices, independent of the prices in other countries. Rather than 
engaging in the practice of external reference pricing, as France partially does in the 
CEPS negotiation, Germany has become one of the countries that is most referenced 
by other EU countries. For this reason, manufacturers often set high prices in 
Germany so that they influence prices upwards in other markets (OBIG, 2006). 
However, despite allowing manufacturers to price freely, Germany still retains the 
authority to indirectly control pharmaceutical prices by mandating rebates and/or 
freezing prices. In 2003, there was a compulsory manufacturer rebate of 6%, 
payable to the sickness funds. Additionally, the 2004 SHI Modernization Act levied 
a 16% rebate on the manufacturer price of products that were not part of the 
reference price system (i.e. patented products) until the implementation of the 
reformed reference price system in 2005, after which point the rebate decreased to 
6% (IMS World Markets). Finally, generics and original brand equivalents were 
subject to manufacturer rebates of 10% in May of 2006, with the exception of drugs 
that were already priced 30% below the reference price (OBIG, 2006). In addition to 
mandated rebates, there have been number of manufacturer price freezes. From 
January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2004, patented drugs’ manufacturer prices were 
frozen at the October 1, 2002 price level. In addition, the Act on Economic 
Provision with Pharmaceuticals introduced a manufacturer price freeze for all 
medicines (at the November 1, 2005 level) from May 1, 2006 to March 31, 2008 
(OBIG, 2006).
In addition to controlling pharmaceutical expenditures through rebates, price 
freezes and a negative list of coverage exclusions, Germany has a strong history of 
encouraging generic drug use. It is most well-known for its longstanding reference
83 Interestingly, one study found that this liberalization o f the OTC distribution chain resulted in 
higher OTC prices (Germany HiT). One possible explanation for this may be that at the same time 
these OTC mark-ups were liberalized, these drugs were also delisted, resulting in only the price 
insensitive portion o f the market purchasing these drugs (since the cost to a patient increased from the 
stipulated co-payment to the full cost o f the drug itself).
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price system, whereby a maximum reimbursement price is set for a group of drugs, 
requiring patients to pay any excess in price above the reimbursement price. Until 
the 2004 SHI Modernization Act, the reference price system applied only to off- 
patent drugs at the molecule level, grouping together all original brand drugs and 
their generic equivalents. The effect of this reference price system was that generic 
penetration (% of the total pharmaceutical market, in volume) increased from 10.9% 
in 1981 (prior to the reference price system, which was introduced in 1989) to 55.2% 
in 2004 (OBIG, 2006). As of 2003, 61% of prescriptions in Germany and 37% of 
total pharmaceutical expenditures were for reference priced medicines (Busse and 
Riesberg, 2004). Thus, until 2004, patented drugs were excluded from the reference 
price system, and reimbursed in full (with the exception of the mandated rebates).
One of the most significant changes in the 2004 SHI Modernization Act was 
the creation of therapeutic reference price groups, often referred to as Jumbo groups. 
Under this revised system, there are three different reference groups. Reference 
group 1 combines drugs of the same molecule into one group (i.e. the old reference 
price system). Reference group 2 combines drugs of different molecules, but similar 
therapeutic mechanisms, such as Proton Pump Inhibitors. Reference group 3 
combines drugs of different therapeutic classes that treat the same condition, such as 
heartburn/reflux. The Federal Association of Sickness Funds is responsible for 
calculating the reference prices for these respective groups.
This new system represents a significant departure from previous 
pharmaceutical policy in Germany in that all patented prescription drugs that were 
covered by the sickness funds used to be excluded from the reference price system 
and reimbursed in full. Under the new regulations, however, patented drugs that are 
determined to be “without significant therapeutic advantage” have been included in 
groups 2 and 3 of the reference price system (OBIG, 2006). The new German 
Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (Institut for Qualitat und 
Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitsweserr, IQWiG) is responsible for evaluating 
drugs’ therapeutic advantages and determining whether or not the drug should be 
part of the reference price system. Notably, it does not base its evaluations on cost- 
effectiveness criteria, but rather on the relative therapeutic benefit of drugs, as well 
as the drug’s safety profile. If it decides that the drug is in fact “innovative” and is 
therefore therapeutically superior to all other drugs on the market, it excludes it from 
the reference price system and the drug is reimbursed in full by the sickness funds.
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If, however, it decides that the drug is not therapeutically superior to its peers (e.g. so 
called “me-too” drugs), then it includes it in the reference price system, under which 
the drug is only reimbursed at its group’s reference price. Thus, under this system, 
some patented drugs may be grouped with generics of other molecules, which are 
likely priced significantly lower than the patented drug, thereby influencing the 
reference price downwards, and resulting in the patented drug manufacturer being 
reimbursed at a relatively small fraction of its desired price. Not surprisingly, this 
policy is controversial, and has been adamantly opposed by most of the 
pharmaceutical industry.
IQWiG conducted its first evaluations on whether to include products into the 
reference pricing system in 2004, after which point the Federal Healthcare 
Committee, which is responsible for forming the actual reference groups, announced 
the first therapeutic reference groups. Effective on August 2004, statins, sartans, 
triptans and proton pump inhibitors became the first “jumbo” reference groups, with 
the goal of the German government being to eventually include 70-80% of all drugs 
in the reference pricing system (Decision Resources, 2005). Manufacturers of 
patented drugs in these classes have to reduce their prices to the reference price level 
in order to avoid a collapse in market share since most patients are not prepared to 
pay both the flat-rate pharmaceutical co-payment and the portion of the drug’s price 
in excess of the reference price. As a result, few drugs in Germany are priced above 
the reference price (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005). One exception was in the case of 
Pfizer’s Sortis (atorvastatin). Because the prices of patented drugs in Germany are 
often reference by other EU countries, Pfizer refused to lower the price of its Sortis, 
which was still on patent, and which it claimed was therapeutically superior to other 
drugs in its class. Consistent with the claim that Sortis was therapeutically superios, 
a survey found that 58% of German physicians would have prescribed Sortis had it 
not been priced above the reference price. However, only 3% continued to prescribe 
Sortis despite its price premium (Decision Resources, 2005). The result was a 
“disastrous collapse” in Sortis’ market share in Germany (Decision Resources,
2005).
Finally, regulations stipulate that group 1 reference prices not exceed the 
highest price in the lowest third of the reference group prices (OBIG, 2006). 
Legislation does not dictate how the reference prices are calculated for groups 2 and 
3. However, in practice, different strengths of a group of drugs have received their
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own reference prices. There has been some discussion of introducing daily cost of  
therapy limits as part of the reference pricing system (Decision Resources, 2005). If 
this were to happen, this could significantly alter the pharmaceutical market in 
Germany by reducing the current multitude of drug presentations for each molecule.
In addition to containing pharmaceutical expenditures through price cuts and 
freezes, and by expanding the reference pricing system, the SHI Modernization Act 
increased patient pharmaceutical cost-sharing. In 2003, before the new regulations, 
patients paid between €4 and €5 for a covered drug, on top of any difference between 
the reference price and the actual price (if the actual price was higher than the 
reference price). The 2004 SHI Modernization Act increased these cost-sharing 
requirements to 10% of the pharmacy retail price, with a minimum fee of €10 and an 
out-of-pocket maximum of 2% of a person’s annual gross income. Similarly to 
before 2004, this is also in addition to any additional cost-sharing through the 
reference price system (Busse and Riesberg, 2004).
Germany also has a history of targeting physicians’ spending and prescribing 
patterns in order to achieve efficient purchasing. During the 1993-2001 period, 
physicians were subject to pharmaceutical spending caps, above which they were 
legally liable to return a percentage of money to the sickness funds. However, this 
practice proved difficult to enforce, so in 2001, this system was abolished in favour 
of a more consensual process in which regional physicians’ associations and the 
associations of sickness funds negotiate annual budgets, which do not contain 
mandatory pecuniary penalties, but do play a significant role in the contractual 
process. Both individual physician and regional spending targets are negotiated.
The individual physician spending target is set according to the average physician 
prescribing costs per patient per year within each region. If physicians exceed their 
target by more then 25%, he/she may have to pay back a portion of the difference 
(usually the overspent amount minus 115% of the target) to the sickness funds. At 
the regional level, guidelines are set which encourage generic prescribing and 
parallel imports. In some cases, bonuses are offered to physicians that meet these 
regional targets. As a result of these pharmaceutical spending budgets and the 
reference price system, physicians in Germany were prescribing generic drugs in 
75% of possible prescriptions in 2003. This was one of the highest generic 
prescribing rates in the EU in 2003 (Busse and Riesberg, 2004).
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In addition to giving physicians the incentive to prescribe generics, 
pharmacists in Germany have also been targeted in the quest for pharmaceutical cost 
containment. As of February 2002, pharmacists have been required to substitute a 
generic for an original brand drug, unless the physician opposed it. Between July 
2002 and August 2003, pharmacists were required to substitute in the case of 184 out 
of 680 molecules that had generic versions, which comprised 35% of the 
prescriptions in the generic market and 29% of generic market sales (Kanavos and 
Gemmill, 2005). The price range for generic substitution was calculated as the 
average price of the three most expensive and the three cheapest available generics 
(OBIG, 2006). The SHI Modernization Act of 2004 attempted to make the 
mandatory substitution consistent with the reference price system by ensuring that 
the reference prices were set below the substitution price line.
In addition to pharmacists having the authority to substitute generics, 
regulatory changes have also attempted to encourage substitution of low cost 
generics by reforming the wholesale and pharmacist mark-up allowances. Prior to 
2003, pharmacists margins were digressively scaled, which gave pharmacists the 
financial incentive to dispense the most expensive products (although the absolute 
mark-up allowance was reduced shortly before 2004). However, the SHI 
Modernization Act of 2004 reformed pharmacists’ margins to a flat-rate payment of 
€8.10 per prescription, plus a fixed margin of 3% of the wholesaler price. The Act 
also created regressively scaled margins for reimbursed OTC products, ranging from 
68% for products in the €0.0 - €1.22 price range to 30% for products in the €35.95 - 
€543.92 price range. This replaced the old digressively scaled margins prior to 2004. 
Non-reimbursed OTC medicines are not subject to regulated margins as of 2004, but 
rather can be priced freely by the manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. As part 
of the distribution chain regulatory changes, the 2004 Act also regressively scaled 
wholesaler margins for prescription-only medicines and reimbursable OTC 
medicines. Finally, Germany also levied a 16% valued-added tax onto its 
pharmaceuticals, which increased to 19% in 2007. Although this percentage is 
relatively low, compared to the VAT in other EU countries, it is a relatively high 
VAT for pharmaceuticals since most countries apply a lower VAT to 
pharmaceuticals than other products (Busse and Riesberg, 2004).
Similarly to the manufacturer rebate, pharmacies and wholesalers have also 
been required to give rebates. The pharmacy rebate rose from 5% until 2002 to 6%
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in 2003 and changed to a flat rate of €2 per prescription-only drug after the SHI 
Modernization Act of 2004. As of 2005, however, the rebate is negotiated between 
the Federal Association of Sickness Funds and the Federal Association of 
Pharmacists’ Organizations. In 2003, the total rebate amount from manufacturers, 
wholesalers, and pharmacists amounted to €3.1 billion (11.6% of pharmaceutical 
sales). However, pharmaceutical expenditures still grew by 2% during this period 
(Busse and Riesberg, 2004).
In addition to attempting to contain pharmaceutical costs by encouraging the 
purchase of more efficient drugs, the SHI Modernization Act of 2004 liberalized 
many of the rules for pharmacies in Germany. Prior to 2003, pharmacy chains were 
not permitted. However, as of 2004, pharmacists may own up to four pharmacies, 
which must be in the same or nearby county (Busse and Riesberg, 2004). In 
addition, as is discussed above, the majority of OTC products can now be priced 
freely (although they are not reimbursable). The purchase of pharmaceuticals via the 
internet is also now allowed. From January 2004 to July 2004, roughly 600 
pharmacies took advantage of this new allowance by obtaining licenses to engage in 
e-commerce (Busse and Riesberg, 2004). The other component to the pharmacy 
market liberalization in 2004 was the allowance of mail order prescription and OTC 
drugs. In order to obtain a medicine via the mail, a patient must first send the 
prescription into a pharmacy. He pharmacist then sends the medication to the patient 
and the bill to the sickness fun. In theory, the patient must still make the co­
payment, although the logistics behind how this happens are not clearly set out in the 
Act (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005).
Finally, parallel trade has been a significant component of pharmaceutical 
cost containment in Germany. In 2000, pharmacists were required to substitute 
branded products with the imported equivalent whenever the imported version was at 
least 10% cheaper. As a result, the market share of imported pharmaceuticals rose 
from 1.8% in 1998 to 5.8% in 2001. However, the SHI Modernization Act of 2004 
stipulated that imported prices be at least 15% (instead of 10%) cheaper in order to 
be substituted, which resulted in a decrease in parallel trade (OBIG, 2006).
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The UK: A relatively free market approach to pharmaceutical cost 
containment combined with free market incentives
In the UK, the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) is responsible for approving the market authorisation of pharmaceuticals, 
based on the criteria of safety and effectiveness. In addition, like the FDA and most 
other pharmaceutical regulatory bodies, the MHRA continues to monitor the safety 
of drugs that are already on the market. The MHRA has three classification 
categories for drugs marketed in the UK—prescription-only medicines (POM), OTC 
pharmacy-only medicines (P) and OTC general sales (GS) medicines. The 
prescription only medicines can only be obtained through a prescription from a 
physician, while the pharmacy-only medicines sit behind the counter in pharmacies, 
where patients must request the medicine from the pharmacist. There are no 
restrictions for the general sales medicines, however, which may be sold at food 
stores and other retail outlets. Between 1999 and 2002, the MHRA approved the 
switch of about 50 medicines, largely for reasons of cost containment (OBIG, 2006).
The majority of OTC (both behind-the-counter and general sales status 
medicines) are not covered by the NHS. However, almost all prescription-only 
medicines in the UK are covered by the National Health Service. The exceptions are 
in the case of the Black List and the Grey List. The Black List is comprised of 
medicines such as diet pills, vitamins and herbal preparations. While the NHS does 
not cover medicines on the Black List, physicians may prescribe these medicines to 
NHS patients who are willing to pay the full price out-of-pocket (OBIG, 2006).
There is also a Grey List, which consists of medicines that the NHS only covers for 
specific indications and patient groups. Like Black Listed drugs, physicians can still 
prescribe the medicine to patients who are not eligible, but are willing to cover the 
full cost of the drug. The Grey List is small, and consists mostly of substances that 
treat erectile dysfunction.
The vast majority of drugs that are not placed on the Black List or Grey List 
are covered, unless they receive a negative recommendation by the National Institute 
of Clinical Efficacy (NICE). The National Institute of Clinical Efficacy is an 
institute that employees health economists who evaluate the clinical efficacy and 
resource implications of new medicines. Thus, it operates independently from the 
NHS in its decisions. In practice, NICE tends to recommend that physicians
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prescribe a drug if it costs less than $30,000 per quality adjusted life year, although 
this threshold is not official. Recently, NICE announced the decision to increase the 
$30,000 threshold for drugs that extend life (by at least 3 months, according to 
evidence) for patients with less than two years to live (BBC, 2009). NICE’S negative 
decisions are meant to be binding, although the pharmaceutical industry and patient 
groups have the right to appeal the decision. Some healthcare policymakers criticize 
NICE as a rationing tool. However, in practice, NICE makes few negative 
recommendations.
The operation of NICE has also become a model for many other countries 
that are interested in introducing cost-effectiveness evaluations into their 
pharmaceutical policy. That isn’t to say, however, that there aren’t inefficiencies in 
the practice of NICE itself. NICE’S evaluation of a new drug does not begin until the 
drug has received a marketing license from the MHRA. It then usually takes at least 
a year to complete the evaluation, during which time many physicians are hesitant to 
prescribe the drug in the event that it receives a negative evaluation, a problem 
referred to as “NHS blight” (The Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh).
There are two different pharmaceutical policy schemes in the UK—one for
branded drugs and one for generics. Notably, off-patent branded drugs used to be
included in the PPRS scheme, but were shifted to the generic policies scheme in
2005. The scheme for on-patent brand drugs is called the Pharmaceutical Pricing
Reimbursement Scheme (PPRS). The aims of the PPRS are to:
Secure the provision of safe and effective medicines for 
the NHS at reasonable prices, promote a strong and 
profitable pharmaceutical industry capable of such 
sustained research and development expenditure as 
should lead to the future availability of new and 
improved medicines, and encourage the efficient and 
competitive development and supply of medicines to 
pharmaceutical markets in this and other countries.
(OFT, 2007)
There are two components to the PPRS, profit controls and price controls. 
Under the profit control requirement, firms must repay any excess profits to the DH 
beyond a set maximum level of profits that they are allowed for their branded drugs. 
In practice, however, the difficulties in the DH assessing profitability (due to an 
increasingly global cost base and a high level of intangible capital) have resulted in 
negligible profit payments during the 1999-2004 scheme. Instead, the price controls
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component of the PPRS is the strongest mechanism for containing costs. Under the 
price controls component, pharmaceutical manufacturers may freely set prices for 
their new medicines. However, price increases may be restricted. In addition, the 
renegotiation of the PPRS scheme, which is conducted every five years, often 
includes stipulated price cuts. The 1999-2004 scheme included a price cut of 4.5%, 
which produced annual savings of roughly £260 million. The 2005 scheme’s price 
cut was increased to 7%, which was estimated to produce annual savings of £370 
million. Under these price cut stipulations, manufacturers are only required to 
reduce the weighted purchased price of all of their drugs by the stipulated amount, so 
have the freedom to vary the prices of individual drugs.
In 2007, the Office of Fair Trade released a report that criticizes the PPRS 
and suggests a new system of patented drug pricing. In this report, they claim that 
the prices of branded drugs in the UK are significantly lower than in the USA, but 
higher than the price of branded drugs in all other European comparator countries, 
except for Ireland and Germany. The advantages to the scheme are that it allows for 
the quick introduction of new drugs, a quick and easy savings mechanism through 
price cutting, low administrative costs and the economic and therapeutic benefits (i.e. 
innovative medicines) of a profitable pharmaceutical industry. However, they claim 
that the disadvantages outweigh these advantages. The disadvantages to the price 
cuts are that they are not based on the value of drugs, may hurt smaller companies 
since they have a smaller portfolio of drugs to vary prices between and that a circular 
game of price cut anticipation may result, whereby drug companies anticipate the 
price cuts by introducing higher prices in the first instance and the DH anticipates 
this strategy by introducing larger price cuts. The disadvantages to the profit control 
component are: 1) free prices do not reflect therapeutic value, so do not provide 
companies with the right investment incentives, 2) companies do not have the 
incentive to invest in the UK because R&D allowances apply globally, not just R&D 
incurred in the UK. In response to these critiques, the OFT proposed a new ex-post 
value based pricing scheme for branded drugs, whereby maximum prices are set 
according to the clinical benefits of a new drug, relative to an appropriate comparator 
(OFT, 2007). Whether the DH will take any of the OFT suggestions is still 
undetermined.
In the majority of cases, generic prices in the UK are determined by the 
generic manufacturers and wholesalers. Specifically, the Department of Health sets a
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reimbursement price for each molecule of a given strength that is based on reported 
manufacturer and wholesaler prices (The Drug Tariff, 2005). The exception was in 
the case of drugs that were subject to the Maximum Price Scheme from 1999 to 
2005, under which the price of products that were in danger of supply shortages were 
capped at the level set by the manufacturer. This ensured that the NHS would not 
experience high price increases for drugs such as antibiotics. In 2006, this Maximum 
Price Scheme was replaced with a new policy that requires manufacturers of drugs 
that may be in short supply to obtain authorisation from the Department of Health for 
a price increase. In addition, to monitor the supply, manufacturers must submit 
quarterly information on generic medicines income revenues, cost of purchases and 
volume transactions.
Because the Drug Tariff prices are based on manufacturer and wholesaler 
prices, retailers are able to negotiate significant discounts during the procurement 
process. As a result, the Drug Tariff includes a clawback, through which the NHS is 
able to recoup a percentage of the savings from the discounts in the distribution 
chain. The NHS intentionally leaves a portion of the discounts for the pharmacists in 
order to provide pharmacists with the incentive to negotiate further price reductions. 
This is implemented through the Prescription Pricing Authority, which adjusts 
pharmacists’ payments accordingly. The clawback ranges from 5.93% to 12.52% 
and depends on the volume of prescriptions dispensed on a monthly basis (Kanavos, 
2007). Smaller pharmacies (i.e. pharmacies with smaller volumes) have a smaller 
percentage clawed back since they cannot reap the benefits of economies of scale. 
Information on the level of discounts has been obtained through a survey called the 
‘discount (margin) inquiry,’ which uses prices from a sample of 300 pharmacies in 
order to determine the clawback (OBIG, 2006). Notably, chain pharmacies have 
been excluded from this survey, although they are still obligated to pay the clawback 
(Kanavos, 2007). The justification for this is that since chain pharmacies can 
leverage their purchasing power to negotiate larger discounts, including their 
discount information in the clawback calculation would result in a higher clawback 
that would hurt smaller pharmacies. However, on the flip side of the coin, the result 
of not including chain pharmacies in the clawback calculation is that they are able to 
retain a larger share of the discounts they negotiate than smaller pharmacies. In an 
attempt to ensure that the NHS is paying a fair price for medicines, all manufacturers
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and wholesalers are now required to submit information on average prices, net of 
discounts offered. This information is publicly available.
As is discussed above, wholesale and generic retail margins are not controlled 
for generic medicines. For generic medicines, in addition to the share of the discount 
margin they are able to retain (less the clawback), pharmacists are also compensated 
on a fee-for-service principle, whereby they are remunerated the net ingredient cost 
of the pharmaceutical, which is listed in the Drug Tariff, as well as a dispensing fee 
of £0.9 per dispensed medicine (OBIG, 2006). For branded medicines, the PPRS 
limits the wholesale margin/discount to 12.5% off the NHS price. The wholesaler is 
free to pass on a portion of this margin to the pharmacists. Thus, in practice, the 
wholesaler margin is significantly below the capped 12.5%. According to the British 
Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, on average 9% of the 12.5% margin is 
passed on to pharmacists, leaving wholesalers with a 3.5% margin (OBIG, 2006). 
There is no VAT on pharmaceuticals in the UK, with the exception of OTC 
pharmaceuticals, non-reimbursed private prescriptions and pharmaceuticals sold in 
hospital pharmacies, which are subject to the standard VAT rate of 17.5%.
On April 1 2005, a new contractual framework was introduced for 
pharmacists, through which their roles were widened. As of 2005, pharmacists in the 
UK can train to independently diagnose and prescribe a wide range of medicines to 
patients. Granting pharmacists this degree of responsibility is unique to the UK 
within the European Union. (Certain medicine classes, such as narcotics, remain the 
sole control of physicians.) While the initial treatment of patients is still meant to 
remain with the physicians, pharmacists may use diagnostic and prescribing skills to 
monitor the ongoing care of patients with chronic conditions. In return for such 
services, pharmacists are now reimbursed for the range and quality of services they 
provide rather than reimbursement being solely based on the volume of medicines 
they dispense. In addition to diagnosing and prescribing, examples of additional 
pharmacists’ services include smoking cessation counselling and blood pressure 
checks (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005). Thus, the strengthening of relationships 
between pharmacists and patients increases pharmacists’ responsibilities as well as 
patients’ responsibilities over their own health.
As part of the 2005 reform, the DH is also in the process of permitting the 
practice of on-line and mail-order pharmacies. Currently, on-line and mail-order 
pharmacies are only allowed to operate if they also have a “bricks and mortar” store,
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through which the patient can receive professional services. However, under this 
new regulations, on-line and mail-order stores can operate without “bricks and 
mortar” branches as long as they continue to provide full professional services.
The one responsibility that pharmaceutical policy has not given to 
pharmacists in the UK is that of generic substitution. That is, if a physician 
prescribes a drug by its brand name, the pharmacists cannot dispense a generic 
equivalent. This differentiates the UK from most other countries in the European 
Union and the USA. Instead, pharmaceutical policy in the UK encourages the 
physicians to prescribe by the INN International Nonpropriety Name (INN). One of 
the ways some Primary Care Trusts incentivize physicians to prescribe this way is by 
offering them a percentage of their budgets surpluses for reinvestment into practice 
services and facilities (OBIG, 2006). As a result, in 2004, roughly 80% of 
prescriptions in the UK were written by the INN. The pharmacist may then choose 
to dispense whichever product (of that given strength/molecule combination) it 
choose. Since pharmacists’ margins from generic medicines are usually significantly 
higher than the margins from brand name medicines, pharmacists are more apt to 
dispense a generic version of a drug when it is prescribed by the INN (Kanavos 
2007). Thus, of the 80% of prescriptions that were written by the INN, 55.4% were 
dispensed generically. The majority of the other 44.6% were likely still on patent 
(Kanavos, 2007).
In addition to prescribing by the INN, there are multiple other ways in which 
the UK seeks to improve cost-effective prescribing. As is mentioned above, NICE 
recommendations are binding. This is taking into account in the determination of the 
prescribing budgets that the PCTs set, which cover regional spending on primary 
care over a three year period and is adjusted for by the local area’s morbidity patterns 
and socioeconomic status. Individual physicians also receive performance reports 
from the Prescription Pricing Authority on their prescribing and expenditure profiles, 
compared with local and national averages. Benchmarking is also used through the 
Indicative Prescribing Scheme, which evaluates physicians’ prescribing costs. 
Despite these benchmarking practices and soft money financial incentive 
mechanisms, there are not explicit financial sanctions for physicians who overspend 
their prescribing budgets. Finally, physicians in the UK use a computerized decision 
support system called PRODIGY (Prescribing Rationally with Decision Support in 
General Practice) which assists their prescribing decisions.
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As another pharmaceutical cost containment measure, patients are required to 
pay a fee for each prescription. The amount—£6.50 in April 2005—increases each 
year by the British Consumer Price Index. However, roughly half of the UK 
population is exempt from having to pay the prescription fee (OBIG, 2006), 
including the following groups of people:
• All people aged 60 years or older
• Children under 16 years old
• Full-time students aged 16,17 and 18 years
• Pregnant women and women who have had a child in the previous 12
months
• Individuals who need medications pertaining to the disablement of war
• Individuals who have certain chronic medical conditions
• Individuals from households that receive income support, pension credit 
guarantee credit, or income-based jobseeker’s allowance tax credit where 
income is £15,050 pounds per year or less (Kanavos and Gemmill 2005).
As a result of these exemptions and the fact that these populations consume a 
disproportionate share of the total prescriptions in the UK, only about 15% of 
dispensed prescriptions incur a prescription charge (Kanavos and Gemmill 2005). 
Thus, the prescription fee in the UK acts more as a revenue raiser from a population 
of people with means than as a mechanism through which to curb demand.
Similarly to Germany, parallel trade plays a significant role in the UK 
pharmaceutical market. Roughly 90% of pharmacists in the UK stock and dispense 
parallel trade pharmaceuticals (OBIG, 2006). Since the NHS reimburses parallel 
trade pharmaceuticals at the same Drug Tariff price as pharmaceuticals sourced 
domestically, pharmacists are able to reap significantly larger profit margins on these 
lower priced imports. Moreover, while the clawback does apply to these imported 
pharmaceuticals, the practice of allowing pharmacists to retain a percentage of these 
margins still incentivizes them to dispense the parallel traded product over 
domestically sourced products. As a result, parallel imports in the UK account for 
15-20% of all NHS pharmaceutical sales (OBIG, 2006).
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APPENDIX B: OTC REGULATIONS IN THE USA AND THE UK
OTC Regulations in the USA
The prescription and OTC drug markets face similar regulatory standards in 
the USA in that they both must be approved by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and deemed to be safe and effective for their intended use. 
There are, however, some significant differences in the OTC market, and its 
regulatory standards. For one, whereas the distribution of outpatient prescription 
drugs is limited to retail pharmacies (including mail order pharmacies), consumers 
may purchase OTC drugs in local grocery stores, wholesale food stores (e.g. Kosko), 
mass merchandisers (e.g. Walmart), mail order outlets and pharmacies. These 
channels amount to roughly 750,000 retail outlets in the USA, compared to 55,000 
retail pharmacies (Consumer Healthcare Products Association). Another difference 
between prescription and OTC medicines is that the FDA regulates direct-to- 
consumer advertising for prescription drugs, whereas the Federal Trade Commission 
regulates DTC advertising for OTC medicines, similarly to other consumer products.
The process of making a prescription-only medicine available in the OTC 
market is called a Rx-to-OTC switch. Since 1976, close to 90 ingredients or dosage 
strengths have made the Rx-to-OTC switch, which translates to over 700 OTC 
products (FDA, 2005). The FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) has an office of Nonprescription Drugs that is responsible for the review of 
these switch applications, and for medicines seeking entry into the OTC market 
straight away (without first being available with prescription).
As is mentioned in the above section on the cost of applying, OTC 
applications in the USA must demonstrate that the medicine has an established safety 
and efficacy record, and that the patient is capable of proper selection and de­
selection. In order to demonstrate this, the FDA requires studies of patients’ 
understanding of the OTC labelling before authorizing the switch. In addition to 
label comprehension studies, actual use studies must be submitted whenever OTC 
safety and effectiveness is in question (e.g. often in the case of a molecule that has 
not yet been approved OTC) in order to show whether consumers will behave 
appropriately. The reason for these requirements may be because the USA does not 
have the pharmacy-only category that the UK and many other European countries
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have. Consequently, they do not have the option of putting drugs behind the counter 
in order to ensure that pharmacists give first time users a proper explanation. This 
lack of professional intermediary therefore requires that extra safety precautions are 
used, such as these studies. Thus, because OTC medicines are not supervised by 
physicians or pharmacists in the USA, there is a wider margin of safety that is 
required for OTC medicines, than for prescription medicines.
For example, the FDA has shown a degree of receptiveness to approving an 
OTC switch for Merck’s Mevacor by being willing to reconsider the switch 
application three times, once in 2000, again in 2005, and most recently in 2008. In 
the most recent review, the FDA’s preliminary report stated that OTC Mevacor 
would be “a reasonably safe and effective option,” provided consumers are able to 
adhere to the guidelines. However, the actual use studies showed that one quarter of 
people would take the pill, even though they weren’t high enough risks to make it 
worth risking the medication’s side effects, while 30% of patients who were high 
enough risks to require physician supervision reported being willing to switch to the 
OTC version (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, 2007). Thus, the FDA eventually 
rejected the application on the grounds that with the current labelling, consumers 
may not be able to safely and effectively direct their own care, (Neergaard, 2008) 
and since the USA does not have a pharmacy category, it did not have this middle 
ground option.
Once a manufacturer files an OTC switch application, the FDA sets up an 
advisory committee of physicians, pharmacists, and academic researchers, which 
makes a recommendation to the agency after determining whether a drug is safe and 
effective, and whether consumers are capable of managing that drug on their own. 
An advisory committee is not convened for an Rx-to-OTC switch in cases where the 
switch product is in a line of similar products already switched, where there are no 
new or outstanding issues, and where the decision to switch the first in the line of 
these similar products was presented to the advisory committees and the advisory 
committee recommended approval.
In theory, the CDER aims to approve OTC applications within 10 months. 
However, in practice, the timeframe depends on the application in question. In some 
cases, the FDA may request additional data on safety, effectiveness or use. In 
addition, the FDA requires labelling revisions, which may take time. Thus, the case-
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specific feedback during the review process sometimes results in the approval 
process taking longer than intended.
Technically, regulations allow any interested party to petition the FDA to 
switch a medicine to OTC status. However, in practice, the FDA deems that the 
original brand manufacturer knows the most about its molecule since it filed the 
original new drug application (NDA) in order to receive prescription status. As a 
result, the final decision of whether to apply for a switch (especially if a drug is still 
on patent) usually rests with the original brand manufacturer. This was seen when 
WellPoint, a health insurer, petitioned the FDA to switch loratadine, certirizine and 
fexofenadine. Although WellPoint was still responsible for providing evidence on 
the safety of the drug in the OTC market, the FDA ultimately deferred to the original 
brand manufacturers before making a final decision. Thus, only loratadine was 
switched in November 2002, in an attempt by Schering-Plough to avoid the 
impending generic competition.
Theoretically, the FDA can also initiate a switch. The only example of this 
was in 1982, when the FDA initiated a switch for metaproterenol, a medicine that 
treats asthma. However, because of a lot of negative criticism, the FDA rescinded its 
application shortly after it was filed. There are also unresolved questions as to how 
the FDA should use proprietary data, what regulations would give the FDA the 
authority to initiate an application, and what sort of review process would be 
appropriate in such a case. Thus, in practice, the FDA has refrained from initiating 
switches for other products.
Once a medicine is approved for OTC status, the same molecule can continue 
to be marketed as a prescription product if the OTC version is marketed at a lower 
dose and/or has been approved for a different use. Following approval, the USA also 
sometimes grants OTC market exclusivity of 3 years, as it did in the case of Prilosec 
(discussed further below). This is often done to compensate the applicant for the 
costly OTC safety studies that were performed as part of the application process. 
Market exclusivity therefore seems less likely in cases where extensive studies were 
not required, or where the studies where performed by a third party. Such was the 
case with the loratadine switch; since WellPoint was responsible for providing the 
safety evidence, Schering-Plough was not granted market exclusivity following the 
switch approval. As a result, generic equivalents were allowed to enter the OTC 
market immediately following the approval. Finally, if the switch is made by the
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original brand directly following patent expiration, then it is also possible that the 
FDA may extend the patent for an extra 3 years, which would both prevent generic 
entry in the prescription market and give the original brand manufacturer a 
significant first mover advantage in the OTC market.
In recent years, the FDA has announced that it hopes to increase annual 
switches by 50%, and is currently targeting drugs that are available OTC in countries 
outside of the USA (Cohen, Paquette and Cairns, 2005). Potential switch therapeutic 
categories include oral contraceptives, asthma, osteoporosis, hypertension, and high 
cholesterol. As part of this process, the FDA has indicated that it will supplement its 
studies on label comprehension with evidence from foreign countries (IMS Health 
Intelligence, 2005). This possible willingness to consider data from foreign countries 
in the approval process signifies a shift in the regulatory culture of switching drugs to 
OTC status. Moreover, there is also some discussion on the possibility of 
introducing a behind the counter category in the USA, which was discussed 30 years 
ago, but dropped (IMS Health Intelligence, 2005).
OTC Regulations in the UK
The regulatory body in the UK that is responsible for overseeing switches to 
the OTC market is called the Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA). When necessary, the MHRA consults with a group called the Committee 
on the Safety of Medicines, which is similar in function to the FDA’s Advisory 
Committee. Thus, the regulatory agency structure is similar in the UK and the USA. 
One significant difference, however, is that in accordance with the Medicines Act of 
1968 and Directive 2001/83/EC, there are three different categories for medicines in 
the UK. Like the USA, there is a prescription only medicines (POM) category in the 
UK. The OTC category, however, is divided into two subgroups, pharmacy (P) and 
general sales list (GSL). A drug in the UK that has pharmacy status is only available 
with the supervision of a pharmacist and therefore can only be sold at pharmacies, 
whereas a drug with general sales list status may be sold in all retail stores, including 
supermarkets.
Similarly to the USA, the principle criteria the MHRA uses in deregulating a 
drug from prescription only status is safety. In order to demonstrate safety, the 
applicant must supply user testing of patient information leaflets (PILs). These tests 
must demonstrate that the information in the patient leaflet is accessible and
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understandable to the population of people who are most likely to use the medicine. 
However, the switch regulations in the UK are unlike the USA’s in that the applicant 
does not need to conduct an actual use study that demonstrates patients’ abilities to 
properly select and deselect the OTC version. Instead, the applicant may be allowed 
to extrapolate from evidence on the medicines’ safety in the prescription-only 
market, especially in circumstances where the drug is known to have few side 
effects, where the OTC version is a lower dose than the prescription only version 
and/or where the target OTC population is a subgroup of the target prescription-only 
population (MHRA). Once an application has been filed, the MHRA opens up the 
switch process to public consultation so that other stakeholders (e.g. physician 
groups, etc.) may comment on the safety of the drug in question. Notably, if the 
application is eventually approved, the new legal status (of P or GSL) will only apply 
to that one product; all other products of the same molecule must obtain their own 
marketing authorization if they too seek a new legal status.
Similarly to the USA, pharmaceutical manufacturers (both original brand and 
generic manufacturers), third parties and the MHRA itself may initiate a switch. In 
practice, however, a third party must obtain the support of a company that actually 
manufacturers the product in order to achieve approval. However, it does not need to 
be the original brand manufacturer. Moreover, since few safety studies are required, 
relative to the USA, the costs of applying may be relatively low, which could in turn 
make it easier for generic manufacturers to file an application. As a result of these 
relatively low costs of applying, the UK may also be less likely grant P or GSL 
market exclusivity to the applicant. However, each subsequent competitor must file 
their own application in order to receive its own market authorization license.
In addition, in 2004, Article 54 of Directive 2004/27/EC amended Directive 
2001/83/EC by requiring that countries grant one year of data protection following 
the approval of a switch application (MHRA). This effectively means that any safety 
evidence that was provided by the manufacturer that initiated the switch cannot be 
used by the MHRA in the approval of a subsequent application by a different 
manufacturer for a year following the approval (of the initial switch). Subsequent 
applications must therefore be self-sufficient in achieving approval. Thus, while this 
does not confer market exclusivity for the manufacturer that initiates the switch, it 
may in practice slow down the entry of competitors, especially to the extent that the 
approval process is not quick.
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Similarly to the USA, the approval time for OTC switches varies on a case by 
case basis. The MHRA classifies switch applications into one of three categories: 1) 
the standard procedure, which is for changes in package size and an extension of an 
existing indication within authorized use, 2) the variation procedure, which is for 
follow on products and 3) the complex procedure, which is for the switch of a drug in 
a therapeutic class that is not yet available OTC, or drugs that have new indications, 
routes of administration, patient groups or strengths (MHRA). Switch applications 
that proceed through the standard procedure route are often not referred to The 
Committee on the Safety of Medicines, and therefore usually have short approval 
times of around 120 days. Meanwhile, switch applications that proceed through the 
complex procedure route usually require committee approval, which takes 
approximately six weeks, increasing the total approval time to 180 days. Other 
factors that may vary approval times include the length of the public consultation 
process, and whether the applicant decides to appeal a negative recommendation.
Following The Medicines for Human Use and Medical Device (Fees and 
Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/542), separate marketing 
authorisations and licenses are required for products of the same molecule that have a 
different legal status. As a result, the MHRA requires that these products also have 
different brand names. An exception is where the only difference in products is the 
package size, in which case the same brand name can be used. This means that if a 
molecule is available as both POM and P status (and likewise for P and GSL), but 
has differing strengths and/or target different populations, then the products must be 
sold under different brand names, even if the manufacturer of the products is the 
same. The MHRA’s rationale for this is that safety concerns could arise if the 
products are sold under the same name (MHRA), presumably because patients could 
mistake them as being intended for the same use.
Similarly to the USA, manufacturers typically initiate switches in the UK. 
However, in 2001, the MHRA came up with a list of medicines that it deemed 
eligible to be switched from POM to P status. It also drafted a strategic framework 
under which such switches could occur, which included protocols that identify target 
populations (for the OTC eligible medicines) and training programs for pharmacists 
and their staff (MHRA). Thus, there is evidence that a cultural shift is also 
happening within the MHRA, with regulators becoming more supportive of switches.
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A primary example of this increasing support for P to POM switches was 
seen in 2004, when the MHRA approved a lOmg dosage form of Merck & 
Company’s simvastatin for POM status, known as Zocor Heart Pro in the UK. In 
this case, Merck initiated the switch, and the MHRA approved it on the grounds that 
POM availability of the lOmg low-dose version would open up a new, preventative 
market for low risk patients. This low dose version was previously not available to 
this low risk population of patients under the NHS. Thus, NHS coverage of the 
medium to high strength simvastatin still remained under the prescription only 
category. This case was especially symbolic of the MHRA’s increasing willingness 
to expand the pharmacy OTC market, as high cholesterol is a chronic disease that has 
serious implications for a patients’ long term health. The seriousness of this disease 
category is therefore a double-edged sword. On the one hand, allowing patients who 
are at risk of high cholesterol to be responsible for their own selection and 
deselection of medicine could have serious consequences in the event that patients 
are not able to accurately do so and pharmacists do not provide sufficient guidance. 
Even where pharmacists do provide accurate guidance, OTC availability means that 
patients are still able to purchase statins without ever having had a cholesterol test. 
(Availability of OTC drugs for such a serious illness could also be especially risky, 
given the fact that the MHRA does not require actual OTC use studies, and therefore 
does not have a strong sense for how the target population in the OTC market will 
actually behave.) On the other hand, the potential long term health benefits resulting 
from increased access to preventative cholesterol lowering drugs could also be 
significant, as clearly stated by the British Heart Foundation, which found that a 
lOmg daily statin dose would reduce heart attack risk by 27% for people at risk 
(Sipkoff, 2004).
Thus, evidence shows that both the USA and the UK have become more 
receptive to over the counter switches with medicines that treat chronic diseases.
